Under the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 638, giving the Court of
Claims jurisdiction over claims for property of citizens of the
United States taken or destroyed by Indians, no jurisdiction is
given to the court over a claim for merely consequential damages
resulting to the owner of property so taken by reason of the
taking, but not directly caused by the Indians.
This case comes to us on appeal from the Court of Claims. The
matter of dispute is disclosed by the second and fourth findings of
the court, which are as follows:
"Second. On the 26th day of June, 1847, near the Arkansas River,
on the route from Western Missouri to Santa Fe at a place in what
is now the State of Kansas, Indians belonging to the Osage tribe
took and drove away 32 head of oxen, the property of said decedent,
which at the time and place of taking
Page 174 U. S. 374
were reasonably worth the sum of four hundred dollars
($400)."
"At the time said oxen were taken, they were being used by said
decedent in the transportation of goods along the route aforesaid,
and in consequence of such taking, decedent was compelled to
abandon the trip, and to sell his portion of said goods and four
(4) wagons belonging to him for the sum of one thousand two hundred
dollars ($1,200)."
"The goods and wagons of said decedent at the time of the
depredation were reasonably worth the sum of seven thousand six
hundred dollars ($7,600)."
"Said property was taken as aforesaid without just cause or
provocation on the part of the owner or his agent in charge and has
not been returned or paid for."
"Fourth. A claim for the property so taken was presented to the
Interior Department in June, 1872, and evidence was filed in
support thereof."
Judgment in that court was entered for $400 (33 Ct.Cl. 106), to
review which judgment the petitioner appealed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The fourth finding simply shows that a claim was presented to
the Interior Department, and evidence filed in support thereof. The
petition alleges not merely the fact of the presentation of the
claim and of the filing of evidence to sustain it, but also an
award by the secretary of the amount of $6,800 -- a sum covering
both the value of the property taken by the Indians, and the
consequential damages resulting therefrom. A demurrer by the
defendants having been overruled, a traverse was filed denying all
the allegations of the petition.
Page 174 U. S. 375
Taking the pleadings with the findings, we might justly assume
that there had never been any award by the Secretary of the
Interior, but only a presentation of a claim, and evidence in
support thereof, but we notice that the Court of Claims speaks of
the award as though it was a fact found. We feel therefore
constrained to consider the case on that basis.
The conclusions of the Secretary, both as to liability and
amount, were placed before the court for consideration by the
election of the defendants to reopen the case. This election opened
the whole case.
Leighton v. United States, 161 U.
S. 291.
The liability of the defendants is not disputed. The single
question presented is as to the amount which may be recovered. The
value of the property taken was awarded, and the only question is
whether the plaintiff was entitled not merely to the value of that
property, but also to the damages to other property which resulted
as a consequence of the taking. The property which was not taken or
destroyed, which remained in the possession of the plaintiff's
intestate, which he could do with as he pleased -- the title and
possession of which were not disturbed -- was, as the findings
show, reasonably worth $7,600. Because out in the unoccupied
territory in which the taking of the oxen took place there was no
market, and because he had no means of transporting the property
not taken to a convenient market, he was subject to the whim or
caprice of a passing traveler, and sold it to him for $1,200. The
loss thereby entailed upon him he claims to recover under the
provisions of the statute of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat.
851.
The right of the plaintiff to recover is a purely statutory
right. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims cannot be enlarged
by implication. It matters not what may seem to this Court
equitable, or what obligation we may deem ought to be assumed by
the government, or the Indian tribe whose members were guilty of
this depredation, we cannot go beyond the language of the statute
and impose a liability which the government has not declared its
willingness to assume. It is useless to cite all the authorities --
for they are many -- upon the proposition. It is an axiom of our
jurisprudence. The government
Page 174 U. S. 376
is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its
liability in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of
the statute authorizing it.
See, among other cases,
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.
S. 163,
155 U. S. 166,
in which this Court said:
"The United States cannot be sued in their courts without their
consent, and, in granting such consent, congress has an absolute
discretion to specify the cases and contingencies in which the
liability of the government is submitted to the courts for judicial
determination. Beyond the letter of such consent the courts may not
go, no matter how beneficial they may deem, or in fact might be,
their possession of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities of
the government."
