Under the Act of July 20, 1892, c. 208, the grand jury in the
Southern Division of the District of Montana had jurisdiction to
find the indictment which forms the subject of discussion in this
case; and, after such indictment had been found, the court had
authority to remit it to the other division for trial.
Where Congress has expressly legislated in respect to a given
matter, that express legislation must control in the absence of
subsequent legislation equally express, and is not overthrown by
any mere inferences or implications to be found in such subsequent
legislation.
The indictment of a person employed in the postal service for
secreting, embezzling or destroying a cheque or draft in a letter
delivered to him as such agent need not give a full description of
the cheque or draft; but it is sufficient to say that, the
instrument having been destroyed, the grand jury is unable to give
any further description than is found in the indictment.
The Act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, 682, admitting
Montana into the Union provided that the state should constitute
one Judicial District, and that the sessions of the circuit and
district courts of the United States should be held at Helena, in
Lewis and Clarke County, that being the capital of the state. On
July 20, 1892, the following act (c. 208) was passed, 27 Stat.
252:
"That the territory embraced within the following counties in
the District of Montana, to-wit: Beaverhead County, Madison County,
and the County of Silver Bow shall hereafter constitute and be
known as the Southern Division of the District of Montana, and
regular terms of the circuit and district courts of the United
States for said district may be held at Butte City, Montana, on the
first Tuesday in February and the first Tuesday in September of
each year, and the said courts so sitting at Butte shall have and
exercise the same jurisdiction and authority in all civil actions,
pleas, or proceedings,
Page 165 U. S. 258
and in all prosecutions, informations, indictments, or other
criminal or penal proceedings conferred by the general laws on the
district and circuit courts of the United States, and where one or
more defendants in any civil cause shall reside in said division,
and one or more defendants to such cause shall reside out of said
division, but in said district, then the plaintiff may institute
his action either in the court having jurisdiction over the latter
or in the said division. That this act shall not affect the
jurisdiction, power, and authority of the court as to actions,
prosecutions, and proceedings already begun and pending in said
district, but the same will proceed as though this act had not been
passed, except that the court shall have power, which it may
exercise at discretion, to transfer to the court in said division
such of said pending actions, prosecutions, and proceedings as
might properly be begun therein under the provisions of this
act."
On March 18, 1895, an indictment in five counts was presented in
the circuit court charging the defendant with violating section
5467, Rev.Stat., which reads:
"Any person employed in any department of the postal service who
shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any letter, packet, bag, or
mail of letters entrusted to him, or which shall come into his
possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail, or
carried or delivered by any mail carrier, mail messenger, route
agent, letter carrier, or other person employed in any department
of the postal service. . . . and which shall contain any . . .
draft, check, warrant, . . . or any other article of value, or
writing representing the same, . . . shall be punishable by
imprisonment at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than
five years."
The fourth count, upon which alone the defendant was found
guilty, charged that on the 13th day of July, 1894, "in the State
and District of Montana, and within the jurisdiction of this
court," the defendant,
"a person employed in the postal service of the United States,
to-wit, a railway postal clerk, . . . and in the discharge of the
duties of that position on the Great Northern Railway, between the
station of
Page 165 U. S. 259
Havre, in the County of Choteau, and the station of Kalispell,
in the County of Flathead, in said State of Montana,"
did destroy a registered letter and the contents thereof, which
letter had
"come into his possession as such railway postal clerk, and
which was intended to be, and was then and there being, conveyed by
United States mail, and which said registered letter had been
deposited in the mail at the United States post office at
Sacramento,"
directed to
"Mrs. Emilie Heistans Greitzer, Gasthaus etzel b. Einsedeln Ct.
Schwizz, Schweizerland, which said registered letter contained a
draft for fifty francs, D. O. Mills & Co., No. d.08250, on
Paris, France, a more particular description of which is to the
grand jurors aforesaid unknown."
