Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, is
affirmed and followed to the point that
"the statute of New York of 1885, c. 448, providing that deeds
from the comptroller of the lands in the forest preserve sold for
nonpayment of taxes, shall, after having been recorded for two
years, and in any action brought more than six months after the act
takes effect, be conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity
in the assessment of the taxes, is a statute of limitations, and
does not deprive the former owner of such lands of his property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States,"
and is held to be decisive.
This is an action of ejectment brought to recover a tract of
7,500 acres of forest land, known as the northwest quarter of
township 24, Great Tract One, Macomb's Purchase, situated in
Franklin County, in the Northern District of the State of New
York.
The plaintiff deraigned title by various mesne conveyances from
one Daniel McCormick, who became the grantee of the State of New
York in 1798. The defendant claims through deeds executed to the
State of New York in pursuance of sales for taxes.
The defendant also set up as a defense a six months' statute of
limitations contained in chapter 448 of a law enacted in 1885,
certain statutes against champerty, the illegal organization of the
plaintiff in error, and a former adjudication made on an
application to cancel one of the tax sales under which the state
claimed title.
The first sale upon which the title of the state is based was
made in 1877 for unpaid taxes of 1866 to 1877, inclusive. A
certificate was issued dated October 18, 1877, showing a sale to
the State of the whole of the northwest quarter for the sum of
$2,756.40, and subsequently a deed in the usual form, and dated
Page 177 U. S. 319
June 9, 1881, which was recorded in Franklin County clerk's
office June 8, 1882.
The subsequent sales were made respectively in 1881 for the
unpaid taxes of 1871 to 1876; in 1885 for those of 1877 to 1879; in
1890 for those of 1881 to 1885. At all of the sales except the
first one, the property was treated as already state property, and
struck off to the state without giving opportunity for bids.
Certificates and deeds were duly issued to the state in pursuance
of the sale of 1881 and 1885 in due form, and duly recorded in the
clerk's office of the proper county. A certificate alone was issued
in pursuance of the sale of 1890.
The taxes for the years 1866 and 1867 were assessed against the
whole quarter as one parcel. In the years 1868, 1869, and 1870, the
whole quarter was not assessed, and so much of it as was assessed
was placed upon the rolls in two parcels, and described as
follows:
"Township 24, Great Tract One, Macomb's Purchase; N.W. 1/4,
excepting 1,000 acres, lying in N.W. corner; also 1,215 acres which
is water, leaving 5,285 acres."
"Macomb's Purchase, Great Tract One, township 24, 1,000 acres,
lying in the northwest corner of northwest quarter."
There was evidence tending to show that on the tract in
controversy there were bodies of water, but no part of them was
within the parcel of 1,000 acres laid out in a square form in the
northwest corner.
In December, 1894, the defendant caused a notice to be published
once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper published in
Franklin County, of which the following is a copy:
"To whom it may concern:"
"Notice is hereby given that the following is the list of wild,
vacant forest lands located in the County of Franklin to which the
state holds title, and that from and after three weeks from the 22d
day of December, 1894, possession thereof will be deemed to be in
the comptroller of this state pursuant to the provisions of section
13 of chapter 711, Laws of 1893."
"William J. Morgan"
"Deputy Comptroller "
Page 177 U. S. 320
The list attached to this notice contained the land in
question.
When the testimony in the case was closed, the counsel for each
of the respective parties, with the approval of the court, admitted
that there was no question of fact in the case to be submitted to
the jury; that the issues depended upon the construction that the
court should give to the law, and thereupon the jury was
discharged, and a written stipulation waiving a jury trial was
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and
filed with the clerk.
The plaintiff requested the court to rule on certain
propositions of law which were based on the assumption of the sale
of the tract in one parcel for the aggregate unpaid taxes for
several years, and claiming the following as jurisdictional defects
in the sale, and not cured or validated by chapter 448 of the Laws
of 1885, or chapter 711 of the Laws of 1893: the sale of the whole
tract for taxes which were assessed against separate and distinct
parcels of it; such sale when during one or more of the years a
part of the tract was not assessed; such sale when some of the
taxes were assessed against the whole tract and others against a
part only; insufficiency of the description to identify and
distinguish the parcel sold; that at the sale of 1881, the
comptroller treated the property as that of the state, and struck
it off to the state without giving opportunity for other bids, and
that chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885 was unconstitutional and void,
and repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States.
