As the plaintiff's in the circuit court claimed in their
declaration that the controversy was one that turned on the
construction of the laws of the United States, and as both courts
below dealt with the case on that assumption, this Court has
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the circuit court of
appeals.
As the plaintiffs, some of whom were citizens of Florida and
some of whom were citizens of Texas, elected to assert a joint
claim to land in Florida in dispute in this case, which was
commenced before the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Florida, and carried by appeal to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and as they
recovered a joint judgment for their undivided interests therein,
and as the plaintiffs' declaration disclosed no federal question,
the principles settled in the cases cited by the court in its
opinion apply, and compel a dismissal of the suit for want of
jurisdiction in the circuit court.
In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Florida, William J. Bell, John W. Bell, Frank A. Bell,
citizens of the State of Texas; E. A. Bell, Matilda P. Feihe, all
heirs of and children of Louis Bell, deceased, late of Hillsborough
County, State of Florida, and George A. Bell and Simon Bell, heirs
of and grandchildren of said Louis Bell, and Anton Feihe, husband
of said Matilda P. Feihe, brought an action of ejectment against
the Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company, a
corporation of the State of Florida, seeking to recover possession
of about seven acres of land in Hillsborough County, Florida,
alleged to be of the value of $30,000, and damages in the sum or
$10,000. The declaration alleged that the land in controversy was
occupied by defendant as its roadbed and right of way, and that the
plaintiffs claimed title to said land under and by virtue of a
patent granted by the United States
Page 176 U. S. 322
to said Louis Bell and his heirs upon a preemption claim filed
in the local land office of the United States in 1883, and upon
appeal to the General Land Office, and upon and from an appeal from
the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the
Secretary of the Interior of the said United States, when by the
order of the said Secretary the said patent was granted. The
declaration further alleged that, in the proceedings in the Land
Department, the defendant claimed and contended that the plaintiffs
were not, under any of the laws of the United States, entitled to
have a patent to said land granted to said Louis Bell and his
heirs, and that the defendant at the time of the commencement of
this suit, claimed and insisted that the plaintiffs derived no
title to said land under and by virtue of the said patent, and at
the same time claimed that, under the laws of the United States,
and especially under and by virtue of the first section of an act
of Congress entitled "An Act Granting Public Lands in Alternate
Sections to the states of Florida and Alabama to Aid in the
Construction of Certain Railroads in Said states," approved May 17,
1856, it was entitled and had the right to locate the route of its
railroad and construct the same through the said lands, and to be
in possession thereof, on the ground, among other grounds, that the
said land was a part of that tract of land which constituted at one
time a military reservation known as the Fort Brook Military
Reservation at Tampa, State of Florida. And the plaintiffs further
alleged in their declaration that after the passage of an Act of
Congress entitled "An Act to Provide for the Disposal of Abandoned
and Useless Military Reservations," approved July 5, 1885, they
contended for and claimed title and a patent to said parcel of land
under and by virtue of the first proviso of the second section of
the last-mentioned act of Congress, both in the office of the said
General Land Office and of the Secretary of the Interior, and that
the defendant appeared in both of the said offices by its counsel,
and there claimed and contended, and at the commencement of this
suit claimed and contended, that plaintiffs were not entitled to a
patent or title to said parcel of land under the
Page 176 U. S. 323
said proviso of said act of Congress, and at the times aforesaid
claimed and insisted that it was entitled to locate the route of
its railroad through said parcel of land, and to be in possession
thereof, under and by virtue of the third proviso of the aforesaid
Act of Congress approved May 17, 1856.
This declaration was filed on December 29, 1896, and on January
4, 1897, the defendant appeared and filed a plea of not guilty.
On February 4, 1897, the defendant, after notice to the
plaintiffs, asked leave to file further and special pleas denying
that the court had jurisdiction of the action, denying that the
defendant claimed title under the Act of May 17, 1856, or under any
other act of Congress or law of the United States, and alleging the
pendency of a prior suit in equity between the same parties in the
circuit court of the United States, and also the pendency in the
Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of
Florida, of a petition and proceeding by the defendant to condemn
the land in dispute under its right of eminent domain under the
laws of the State of Florida.
