The enforcement
in rem of the lien upon a vessel,
created by the Public Statutes of Massachusetts, c.192, §§ 14-19,
for repairs and supplies in her home port is exclusively within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
This was a petition to the Superior Court of the County of
Suffolk and State of Massachusetts, under section 17 of chapter 192
of the Public Statutes of Massachusetts (the material provisions of
which are copied in the margin
*), by the
Atlantic
Page 167 U. S. 607
Works, a corporation established by the laws of that state, and
having its usual place of business at Boston, in that county, to
enforce a lien upon the tugboat
Glide, whose home port was
Boston, for labor performed and materials furnished in
Page 167 U. S. 608
repairing her at that port, under a contract between the
petitioner and Jonathan Chase, one of her owners, all of whom
resided in Boston, and were named in the petition.
Upon the filing of the petition, the court issued a writ
commanding the sheriff to attach the vessel and to summon her
owners to answer. The vessel was attached accordingly, and her
owners appeared and moved to dismiss the petition for want of
jurisdiction because the subject matter was a matter of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, and therefore within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The court granted
the motion and dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Judicial Court of the state, the majority of which held
that the state court had jurisdiction of the proceedings under the
statute, and therefore reversed the order dismissing the petition.
157 Mass. 525.
The respondents thereupon filed an answer, without waiving their
motion to dismiss, and at the trial requested the court to rule
that it had no jurisdiction for the reason stated in that motion.
But the superior court ruled that it had jurisdiction, rendered
judgment for the petitioner, and ordered a sale of the vessel in
accordance with the statute, and exceptions to the ruling were
overruled by the Supreme Judicial Court. 159 Mass. 60. The
respondents sued out this writ of error, addressed to the superior
court, in which the record remained.
Page 167 U. S. 609
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the lien given by a statute
of Massachusetts for repairs made upon a vessel in her home port,
under a contract with her owners or their agent, may be enforced
against her by petition in a court of the state, as provided in
that statute, or can be enforced only in an admiralty court of the
United States. The diverse inferences drawn from the previous
judgments of this Court, in the careful opinions of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and of the dissenting judges in the
case at bar, have induced us to state with some fullness the
reasons and authorities which have influenced our conclusion.
The most convenient way of tracing the development of the law
upon this subject will be to consider the principal decisions of
this Court in chronological order, first referring to the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes of the United States
which lie at the foundation of the whole matter.
By the Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section
2, "the judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." And by provisions, still in force, of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the district courts of the United
States
"shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several states, .
. . original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the
right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it."
Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 9; 1 Stat. 76; Rev.Stat. §
563, cl. 8; § 711, cl. 3.
The leading case in this Court upon the subject of admiralty
jurisdiction over suits by materialmen is
The General
Smith, decided at February term, 1819, in which a decree of
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland
sustaining a libel
in rem filed in the district court for
supplies furnished to a ship in Baltimore, her home port, was
reversed by this Court for the reasons stated in its opinion,
delivered by Mr. Justice Story, as follows:
"No doubt is entertained by this Court that the admiralty
Page 167 U. S. 610
rightfully possesses a general jurisdiction in cases of
materialmen, and if this had been a suit
in personam,
there would not have been any hesitation in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the district court. Where, however, the proceeding
is
in rem to enforce a specific lien, it is incumbent upon
those who seek the aid of the court to establish the existence of
such lien in the particular case. Where repairs have been made, or
necessaries have been furnished to a foreign ship, or to a ship in
a port of the state to which she does not belong, the general
maritime law, following the civil law, gives the party a lien on
the ship itself for his security, and he may well maintain a suit
in rem in the admiralty to enforce his right. But, in
respect to repairs and necessaries in the port or state to which
the ship belongs, the case is governed altogether by the municipal
law of that state, and no lien is implied unless it is recognized
by that law. Now it has been long settled, whether originally upon
the soundest principles it is now too late to inquire, that by the
common law, which is the law of Maryland, materialmen and mechanics
furnishing repairs to a domestic ship have no particular lien upon
the ship itself for the recovery of their demands. A shipwright,
indeed, who has taken a ship into his own possession to repair it,
is not bound to part with the possession until he is paid for the
repairs, any more than any other artificer. But if he has once
parted with the possession, or has worked upon it without taking
possession, he is not deemed a privileged creditor, having any
claim upon the ship itself. Without, therefore, entering into a
discussion of the particular circumstances of this case, we are of
opinion that here there was not, by the principles of law, any lien
upon the ship; and consequently the decree of the circuit court
must be reversed."
