The provision in section 1 of chapter 74 of the Laws of Kansas
of 1891, authorizing certain first-class cities to take in
described tracts of land in territory adjoining or touching the
city limits and make them a part of the city by ordinance, and
providing that
"nothing in this act shall be taken or held to apply to any
tract or tracts of land used for agricultural purposes, when the
same is not owned by any railroad or other corporation,"
does not conflict with any provision of the Constitution of the
United States, when exercised by such a city to take in lands
belonging to a railroad company which are not used for agricultural
purposes, but are occupied by the company for railroad
purposes.
This case was here once before on writ of error to review a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversing a judgment of the
nisi prius court sustaining a demurrer to the petition of
plaintiffs.
172 U. S. 172 U.S.
334.
Page 176 U. S. 115
The writ was dismissed on the ground that the judgment was not
final. On the return of the case to the supreme court of the state,
such proceedings were had there and, by its direction, in the trial
court, that a final judgment was entered denying the relief prayed
for, which judgment the supreme court affirmed, and the case was
then brought here.
The question presented is the constitutionality of a statute of
the state, and the validity of an ordinance passed by Kansas City
under the statute. Kansas Laws of 1891, 133, c. 74; Act of March
10, 1891. The statute is as follows:
"
Cities of the First Class."
"
An Act Relating to Certain Cities of the First
Class"
"
and the Adding Thereto Certain Adjoining
Territory"
"
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Kansas: SEC. 1. That whenever any territory adjoining or
touching the city limits of any city of the first class having a
population of 30,000 inhabitants or more shall be subdivided into
lots and blocks, or whenever any unplatted tract of land shall lie
upon or mainly within any such city, or is so situated as to be
bounded on three-fourths of its boundary line by platted territory
of or adjacent to such city, or by the boundary line of such city,
or by both, the same may be added to and made a part of the city by
ordinance duly passed, which ordinance shall describe the territory
by giving the name of the subdivision or addition as platted, and
by giving the metes and bounds of such unplatted tract, or by
giving the metes and bounds of each tract and plat so taken in
separately, or of the entire tract or tracts so taken in, with the
section, town, range, and county in which the same is located,
without further proceedings;
but nothing in this act shall be
taken or held to apply to any tract or tracts of land used for
agricultural purposes when the same is not owned by any railroad or
other corporation."
"
* * * *"
The following is the ordinance:
Page 176 U. S. 116
"
Ordinance No. 2163"
An Ordinance Adding Certain Lands Therein Described, Known as
the Union Pacific Lands, to and Making the Same a Part of the City
of Kansas City, Kansas.
"Whereas, A certain unplatted territory belonging to the Union
Pacific Railroad Company lies upon and mainly within the City of
Kansas City, Kansas, and is so situated as to be bounded on
three-fourths (3/4) of its boundary line by platted Territory of
and adjoining to said city; which said railroad land, by virtue of
its location, enjoys the benefits of said city without sharing its
burdens, now therefore,"
"
Be it ordained by the Mayor and Councilmen of the City of
Kansas City, Kansas: SEC. 1. That the following described
territory, to-wit: . . . said tracts being contiguous and
containing in the aggregate one hundred and seventy-two (172)
acres, be and hereby is added to and made a part of the City of
Kansas City, Kansas."
"SEC. 2. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force from
and after its passage and publication in the Kansas City
Gazette."
After passage of the ordinance, the city levied taxes on the
lands, and this suit was brought to restrain their collection. The
petition presented the facts and contained the following
allegations:
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
"And plaintiffs are advised and so charge the fact to be that,
insofar as said statute attempts to authorize the taking of said
lands within the limits of Kansas City, Kansas, as attempted in
said ordinance, 'Exhibit A,' it is unconstitutional, null, and
void, in this, to-wit:"
"That by reason of that portion of the act which excepts from
its operation any tract or tracts of land used for agricultural
purposes when the same is not owned by any railroad or other
corporation, it is in violation of that part of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
Page 176 U. S. 117
States which reads as follows:"
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
"Plaintiffs further allege upon information and belief that
there was not at the time of the passage of said chapter 74 of the
Session Laws of Kansas for 1891 any city of thirty thousand
(30,000) inhabitants or more in the State of Kansas where the
conditions referred to in the first part of the said act permitting
the adding of additional territory to a city by the passage of an
ordinance merely exist, and plaintiffs are advised, and so charge
the fact to be, that said act of the legislature, while purporting
to be a general act, was intended solely to apply to the lands
attempted to be taken within the limits of said Kansas City,
Kansas, by said ordinance, 'Exhibit A.'"
The property over which the extension was made was actually used
in part for railroad purposes, and consisted of roadbed and right
of way, main and side tracks, buildings, and improvements. The
portion not actually used for railroad purposes, the petition
alleged, were vacant and unoccupied lands, which were held and
possessed by the railroad company for railroad purposes.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The statute excepts from its operation lands used for
agricultural purposes if owned by individuals. It includes such
lands if owned by corporations. It is hence contended by plaintiff
in error that the statute discriminates between the owners of
agricultural lands, and between them again and the
Page 176 U. S. 118
owners of all other lands, and infringes thereby the provision
of the Constitution of the United States which guarantees to all
persons the equal protection of the laws.