Thereafter, on February 18, 1897, the court made the following
order:
"This cause coming on to be heard upon the motion of the
defendant for leave to file additional pleas, and upon the motion
of the plaintiffs to transfer the cause to Tampa for trial, and it
having been fully heard and considered, and it appearing that none
of said pleas constitute a good defense to said action that could
not as well be shown under the general plea of not guilty, it is
ordered that said motion to file additional pleas be denied, and
that the order to transfer the cause for trial be granted, and that
this order be without prejudice to any motion for a stay of an
enforcement possession under any judgment which may be recovered on
account of condemnation proceedings."
On February 10, 1897, the defendant moved for a continuance,
which motion was on February 18 denied.
On March 5, 1897, the defendant moved the court to
"dismiss the cause for the reason that there is nothing on the
face
Page 176 U. S. 324
of the declaration to show that this court has jurisdiction to
hear and determine the said cause."
On March 11, 1897, after a consideration of this motion to
dismiss, it was ordered in open court that said motion be
dismissed. On the same day an agreement, signed by the attorneys of
the respective parties, to waive a jury and that the cause might be
tried by the court was filed.
The cause was so proceeded in that, on March 23, 1897, the court
found that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession and have a
fee simple title in and to the land in dispute, and assessed their
damages in loss of rent and profit in the sum of $1,955, and
entered a judgment as follows:
"It is considered by the court that the plaintiff's herein,
William J. Bell, John W. Bell, Frank A. Bell, Eliza A. Bell, and
Matilda P. Feihe, and George A. Bell, and Simon Bell, do receive
and recover from the defendant, the Florida Central &
Peninsular Railroad Company, the sum of $1,955, as well as for
costs in this behalf, and it is further, considered that said
plaintiff's have a fee simple title in and to the lands and
premises described as follows, to-wit,"
etc.
On April 10, 1897, the defendant moved the court for a writ of
error and a citation to review the judgment in said cause,
returnable to the United States circuit court of appeals, and for a
supersedeas of the said judgment upon filing a bond. On the same
day, the writ of error was allowed and it was ordered that, on the
defendant's filing a bond with sufficient sureties in the sum of
$3,500, to be approved by the court or by the clerk thereof, the
said writ should operate as a supersedeas of the judgment in said
cause. A bond was approved and filed accordingly.
On May 24, 1898, the circuit court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court. 87 F. 369.
And thereupon, on June 2, 1898, a writ of error from this Court
was allowed.
Page 176 U. S. 325
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Our first inquiry is whether this Court has jurisdiction to
review the judgment of the circuit court of appeals. The writ of
error in this case was brought under section 6 of the Judiciary Act
of March 3, 1891. If the judgment of the circuit court of appeals
was final, under that section, this writ of error must be
dismissed. In order to maintain our jurisdiction, it must appear
that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not dependent solely
upon the opposite parties being citizens of different states.
Colorado Central Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.
S. 138;
Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe,
164 U. S. 105.
This question must be answered upon an inspection of the
declaration of the plaintiffs in the circuit court. Does it
disclose that the plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction of that court
because the parties were citizens of different states, or because
the case was alleged to be one arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States?
The action was in ejectment to recover possession of a tract of
land in Hillsborough County, State of Florida. The plaintiffs were
eight in number, three of whom were alleged to be citizens of the
State of Texas, and there was no allegation as to the citizenship
of the other five. The defendant, the Florida Central &
Peninsular Railroad Company, was alleged to be a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Florida. Hence, upon the
face of the declaration, the jurisdiction of the circuit court
would have failed at least as to five of the plaintiffs if that
jurisdiction depended solely on the citizenship of the parties. The
declaration, however, alleges that the plaintiffs claim title to
the land in dispute by virtue of a patent granted to their ancestor
by the government of the
Page 176 U. S. 326
United States, that the defendant claimed title under the first
section of an Act of Congress entitled "An Act Granting Public
Lands in Alternate Sections to the States of Florida and Alabama,
to Aid in the Construction of Certain Railroads in said states,"
approved May 17, 1856, and further that the defendant railroad
company claimed and insisted that it was entitled to locate and
maintain the route of its road through the land in question under
said act of Congress.