17 U. S. 4 Wheat.
438,
17 U. S.
443.
The law there stated as to repairs or supplies in a foreign port
has been since constantly recognized, and never doubted.
The St. Jago de
Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409,
22 U. S. 417;
The Virgin, 8
Pet. 538,
33 U. S. 550;
The Laura, 19
How. 22,
60 U. S. 28;
The Grapeshot,
9 Wall. 129,
76 U. S. 136;
The Lulu, 10
Wall. 192;
The Kalorama,
10 Wall. 204;
The Patapsco,
13 Wall. 329;
The Emily
Souder, 17 Wall. 666;
The Kate,
164 U. S. 458,
164 U. S.
466.
Page 167 U. S. 611
The only point directly adjudged in
The General Smith
was that there was no lien for repairs or supplies in the home port
which could be enforced
in rem in admiralty, unless such a
lien was recognized by the local law of the state. But the opinion
clearly implied that, if so recognized, the lien could be enforced
in rem in a court of the United States, sitting in
admiralty.
Accordingly, in the case of
The Planter at January
term, 1833, it was decided that a lien upon a vessel, given by the
local law, for repairs in her home port, could be enforced by suit
in rem in admiralty in the district court of the United
States. Mr. Justice Thompson, delivering the unanimous opinion of
the Court, said:
"The proceeding is
in rem against a steamboat, for
materials found and work performed in repairing the vessel in the
port of New Orleans, as is alleged in the libel, under a contract
entered into between the parties for that purpose. It is therefore
a maritime contract, and if the service was to be performed in a
place within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and the lien given
by the local law of the State of Louisiana, it will bring the case
within the jurisdiction of the court. By the Civil Code of
Louisiana, art. 2748, workmen employed in the construction or
repair of ships and boats enjoy the privilege established by the
Code, without being bound to reduce their contracts to writing,
whatever may be their amount; but this privilege ceases if they
have allowed the ship or boat to depart without exercising their
right. The state law therefore gives a lien in cases like the
present."
He then referred to the case of
The General Smith as
having "decided that the jurisdiction of the admiralty in such
cases, where the repairs are upon a domestic vessel, depends upon
the local law of the state," and after substantially repeating part
of the opinion of Mr. Justice Story, above quoted, ending with the
statement that, for repairs or supplies of a ship in her home port,
no lien is implied, unless recognized by local law, he added: "But,
if the local law gives the lien, it may be enforced in the
admiralty."
32 U. S. 7 Pet.
324,
32 U. S.
341.
The principle of the decision in the case of
The
Planter was stated by Mr. Justice Story at January term, 1837,
as
Page 167 U. S. 612
follows:
"In that case, the repairs of the vessel for which the state
laws created a lien were made at New Orleans, on tidewaters. The
contract was treated as a maritime contract, and the lien under the
state laws was enforced in the admiralty upon the ground that the
court, under such circumstances, had jurisdiction of the contract
as maritime, and then the lien, being attached to it, might be
enforced according to the mode of administering remedies in the
admiralty. The local laws can never confer jurisdiction on the
courts of the United States. They can only furnish rules to
ascertain the rights of parties, and thus assist in the
administration of the proper remedies, where the jurisdiction is
vested by the laws of the United States."
The Orleans,
11 Pet. 175,
36 U. S. 184.
The libel against the
Orleans was dismissed, upon the
ground that the vessel was not engaged in maritime trade or
navigation, and that the admiralty had no jurisdiction of the
claims made by a part owner and by the master.
In the case of
The Yankee Blade, at December Term,
1856, the nature of a maritime lien was clearly and exactly defined
by Mr. Justice Grier, speaking for this Court, as follows:
"The maritime 'privilege' or lien is adopted from the civil law,
and imports a tacit hypothecation of the subject of it. It is a
'
jus in re,' without actual possession or any right of
possession. It accompanies the property into the hands of a
bona fide purchaser. It can be executed and divested only
by a proceeding
in rem. This sort of proceeding against
personal property is unknown to the common law, and is peculiar to
the process of courts of admiralty. The foreign and other
attachments of property in the state courts, though by analogy
loosely termed 'proceedings
in rem,' are evidently not
within the category."
