A vessel and cargo which is liable to capture as enemy's
property or for sailing under the pass or license of the enemy or
for trading with the enemy may be seized after her arrival in a
port of the United States and condemned as a prize of war. The
delictum is not purged by the termination of the
voyage.
Any citizen may seize any property forfeited to the use of the
government, either by the municipal law, or as a prize of war, in
order to enforce the forfeiture, and it depends upon the government
whether it will act upon the seizure; if it proceeds to enforce the
forfeiture by legal process, this is a sufficient confirmation of
the seizure.
Page 17 U. S. 101
STORY, JUSTICE, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the case of an American ship which sailed from
Charleston, South Carolina, with a cargo of rice, bound to Lisbon,
about 28 May, 1813, under the protection of a British license. In
the course of the voyage, the ship was captured by a British
frigate and sent into Bermuda for adjudication. Upon trial, she was
acquitted and her cargo, being prohibited from exportation, was
afterwards sold by the agent of the claimant at Bermuda, and the
proceeds were remitted for his use. The ship sailed from Bermuda
for the United States in November, 1813, and upon her arrival at
Newport in Rhode Island, was seized by the collector of that port
as forfeited to the United States. The libel contains four articles
propounding the causes of forfeiture -- first for the ship's having
on board and using a British license; secondly for the ship's being
engaged in trade with the enemy; and thirdly and fourthly for using
a British license, contrary to the Act of Congress of 2 August,
1813, ch. 56, prohibiting the use of British licenses.
It is unnecessary to consider the last two articles,
Page 17 U. S. 102
which are founded upon statutable prohibitions, because it is
clear, that the two preceding articles, founded on the general law
of prize, are sufficient to justify a condemnation
jure
belli, the proof of the facts being most clearly
established.
The only questions which can arise in the case are whether the
ship was liable to seizure for the asserted forfeiture after her
arrival in port, and if so whether the collector had authority to
make the seizure. And we are clearly of opinion in favor of the
United States on both points. It is not necessary, to enable the
government to enforce condemnation in this case, that there should
be a capture on the high seas. By the general law of war, every
American ship sailing under the pass or license of the enemy or
trading with the enemy is deemed to be an enemy's ship and
forfeited as prize. If captured on the high seas by a commissioned
vessel, the property may be condemned to the captors as enemy's
property; if captured by an uncommissioned ship, the capture is
still valid and the property must be condemned to the United
States. But the right of the government to the forfeiture is not
founded on the capture; it arises from its general authority to
seize all enemies' property coming into our ports during war, and
also from its authority to enforce a forfeiture against its own
citizens whenever the property comes within its reach. If, indeed,
the mere arrival in port would purge away the forfeiture, it would
afford the utmost impunity to persons engaged in illegal traffic
during war, for in most instances the government
Page 17 U. S. 103
would have no means of ascertaining the offense until after such
arrival.
In respect to the other point, it is a general rule that any
person may seize any property forfeited to the use of the
government, either by the municipal law or by the law of prize, for
the purpose of enforcing the forfeiture. And it depends upon the
government itself whether it will act upon the seizure. If it
adopts the acts of the party and proceeds to enforce the forfeiture
by legal process, this is a sufficient recognition and confirmation
of the seizure, and is of equal validity in law with an original
authority given to the party to make the seizure. The confirmation
acts retroactively, and is equivalent to a command.
Decree affirmed with costs.