Accordingly it appears that the theory of the plaintiffs in
bringing their suit in the circuit court of the United States was
that the controversy was between a patentee of the United States
and a railroad company claiming a right to occupy the land embraced
in the patent by virtue of an act of Congress, and was therefore a
case arising under the laws of the United States. This was the view
of the judge who tried the case in the circuit court, as he refused
to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction, and this view was also taken by the circuit court of
appeals, as appears in the following passage of its opinion:
"There is no effort in this case to found the jurisdiction of
the court on the diverse citizenship of the parties. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the judge of the circuit
court entertained jurisdiction of the case on that ground. The
declaration shows that in the preemption claim by the ancestor of
the defendants in error to the land involved the claim was stoutly
resisted by the plaintiff in error in the different stages of the
prosecution thereof and before the different officers of the Land
Department. It shows that, under a named act of Congress approved
May 17, 1856, the defendant claimed the right to occupy the land in
question in the manner in which it was occupying it, without
accountability to the defendants in error. . . . So that,
independently of the claim for mesne profits for the time
transpiring between the preemption entry and the issuance of the
patent, it is clear that the issues made by the declaration
presented a case within the jurisdiction of the circuit court."
As then the plaintiffs in the circuit court claimed in their
declaration that the controversy was one that turned on a
construction
Page 176 U. S. 327
of the laws of the United States, and as both the courts below
dealt with the case on that assumption, it is plain that it cannot
be successfully contended in this Court that the judgment of the
circuit court of appeals was final because the jurisdiction of the
circuit court was dependent entirely upon the opposite parties
being citizens of different states.
Nor do we find merit in a second ground urged to maintain the
motion to dismiss -- namely that the action was in ejectment, that
the defendant admitted of record that it had no title, and that
therefore the only question it could raise was one of jurisdiction.
An inspection of the defendant's answer shows that while it did
disclaim title under the act of Congress, it claimed a right of
possession on other grounds with, respect to which it had a right
to be heard if indeed the circuit court had jurisdiction.
We come to the case, then, as one in which we have a right to
supervise the judgment of the circuit court of appeals. And the
first question, and indeed, as we read the record, the only one we
have to meet is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction of the
case. Not having, as we have seen, jurisdiction because of a
controversy between citizens of different states, did it have
jurisdiction because the case was one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States? This question was
answered affirmatively in both courts below, and this because, as
it seemed to them, the plaintiff's declaration disclosed such a
case.
It must be regarded as conclusively established by our decisions
that the jurisdiction of the circuit court must appear in the
plaintiff's statement of their case.
"Where, however, the original jurisdiction of a circuit court of
the United States is invoked upon the sole ground that the
determination of the suit depends upon some question of a federal
nature, it must appear at the outset, from the declaration or the
bill of the party suing, that the suit is of that character; in
other words, it must appear in that class of cases that the suit
was one of which the circuit court at the time its jurisdiction is
invoked, could properly take cognizance. If it does not so appear,
then the court, upon demurrer or motion or upon
Page 176 U. S. 328
its own inspection of the pleading, must dismiss the suit, just
as it would remand to the state court a suit which the record at
the time of removal, failed to show was within the jurisdiction of
the circuit court. It cannot retain it in order to see whether the
defendant may not raise some question of a federal nature upon
which the right of recovery will finally depend, and, if so
retained, the want of jurisdiction at the commencement of the suit
is not cured by an answer or plea which may suggest a question of
that kind."
Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 588;
Colorado Central Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.
S. 138;
Oregon &c. Railway v. Skottowe,
162 U. S. 490;
Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273;
Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 164 U.