60 U. S. 19 How. 82,
60 U. S. 89.
The question of the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States over cases like that now before the
Court became at one time entangled in the question of the effect of
the regulation of pleading and procedure in admiralty by this Court
under the power conferred upon it by the Acts of Congress of May 8,
1792, c. 36, § 2, and August 23, 1842, c. 188, § 6. 1 Stat. 276; 5
Stat. 518.
Page 167 U. S. 613
The twelfth of the "Rules of Practice of the Courts of the
United States in Causes of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction on
the Instance Side of the Court -- in pursuance of the act of the
23d of August, 1842, c. 188," promulgated by this Court at December
Term, 1844, to take effect September 1, 1845, was as follows:
"In all suits by materialmen for supplies or repairs or other
necessaries for a foreign ship or for a ship in a foreign port, the
libellant may proceed against the ship and freight
in rem,
or against the master or the owner alone
in personam. And
the like proceeding
in rem shall apply to cases of
domestic ships, where by the local law a lien is given to
materialmen for supplies, repairs or other necessaries."
3 How. iii., Vi., xiv.
The last clause of that rule was in accord with the previous
judgments of this Court as to such proceedings
in rem in
the cases of
The General Smith, The Planter, and
The
Orleans, above cited.
At December Term, 1858, this Court made an order, to take effect
May 1, 1859, by which Rule 12 was repealed and a new rule
substituted in its place differing from it only in making the last
clause read as follows: "And the like proceeding
in
personam, but not
in rem, shall apply to cases of
domestic ships for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries." 21
How. iv.
The effect of that change in the rule was that where the only
right created by local statutes was a lien upon the ship,
jus
in re, without in any way affecting personal liability, this
new right in the thing could not be enforced in admiralty
in
rem, but only
in personam, and that much difficulty
and embarrassment were thereby created in proceedings in admiralty,
which were not wholly removed by the explanations, in succeeding
opinions of this Court, of the purpose of the change.
In the case of
The Goliah, at December Term, 1858,
decrees of the circuit and district courts of the United States for
the District of California, sustaining a libel
in rem by
the assignee of a claim for coal furnished to a vessel at
Sacramento, her home port, for which claim a lien existed under the
statutes
Page 167 U. S. 614
of California, were reversed by this Court, and the libel
ordered to be dismissed. The principal reason assigned was that the
vessel was engaged in the business of navigation and trade in the
Sacramento River, in the purely internal commerce of the state, not
within the power of Congress to regulate, and therefore not subject
to the admiralty jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering
the opinion, suggested this additional reason:
"We have at this term amended the 12th rule of the admiralty, so
as to take from the district courts the right of proceeding
in
rem against a domestic vessel for supplies and repairs, which
had been assumed upon the authority of a lien given by state laws,
it being conceded that no such lien existed according to the
admiralty law, thereby correcting an error which had its origin in
this Court in the case of
The General Smith, . . . applied
and enforced in the case of [
The Planter], and afterwards
partially corrected in the case of [
The Orleans]. We have
determined to leave all these liens depending upon state laws, and
not arising out of the maritime contract, to be enforced by the
state courts."
62 U. S. 21 How.
248,
62 U. S.
250-251. It appears, by the report and by the briefs on
file, that the question of jurisdiction was not argued by counsel,
and, by the records and docket of this Court, that the case was
decided by this Court February 7, 1859, nearly three months before
the rule of 1858 took effect, and in the district and circuit
courts about three years before.
But that decision, insofar as concerned its principal ground,
was expressly overruled in
The Belfast, 7
Wall. 624,
74 U. S.
640-642, as inconsistent with the series of decisions
from
The Genesee
Chief, 12 How. 443, to
The
Hine, 4 Wall. 555, declaring the admiralty
jurisdiction to extend over all navigable waters, and was not
followed in
The Eagle, 8
Wall. 15,
75 U. S. 21, in
which the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Nelson. And insofar
as it rested on the suggestion of error in
The General
Smith and
The Planter, or on the change in the
twelfth rule, it was in effect overruled by
The
St.Lawrence, 1 Black 522, and
The
Potomac, 2 Black 581.