The term of the Circuit Court for the District of Montana at
which the grand jury was empaneled, and at which this indictment
was presented, was held at the City of Butte, in the Southern
division of the district. Thereafter, the defendant having been
arrested, on motion of the United States district attorney, the
indictment was remitted for trial to the term of court to be held
at Helena, in Lewis and Clarke County, in the other division of the
district. No objections to this transfer were made by the
defendant. Trial being had, the jury found the defendant guilty, as
heretofore stated, under the fourth count. A motion in arrest in
which for the first time the question of jurisdiction was raised
having been made and overruled, the defendant was sentenced to
imprisonment for the term of one year, whereupon this writ of error
was sued out.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Counsel for defendant state that the main question for
determination is one of jurisdiction -- first, of the grand
jury
Page 165 U. S. 260
in the Southern Division of the District of Montana to find the
indictment, and second whether, such indictment having been found,
the court had authority to remit it to the other division for
trial.
It is insisted that the Circuit Court for the Southern Division
had jurisdiction, under the act of 1892, of only such offenses as
were committed within the limits of the division; that therefore
the grand jury had no authority to find an indictment for an
offense such as this, apparently committed in the other division.
The solution of this question depends upon the construction to be
given to the act of 1892. By section 563, Rev.Stat., the district
courts are given jurisdiction "of all crimes and offenses
cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed
within their respective districts." By § 629, par. 20, the circuit
courts have "concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of
crimes and offenses cognizable therein."
These statutes declare the general rule that jurisdiction is
coextensive with district. That being the general rule, no mere
multiplication of places at which courts are to be held, or mere
creation of divisions, nullifies it. Indeed, the place of trial has
no necessary connection with the matter of territorial
jurisdiction. By § 581, Rev.Stat., it is provided that
"a special term of any district court may be held at the same
place where any regular term is held, or at such other place in the
district as the nature of the business may require."
And by § 729, that
"the trial of offenses punishable with death shall be had in the
county where the offense was committed where it can be done without
great inconvenience."
Jurisdiction in the trial courts being thus bounded by district,
we find many acts, some increasing in a district the places of
trial and others in terms subdividing the district into divisions.
The former have no effect on the matter of jurisdiction. Some of
these latter acts specifically limit the jurisdiction in criminal
actions of the courts held in a division to the territory within
that division -- as, for instance, in respect to Alabama, Act of
May 2, 1884, c. 38, 23 Stat. 18, Louisiana, Act of August 8, 1888,
c. 789, 25 Stat. 388, Michigan,
Page 165 U. S. 261
Act of June 19, 1878, c. 326, 20 Stat. 175, Ohio, Act of June 8,
1878, c. 169, 20 Stat. 101; 21 Stat. 63, Tennessee, Act of June 11,
1880, c. 203, 21 Stat. 175, Texas, Act of March 1, 1889, c. 333, 25
Stat. 783, 786, while, on the other hand, some contain no such
provision, as in the case of Minnesota, Act of April 26, 1890, c.
167, 26 Stat. 72;
Post v. United States, 161 U.
S. 583,
161 U. S. 585,
though this was changed by the subsequent Act of July 12, 1894, c.
132, 23 Stat. 102;
Post v. United States, 161 U.
S. 583.
In the light of this legislation, with its diversity of
provision, we are called upon to construe the act of 1892, creating
the Southern Division of the District of Montana. The first part of
the section simply creates the division and defines its limits.
This is followed by the general declaration that the courts so
sitting in Butte, the place at the Southern Division in which they
are to be held,
"shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction and authority in
all civil actions, pleas, or proceedings, and in all prosecutions,
informations, indictments, or other criminal or penal proceedings
conferred by the general laws upon the circuit and district courts
of the United States."
If the section stopped here, there would be no question. The
mere creation of a division does not disturb the general
jurisdiction over the district. And, in addition, the language just
quoted makes an affirmative grant to the courts, when sitting at
Butte, of all the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, vested in the
circuit and district courts -- that is, a jurisdiction coextensive
with the district. The latter part of the section causes all the
doubt in respect to the matter. In that are found two provisions:
one that where one or more of the defendants in any civil cause
reside in one division, and one or more in another, the plaintiff
may institute his action in either division. This, of course, has
no bearing on the question of jurisdiction in criminal cases. The
second, that the act should not affect the jurisdiction of the
court as to actions, prosecutions, and proceedings already begun,
and that they should proceed where they were commenced, with a
proviso that the court might in its discretion transfer all such
actions, etc., as might properly be begun in the new division to
the court in that division.