S. 105.
We do not, however, understand that these cases are questioned
by the defendants in error, but their contention is that, in the
plaintiff's declaration, it did sufficiently appear that a federal
question was necessarily involved upon the solution of which the
determination of the case depended.
The paragraph of the declaration which sets forth the
plaintiffs' claim is as follows:
"The plaintiffs allege that they claim title to the said land
under and by virtue of a patent granted by the government of the
United States of America to the said Louis Bell and his heirs, upon
a preemption claim for said land under the laws of the United
States, originally commenced and filed in the local land office of
the United States of America at Gainesville, Florida, in 1883, and
prosecuted by the heirs of the said Louis Bell and his heirs, the
plaintiffs, in said land office, and upon appeal in the General
Land Office of the government, and upon and from an appeal from the
decision of the Commissioner of the said General Land Office to the
Secretary of the Interior of the United States, the said heirs
prosecuted the preemption claim, until by the order and decision of
the said Secretary the said patent was granted."
In view of the frequent and recent decisions of this Court on
this subject, it is not necessary to argue the proposition that the
mere assertion of a title to land derived to the plaintiffs under
and by virtue of a patent granted by the United States presents
Page 176 U. S. 329
no question which, of itself, confers jurisdiction on a circuit
court of the United States.
Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining
Co., 175 U. S. 571.
But it seems to be thought that, by alleging that the defendant
claimed and contended in the Land Department that the plaintiffs
were not entitled under any of the laws of the United States to
have a patent granted to them, and that the defendant at the time
of the commencement of this suit claimed and insisted that the
plaintiffs derived no title to the said land under and by virtue of
the said patent, and at said time claimed that, under the laws of
the United States, and especially under and by virtue of the first
section of an Act of Congress entitled "An Act Granting Public
Lands in Alternate Sections to the states of Florida and Alabama,
to Aid in the Construction of Railroads in said States," approved
May 17, 1856, it was entitled and had the right to locate the route
of its railroad and construct the same through the said lands, and
to be in possession thereof, on the ground, among other grounds,
that the said section eight was a part of that tract of land which
constituted at one time a military reservation known as the Fort
Brooke Military Reservation at Tampa, State of Florida, there was
presented a question needing for its solution a construction of
laws of the United States.
It is obvious that all that is added by these allegations to the
plaintiffs' statement of their own claim is a statement of what the
defendant claimed before and at the time of the commencement of
this suit in respect to its own title. The plaintiffs were not
pretending to have title under the Act of May 17, 1856, however it
might be construed. That act was, under the allegations of the
declaration, the source of the defendant's title, but it could not
affect the plaintiffs' title unless it were pleaded and set up by
the defendant. It has been several times held by this Court that
the plaintiff, if the statement of his own claim does not disclose
a federal question, cannot create jurisdiction in a circuit court
by anticipating the defendant's claim and by alleging that the
defendant will set up a defense under some law of the United
States.
Page 176 U. S. 330
Thus, in
Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank,
152 U. S. 454, MR.
JUSTICE GRAY, after citing
Metcalf v. Watertown,
128 U. S. 586, and
other cases, said:
"In each of the three cases now before this Court, the only
right claimed by the plaintiffs is under the law of Tennessee, and
they assert no right whatever under the Constitution and laws of
the United States. In the first and second bills, the only
reference to the Constitution or laws of the United States is the
suggestion that the defendants will contend that the law of the
state under which the plaintiffs claim is void because in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States, and by the
settled law of this Court, as appears from the decisions above
cited, a suggestion of one party that the other will or may set up
a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States does
not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those
laws."
Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.
S. 102;
East Lake Land Co. v. Brown,
155 U. S. 488;
Oregon Short Line Co. v. Skottowe, 162 U.