In
The St.Lawrence, at December Term, 1861, this Court
adjudged that the rule of 1858 had no effect upon a libel filed
Page 167 U. S. 615
while the rule of 1844 was in force, and affirmed a decree
against a vessel for supplies furnished in her home port, for which
the statutes of New York gave a lien, and, in the opinion delivered
by Chief Justice Taney, said that in the case of
The General
Smith,
"the court held that where, upon the principles of the maritime
Code, the supplies are presumed to be furnished upon the credit of
the vessel, or, where a lien is given by the local law, the party
is entitled to proceed
in rem in the admiralty court to
enforce it,"
that that case was decided in 1819, and had ever since been
followed and regarded as a leading case in the admiralty courts,
that its authority had been recognized in the cases of
The
Planter and
The Orleans and other cases, that while
process against the vessel was denied in the case of
The
General Smith because the laws of Maryland gave no lien or
priority, it was used and supported in the case of
The
Planter, upon the ground that the party had a lien upon the
vessel by the law of Louisiana, and, as the contract was within its
jurisdiction, it ought to give him all the rights he had acquired
under it, and that
"when this Court framed the rules in 1844, it of course adhered
to the practice adopted in the previous cases, and by the twelfth
rule authorized the process
in rem where the party was
entitled to a lien under the local or state law."
1 Black
66 U. S.
529-530. And the Court treated the rules of 1844 and
1858 as mere regulations of procedure, under the power conferred
upon this Court by Congress, and liable to be changed from time to
time at the discretion of the court as convenience might require so
far as regarded the return.
Although, as early as February term, 1816, it had been assumed
that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction vested by the
Constitution in the courts of the United States was exclusive, and
could not be exercised by the courts of a state,
Martin v.
Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304,
14 U. S. 337,
14 U. S. 373,
yet the question whether a claim of a maritime nature could be
enforced in the courts of a state by process
in rem under
a statute of the state creating a right in the thing itself and
providing for its enforcement by process essentially like
proceedings
in rem in the admiralty, was not brought into
judgment in this Court
Page 167 U. S. 616
until December term, 1866, when the question was directly
presented in two cases, and was determined in the negative.
The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411;
The
Hine, 4 Wall. 555.
The case of
The Moses Taylor arose under a statute of
the State of California enacting that claims against any vessel for
supplies or materials furnished for her use or repair, and for
breaches of contracts for transportation of persons or property,
and certain other classes of claims, should constitute liens upon
the vessel; that actions upon such claims might be brought directly
against the vessel, and the summons served upon the master or
anyone in charge; that the vessel might be attached as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that might be recovered, and that
if the attachment was not discharged and a judgment was recovered,
the vessel might be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of
the judgment. Upon a writ of error from this Court to the highest
court of the state to which the case could be taken, it was held
that a contract for the transportation of a passenger upon an ocean
voyage, relating exclusively to a service to be performed on the
high seas and pertaining solely to the business of commerce and
navigation, was a maritime contract, and a breach of it an
appropriate subject of maritime jurisdiction, and that the statute
of the state, insofar as it authorized process
in rem in
the courts of the state against the vessel, was unconstitutional as
interfering with the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States.
The case of
The Hine arose under a statute of the State
of Iowa providing for similar proceedings in the courts of the
state in the case of any injury to persons or property by a vessel,
her officers or crew, and that statute, so far as it gave such
process
in rem for a collision between two vessels, was
held to be unconstitutional under the decision in
The Moses
Taylor. Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion,
declared it to be
"the settled law of this Court that wherever the district courts
of the United States have original cognizance of admiralty causes,
by virtue of the act of 1789, that cognizance is exclusive, and no
other court, state or national, can exercise
Page 167 U. S. 617
it, with the exception always of such concurrent remedy as is
given by the common law."
4 Wall.
71 U. S.
568-569.