These propositions of law the court refused to affirm, and the
court's action is assigned as error.
It is also urged that it was error to admit in evidence, over
the objection of plaintiff, the deed from the state made on the
sale of 1881 conveying to the state two parcels of land in the
northwest quarter of township 24 by the following description:
"Macomb's Purchase, Great Tract One, township 24, northwest
quarter, 5,285 acres, more or less, being all that remains of the
said northwest quarter after excepting therefrom 1,000 acres in the
northwest corner thereof, and 1,215 acres covered by water; 1,000
acres in the northwest corner of the northwest quarter. "
Page 177 U. S. 321
Also in receiving in evidence the certificate of sale issued on
the sale of 1890, because it was not in evidence of a legal
title.
The assignments of error may, as is said in the brief of
plaintiff in error, be reduced in a general way to two --
"First. Is chapter 448 of the Laws of New York of 1885 a valid
and constitutional law when set up by the state in its own
favor?"
"Second. Were the defects shown to exist in the tax sales, or
either of them, of such nature as to be beyond the reach of that
law if valid, accepting the construction which has been put upon it
by the New York court?"
The act referred to is inserted in the margin.
* The circuit
court found in favor of the state, basing its decision upon the
constitutionality of chapter 448, following
Turner v. New
York, 168 U. S. 90, and
holding also the law to be curative of the defects urged against
the validity of the tax sales. 83 F. 436. The complaint was filed
January 25, 1895. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.
Page 177 U. S. 322
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
If chapter 448 is constitutional, it limitation attached some
years before this action was commenced. It was held constitutional
by this Court in
Turner v. New York, 168 U. S.
90. The contention now is, however, that our conclusion
depended upon reasoning not applicable to the case at bar. It is
said that to the validity of a statute of limitations, a remedy
precedent to and during the period of limitation must exist, and
that a remedy did exist we assumed was decided by the state court
as a state question, and that, on a writ of error to its judgment,
we were bound by the ruling, and for that reason affirmed the
judgment. But the pending case being on error to a United
Page 177 U. S. 323
States court, we not only may but must exercise an independent
judgment -- decide for ourselves, not follow the state court,
whether a remedy existed.
But was the conclusion in the
Turner case as dependent
as contended? The question is best answered by the case itself.
The action was brought in the state court, and was replevin for
logs cut upon wild forest lands. The state claimed title through
sales for delinquent taxes and deeds executed in pursuance of them.
The defendant attacked the deeds, alleging the invalidity of the
taxes for 1867 and 1870, and offered evidence to show that the oath
of the assessors to the assessment roll of 1867 was taken on August
10, instead of on the third Tuesday of August, and that the
assessors omitted to meet on the third Tuesday to review the
assessment for that year.
The state objected to the evidence as immaterial because the
comptroller's deed was made conclusive evidence of those matters by
the statute of the state of 1885, c. 448 -- the statute now in
controversy. To the objection it was replied that the statute
infringed the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. The state's objection, however,
was sustained, and judgment was directed and entered for the state,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 145 N.Y. 451.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of this Court. He stated
the law of 1885 establishing a forest preserve and the creation of
a forest commission and its duties, and that, at the date of the
passage of the statute, the time for redemption from tax sales was
two years. He then stated the enactment and provisions of the law
whose constitutionality was attacked, the time of the tax sales,
the time for redemption and its expiration, the period the
comptroller's deeds were on record, and the time that they became
conclusive, and said:
"The statute according to its principal intent and effect, and
as construed by the Court of Appeals of the state, was a statute of
limitations.
People v. Turner, 117 N.Y. 227;
People v.
Turner, 145 N.Y. 451. It is well settled that a statute
shortening the period of limitation is within the constitutional
power of the legislature provided a reasonable time, taking into
consideration
Page 177 U. S. 324
the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an action after
the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect.
Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628,
95 U. S.
632-633,;
In re Brown, 135 U. S.