S. 490.
And even if it could be held that, by anticipating a supposed
defense, a federal question might be made to appear to be involved
in the controversy, jurisdiction in the circuit court would fail
if, on the coming in of the plea or answer, the defense would turn
out to be based on matter wholly independent of the Constitution or
any law of the United States, and it would be the clear duty of the
court to dismiss the suit for the reason that it did not "really
and substantially involve a dispute or controversy within the
jurisdiction of that court."
So it was held in
Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.
S. 522, where an order of the circuit court dismissing
the case was affirmed, this Court saying, through Mr. Chief Justice
Waite:
"Even if the complaint, standing by itself, made out a case of
jurisdiction, which we do not decide, it was taken away as soon as
the answers were in, because if there were jurisdiction at all, it
was by reason of the averments in the complaint as to what the
defenses against the title of the plaintiff would be, and these
were of no avail as soon as the answers were filed and it was made
to appear that no such defenses were
Page 176 U. S. 331
relied on. The circuit court cannot be required to keep
jurisdiction of a suit simply because the averments in a complaint
or declaration make a case arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States if, when the pleadings are all in, it
appears that these averments are immaterial in the determination of
the matter really in dispute between the parties, and especially
if, as here, they were evidently made 'for the purpose of creating
a case' cognizable by the circuit court when none in fact
existed."
Such observations are directly applicable to the present case,
for the defendant, in its plea to the jurisdiction of the court,
explicitly admitted the plaintiffs' title to the land under the
patent, and denied that the defendant claimed title to the land in
dispute under the Act of May 17, 1856, or under any other act of
Congress, but placed its defense, by way of confession and
avoidance, on totally different grounds than those mentioned in the
declaration, and which involved no construction or application of
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
It is contended, however, that whether or not the circuit court
had jurisdiction to determine the question of title to the land in
dispute or of the right of possession thereof, the plaintiffs'
demand to recover mesne profits accruing between the preemption
entry and the issuance of the patent presented a question within
the jurisdiction of that court. It is not easy to perceive why, if
the circuit court did not possess jurisdiction to decide the right
of possession, it could have jurisdiction to pass upon the question
of mesne profits, the right to recover which would depend on the
right of possession.
In affirming this view of the case, the circuit court of appeals
cites
Durango Land & Coal Company v. Evans, 80 F. 433.
That was a case where the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit held that the inquiry as to the right of the plaintiff to
recover mesne profits accruing while the alleged contest was
depending and undetermined in the General Land Office involved an
examination and construction of the laws of the United States. The
case was brought to this Court, but was dismissed on stipulation of
the
Page 176 U. S. 332
parties. The report of the case does not disclose whether there
was really a controversy between the parties respecting the
construction of the land laws of the United States. What really
seems to have been involved in respect to mesne profits was whether
the doctrine of relation, which is a common law doctrine, would
enable the plaintiff, after having established his title, to
recover the mesne profits which accrued while the plaintiff was
wrongfully excluded from possession. Such a question would not seem
to be a federal one, but one incidental to the determination of the
principal controversy concerning the right of possession.
At all events, there is nothing disclosed in the declaration in
the present case showing that, so far as the damages and mesne
profits are concerned, any federal question was presented. If the
circuit court had jurisdiction to determine the right of possession
and, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, decided in the
plaintiffs' favor, the incidental question of the time when damages
and profits would accrue to the plaintiffs would legitimately
arise. But if that court had not jurisdiction to determine the
controversy as to the right of possession, it could not draw to
itself the jurisdiction of the case by considering what the
consequences would be if the plaintiffs were permitted to recover
possession.
Apart from the question of jurisdiction arising from the
presence of any federal question, can it be said that jurisdiction
did attach in respect to those plaintiffs who were alleged to be
citizens of Texas?
As we have seen, neither of the courts below was of that
opinion. The judgment of the circuit court was in favor of all the
plaintiffs jointly for the entire tract in dispute, and, in so
doing, followed the plaintiffs' claim in their declaration, wherein
they claimed title to the whole tract as belonging to them jointly.
They did not allege that they were tenants in common, although in
the findings the court found that the respective plaintiffs held
undivided interests in the land.