Each of those two cases was sought to be brought within the
saving clause in section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, as to
which Mr. Justice Field, in
The Moses Taylor, said:
"That clause only saves to suitors 'the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.' It is not a
remedy in the common law courts which is saved, but a common law
remedy. A proceeding
in rem, as used in the admiralty
courts, is not a remedy afforded by the common law; it is a
proceeding under the civil law. When used in the common law courts,
it is given by statute."
4 Wall.
71 U. S. 431. And
Mr. Justice Miller, in
The Hine, said:
"But the remedy pursued in the Iowa courts in the case before us
is in no sense a common law remedy. It is a remedy partaking of all
the essential features of an admiralty proceeding
in rem.
The statute provides that the vessel may be sued and made defendant
without any proceeding against the owners or even mentioning their
names; that a writ may be issued, and the vessel seized, on filing
a petition similar in substance to a libel; that after a notice in
the nature of a monition, the vessel may be condemned, and an order
made for her sale if the liability is established for which she was
sued. Such is the general character of the steamboat laws in the
Western states. While the proceeding differs thus from a common law
remedy, it is also essentially different from what are in the West
called 'suits by attachment,' and in some of the older states
'foreign attachments.' In these cases, there is a suit against a
personal defendant by name, and because of inability to serve
process on him on account of nonresidence, or for some other reason
mentioned in the various statutes allowing attachments to issue,
the suit is commenced by a writ directing the proper officer to
attach sufficient property of the defendant to answer any judgment
which may be rendered against him. This proceeding may be had
against an owner or part owner of a vessel, and his interest thus
subjected to sale in a common law court of the state. Such actions
may also be maintained
in personam against a defendant in
the common law courts,
Page 167 U. S. 618
as the common law gives, all in consistence with the grant of
admiralty powers in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act. But it
could not have been the intention of Congress, by the exception in
that section, to give the suitor all such remedies as might
afterwards be enacted by state statutes, for this would have
enabled the states to make the jurisdiction of their courts
concurrent in all cases by simply providing a statutory remedy for
all cases. Thus the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
would be defeated."
4 Wall.
71 U. S.
571-572.
Again at December term, 1868, in the case of
The
Belfast, a statute of Alabama giving a lien upon the vessel
under a contract of affreightment was held unconstitutional so far
as it provided for the enforcement of the lien in the courts of the
state by proceedings
in rem in the nature of proceedings
in admiralty, because the lien of the shipper was a maritime lien,
and, as was said by Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the
opinion,
"authority does not exist in the state courts to hear and
determine a suit
in rem in admiralty to enforce a maritime
lien, . . . but, in all cases where a maritime lien arises, the
original jurisdiction to enforce the same by a proceeding
in
rem is exclusive in the district courts of the United States,
as provided in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act."
74 U. S. 7 Wall.
624,
74 U. S.
645-646. The dictum uttered by the learned justice
towards the end of the opinion, and afterwards repeated by him in
Leon v.
Galceran, 11 Wall. 185,
78 U. S. 192,
and in
Norton v. Switzer, 93 U. S.
355,
93 U. S. 365,
that
"such a lien does not arise in a contract for materials and
supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port, and in respect to
such contracts it is competent for the states, under the decisions
of this Court, to create such liens as their legislatures may deem
just and expedient, not amounting to a regulation of commerce, and
to enact reasonable rules and regulations prescribing the mode of
their enforcement,"
if understood, as contended by the defendants in error, to imply
that the states may authorize such liens to be enforced in their
own courts by proceedings in the nature of admiralty process
in
rem, is unsupported by the decisions there referred to, or by
any other decision of
Page 167 U. S. 619
this court, and is inconsistent with several recent opinions of
this Court in which the subject was fully considered.
On May 6, 1872, this Court ordered the twelfth rule in admiralty
to be amended so as to read as follows:
"In all suits by materialmen for supplies or repairs, or other
necessaries, the libellant may proceed against the ship
in
rem, or against the master or owner alone
in
personam."
13 Wall. xiv.
This amendment of the rule left the law in this respect in the
same condition in which, as declared by this Court in cases above
cited, it had been before the promulgation of any rule upon the
subject.
