Depositions, taken according to the proviso in the thirtieth
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, chapter twenty, under a
dedimus potestatem, "according to common usage, when it
may be necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice," are
under no circumstances to be considered as taken
de bene
esse, whether the witnesses reside beyond the process of the
court or within it; the provisions of the act relative to
depositions
de bene esse being confined to those taken
under the enacting part of the section.
WASHINGTON, JUSTICE, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 17 U. S. 509
The only question certified by the Circuit Court for the
District of Delaware to this Court is whether certain depositions,
taken under a commission issued from that court to Philadelphia,
could, under the circumstances of the case, be given in evidence to
the jury?
This question arises out of the following facts:
On 25 October 1817, a consent rule was entered in this case
"for a commission to issue to take depositions on both sides, to
be directed to Thomas Bradford, Jr., and William J. Duane, of
Philadelphia; interrogatories to be filed on ten days' notice."
The agreement of the counsel under which this rule was entered
was filed in court on 11 November of the same year. On 27 October,
1817, an
ex parte rule was entered on the motion of the
defendants' counsel,
"for a commission to issue to the City of Philadelphia, on the
part of the defendants, to be directed to George Vaux and William
Smith, or either of them, commissioners on the part of the
defendants, on ten days' notice of filing interrogatories, with
liberty to the plaintiff's counsel to name a commissioner or
commissioners, if they should choose to do so, at any time before
issuing the commission."
After the counsel for the lessor of the plaintiff had opened his
case, and gone through his evidence, the counsel for the
defendants, having opened his case, offered to give in evidence to
the jury sundry depositions of witnesses, taken under a commission
to Philadelphia, bearing date 31 October, 1817, directed to George
Vaux and William Smith, or
Page 17 U. S. 510
either of them, and to George M. Dallas and Richard Bache, or
either of them. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff's
counsel, on the ground that the depositions so taken were to be
considered, in point of law, as taken
de bene esse. In
support of this evidence, the defendants stated, and the opposite
counsel admitted, that previous to the execution of this
commission, an agreement had been entered into, that the same
should be executed by George M. Dallas one of the commissioners on
the part of the plaintiff, and George Vaux, another of the
commissioners on the part of the defendants, and that it was
further agreed, and so endorsed on the commission, that the said
George Vaux might be permitted to take a solemn affirmation,
instead of an oath, and that the commissioners who should act,
might be qualified by any alderman of Philadelphia, and their
clerk, by the commissioners; and which agreements were entered into
upon the application of the defendants' counsel. He further gave in
evidence that commissions had heretofore issued to Philadelphia and
other places within 100 miles of the place of trial, from the
circuit court for that district, upon motions made for that
purpose, and that upon motion, commissions had issued to
Philadelphia, and to other places without the state, from the
Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, previous and subsequent to
the year 1789. That upon the return of the commission in this case,
publication thereof was ordered by the court, and lastly that all
the witnesses examined in the execution of the
Page 17 U. S. 511
said commission, resided in Philadelphia, distant 33 miles from
the place of holding the court.
It is contended by the plaintiff's counsel that as, by the 6th
section of the Act of 2 March, 1793, subpoenas for witnesses may
run into any other district than that in which the court is holden,
provided that in civil causes, the witnesses do not live at a
greater distance than 100 miles from the place of holding the
court, the deposition in this case ought not to have been received
unless it had appeared to the court that the witnesses had been
duly summoned, and were unable to attend. This argument appears to
be founded upon the provision of the 30th section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20, to which this case has no relation. That
section authorizes the taking of depositions in the specified
cases, without the formality of a commission, but declares, that
the depositions so taken, shall be
de bene esse, and to
prevent any conclusion from being drawn against the power of the
courts to grant commissions for taking depositions, by reason of
the above provisions, this section goes on to provide that nothing
in the said section contained shall be construed to prevent any
court of the United States from granting a
dedimus
potestatem to take depositions, according to common usage,
when it may be necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice,
which power it is declared they shall severally possess.
The only question then is whether depositions taken under a
dedimus potestatem, according to common usage, are, under
any circumstances, to be considered as taken
de bene esse?
And it is the opinion
Page 17 U. S. 512
of this Court that they cannot be so considered. What might be
the effect of the agreement of the parties or of an order of the
court to the contrary need not be decided in this case as the rule,
as well as the commission which issued under it, was absolute and
unqualified. Whenever a commission issues for taking depositions,
according to common usage, whether the witness reside beyond the
process of the court, or within it, the depositions are absolute,
the above section of the act of Congress relating to depositions
de bene esse, being most obviously confined to those taken
under the enacting part of that section.
But it is contended by the plaintiff's counsel that this
commission to take depositions of witnesses living within 100 miles
from the place at which the court was to sit, although in another
district, was improvidently issued, and that the rule under which
it issued was erroneously made. Whether this objection ought or
ought not to have been made, at the time or during the term when
the rule was entered, is a question which does not occur in this
case; because, it is most obvious from the conduct of the
plaintiff's counsel in the court below that if they did not agree
to the rule, the commission was issued with their consent. A
consent rule was entered on 25 October, differing from the
ex
parte rule, entered two days afterwards, in no other respect,
but as to the names of the commissioners. The plaintiff's counsel
afterwards joined in the commission, removed every possible
objection as to the commissioners, by naming one on the part of the
plaintiff, to act with one of the defendants'
Page 17 U. S. 513
commissioners, and filed his cross-interrogatories, to be
propounded to the witnesses. The commission was executed by the
commissioners so named, and the witnesses were regularly examined,
as well on the cross-interrogatories, as on those in chief. After
such unequivocal evidence of consent to the issuing of the
commission, it is not competent to the plaintiff's counsel to
object, that it issued improvidently, or that the rule was
improperly obtained.
It is to be certified to the circuit court for the District of
Delaware, that the depositions taken under the commission, referred
to in the transcript of the record sent to this Court, dated 31
October 1817, ought to be given in evidence to the jury, upon the
trial of the cause in which they were taken.
Certificate accordingly.