A judgment in the Court of Claims against the District of
Columbia recovered under the Act of February 13, 1895, c. 87, was
reversed in this Court because interest on the original claim had
been improperly allowed, and the case was remanded to that court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this
Court. The mandate of this Court was filed in that court, and
application was made for judgment in accordance with the opinion of
this Court, waiving interest. Pending the decision upon this
application, the said Act of February 13, 1895, authorizing the
original judgment was repealed by Congress, and the Court of Claims
declined to enter judgment as prayed for. The plaintiff thereupon
made application to this Court for a mandamus to require the Court
of Claims to enter judgment as requested.
Held that the
effect of the repealing act was to take away the jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims to proceed further in any case founded upon the
repealed act, but that this Court did not intimate by this decision
that that court would not have jurisdiction to entertain and grant
a motion on the part of the petitioner to reinstate the original
judgment.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an original application to this Court for a writ of
mandamus to the judges of the Court of Claims commanding them to
cause to be entered a judgment in favor of petitioner and against
the District of Columbia for the sum of $8,644.19, as of March 2,
1897, the date of the filing of a mandate from this Court with the
Court of Claims in the case of
District of Columbia v.
Hall. The record now before us gives the history of that case
since it was decided by this Court in February last.
The facts in the original litigation out of which this
application
Page 167 U. S. 39
grows are to be found in the report of the cases of
District
of Columbia v. Hall, 165 U. S. 340, and
District of Columbia v. Johnson, 165 U.
S. 330. It appears therein that this petitioner, under
the provisions of the Act of Congress approved February 13, 1895,
had recovered a judgment in the Court of Claims which was entered
June 22, 1896, against the District of Columbia, for the
above-named sum or $8,644.19, with a declaration contained in the
judgment that such amount became due and payable on the 1st of
January, 1877, the effect of which was to grant interest thereon
from the last-named date. Upon appeal, this Court determined that
the Court of Claims erred in the matter of granting interest, and
therefore the judgment of that court was reversed and the cause
remanded. On the 1st day of March, 1897, the mandate from this
Court was issued, in which it was
"ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of said
Court of Claims in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed.
And it is further ordered that this cause be, and the same is
hereby, remanded to said Court of Claims for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court."
The mandate was filed with the Court of Claims on the second day
of March, 1897, and, on the opening of the court on that day,
application was made for judgment in accordance with the mandate
and the opinion of this Court, the petitioner waiving any interest
on the judgment. This motion was consented to by the attorney
representing the District of Columbia, but the Court of Claims
refused to immediately grant the motion, and soon thereafter
adjourned to the 8th of March. On the 15th of March, the court
entered an order declining to take any further proceedings in any
suits based on the act of Congress -- among them being the
petitioner's claim -- for the reason that the act had been
repealed. The repealing act was enacted one day after the filing of
the mandate in this case in the Court of Claims, and the making of
the motion by the petitioner for judgment.
The judges of the Court of Claims have made return to the order
to show cause why the mandamus should not issue, and in that return
they state:
Page 167 U. S. 40
"That on the second day of March, 1897, that not being a motion
day, according to the practice of said court, was presented in open
court the mandate of the supreme court reversing the judgment in
favor of Joseph T. H. Hall, which is described and set forth in the
petition, together with a motion for entry of judgment for the sum
of $8,664.19; that said motion was presented upon a day when the
court was engaged in the regular trial of cases, and, according to
the practice of the court, was received without argument and taken
under advisement for decision thereafter; that at or about the same
time, the attention of the court was called to the pendency of the
various motions for new trial from the numerous judgments,
embodying the same characteristics which had been held to be
erroneous by the supreme court, and on the said 2d day of March,
1897, mandates from the supreme court reversing the three other
judgments appealed from as aforesaid, and heard together with that
of Joseph T. H. Hall, and in the same form as the mandate set forth
in the petition, were filed."
"That on the said 2d day of March, 1897, and before the court,
in the ordinary course of its business, had been able to take up
for consideration the motion for judgment in favor of said
petitioner or to examine the opinion of the supreme court referred
to in the mandate and set forth in the petition, the court
adjourned to the 8th day of March, and, while so adjourned,
Congress enacted and the President approved the Act of March 3,
1897, entitled 'An act making appropriations to provide for the
expenses of the District of Columbia for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1898, and for other purposes,' which said act contained,
amongst other things, the following provision:"
"That the Act approved February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-five, entitled "An act to amend an act, entitled
An act
to provide for the settlement of all outstanding claims against the
District of Columbia, and conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of
Claims to hear the same, and for other purposes,' approved June
sixteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty,""
"be and the same is hereby repealed, and all proceedings pending
shall be vacated,
Page 167 U. S. 41
and no judgment heretofore rendered in pursuance of said act
shall be paid."