In
The Lottawanna, at October Term, 1874, the purpose
and effect of the amendment were stated by Mr. Justice Bradley (who
had taken part in making it) as follows:
"As to the recent change in the admiralty rule referred to, it
is sufficient to say that it was simply intended to remove all
obstructions and embarrassments in the way of instituting
proceedings
in rem in all cases where liens exist by law,
and not to create any new lien, which, of course, this Court could
not do in any event, since a lien is a right of property, and not a
mere matter of procedure. . . . We have now restored the rule of
1844, or rather we have made it general in its terms, giving to
materialmen in all cases their option to proceed either
in
rem or
in personam. Of course, this modification of
the rule cannot avail where no lien exists; but where one does
exist, no matter by what law, it removes all obstacles to a
proceeding
in rem if credit is given to the vessel."
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S.
579-581.
In
The Lottawanna, this Court allowed to a mortgage of
a ship precedence over claims of materialmen in the home port,
because they had no lien by the maritime law of the United States,
as declared in the case of
The General Smith, and because
their claim had not been recorded as required by the law of the
State of Louisiana, which gave them a lien. The decree of the
district court was rendered before the admiralty rule of 1858 was
superseded by the rule of 1872. Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering
the opinion of this Court, said:
"Had
Page 167 U. S. 620
the lien been perfected, and had the rule not stood in the way,
the principles that have heretofore governed the practice of the
district courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, and which have
been repeatedly sanctioned by this Court, would undoubtedly have
authorized the materialmen to file a libel against the vessel or
its proceeds. It seems to be settled in our jurisprudence that so
long as Congress does not interpose to regulate the subject, the
rights of materialmen furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her
home port may be regulated in each state by state legislation.
state laws, it is true, cannot exclude the contract for furnishing
such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, for it
is a maritime contract, and they cannot alter the limits of that
jurisdiction; nor can they confer it upon the state courts, so as
to enable them to proceed
in rem for the enforcement of
liens created by such state laws, for it is exclusively conferred
upon the district courts of the United States."
21 Wall.
88 U. S.
579-580.
In that opinion, as appears by the passages above quoted, this
Court distinctly affirmed the following positions: First. The
admiralty rule of 1872 was intended to remove all obstructions and
embarrassments in the way of instituting proceedings
in
rem in all cases where liens exist by law. Second. A lien is a
right of property, and not a mere matter of procedure. Third. Where
a state statute has given to materialmen in the home port a lien
upon the vessel, to be enforced by proceedings like those in
admiralty, the district courts of the United States have
jurisdiction to enforce it by libel
in rem. Fourth. Their
jurisdiction
in rem in such a case is exclusive of that of
the courts of the state.
At the same term, a process
in rem to enforce a lien
given by a statute of New Jersey for building a ship was held to be
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the state solely because,
as previously adjudged by this Court, a contract for building a
ship was not a maritime contract, but a contract made on land, and
to be performed on land, and therefore not a subject of admiralty
jurisdiction.
Edwards v.
Elliott, 21 Wall. 532,
88 U. S.
553-556;
The Jefferson,
20 How. 393;
The Capitol,
22 How. 129.
Likewise, in
Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific. Elevator
Co., decided
Page 167 U. S. 621
October Term, 1886, the remedy given by the statute of Illinois
was
in personam, and the cause of action was not a
maritime tort, but an injury done by a steam tug to a building on
land, of which an admiralty court of the United States would have
no jurisdiction; and, as was said by Mr. Justice Blatchford in
delivering judgment:
"This being so, no reason exists why the remedy for the wrong
should not be pursued in the state court, according to the
statutory method prescribed by the law of the state, even though
that law gives a lien on the vessel. The cases in which state
statutes have been held void by this Court, to the extent in which
they authorized suits
in rem against vessels, because they
gave to the state courts admiralty jurisdiction, were only cases
where the causes of action were cognizable in the admiralty. . . .
There being no lien on the tug, by the maritime law, for the injury
on land inflicted in this case, the state could create such a lien
therefor as it deemed expedient, and could enact reasonable rules
for its enforcement, not amounting to a regulation of commerce.
Liens under state statutes, enforceable by attachment, in suits
in personam are of every-day occurrence, and may even
extend to liens on vessels when the proceedings to enforce them do
not amount to admiralty proceedings
in rem or otherwise
conflict with the Constitution of the United States. There is no
more valid objection to the attachment proceeding to enforce the
lien in a suit
in personam, by holding the vessel by mesne
process to be subjected to execution on the personal judgment when
recovered, than there is in subjecting her to seizure on the
execution. Both are incidents of a common law remedy, which a court
of common law is competent to give."
