When a defendant has, by his own action, reduced the judgment
against him by a voluntary settlement and payment below the amount
which is necessary in order to give this Court jurisdiction to
review it, the real matter in dispute is only the balance still
remaining due on the judgment, and the right of review in this
Court is taken away.
The Court, being satisfied that the amount in dispute in this
case is less than the amount required by statute to give it
jurisdiction, orders the writ dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
The statement of case will be found in the opinion of the
Court.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case has been transferred from the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, under and by virtue of an
act of Congress (30 Stat. 728) providing for such transfer. The act
is set forth in the margin.
*
Page 177 U. S. 16
By the terms of this act, it is to operate only upon those cases
of which this Court would have had jurisdiction under the law
existing at the time the case was taken to the circuit court of
appeals if a proper appeal had been taken to this Court at the time
the case was filed in the circuit court of appeals. If this act be
valid, therefore, we must inquire whether the case was one over
which this Court would have had jurisdiction if a proper appeal had
been taken.
The case was commenced in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska in April, 1895, for the purpose of
recovering moneys alleged to be due under the terms of a contract
for the leasing of certain mining properties situated in that
district. The plaintiffs (defendants in error) demanded judgment
for $7,231.25, besides costs of the action. The defendant
(plaintiff in error) demurred to the complaint on the ground that
it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The demurrer was overruled and leave given to answer, which the
defendant failed to do within the time granted, and judgment was
entered by default for the amount claimed in the complaint, with
costs.
The defendant then moved to vacate and set aside the judgment,
and that motion was denied, and he sued out a writ of error from
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The defendants in error moved to dismiss the writ on the ground
that the circuit court of appeals had no jurisdiction.
The circuit court of appeals certified the question to this
Court for the purpose of receiving its instruction upon the
question of jurisdiction. This Court answered the question in the
negative, denying the jurisdiction of the circuit court of
appeals.
Page 177 U. S. 17
168 U.S. 703. The mandate from this Court was duly issued, and
the circuit court of appeals, in conformity therewith, dismissed
the writ of error, and on January 4, 1898, it issued its mandate to
that effect, directed to the District Court of the United States
for the District of Alaska, which was filed in the office of the
clerk of that court on February 3, 1898, and in obedience to that
mandate the writ of error was duly dismissed by the district
court.
On March 29, 1898, an execution upon the original judgment was
issued from the district court, directed to the United States
marshal of the district, under which certain property of the
defendant was sold and a return made by the marshal to the court,
and on June 14, 1898, the sale was duly confirmed by the district
court.
It thus appears that nearly a month before the passage of the
Act of July 8, 1898 (
supra), the judgment of the District
Court of Alaska had been carried into effect, an execution issued,
the property sold, a report made of the sale to the court, and that
sale confirmed.
The defendants in error made a motion in this Court to dismiss
the writ for want of jurisdiction. That motion was postponed by the
Court until the hearing of the case upon its merits, and upon the
argument thereof, the motion to dismiss was renewed upon the ground
(among others) that the act of Congress, if applicable to cases
such as this, was unconstitutional and void.
A further ground for dismissal was set up because, as alleged,
it appeared from the record that the amount in dispute between the
parties was less than the sum necessary to give jurisdiction to
this Court. This ground necessitates the statement of a few
additional facts, and if it be well founded, it relieves us from a
discussion of the constitutional question.
After the demurrer of the defendant to the plaintiff's complaint
had been overruled and leave given to answer, and the defendant
made default, judgment was entered for the amount of the
plaintiffs' claim. This was on January 25, 1896. By the complaint
it appears that, under the lease of the mine by the plaintiffs to
the defendant Thorp, the latter agreed to mine, work, and operate
the premises, and after making certain payments,
Page 177 U. S. 18
etc., he was to retain for himself seven sixteenths of the
profits or net proceeds arising from the operation of the mine, and
was to pay to the plaintiffs the remaining nine sixteenths in the
proportion of seven sixteenths to the plaintiff Bonnifield and two
sixteenths to the plaintiff Heid.
