Captain Carter, of the corps of engineers, in the army of the
United States, was duly and regularly tried before a legally
convened court-martial, was found guilty of the charges made
against him, and was sentenced to dismissal; to be fined; to be
imprisoned, and to publication of crime and punishment, and the
sentence was duly approved and confirmed. On a motion in his
behalf, the United States Circuit Court for the Second Circuit
issued a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the matter, which
resulted in the dismissal of the writ, and the remanding of Carter
to custody. He took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which affirmed the judgment below, and this
Court denied an application for a writ of certiorari to review that
judgment. An appeal and writ of error was allowed on the same day
by a judge of the circuit court to this Court.
Held that
the appeal and writ of error could not be maintained, as they fall
directly within the ruling in
Robinson v. Caldwell,
165 U. S. 359,
where it was held that the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, does not
give a defeated party in a circuit court the right to have his case
finally determined both in this Court and in the circuit court of
appeals on independent appeals.
When cases arise which are controlled by the construction or
application of the Constitution of the United States, a direct
appeal lies to this Court, and if such cases are carried to the
circuit courts of appeals, those courts may decline to take
jurisdiction, or where such construction or application is involved
with other questions, may certify the constitutional question and
afterwards proceed to judgment, or may decide the whole case in the
first instance. But when the circuit court of appeals has acted on
the whole case, its judgment stands unless revised by certiorari to
or appeal from that court in accordance with the Act of March 3,
1891.
These were motions to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated
in the opinion of the court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 177 U. S. 497
Carter was a captain of the United States Army, assigned to the
corps of engineers. He was arraigned and tried before a
court-martial in Savannah, Georgia, convened according to law, upon
certain charges and specifications; found guilty; sentenced to
dismissal; to suffer a fine; to be imprisoned, and to publication
of crime and punishment. This sentence was approved by the
Secretary of War and confirmed by the President of the United
States, September 29, 1899, and the Secretary of War took the
necessary action for the execution of the sentence. October 2,
1899, Carter obtained from the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York a writ of habeas corpus,
directed to the military authority having him in custody, for his
production before the court, together with the time and cause of
his detention. He was accordingly produced, and due return made,
setting up that he was lawfully held in custody by authority of
General Orders No. 172, of September 29, 1899. During the pendency
of the habeas corpus proceedings, the fine imposed was paid. The
circuit court dismissed the writ, and Carter was remanded to
custody. 97 F. 496.
From this final order, as appears from the records of this
Court, and is conceded, petitioner prosecuted an appeal to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
case having been there heard, that court, on January 24, 1900,
entered judgment affirming the judgment of the circuit court, with
costs. On February 5, 1900, an application for the writ of
certiorari to the circuit court of appeals was made to this Court
which, on February 26, 1900, was denied.
176 U.
S. 684.
On the same day, an appeal from the final order of the circuit
court directly to this Court was allowed by a judge of the circuit
court, as also a writ of error.
The eighth section of Art. I of the Constitution provides that
the Congress shall have power "to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces," and in the exercise of
that power Congress has enacted rules for the regulation of the
army known as the Articles of War. Rev.Stat. ยง 1342. Every officer,
before he enters on the duties of his
Page 177 U. S. 498
office, subscribes to these articles, and places himself within
the power of courts martial to pass on any offense which he may
have committed in contravention of them. Courts martial are lawful
tribunals, with authority to finally determine any case over which
they have jurisdiction, and their proceedings, when confirmed as
provided, are not open to review by the civil tribunals, except for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had
jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and whether, though
having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the
sentence pronounced.
The ground for an appeal directly to this Court is said in the
briefs to be that the case involved the construction or application
of the Constitution, in that, by the sentence, petitioner was twice
punished for the same offense. But if the statutes authorized the
penalties in question to be inflicted in one and the same
proceeding as punishment for the offenses charged, then there was
no double punishment. And, as this was a case arising in the land
forces, it is hardly to be conceded that the suggested
constitutional objection was raised below as such by the bare
averment in the petition that petitioner, having suffered the
punishment of dismissal and of publication, his "imprisonment is
without authority of law," and "his further punishment and
detention," and "the carrying out of said sentence, is contrary to
law and the provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
and is illegal."