701,
135 U. S. 705-707."
"The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed
to the state for nonpayment of taxes; it applies to those cases
only in which the conveyance has been of record for two years in
the office where all conveyances of lands within the county are
recorded, and it does not bar any action begun within six months
after its passage. Independently of the consideration that, before
the passage of the statute, the plaintiff had had eight years since
the sale and three years since the recording of the deed during
which he might have asserted his title, this Court concurs with the
highest court of the state in the opinion that the limitation of
six months, as applied to a case of this kind, is not repugnant to
any provision of the Constitution of the United States."
"It was argued in behalf of the plaintiff in error that the
statute was unconstitutional because it did not allow him any
opportunity to assert his rights even within six months after its
passage. But the statute did not take away any right of action
which he had before its passage, but merely limited the time within
which he might assert such a right. Within the six months, he had
every remedy which he would have had before the passage of the
statute. If he had no remedy before, the statute took none away.
From the judgments of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar, and
in the subsequent case of
People ex Rel. Millard v.
Roberts, 151 N.Y. 540, there would appear to have been some
difference of opinion in that court upon the question whether his
proper remedy was by direct application to the comptroller to
cancel the sale or by action of ejectment against the comptroller
or the forest commissioners. But as that court has uniformly held
that he had a remedy, it is not for us to determine what that
remedy was under the local Constitution and laws."
The decision establishes the following propositions:
1. That statutes of limitations are within the constitutional
power of the legislature of a state to enact.
Page 177 U. S. 325
2. That the limitation of six months was not unreasonable.
3. That the statute took away no remedy which the landowner had
before its passage.
4. That the state court held he had a remedy, although there was
difference of opinion whether it was by direct application to the
comptroller to cancel the sales or by action of ejectment against
the comptroller or forest commissioners.
5. That as the state courts decided he had a remedy, it was not
for us to determine what that remedy was under the local
constitution and laws -- that is whether it was either a direct
application to the comptroller or by action of ejectment.
What then did this Court assume, that it did not decide or ought
now to decide? Counsel for plaintiff in error say that --
"The
Turner case established the sufficiency of the
time allowed by the law now in question, but it treated the
existence of a court competent to try the disputed rights and of a
person liable to be sued for that purpose as questions of state
law, and foreclosed by the judgment of the state court. These
things ought now to be decided, and not assumed."
The case, however, as we have seen, was not so limited. It
decided more than that the time allowed by the statute was
reasonable and sufficient. It also decided that the statute took
away no remedy the landowner had before its passage, and that the
law of the state gave him a remedy. What it precisely was -- which
of the three enumerated ones it was -- was not decided. Not,
however, because of the assumption of anything, but because it was
not demanded. And why? The question presented was the
constitutionality of the statute. That depended upon the existence
of a remedy in the landowner during the period of its limitation,
and whether a remedy existed, what better evidence or authority
could there be than the decisions of the courts interpreting the
laws of the state? To accept them as such was not to assume
anything without deciding it. It was to ascertain a necessary
element of decision, and then exercising decision. This was our
duty then, and it is our duty now, and the fact that the case comes
for review from the circuit court of the United States neither
enforces nor justifies different considerations. If a precedent or
coincident remedy is necessary
Page 177 U. S. 326
to the constitutional validity of a statute of limitations, the
existence of such remedy is necessary to be decided, and it depends
upon the same considerations, and must be upon the same
examination, no matter in what court it may be presented or may
come.
The reasoning of the
Turner case was therefore
complete, and we think it is decisive against the contention of the
plaintiff in error. The sufficiency of the remedies enumerated was
not contested. It is not contested now. The existence of remedies
is denied, but to the reasoning which attempts to support the
denial, we reply by repeating what we said in the
Turner
case -- that as the New York Court of Appeals has uniformly held
that the landowner had a remedy, "it is not for us to determine
what that remedy was under the local Constitution and laws."
The defects which plaintiff in error claims to have been in the
assessments and to have been jurisdiction are stated as
follows:
"1. The sale of the whole tract of land in question for the
aggregate unpaid taxes of several years when, during one or more of
those years, a part of the tract sold was not assessed or taxed at
all."
"2. The sale as one tract of two or more parcels separately
assessed."
"3. The assessment of taxes by a description so uncertain as not
to identify the parcel of land taxed."
"4. Treating the land on the sale as already the property of the
state, and denying opportunity for competitive bidding."