Page 165 U. S. 262
This language is broad enough to include criminal actions. Too
much stress should not be placed on the word "properly." The
creation of divisions and the multiplication of places of trial are
for the convenience of litigants, bringing the trial nearer to them
and their witnesses. There is a manifest propriety, even when no
jurisdictional necessity, in conducting criminal prosecutions as
near to the place of the offense as possible. The idea of the
vicinage is familiar to criminal law. And all that Congress may
have intended by this second provision was to make it clear that
the court should have the power to transfer to this new division
any pending proceeding which might, with more convenience, and
therefore propriety, be prosecuted at the place at which, in the
new division, the sessions of the court were to be held. It must,
however, be conceded that these provisions do carry some
implication that a distribution has been made of territorial
jurisdiction between the courts of the two divisions, and the
question we have to determine is whether this implication is
sufficient to create a distribution which the statute has not in
terms made. It may be said, and with force, that there is no need
of the last half of the section; that it is superfluous, unless
upon the assumption that there has been a distribution of
jurisdiction, civil or criminal, or both, coextensive with the
territories of the two divisions, and yet, can it be adjudged that
Congress has created such distribution, when it has not in terms
directed it, simply because some expressions in the statute imply
its existence? The question is a difficult one, and yet we think
the true rule of construction is this: when there are statutes
clearly defining the jurisdiction of the courts, the force and
effect of such provisions should not be disturbed by a mere
implication flowing from subsequent legislation. In other words,
where Congress has expressly legislated in respect to a given
matter, that express legislation must control in the absence of
subsequent legislation equally express, and is not overthrown by
any mere inferences or implications to be found in such subsequent
legislation. Especially is this rule to control when it appears
that Congress, in some cases, has made express provision for
effecting a
Page 165 U. S. 263
change. This does not conflict with the doctrine, stated in
In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242,
151 U. S. 256,
that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases cannot "be
enlarged by any mere inferences from the law or doubtful
construction of its terms." It is rather the converse of that, for
the effort is to destroy a jurisdiction otherwise clearly existing
by mere inferences and doubtful construction.
This may be a case of mere omission, but it is an omission which
the courts cannot supply. We cannot assume that because Congress,
in creating some divisions, distributed jurisdiction, it meant, in
creating other divisions, to also so distribute it, and when we
find that, in some cases of division it distributed the
jurisdiction, and in other cases not, we are not justified in
assuming that in this case it intended a distribution which it did
not in terms make simply because of the use of language which
somewhat implies that a distribution had already been made.
So far as the mere transfer of the place of trial from one
division to another, it would seem, in the absence of express
prohibition, to be within the competency of the court having full
jurisdiction over the entire district, and certainly presents no
ground of error when it is not at the time challenged, and the
trial proceeds without objection.
These considerations also show that there is no force in the
objection that the indictment does not specify the place at which
the grand jury that found it was sitting, and also as to the
certainty of the venue.
The only remaining question is in reference to the description
of the draft which was in the letter destroyed. It is insisted that
this is not sufficient. This objection cannot be sustained. The
gravamen of the charge is the destruction of the letter. It is an
offense against the postal laws of the United States, and, while
the letter must contain a draft, check, or some other thing of
value or supposed value in order to bring the case within the
compass of this statute, yet it is unnecessary to describe this
draft, check, etc., with the same precision as if forgery, or some
other crime directed against the instrument itself, was charged. A
full description
Page 165 U. S. 264
of the check or draft being unessential, it is clearly
sufficient when the grand jury say that, the instrument having been
destroyed, they are unable to give any further description than
such as is found in this indictment, for that, as will be seen,
contains some matters of description and identification. There
being no other questions presented in the record, and in these
appearing no error, the judgment of the circuit court is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissent.