In
Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, it was said:
"Where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in
that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued,
Page 176 U. S. 333
in the circuit courts. But the Court does not mean to give an
opinion in the case where several parties represent several
distinct interests, and some of those parties are, and others are
not, competent to sue or liable to be sued, in the courts of the
United States."
New Orleans v.
Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, was the case of a possessory
action brought by the heirs of Elisha Winter, deceased, to recover
the possession and property of certain lands in the City of New
Orleans. One of the petitioners was described in the record as a
citizen of the State of Kentucky, and the other as a citizen of the
Territory of Mississippi. The plaintiffs recovered a judgment in
the circuit court, but this judgment was reversed by this Court,
Chief Justice Marshall saying:
"Gabriel Winter, being a citizen of the Mississippi Territory,
was incapable of maintaining a suit alone in the Circuit Court of
Louisiana. Is his case mended by being associated with others who
are capable of suing in that court? In the case of
Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, it was decided that where a joint interest is
prosecuted, the jurisdiction cannot be sustained unless each
individual be entitled to claim that jurisdiction. In this case, it
has been doubted whether the parties might elect to sue jointly or
severally. However this may be, having elected to sue jointly, the
court is incapable of distinguishing their case, so far as respects
jurisdiction, from one in which they were compelled to unite. The
Circuit Court of Louisiana therefore had no jurisdiction of the
cause, and their judgment must on that account be reversed, and the
petition dismissed."
In
Barney v.
Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, it was held that part
owners or tenants in common in real estate of which partition is
asked in equity have an interest in the subject matter of the suit,
and in the relief sought, so intimately connected with that of
their co-tenants that if these cannot be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court, the bill will be dismissed.
Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395, was
an action of ejectment brought in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Western District of Wisconsin by a complaint in
which the plaintiffs
Page 176 U. S. 334
alleged that they resided in and were citizens of the City of
Washington, D.C., and that defendants all resided in and were
citizens of the State of Wisconsin. Defendants moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction, as
the controversy was not between citizens of different states. The
circuit court ordered that the action be dismissed unless
plaintiffs within five days thereafter should so amend their
complaint as to allege the necessary jurisdictional facts.
Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint by
averring that three of them were, when the suit was commenced, and
continued to be, citizens of the District of Columbia, but that one
of them was a citizen of the State of Minnesota, and that each was
the owner of an undivided one-fourth of the lands and premises
described in the complaint, and that they severally claimed damages
and demanded judgment. This motion was denied, and the action
dismissed. Plaintiff sued out a writ of error, and the circuit
court certified to this Court these questions of jurisdiction:
first, whether or not said complaint set forth any cause of action
in which there is a controversy between citizens of different
states, so as to give said circuit court jurisdiction thereof;
second, whether or not said complaint as so proposed to be amended
would, if so amended, set forth any cause of action in which there
is a controversy between citizens of different states, so as to
give said circuit court jurisdiction thereof. This Court held,
through MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after reviewing the cases, that
the voluntary joinder of the parties had the same effect for
purposes of jurisdiction as if they had been compelled to unite;
that as no application was made to discontinue as to the three
plaintiffs who were citizens of the District of Columbia, and to
amend the complaint and proceed with the cause in favor of that one
of the plaintiffs alleged to be a citizen of Minnesota,
jurisdiction as to four plaintiffs could not be maintained on the
theory that, when the trial terminated, it might be retained as to
one. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court was
reversed.
As, then, in the present case, the plaintiffs elected to assert
a joint claim and title to the land in dispute, and recovered a
Page 176 U. S. 335
joint judgment for their undivided interests therein, and as the
plaintiffs' declaration discloses no federal question, the
principles of the cited cases apply and compel a dismissal of the
suit for want of jurisdiction in the circuit court.
This conclusion withdraws from our consideration the errors
assigned to the action of the courts below in respect to the
defendant's several pleas of
lis pendens.
The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is reversed,
the judgment of the Circuit Court is likewise reversed, and the
cause is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.