The first two are treated by counsel as similar and dependent
upon the same grounds of objection. The specification of those
grounds is that, at the sale of 1877, the whole quarter, containing
7,500 acres, was sold as one parcel for the aggregate unpaid taxes
of 1866-1870 inclusive, amounting, with interest and costs, to
$2,756.40, but that it was not assessed as a whole except for the
years 1866 and 1867; that, for the years 1868, 1869, and 1870, it
was assessed in two parcels: (1) the northwest quarter of township
24, "excepting 1,000 acres lying in the northwest corner; also
1,315 acres which is water;" and (2) "1,000 acres lying in the
northwest corner of the northwest quarter." And that
Page 177 U. S. 327
1,215 acres was not assessed at all for those years. The
plaintiff in error, however, does not show that it was in any way
injured by the manner of selling. Its counsel supposes a possible
severalty of ownership of the different parcels, and claims a cause
of action from an injury which might have resulted to someone else.
"We take it to be settled law," counsel say,
"that the constitutionality of a statute is to be tested, not so
much by what is done as what may be done under it. . . . The
present record is silent as to the actual ownership of the
different parcels of the quarter in question during the years
1866-1870, but plainly they might have been the subject of separate
ownership."
And counsel proceed to show how a separate owner, if he had
existed, would have been embarrassed in his right of redemption by
the necessity of paying some other person's taxes besides his own,
and of which he had not been notified during the pendency of the
tax proceedings.
We are not concerned with what might have been, but only with
what was. The plaintiff in error now sues as owner of the whole
tract, and if there was a several ownership of it, or of parts of
it, such ownership should have been shown if anything can be
claimed from it. We may not suppose it from this record. It is
manifest that the manner of sale could do no injury to the owner of
the whole tract. Its separation in parcels on the assessment roll
would be artificial and mere description. It would not affect its
value, would not require the owner to pay someone's else taxes,
would not make him pay more than was justly due from him, either
before a sale or after a sale, if he then desired to exercise the
right of redemption.
But even if we should suppose a several ownership of the lands
at the time of the assessment or sale, we do not think that the
defects in the latter were jurisdictional, and certainly, of all
other defects, the law of 1885 is not curative only -- it is one of
limitation. It matters not, therefore, what the rights of any
predecessor of the plaintiff might have been if seasonably
asserted. They were not seasonably asserted, and they are therefore
now precluded.
The law is like any other statute of limitations. It is not
Page 177 U. S. 328
affected by what the rights of plaintiff in error were. Whatever
they were, their remedy is gone, and the title and possession of
the state, whatever may have been the defects in the proceedings of
which they are the consummation, cannot now be disturbed. This was
the ruling in
Marsh v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Association, 25
App.Div. 34, where the cases were reviewed, and we think correctly
interpreted.
In
People v. Turner, 117 N.Y. 227, the remedies of the
landowner before and after a sale were considered and the law
defined as one of limitation. The court said:
"Considered as an act of limitation, the only question in
relation thereto is whether such limitation is just and gives the
claimant a reasonable opportunity to enforce his rights. (See
authorities,
supra.) Under all the circumstances of the
case it cannot, we think, be said as a question of law that the
time afforded is unreasonable. Considered as establishing a rule of
evidence, the only question for examination is whether property is
thereby necessarily taken without due process of law."
That case seems to have been qualified somewhat by
Joslyn v.
Rockwell, 128 N.Y. 334, where it was decided that the law was
not conclusive against jurisdictional defects. But
People v.
Turner was reaffirmed in 145 N.Y. 451. If the cases are in
conflict, the latter must prevail, but assuming their
reconciliation to be in the character of the defects passed on,
they are equally authoritative against plaintiff in error.
In
Joslyn v. Rockwell, two defects were said to be
jurisdictional: the payment of taxes and the occupation of the
lands. Of the latter, it was said:
"The act of 1885 (chap. 448) is one, by its title, relating 'to
the collection of taxes on lands of nonresidents, and to provide
for the sale of such lands for unpaid taxes.' It is provided that
occupied lands are not the lands of nonresidents. 1 Rev.Stat. 389,
§ 3. And where lands of a nonresident of a county are occupied by a
resident of the town, an assessment to the owner in the
'nonresident' part of the roll is illegal, and the lands should be
assessed to the resident occupant.
People ex Rel. Barnard v.
Wemple, 117 N.Y. 77. If the lands were occupied, the act of
1885 would not apply."