The circuit court stated the questions thus:
"The contention of the relator is that, conceding that the
court-martial had jurisdiction of the person of the accused and of
the offenses charged, and conceding further the regularity of its
proceeding and the propriety of its findings, it was without power
to impose the four separate punishments of dismissal, fine,
imprisonment, and degradation (special publication of sentence),
although it might have imposed either one of them. When application
was made for the writ, it appeared that the first punishment
(dismissal from the service of the United States) and the fourth
(publication of sentence) had been carried out, and the relator
contended that, having thus paid a penalty which the court had
power to inflict, he could not be held to submit to another
penalty,
Page 177 U. S. 499
which the court had no power to add to the one already by it
selected. Since the return was made, the relator has also paid the
fine, and, although that fact does not appear upon the face of the
original papers, it has been discussed in the briefs of both sides,
and is now embodied in a stipulation, thus completing the
case."
"If the relator's premises be sound,
viz., that
punishments have been imposed in the aggregate, when the statute
authorized their imposition only in the alternative, his conclusion
is supported by high authority.
Ex Parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163. In that case, it was held that
when a court has imposed fine and imprisonment, where the statute
only conferred power to punish by fine or imprisonment, and the
fine has been paid, and the judgment of the court thus executed so
as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of
the law, the power of the court as to that offense is at an end.
The important question in the case, therefore, is whether, under
the statutes of the United States, the court-martial had the power,
under its findings, to impose a sentence inflicting these four
penalties."
And the court, after considering that question at length, held
that the court-martial had such power.
We need not discuss, however, whether a direct appeal could have
been taken in the first instance, as we are of opinion that, even
if so, the present appeal cannot be maintained. It falls directly
within the ruling in
Robinson v. Caldwell, 165 U.
S. 359,
165 U. S. 41 L.
ed. 745. It was there held that the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891,
does not give a defeated party in a circuit court the right to have
his case finally determined both in this Court and in the circuit
court of appeals on independent appeals. That case was heard in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Idaho upon
its merits, which included the consideration of questions involving
the construction of a treaty and the validity of an act of
Congress. Judgment passed for plaintiff, and defendant was allowed
a direct appeal to this Court. Pending this, defendant had also
prosecuted an appeal to the circuit court of appeals, and the case
was there again heard and determined. 67 F. 391. When subsequently
the appeal to this Court was heard, it was dismissed, because we
held that
Page 177 U. S. 500
we could not properly retain cognizance thereof in face of the
fact that the case had been adjudicated by the court of appeals,
whose judgment remained undisturbed.
Pullman's Palace Car Company v. Central Transportation
Company, 171 U. S. 138, is
not to the contrary. The Pullman Company had taken an appeal
directly from the circuit court to this Court on the theory that
the case involved the construction or application of the
Constitution, and had also taken an appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The circuit court of appeals
overruled a motion to dismiss, but postponed further argument until
the appeal to this Court was disposed of. 76 F. 401. A motion to
dismiss was also made in this Court, whereupon an application was
made for a writ of certiorari to the circuit court of appeals, and,
by reason of the circumstances, was granted, and the record
returned by virtue of that writ. And we proceeded to dispose of the
case on the merits without passing on the question, which had
become immaterial, whether the direct appeal could have been
maintained or not.
The case before us presents no such features. It has been
regularly heard and gone to judgment in the circuit court of
appeals, and an application duly made to this Court for certiorari
has been denied. These prior proceedings cannot be ignored and the
cause brought here as if they had not been had.
When cases arise which are controlled by the construction or
application of the Constitution of the United States, a direct
appeal, lies to this Court, and if such cases are carried to the
circuit courts of appeals, those courts may decline to take
jurisdiction, or where such construction or application is involved
with other questions, may certify the constitutional question and
afterwards proceed to judgment, or may decide the whole case in the
first instance.
Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Company, 80
F. 1,
176 U. S. 176 U.S.
68;
United States v. Jahn, 155 U.
S. 109;
New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U.
S. 411;
Benjamin v. New Orleans, 169 U.
S. 161. But when the circuit court of appeals has acted
on the whole case its judgment stands unless revised by certiorari
to or appeal from that court in accordance with the Act of March 3,
1891.
Appeal and writ of error dismissed.