119 U. S. 119 U.S.
388,
119 U. S.
397-399.
In the case of
The J. E. Rumbell, decided at October
Term, 1892, since the first decision of the present case in the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, this Court, referring to
many of the cases above cited, stated the general principles of law
upon the subject now before us as follows:
"In the admiralty and maritime law of the United States as
declared and established by the decisions of this Court, the
following propositions are no longer doubtful: 1st. For
Page 167 U. S. 622
necessary repairs or supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign
port, a lien is given by the general maritime law, following the
civil law, and may be enforced in admiralty. 2d. For repairs or
supplies in the home port of the vessel, no lien exists or can be
enforced in admiralty under the general law independently of local
statute. 3d. Whenever the statute of a state gives a lien, to be
enforced by process
in rem against the vessel, for repairs
or supplies in her home port, this lien, being similar to the lien
arising in a foreign port under the general law, is in the nature
of a maritime lien, and therefore may be enforced in admiralty in
the courts of the United States. 4th. This lien, in the nature of a
maritime lien, and to be enforced by process in the nature of
admiralty process, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States, sitting in admiralty. The fundamental
reasons on which these propositions rest may be summed up thus: the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of
the United States by the Constitution, and cannot be enlarged or
restricted by the legislation of a state. No state legislation,
therefore, can bring within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
national courts a subject not maritime in its nature. But when a
right, maritime in its nature and to be enforced by process in the
nature of admiralty process, has been given by the statute of a
state, the admiralty courts of the United States have jurisdiction,
and exclusive jurisdiction, to enforce that right according to
their own rules of procedure."
148 U. S. 148 U.S.
1,
148 U. S.
11-13.
In that case, it is true, the single question presented for
decision was whether a lien upon a vessel for necessary supplies
and repairs in her home port, given by the statute of a state and
to be enforced by proceedings
in rem in the nature of
admiralty process, took precedence of a prior mortgage, recorded as
required by act of Congress. But the decision of that question, as
in the similar case of
The Lottawanna, above cited, really
depended upon the question whether the contract and the lien of the
materialmen, on the one side, or those of the mortgagee, on the
other, were in their nature maritime, and therefore entitled to be
enforced
in rem in a
Page 167 U. S. 623
court of admiralty. The conclusion of this Court as to the
nature of the claims respectively was that
"the lien created by the statute of a state for repairs or
supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port has the like
precedence over a prior mortgage that is accorded to a lien for
repairs or supplies in a foreign port under the general maritime
law, as recognized and adopted in the United States. Each rests
upon the furnishing of supplies to the ship, on the credit of the
ship herself, to preserve her existence, and secure her usefulness,
for the benefit of all having any title or interest in her. Each
creates a
jus in re, a right of property in the vessel,
existing independently of possession, and arising as soon as the
contract is made, and before the institution of judicial
proceedings to enforce it. The contract in each case is maritime,
and the lien which the law gives to secure it is maritime in its
nature, and is enforced in admiralty by reason of its maritime
nature only. The mortgage, on the other hand, is not a maritime
contract, and constitutes no maritime lien, and the mortgagee can
only share in the proceeds in the registry after all maritime liens
have been satisfied."
148 U.S.
148 U. S. 19.
The form of proceeding against the vessel, provided for in the
statute of Massachusetts now in question, is clearly in the nature
of admiralty process
in rem, and is undistinguishable from
the proceedings, provided for in statutes of other states, which
have been held by this Court to be exclusively within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The lien upon the
vessel is created as soon as money is due for labor performed or
materials furnished, and continues until the debt is satisfied,
unless the lien is dissolved by failure to record a statement of
the claim, as required by the statute. The petition is to be served
by an attachment of the vessel, and a summons to the owners, if
known. A dissolution of the attachment does not dissolve the lien,
and any number of persons having such liens upon the same vessel
may join in one petition to enforce them. Mass.Pub.Stat., c.192, §§
14-19.