"That at the time of the passage of said act, the judgment in
favor of the petitioner, as also of said three other appellants,
had been by the action of the supreme court reversed and set aside.
The judges of the Court of Claims, upon conference and due
consideration, reached the conclusion that said act of Congress had
taken away the power of the court to render judgment or take any
step or proceeding in the said case, or in any of the other cases
pending, or with reference to any of the judgments theretofore
rendered under and by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred by said
Act of February 13, 1895, wherefore, on the 15th day of March, 1897
(that being the first motion day after the court resumed its
sittings on the 8th of March, and the regular day upon which,
according to the practice of the Court of Claims, judgments and
decisions are rendered and entered), the said Court of Claims made
the order set forth on page 7 of the petition in the following
words, to-wit:"
" The act of 13th February, 1895, 28 Stat. 664, having been
repealed by Congress, it is ordered, in all suits brought under or
subsequent to said act, that motions for new trial, applications
for judgments, and all other papers in such suits, be restored to
and retained upon the files of the court without further
proceedings being had."
The petitioner now insists that he has the legal right to a
judgment in the Court of Claims for the original sum of $8,644.19,
because he says the judgment of that court originally awarding him
that sum was not in effect wholly reversed by this Court, but only
in part, in regard to interest, and that, as to all other matters,
the judgment, under the opinion of this Court, substantially
remained and was in full force on the second day of March at the
time of the filling of the mandate and of the making of his motion
to the Court of Claims. He therefore further insists that he was,
when he made that motion, entitled at once to the judgment he asked
for, and that if it had then been given, he would have been enabled
to obtain payment of the judgment prior to the repeal of the act
upon
Page 167 U. S. 42
which the judgment was originally founded. He asks therefore
that this Court direct the Court of Claims to enter a judgment
nunc pro tunc as of March 2, 1897.
In this case, the judgment was, in form at least, absolutely
reversed, and the case remanded to the Court of Claims for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.
Confessedly, further proceedings by virtue of the mandate, and
under the direction of the Court of Claims, were necessary to be
taken before any judgment could be entered in such court and
thereafter enforced, and, before any proceedings were taken by way
of the entry of any judgment, Congress interfered by repealing the
statute. When the mandate was filed in the Court of Claims and the
motion made for judgment, that court was engaged in the regular
trial of causes. It was not a motion day, according to the practice
of the court, and the court received the mandate, and heard the
request, and took the same under advisement for decision
thereafter. The court was not bound, upon the simple presentation
of the mandate and the statement of counsel, even if there were no
opposition on the part of the attorney for the District of
Columbia, to immediately drop all other business and grant the
motion. It had the right, and it was its duty, in the due and
orderly progress of its work, to take the motion into consideration
if it thought it necessary, so that it might examine the opinion
and come to an intelligent conclusion as to what action was
required of it for the purpose of complying with the terms of the
mandate. The fact that the court had already heard of the decision
of this Court, and had casually seen the opinion, did not alter the
case.
The effect of the passage of the repealing act was to take away
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to proceed further in those
cases which were founded upon the act thus repealed. This the
Congress had power to do.
Merchants' Insurance Co. v.
Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541,
72 U. S. 544;
Ex Parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506;
Ex Parte
Yerger, 8 Wall. 85;
Baltimore & Potomac
Railroad v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398;
Gurnee v. Patrick County, 137 U.
S. 141.
This Court had just decided that the Act of February 13, 1895,
28 Stat. 644, simply conferred a gratuity upon the persons
Page 167 U. S. 43
covered by its provisions; that there was no element of a legal
or an equitable claim in their favor against the municipal
authorities of the District, but that the act provided for a gift
which was wholly without consideration. The repeal of the act took
away all jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to proceed further so
far as concerned any rights founded upon the act so repealed. If
there had been no repeal and the Court of Claims had, after the
filing of the mandate from this Court, proceeded to a new trial of
the whole merits of the original judgment, the case cited by the
petitioner,
Gaines v. Rugg, 148 U.
S. 228, might be in point. It does not touch the case
upon the facts here presented.
In this case, however, the record originally before us showed
that the petitioner had at one time obtained a judgment for over
$1,000 against the District of Columbia upon a cause of action not
founded upon the act of Congress just repealed. This judgment had
been vacated. We do not intimate by this decision that the Court of
Claims would not have jurisdiction to entertain and grant a motion
on the part of petitioner, if he should be so advised, to reinstate
that original judgment. That question is not before us, and we
allude to it simply for the purpose of stating that our decision
herein should not be taken as any expression of opinion adverse to
the granting of a motion such as is above mentioned.
The application for a writ of mandamus is
Denied.