Of the discrimination between owners of agricultural lands the
Supreme Court of Kansas said the defendants in error (plaintiffs
here) cannot be heard to complain.
"Their lands are not agricultural lands. At least they do not
allege them to be such lands, but, on the contrary, allege that
parts of them are used for railroad purposes, and that the
remaining portions are vacant and unoccupied lands held and
possessed for railroad purposes. Owning no agricultural land, the
defendants in error are not affected by the discrimination which
the statute makes between the different classes of owners of such
kind of land, and they cannot therefore be heard to complain on
that score."
"A court will not listen to an objection made to the
constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not
affect and who has therefore no interest in defeating it."
"Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. 6th ed.196."
Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.
S. 305.
We concur in this view, and it would be difficult to add
anything to its expression. The discrimination occurs only in a
particular use of the lands, and it would seem obvious that such
use must be shown to make a cause of action -- a right infringed
and to be redressed. If the lands of the plaintiff belonged to an
individual, they would be subject to the statute. Where, then, is
the discrimination? In that, it is claimed, if the lands were used
for agriculture, being owned by a corporation, they would be
subject to the statute, but would not be if owned by an individual.
But that is not a discrimination immediate and actual against
plaintiff in error. It does not now, and there is nothing in the
record to show that it ever will, exist. Not a law alone, but a law
and its incidence, are necessary to a justiciable right or injury,
and it therefore follows, if plaintiff has a grievance under the
statute which this Court can redress, it comes from the
discrimination between agricultural lands and other lands -- a
cause of action not because the plaintiff is a corporation, but
because it is an owner of such lands, and one which it would have
even if it were an individual.
Page 176 U. S. 119
The answer to that charge depends upon the power of the state to
classify objects of legislation -- necessarily a broad power, and
one which this Court has so many times decided exists, and so many
times has defined and illustrated the limits upon it of the
provision of the Constitution of the United States invoked by
plaintiff in error, that farther definition would seem impossible,
and any new instance of its application not without exact or
analogous example in some decided case.
The reasoning of the cases we need not repeat. It is enough to
say that the rule of the Constitution leaves to the discretion and
wisdom of the state a wide latitude as far as interference by this
Court is concerned. It is not a substitute for municipal law, it
does not invest power in this Court to correct the impolicy and
injustice of state laws, and the equality it prescribes is not for
persons merely as such, but according to their relations.
"In some circumstances it may not tax A more than B, but if A be
of a different trade or profession than B, it may. And in matters
not of taxation, if A be a different kind of corporation than B, it
may subject A to a different rule of responsibility to servants
than B,
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Mackey, 127 U. S.
205, to a different measure of damages than B,
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Beckwith,
129 U. S.
26, and it permits special legislation in all its
varieties.
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Mackey,
127 U. S.
205;
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v.
Herrick, 127 U. S. 210;
Duncan v.
Missouri, 152 U. S. 377."
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank,
170 U. S. 283.
And these principles have been affirmed in later cases, and a
classification based on the difference between fire insurance and
other insurance has been sustained; also on a difference between
railroad and other corporations and of persons.
Orient Ins. Co.
v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557;
Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad, 175 U.
S. 348.
In
Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad v. Matthews,
174 U. S. 96, the
majority of the Court decided that, in consequence of the great
peril and possibility of fires' being communicated by
Page 176 U. S. 120
the locomotives of railroad corporations, it was in the power of
the State of Kansas to impose on them, in a suit successful against
them, an attorney's fee, and not impose it on an unsuccessful
plaintiff. It was said by MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after a review of the
cases, that --
"It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are
cast duties and burdens different from those resting upon the
general public. Thus, when the legislature imposes on railroad
corporations a double liability for stock killed by passing trains,
it says in effect that if suit be brought against a railroad
company for stock killed by one of its trains, it must enter into
the courts under conditions different from those resting on
ordinary suitors. If it is beaten in the suit, it must pay, not
only the damage which it has done, but twice that amount. If it
succeeds, it recovers nothing. On the other hand, if it should sue
an individual for destruction of its livestock, it could under no
circumstances recover any more than the value of that stock. So
that it may be said that, in matter of liability in case of
litigation, it is not placed on an equality with other corporations
and individuals; yet this Court has unanimously said that this
differentiation of liability, this inequality of right in the
courts, is of no significance upon the question of
constitutionality. Indeed, the very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality."
174 U.S.
174 U. S.
106.
In the case at bar, the distinction is between tracts of
agricultural lands in a certain relation to cities and lands used
for other purposes in such relation.
We think the distinction is justified by the principle of the
cases we have cited. That principle leaves to the state the
adaptation of its laws to its conditions. The growth of cities is
inevitable, and in providing for their expansion, it may be the
judgment of an agricultural state that they should find a limit in
the lands actually used for agriculture. Such use, it could be
taken for granted, would only be temporary. Other uses, certainly
those to which the plaintiff puts its lands, can receive all the
benefits of the growth of a city, and not be
Page 176 U. S. 121
moved to submit to the burdens. Besides, such uses or
manufacturing uses adjacent to a city may, for its order and
health, need control. Affecting it differently from what farming
uses do may justify, if not require, their inclusion within the
municipal jurisdiction.
We think, therefore, that within the latitude which local
government must be allowed, the distinction is not arbitrary, and
infringes no provision of the Constitution of the United
States.
Judgment affirmed.