Now the jurisdiction given by the act of 1891 to the Court of
Claims is over "all claims for property of citizens of the United
States taken or destroyed by Indians," etc. So far as any property
was taken or destroyed by the Indians, the judgment of the Court of
Claims awards full compensation therefor, and no question is made
as to the judgment in that respect. The single contention of the
plaintiff is that, because of the taking of certain property, the
value of other property not taken or destroyed was, under the
conditions surrounding the petitioner and such property,
diminished. This diminution in value did not arise because of any
change in its quality or condition, but simply because the
petitioner, left in possession of that property, was, in
consequence of the taking away of the means of transportation,
unable to carry it to a place where its full value could be
realized. In other words, the damages which he thus claims do not
consist in the value of property taken or destroyed, but are those
which flow, in consequence of the taking, to property which is
neither taken nor destroyed. In brief, he asks consequential
damages. Now, as we have said, we are not at liberty to consider
whether there may not be some equitable claim against the
government or the Indians for such consequential damages. We are
limited to the statutory description of the obligations which the
government is willing to assume and which it has submitted to the
Court of Claims for determination. We may not enter into the wide
question of how far an individual taking or destroying property
Page 174 U. S. 377
belonging to another may be liable for all the damages which are
consequential upon such injury or destruction. If Congress had seen
fit to open the doors of the court to an inquiry into these
matters, doubtless many questions of difficulty might arise, but,
as it has only declared its willingness to subject the government
to liability for property taken or destroyed, we may not go beyond
that and adjudge a liability not based upon the taking or
destruction of property, but resulting from the destruction or
taking of certain property to other property not taken or
destroyed. Questions, such as arose in
Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, as to the scope of
constitutional limitations upon the right to take property without
full compensation, are not pertinent to the present inquiry, for
while, if the court had free hand and could adjudge a liability
upon the government commensurate to the wrong done, one conclusion
might follow therefrom, yet we are limited by the other fact that
the liability of the government to suit is a matter resting in its
discretion, and cannot be enlarged beyond the terms of the act
permitting it. Consequential damages to property not taken or
destroyed are not within the scope of the act authorizing recovery
for damages to property taken or destroyed.
We have thus far considered the case as though it were one
de novo, and in no way affected by prior proceedings in
the Interior Department. As heretofore indicated, notwithstanding
the limited scope of the findings, we think we ought, in view of
the opinion of the Court of Claims, to consider the case in the
attitude of one for which an award had been made by the Secretary
of the Interior, that award including not merely damages for the
property taken and destroyed, but also what, as we have shown, were
merely consequential damages. Here we are met by the contention of
the plaintiff that larger jurisdiction is given to the Court of
Claims in respect to matters thus determined by the Secretary of
the Interior. Beyond the general jurisdiction given to the extent
heretofore indicated by the quotation from the statute is this,
expressed in the subsequent part of the same section:
"Second. Such jurisdiction shall also extend to all cases
Page 174 U. S. 378
which have been examined and allowed by the Interior Department
and also to such cases as were authorized to be examined under the
act of Congress making appropriations for the current and
contingent expenses of the Indian department, and for fulfilling
treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes for the year ending
June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-six, and for other
purposes, approved March third, eighteen nundred and eighty-five,
and under subsequent acts, subject however, to the limitations
hereinafter provided."
It is contended that in cases coming under this clause, the
Court of Claims may award all damages which the Secretary of the
Interior has, or might have, given to the petitioner. Conceding for
the purpose of the argument that this contention is justified, we
cannot see that therefrom any new measure of liability is
established, or at least none that will avail this petitioner. The
Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 376, c. 341, which provided for the
investigation by the Interior Department of claims on account of
Indian depredations, and under which it is alleged that the
Secretary acted in making his award, authorized the Secretary "to
determine the kind and value of all property damaged or destroyed
by reason of the depredations aforesaid." The contention is that
the terms "damaged or destroyed" enlarge the scope of the liability
assumed by the government. We are unable to perceive that this is
of any significance in this case. The property left in the
possession of the petitioner was neither damaged nor destroyed by
the action of the Indians in taking away the other property. Its
inherent intrinsic value was in no manner disturbed. The damages
were not to the property, considered as property, but simply
consequential from the wrong done, and consisted solely in the fact
that the petitioner, wronged by the taking away of certain
property, was unable to realize the real value of property not
taken, damaged, or destroyed. Nothing was done by the Indians to
disturb the intrinsic value of the property left in possession of
the petitioner. It remained his, with full right of control and
disposition, in no manner
Page 174 U. S. 379
marred or changed in value, and the sum of the injury results
only from the fact that he could not remove it to a suitable
market. The property, in itself considered, was neither taken,
damaged, nor destroyed. The only result was that his ability to
make use of that value was taken away because his means of
transportation were destroyed. The damages were therefore
consequential, and not to the property itself. We do not perceive
how, under the statute, the liability of the govern ment was
enlarged by this fact.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, and MR. JUSTICE McKENNA
dissented.