In the case at bar, there is no such fact to preclude the
application of the law.
Page 177 U. S. 329
In the case of
Meigs v. Roberts, recently decided by
the Court of Appeals of New York,
Joslyn v. Rockwell has
been explained and limited, and
People v. Turner again
affirmed.
The action was ejectment, and the plaintiff Meigs traced his
title by a chain of conveyances from an original grant by the state
in 1798. The defendant justified his possession under deeds to the
state in pursuance of sales for taxes. One of them was assailed on
account of an alleged defect in the notice of redemption published
by the comptroller. The defendant pleaded that the action was not
brought within the time prescribed by the provision of chapter 448
of the Laws of 1885 and subsequent laws. The trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the land was in the occupation of
the state, and suit could not be maintained against it without its
consent. An appeal having been taken, the appellate division
reversed the judgment and granted a new trial, holding that the
action could be maintained, but also holding that the notice of
redemption of the tax sale of 1881 was fatally defective, and that
the deed made in pursuance of the sale did not pass title, and that
the defect was not cured by the provisions of chapter 148
(subsequently reenacted in part in 1891 and 1893), which makes the
conveyance of the comptroller upon tax sales, after the two years
from its record in the county in which the lands are situated,
conclusive evidence of the regularity of the proceedings in which
conveyance was made
The case was taken to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
appellate division.
The court said:
"We do not find it necessary to pass upon many of the questions
which have been elaborately argued before us, or even the one upon
which the decision of the trial court proceeded. We are of opinion
that the lapse of time between the record of the conveyance of 1884
and the commencement of this action barred the right to the
plaintiff to maintain it, even assuming the other questions in the
case should be resolved in his favor. The learned appellate
division held that the failure to publish a proper redemption
notice was jurisdictional as to the conveyance of 1884, and hence
not cured by chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885, and cited
Ensign
v. Barse, 107 N.Y. 329, and
Joslyn
Page 177 U. S. 330
v. Rockwell, 128 N.Y. 334, as authorities for that
proposition. We think the learned court took too narrow a view of
the statute of 1885. This statute, though in some aspects a
curative law, is primarily and essentially much more; it is a
statute of limitation. It was distinctly held to be such in two
decisions of this Court,
People v. Turner, 117 N.Y. 227;
People v. Turner, 145 N.Y. 459, and by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Turner v. New York, 168 U. S.
90. A curative act in the ordinary sense of that term is
a retrospective law, acting on past cases and existing rights. The
power of the legislature to enact such laws is therefore confined
within comparatively narrow limits, and they are usually passed to
validate irregularities in legal proceedings, or to give effect to
contracts between parties which might otherwise fall for failure to
comply with technical legal requirements. Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, p. 454. A very full enumeration of the cases in which
the legislature may properly exercise this power is to be found in
Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 559. But there may be in
legal proceedings defects which are not mere informalities or
irregularities, but so vital in their character as to be beyond the
help of retrospective legislation; such defects are called
jurisdictional. This principle does not apply to a statute of
limitations, for such a statute will bar any right, however high
the source from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable
time is given a party to enforce his right.
Terry v.
Anderson, 95 U. S. 628;
People v.
Turner, 145 N.Y. 451.
Ensign v. Barse, 107 N.Y. 329,
was strictly a case of a retrospective statute, for no period of
time was given within which any party affected could assert his
rights. The same is true of
Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 N.Y.
474. In
Joslyn v. Rockwell, 128 N.Y. 334, as well as in
the two cases of
People v. Turner, all of which arose
under the statute of 1885, there is to be found a discussion of
defects which it was claimed were jurisdictional, and not cured by
that act. Such discussion, however, is not to be construed as
authority for the proposition that jurisdictional defects in legal
proceedings which are beyond the scope of retrospective legislation
will equally take a claim out of the bar of a statute of
limitations. The existence of such defects was necessarily
considered in the authorities cited, because the statute of 1885 in
terms exempted from its operation cases where
Page 177 U. S. 331
the taxes had been paid, or where there was no legal right to
assess the land on which they were laid. There is no exception,
however, as to defects in notices of redemption or in their
publication; on the contrary, it is expressly provided that the
comptroller's deed, after the lapse of the requisite time, shall be
conclusive evidence that 'all notices required by law to be given
previous to the expiration of the two years allowed by law to
redeem were regular and regularly given.'"