In conclusion, the considerations by which this case must be
governed may be summed up as follows: the maritime
Page 167 U. S. 624
and admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and
laws of the United States upon the district courts of the United
States is exclusive. A lien upon a ship for repairs or supplies,
whether created by the general maritime law of the United States or
by a local statute, is a
jus in re, a right of property in
the vessel, and a maritime lien, to secure the performance of a
maritime contract, and therefore may be enforced by admiralty
process
in rem in the district courts of the United
States. When the lien is created by the general maritime law, for
repairs or supplies in a foreign port, no one doubts at the present
day that under the decisions in
The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, and
The
Hine, 4 Wall. 555, above cited, the admiralty
jurisdiction
in rem of the courts of the United States is
exclusive of similar jurisdiction of the courts of the state. The
contract and the lien for repairs or supplies in a home port, under
a local statute, are equally maritime, and equally within the
admiralty jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction is equally
exclusive.
The necessary result is that the petition ought to have been
dismissed; but, in accordance with the usual practice upon
reversing a judgment of the highest court of a state, the proper
form of judgment is:
Judgment reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the argument, or take any part
in the decision of this case.
*
"SEC. 14. When by virtue of a contract, expressed or implied,
with the owners of a vessel or with the agents, contractors or
subcontractors of such owners, or with any of them, or with a
person who has been employed to construct, repair or launch a
vessel or to assist therein, money is due for labor performed,
materials used, or labor and materials furnished in the
construction, launching or repairs of, or for constructing the
launching ways for, or for provisions, stores or other articles
furnished for or on account of such vessel in this commonwealth,
the person to whom such money is due shall have a lien upon the
vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture, to secure the payment of
such debt, and such lien shall be preferred to all others on such
vessel, except that for mariners' wages, and shall continue until
the debt is satisfied."
"SEC. 15. Such lien shall be dissolved unless the person
claiming the same files, within four days from the time when the
vessel departs from the port at which she was when the debt was
contracted, in the office of the clerk of the city or town within
which the vessel was at such time, a statement, subscribed and
sworn to by him, or by some person in his behalf, giving a just and
true account of the demand claimed to be due to him, with all just
credits, and also the name of the person with whom the contract was
made, the name of the owner of the vessel, if known, and the name
of the vessel, or a description thereof sufficient for
identification; which statement shall be recorded by such clerk in
a book kept by him for that purpose, and for such recording the
clerk shall receive the same fees as for recording mortgages of
equal length."
"SEC. 16. If the vessel is partly constructed in one place and
partly in another, either place shall be deemed the port at which
she was when the debt was contracted, within the meaning of this
chapter, and the validity of the lien shall not be affected by any
inaccuracy in the description of the vessel, if she can be
recognized thereby, nor by any inaccuracy in stating the amount due
for labor or materials, unless it appears that the person filing
the statement has willfully and knowingly claimed more than is
due."
"SEC. 17. Such lien may be enforced by petition to the superior
court for the county where the vessel was at the time when the debt
was contracted, or in which she is at the time of instituting
proceedings. The petition may be entered in court, or filed in the
clerk's office in vacation, or may be inserted in a writ of
original summons with an order of attachment, and served, returned
and entered like other civil actions, and the subsequent
proceedings for enforcing the lien shall, except as hereinafter
provided, be as prescribed in chapter one hundred and ninety-one
for enforcing liens on buildings and land, so far as the provisions
of said chapter are applicable. At the time of entering or filing
the petition, a process of attachment against such vessel, her
tackle, apparel, and furniture shall issue and continue in force,
or may be dissolved like attachments in civil cases, but such
dissolution shall not dissolve the lien."
"SEC. 18. The petition shall contain a brief statement of the
labor, materials or work done or furnished, or of the stores,
provisions or other articles furnished, and of the amount due
therefor, with a description of the vessel subject to the lien, and
all other material facts and circumstances, and shall pray that the
vessel may be sold and the proceeds of the sale applied to the
discharge of the demand."
"SEC. 19. Any number of persons having such liens upon the same
vessel may join in a petition to enforce the same: and the same
proceedings shall be had in regard to the respective rights of each
petitioner, and the respondent may defend as to each petitioner, in
the same manner as if they had severally petitioned for their
individual liens."