The statute of New York of 1885, c. 448, providing that deeds
from the Comptroller of the lands in the forest preserve sold for
nonpayment of taxes shall, after having been recorded for two
years, and in any action brought more than six months after the act
takes effect, be conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity
in the assessment of the taxes, is a statute of limitations, and
does not deprive the former owner of such lands of his property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.
This was an action of replevin, brought April 11, 1887, in
behalf of the State of New York, by the forest commissioners of the
state against Turner, in the Supreme Court of the County of
Franklin, and State of New York, to recover a quantity of logs cut
by him upon lands in that county, and within the forest preserve of
the state, between September 1, 1886, and March 25, 1887. The
answer denied the allegations of the complaint, and alleged that at
the time mentioned therein the defendant was the owner and in
possession of the lands.
The material facts of the case, as found by a referee, were as
follows: on October 12, 1877, the lands, being then owned by one
Norton, were sold by the Comptroller of the State of New York for
unpaid taxes of the years from 1866 to 1870, inclusive, and were
bid in by the comptroller in behalf of the state, and conveyed by
him to the state by deed dated June 9, 1881, and recorded June 8,
1882. The defendant, more than nine years after that sale, acquired
Norton's title in the land. The land was wild forest land,
uncultivated, unimproved, unenclosed, and with no dwelling house or
other building thereon. Neither the state nor any officer thereof
ever took actual possession of the land, and no part of it was in
occupancy of any person on October 12, 1879, when the
Page 168 U. S. 91
period of two years allowed by law for redemption from the
comptroller's sale expired.
At the trial before the referee, the defendant, in order to
prove the invalidity of the comptroller's deed by reason of
illegality in the assessment of the taxes for the years 1867 and
1870, offered to show that the oath of the assessors to the
assessment roll of 1867 was taken on August 10th, instead of on the
third Tuesday of August, and that the assessors omitted to meet on
the third Tuesday of August, 1870, to review their assessments for
that year.
The plaintiff objected to the evidence as immaterial, because
the comptroller's deed was made conclusive evidence of those
matters by the statute of New York of 1885 (chapter 448), which is
copied in the margin.
* The defendant
contended that this
Page 168 U. S. 92
statute was invalid, as contrary to the first section of the
fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. But the referee sustained the plaintiff's objection to the
evidence, and directed judgment for the plaintiff, which was
accordingly rendered by the court, and affirmed by the court of
appeals. 145 N.Y. 451. The defendant sued out this writ of
error.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the court.
On May 15, 1885, the Legislature of New York, by the statute of
1885, c. 283, declared that all the lands then owned or thereafter
acquired by the State of New York within in certain counties (one
of which was Franklin County) should constitute and be known as the
"Forest Preserve;" and established a forest commission of three
persons, styled "Forest Commissioners," to "have the care, custody,
control and superintendence of the
Page 168 U. S. 93
forest preserve," and "to maintain and protect the forests now
in the forest preserve, and to promote as far as practicable the
further growth of forests thereon," and authorized them to appoint
a warden and other officers, and to exercise various powers to
carry out its object.
At the date of the passage of that statute, the time allowed by
law for the redemption of lands from sale by the comptroller for
nonpayment of taxes was two years from the time of sale. New York
Stat. 1855, c. 427, § 50.
On June 9, 1885, the legislature of the state passed the statute
of 1885, c. 448, to take immediate effect, which provided that all
conveyances thereafter executed by the comptroller of lands in the
same counties, sold by him for nonpayment of taxes, and having been
recorded for two years in the clerk's office of the county in which
the lands lay, should,
"six months after this act takes effect, be conclusive evidence
that the sale and all proceedings prior thereto, from and including
the assessment of the land, and all notices required by law to be
given previous to the expiration of the two years allowed by law to
redeem, were regular,"
and as required by law; but that all such conveyances and the
taxes and tax sales on which they were based should
"be subject to cancellation, as now provided by law, on a direct
application to the comptroller, or an action brought before a
competent court therefor, by reason of the legal payment of such
taxes, or by reason of the levying or such taxes by a town or ward
having no legal right to assess the land on which they are
laid."
The land now in question was sold by the comptroller to the
state October 12, 1877. The time allowed by law for redeeming the
land from that sale expired October 12, 1879. The comptroller's
deed to the state was made June 9, 1881, and recorded June 8, 1882.
It had therefore been on record for three years when the statute of
June 9, 1885, was passed and took effect, and by the terms of this
statute, on December 9, 1885, the comptroller's deed became
conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the
assessment of any of the taxes for nonpayment of which the land had
been sold and
Page 168 U. S. 94
conveyed to the state. This action was brought April 11,
1887.