Immediately after the entry of the judgment, it appears by the
affidavits in the case, presented for the purpose of setting the
judgment aside, that the defendant and the plaintiff Bonnifield
entered into negotiations in regard to the judgment, and Bonnifield
became satisfied that it had been entered for more than was
equitably due from the defendant, and, accordingly, upon the
payment of a certain sum to him (much less than by the face of the
judgment appeared to be due him), Bonnifield
"made a complete settlement of all his matters and differences
with the defendant, and received a full and complete settlement and
satisfaction for his interest in the judgment obtained in the
case,"
and Bonnifield thereupon "executed a satisfaction of all his
right, title, and claim in and to said judgment, to-wit, seven
eighths thereof." This satisfaction was given the defendant on the
28th of January, who filed the same in the clerk's office on the
tenth day of February, 1896. After he had filed the satisfaction,
and on the same day, the defendant filed his petition for a writ of
error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
The judgment in the case continued to stand on the face of the
record at its original sum, $7,231.25 recovery and $33.55 costs. By
the defendant's voluntary settlement with and payment to
Bonnifield, one of the plaintiffs, the balance remaining unpaid was
less than the amount necessary to give this Court jurisdiction.
The plaintiff in error cites various cases to maintain the
proposition that, when the defendant in the case below brings it
here for review, the amount of the judgment or decree against him
governs our jurisdiction, and, as in this case, the judgment is for
more than $7,000, he maintains that this Court has jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the payment and settlement above mentioned.
But those cases have no application when the defendant, by
his
Page 177 U. S. 19
own action, has reduced the judgment by a voluntary settlement
and payment below the amount which is necessary in order to give
this Court jurisdiction to review it. The real matter in dispute is
in such case the balance still remaining due on the judgment.
Otherwise he might voluntarily settle the controversy and pay the
whole judgment, and then seek to review it. In this case, it
appears there was a "full, final, and complete settlement of all
matters and differences" between the defendant and plaintiff
Bonnifield, and the latter then executed "a full and complete
satisfaction of all his rights, title, and claim in and to said
judgment." And this was procured by the defendant's own voluntary
act. Clearly there was no matter in dispute relative to that
judgment after such voluntary settlement and payment beyond the sum
remaining due thereon. Thus, an event has intervened subsequently
to the entry of the judgment, and one which owes its existence to
the act of the defendant himself, which has taken away his right of
review in this Court. It is a compromise or settlement,
pro
tanto, between the parties, or it is like a case where,
pending a suit concerning the validity of the assessment of a tax,
the tax is paid, or the amount of the tax has been tendered and
deposited in a bank which by statute had the same effect as actual
payment and receipt of the money.
Dakota County v.
Glidden, 113 U. S. 222;
Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547;
California v. Railroad Company, 149 U.
S. 308. In such cases, the writs of error will be
dismissed.
The facts as to the settlement and payment appear here in the
record, although they may be shown by other evidence, as the above
cases hold.
It is urged that the plaintiff Bonnifield had no right under the
circumstances to make the settlement and to satisfy the judgment to
the extent which he did. But this does not answer the objection. As
matter of fact, he and the defendant had a full settlement, and he
did satisfy the judgment at the request of the latter, and both
defendants in error now join in a motion to dismiss predicated upon
that settlement and payment, and they both thus ratify the same and
acknowledge its sufficiency. The plaintiff in error is in no
position to deny the validity of the settlement and payment made at
his own request
Page 177 U. S. 20
and by himself when its sufficiency is acknowledged by the other
parties.
Being satisfied that the amount in dispute in this case is less
than the amount required by statute to give us jurisdiction, and
without expressing any opinion upon the other ground for the
motion,
The writ must be dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, and
it is so ordered.
*
"That all cases, civil and criminal, filed on appeal from the
District Court of the United States for the District of Alaska, in
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial
Circuit, and pending on appeal therein, on and prior to the
thirtieth day of December, 1897, of which the Supreme Court of the
United States would have had jurisdiction under the then existing
law if a proper appeal had been taken thereto at the time said
cases were filed on appeal in said circuit court of appeals, be,
and the same are, deemed and treated as regularly filed on appeal
in the Supreme Court of the United States as of the date when filed
in said circuit court of appeals. The clerk of said circuit court
of appeals is directed to transmit to the Supreme Court of the
United States, as soon as practicable, the records of such cases,
and the clerk of said Supreme Court is directed to receive and file
the same for hearing and determination in the Supreme Court of the
United States when regularly reached on the docket, subject to any
rules made or to be made by said court which may be
applicable."
Approved July 8, 1898.