All questions under the Constitution and laws of Kansas are, for
the purposes of this case, foreclosed by the decisions of the state
courts.
It is the duty of a receiver appointed by a federal court to
take charge of a railroad, to operate it according to the laws of
the state in which it is situated, and he is liable to suit in a
court other than that by which he was appointed, even in a state
court, for a disregard of official duty which causes injury to the
party suing.
A city, when authorized by the legislature, may regulate the
speed of trains within its limits, and this extends to interstate
trains in the absence of congressional action on the subject.
The Interstate Transit Railway is a railway connecting Kansas
City, Missouri, with Kansas City, Kansas, and the exception of its
trains from the general provision in the city ordinance respecting
the speed of trains in the city was an exception entirely within
the power of the legislature to make.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
While in their briefs many matters are discussed with
fullness
Page 177 U. S. 585
and elaboration by counsel for plaintiff in error, we are of
opinion that those of a federal nature involved in this record are
few in number, and practically determined by previous decisions of
this Court. Of course, all questions arising under the Constitution
and laws of Kansas are, for the purposes of this case, foreclosed
by the decisions of the state courts.
Turner v. Wilkes County
Commissioners, 173 U. S. 461;
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, and
cases cited in opinion.
In September, 1888, the City Council of Kansas City passed an
ordinance regulating the running of railroad trains through that
city. Section 2 and 8 are the only ones material to the present
controversy. They are as follows:
"SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any such engineer, conductor,
or other persons having a railway engine or train of cars in charge
to permit the same to be run along any track in said city at a
greater speed than six miles an hour."
"SEC. 8. The provisions of this ordinance shall not apply to the
Interstate Rapid Transit Railway Company, excepting with reference
to funeral or other processions."
Now in respect to the federal questions, we remark first that it
is the duty of a receiver, appointed by a federal court to take
charge of a railroad, to operate such road according to the laws of
the state in which it is situated. 25 Stat. 436, c. 866, ยง 2;
United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305.
Second, that he is liable to suit in a court other than that by
which he was appointed, even in a state court, for a disregard of
official duty which causes injury to the party suing.
McNulta
v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327;
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Cox, 145 U.
S. 593.
Third, that a city, when authorized by the legislature, may
regulate the speed of railroad trains within the city limits.
Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S.
521;
Cleveland &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois,
ante. Such act is, even as to interstate trains, one only
indirectly directly affecting interstate commerce, and is within
the power of the state until at least Congress shall take action in
the matter.
And, fourth, the sections quoted of the ordinance are not in
Page 177 U. S. 586
conflict with those provisions of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which restrain a state
from denying the equal protection of the laws. This last
proposition seems to be the only matter requiring anything more
than a declaration of the law and a citation of decided cases.
The contention here is that the exception of the Interstate
Transit Railway Company from the provision in reference to the
speed of its trains creates a classification which is arbitrary and
without any reasonable basis, and therefore operates to deny the
equal protection of the laws.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe
Railway v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150. If
there were nothing in the record beyond the mere words of the
ordinance, we are of opinion that that contention could not be
sustained, because it is obvious on a moment's reflection that the
tracks of different railroads may traverse the limits of a city
under circumstances so essentially different as to justify separate
regulations. One may pass through crowded parts crossing or along
streets constantly traveled upon by foot passengers and vehicles,
while others may pass through remote parts of the city where there
is little travel and little danger to individuals or carriages. One
may pass through such parts of the city as will prevent its tracks
from being fenced and where it is not in fact fenced, while another
may pass through parts which permit of the fencing of the tracks
and where its tracks are in fact fenced. Under those circumstances,
a difference of regulation as to the matter of speed would be
perfectly legitimate, and it could not be held that the
classification was arbitrary or without reasonable reference to the
conditions of the several roads. With the presumption always in
favor of the validity of legislation, state or municipal, if the
ordinance stood by itself the courts would be compelled to presume
that the different circumstances surrounding the tracks of the
respective railroads were such as to justify a different rule in
respect to the speed of their trains.
But in this case, we are not left to any mere matter of
presumption. The testimony discloses that the Interstate Rapid
Transit Railroad is simply a street railroad connecting the cities
of Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas City, Kansas, operated at the
time of the passage of the ordinance by steam power, but
Page 177 U. S. 587
with that power used only in dummy engines, and, at the time of
the accident involved in this case, by electricity. It is true that
there is testimony that, at or near the place where the accident
happened, parties thought the operation of the street railroad was
more dangerous than the operation of the railroad of which the
plaintiff in error was receiver, but the validity of such an
ordinance is not determinable by individual judgments. It is not a
question to be settled by the opinions of witnesses and the verdict
of a jury upon the question whether one railroad in its operation
is more dangerous than another. All that is necessary to uphold the
ordinance is that there is a difference, and, that existing, it is
for the city council to determine whether separate regulations
shall be applied to the two. It is not strange that one witness
differs from another in respect to the comparative danger of the
two roads. One jury might also disagree with another in respect to
the same matter. But neither witness nor jury determines the
validity of state or municipal legislation. Given the fact of a
difference, it is a part of the legislative power to determine what
difference there shall be in the prescribed regulations. We see
nothing else in this case calling for notice, and the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Kansas is
Affirmed.