The statute, according to its principal intent and effect, and
as construed by the Court of Appeals of the state, was a statute of
limitations.
People v. Turner, 117 N.Y. 227;
Same v.
Same, 145 N.Y. 451. It is well settled that a statute
shortening the period of limitation is within the constitutional
power of the legislature, provided a reasonable time, taking into
consideration the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an
action after the passage of the statute, and before the bar takes
effect.
Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
628,
95 U. S.
632-633;
In re Brown, 135
U. S. 701,
135 U. S.
705-707.
The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed to
the state for nonpayment of taxes. It applies to those cases only
in which the conveyance has been of record for two years in the
office where all conveyances of lands within the county are
recorded, and it does not bar any action begun within six months
after its passage. Independently of the consideration that, before
the passage of the statute, the plaintiff had had eight years since
the sale, and three years since the recording of the deed, during
which he might have asserted his title, this Court concurs with the
highest court of the state in the opinion that the limitation of
six months, as applied to a case of this kind, is not repugnant to
any provision of the Constitution of the United States.
It was argued in behalf of the plaintiff in error that the
statute was unconstitutional because it did not allow him any
opportunity to assert his rights, even within six months after its
passage. But the statute did not take away any right of action
which he had before its passage, but merely limited the time within
which he might assert such a right. Within the six months, he had
every remedy which he would have had before the passage of the
statute. If he had no remedy before, the statute took none away.
From the judgments of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar and
in the subsequent case of
People v. Roberts, 151 N.Y. 540,
there would appear to have been some difference of opinion in that
court upon the question whether his proper remedy was by direct
application
Page 168 U. S. 95
to the comptroller to cancel the sale or by action of ejectment
against the comptroller or the forest commissioners. But as that
court has uniformly held that he had a remedy, it is not for us to
determine what that remedy was under the local constitution and
laws.
It was also argued that the plaintiff in error was in possession
of the land, and could not be put to his action. But the decision
below that he was not in possession involved no federal question,
or any other question of law, but a mere inference of fact from the
evidence, which this Court is not authorized to review on writ of
error.
Dower v. Richards, 151 U.
S. 658;
Egan v. Hart, 165 U.
S. 188.
Judgment affirmed.
*
"An act to amend chapter four hundred and twenty-seven of the
Laws of Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-Five, entitled 'An act in
relation to the collection of taxes on lands of nonresidents and to
provide for the sale of such lands for unpaid taxes.'"
"Section 1. Section sixty-five of chapter four hundred and
twenty-seven of the Laws of Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-Five,
entitled 'An act in relation to the collection of taxes on lands of
nonresidents and to provide for the sale of such lands for unpaid
taxes,' is hereby amended so as to read as follows:"
"§ 65. Such conveyances shall be executed by the comptroller
under his hand and seal, and the execution thereof shall be
witnessed by the treasurer or deputy comptroller, and all such
conveyances that have been heretofore executed by the comptroller,
and all conveyances of the same lands by his grantee or grantees
therein named, after having been recorded for two years in the
office of the clerk of the county in which the lands conveyed
thereby are located, and all outstanding certificates of a tax sale
heretofore held by the comptroller that shall have remained in
force for two years after the last day allowed by law to redeem
from such sale shall, six months after this act takes effect, be
conclusive evidence that the sale and all proceedings prior
thereto, from and including the assessment of the land, and all
notices required by law to be given previous to the expiration of
the two years allowed by law to redeem, were regular and were
regularly given, published and served according to the provisions
of this act, and all laws directing or requiring the same or in any
manner relating thereto, and all other conveyances or certificates
heretofore or hereafter executed or issued by the comptroller,
shall be presumptive evidence of the regularity or all the said
proceedings and matters hereinbefore recited, and shall be
conclusive evidence thereof from and after the expiration of two
years from the date of recording such other conveyances, or of four
years from and after the date of issuing such other certificates.
But all such conveyances and certificates and the taxes and tax
sales on which they are based shall be subject to cancellation, as
now provided by law, on a direct application to the comptroller, or
an action brought before a competent court therefor, by reason of
the legal payment of such taxes, or by reason of the levying of
such taxes by a town or ward having no legal right to assess the
land on which they are laid."
"§ 2. The provisions of this act are hereby made applicable only
to the following counties,
viz., Clinton, Delaware, Essex,
Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Hamilton, Herkimer, Lewis, Saratoga,
St.Lawrence, Sullivan, Ulster, Warren and Washington, but shall not
affect any action, proceeding or application pending at the time of
its passage; nor any action that shall be begun, proceeding taken
or application duly made within six months thereafter for the
purpose of vacating any tax sale or any conveyance or certificate
of sale made thereunder."
"§ 3. This act shall take effect immediately."