These considerations dispose also of the other objections to the
assessment and sale. If further comment be needed as to the
insufficiency of the description, it may be brief. It is based on
the possibility of there having been more or less land than 1,215
acres covered by water. But whether there were depends upon a
question of fact, and what the court found we are not informed by
the record. Not insisting on that, however, the evidence of the
plaintiff tended to show that the area covered was 1,035 acres; the
evidence means of identification, and does not positively was 1,284
acres. Even if the court found the latter, the difference between
it and the assessment did not make the description insufficient. A
description of land for the purposes of taxation is sufficient if
it affords the means of identification, and dose not positively
mislead the owner. Cooley on Taxation 407;
Keely v.
Sanders, 99 U. S.
443.
The assessment was not of the land covered by water. That was an
exception from a larger tract, and an error of a few acres in a
part so completely defined by its character surely did not so
impair the identity of the larger tract as to hide it from the
search or knowledge of its owner, whether he was anxious or
indifferent about his taxes.
The same comment can be made of the "1,000 acres lying in the
northwest corner of the northwest quarter" of the tract, whether we
regard it as a parcel or an exception from another parcel.
Jackson v. Vickory, 1 Wend. 407;
Dolan v.
Trelevan, 31 Wis. 147;
Bowers v. Chambers, 53 Miss.
259;
Doe ex dem. Hooper v. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391.
The other assignments of error it is not necessary to
specifically notice, nor the defenses of champerty and the alleged
illegal organization of the plaintiff in error.
Judgment affirmed.
* Laws 1885, Chapter 448.
"An act to Amend Chapter Four Hundred and Twenty-seven of the
Laws of Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-five, Entitled, 'An Act in
Relation to the Collection of Taxes on Lands of Nonresidents, and
to Provide for the Sale of Such Lands for Unpaid Taxes.'"
"SEC. 1. Section sixty-five of chapter four hundred and
twenty-seven of the laws of eighteen hundred and fifty-five,
entitled, 'An Act in Relation to the Collection of Taxes on Lands
of Nonresidents, and to Provide for the Sale of Such Lands for
Unpaid Taxes,' is hereby amended so as to read as follows:"
"§ 65. Such conveyances shall be executed by the comptroller,
under his hand and seal, and the execution thereof shall be
witnessed by the treasurer or deputy comptroller, and all such
conveyances that have been heretofore executed by the comptroller,
and all conveyances of the same lands by his grantee or grantees
therein named, after having been recorded for two years in the
office of the clerk of the county in which the lands conveyed
thereby are located, and all outstanding certificates of a tax sale
heretofore held by the comptroller that shall have remained in
force for two years after the last day allowed by law to redeem
from such sale, shall, six months after this act takes effect, be
conclusive evidence that the sale and all proceedings prior
thereto, from and including the assessment of the land and all
notices required by law to be given previous to the expiration of
the two years allowed by law to redeem, were regular and were
regularly given, published and served according to the provisions
of this act, and all laws directing or requiring the same, or in
any manner relating thereto, and all other conveyances or
certificates heretofore or hereafter executed or issued by the
comptroller, shall be presumptive evidence of the regularity of all
the said proceedings and matters hereinbefore recited, and shall be
conclusive evidence thereof from and after the expiration of two
years from the date of recording such other conveyances, or of four
years from and after the date of issuing such other certificates.
But all such conveyances and certificates and the taxes and tax
sales on which they are based shall be subject to cancellation, as
now provided by law, on a direct application to the comptroller or
an action brought before a competent court therefor, by reason of
the legal payment of such taxes, or by reason of the levying of
such taxes by a town or ward having no legal right to assess the
land on which they are laid."
"SEC. 2. The provisions of this act are hereby made applicable
only to the following counties, namely: Clinton, Delaware, Essex,
Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Hamilton, Herkimer, Lewis, Saratoga.
St.Lawrence, Sullivan, Ulster, Warren, and Washington, but shall
not affect any action, proceeding, or application pending at the
time of its passage, nor any action that shall be begun, proceeding
taken, or application duly made within six months thereafter for
the purpose of vacating any tax sale or any conveyance or
certificate of sale made thereunder."