A general statement that the decision of a state court is
against the constitutional rights of the objecting party, or
against the Fourteenth Amendment, or that it is without due process
of law, particularly when these objections appear only in
specifications of error, so called, will not raise a federal
question, even where the judgment is a final one within Rev.Stat. §
709.
In these cases there was no final judgment, such as is provided
for in Rev.Stat. § 709, and there does not appear to have arisen
any federal question whatever.
Page 165 U. S. 169
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.
The records in the above numbers, 158 and 159, relate to
proceedings in habeas corpus. Those records are printed. Nos. 161
and 165 also relate to proceedings in habeas corpus. The records in
those cases are not printed. No. 160 relates to a writ of error in
what is termed in the record an "action."
All the records now before us, both printed and unprinted, are
such a mass of confusion as to render it difficult to determine
what has been done in the court below. The records relating to the
proceedings taken upon habeas corpus show applications for that
writ to various judges of the Superior Court of the City and County
of San Francisco, State of California. From a perusal of the series
of papers variously denominated "orders," "objections,"
"demurrers," "motions to vacate," "answers," "specifications of
errors," and "petitions for reversal," which are mixed up in
inextricable confusion, we are able to gather that the plaintiff in
error, Clarke, was proceeded against in the Superior Court of San
Francisco as an alleged insolvent, and that such court, after a
hearing, adjudged that he was insolvent; that he appealed from the
adjudication, and his appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of
California, which court affirmed the adjudication, and remitted the
record to the Superior Court of San Francisco. These facts are
discovered from the perusal of a paper appearing to be an order
signed by one of the judges of the superior court, which shows that
there had been an appeal, and that the remittitur had come down to
that court, affirming its judgment adjudging Clarke an
insolvent.
Page 165 U. S. 170
The order containing such recitals then directs the insolvent to
file an inventory of his property, and it is signed by one of the
judges of the court. An appeal was taken from the order, but no
disposition of it appears to have been made, so far as the record
shows. He failed to obey the order by filing the inventory as
directed, and, an order to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt having been made, he appeared and offered various
objections to such adjudication. He was finally adjudged guilty of
the contempt charged, and was committed to the jail in San
Francisco until he should obey the order of the court and file an
inventory as directed. After his commitment to the jail, he
commenced a series of proceedings, by habeas corpus, to obtain his
release. It is the decision of the judge rendered in each
proceeding of which he complains. He applied to one judge of the
superior court after another for the writ which was granted him,
and when the writ was served, and the petitioner produced in
obedience to the writ, after a hearing the writ was discharged, and
the petitioner was remanded by the judge who granted the writ. This
was repeated three or four times before different judges, with the
same result. He also applied to Judge Morrow, United States
District Judge, for a writ of habeas corpus, and that writ was
applied for after he had applied to the state judge for the same
kind of a writ which had been allowed, but before a decision was
given by the state judge in that particular proceeding; and, upon a
hearing before the state judge upon the return of the writ sued out
by himself, he objected that the judge had no right to hear the
case, as he had applied to a United States district judge for a
writ of habeas corpus, and that, under the provisions of §§ 763,
766 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, there was no
power in the state judge to proceed with the hearing upon a return
of the writ.
It does not appear what (if any) action was taken by the federal
judge on the application for the habeas corpus, and it is upon the
decisions made by the state judges on these various applications
for writs of habeas corpus that the questions arise which plaintiff
in error claims that this Court has the jurisdiction to decide.
Page 165 U. S. 171
All his objections to the proceedings are to be found in
documents set forth in the records, signed by himself, and which he
describes as "specifications of error" and "prayers for reversal."
In these specifications, he sets up numerous objections to the
order adjudging him an insolvent, and to the order adjudging him in
contempt, and to the alleged refusal of the various judges to admit
him to bail pending an examination of his case under the writs
issued. What these various decisions were can only be determined
from these specifications of error and other descriptions and
allegations contained in affidavits and alleged answers to
petitions signed by the plaintiff in error.
He objects that the order adjudging him an insolvent, as well as
various of the other orders made by the court, were not signed by
the clerk and sealed with the seal of the court assuming to grant
them; that they were not served by the sheriff; that he was denied
a trial by jury upon the question of insolvency, and upon the
question of contempt, that he was denied bail, and generally that
the Fourteenth Amendment was violated in his person, and that all
of the various orders were made in violation of the sections of the
Revised Statutes, §§ 1977, 763-766.
There is not one judgment of any court to be found in the
record. There is a statement in each of the records relating to the
habeas corpus proceedings, following the writ and return thereto,
as follows: "Court order, October 26, 1893. Writ dismissed.
Prisoner remanded. Register 2 of departments 1 to 10, page
249.�
In one of the records, four petitions for writs of habeas corpus
are contained, one after the other, and no action shown in regard
to any petition, excepting at the end of the fourth there is a
statement similar to that which is above set forth as to the
dismissal of the writ.
There is no record of any appeal's being taken to any state
appellate tribunal, or of any review's being had or attempted of
the various so-called court orders remanding the prisoner after a
hearing upon the returns to the various writs, but the writs of
error from this Court are directed to the judges of the
Page 165 U. S. 172
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, and they
have been allowed by one of the judges of that court.
The fatal objection appears in each case that the so-called
court orders, made upon the returns to the several writs of habeas
corpus which were granted by a judge and returnable before him, do
not constitute that final judgment or decree in a suit in the
highest court of a state in which a decision in the suit could be
had which may be reviewed on writ of error from this Court, under
section 709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. If these
various orders did constitute such a final judgment, it does not
appear in the record that any question arose in such a manner as
would give this Court jurisdiction to review the same under the
above-named section.
A general statement that the decision of a court is against the
constitutional rights of the objecting party, or against the
Fourteenth Amendment, or that it is without due process of law,
particularly when these objections appear only in specifications of
error, so called, will not raise a federal question even where the
judgment is a final one within the section of the Revised Statutes
above mentioned. There must be at least some color of a federal
question.
Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U.
S. 531.
In No. 160 of the above records, entitled
C. W. Mott and
others v. Alfred Clarke, in the Superior Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, Department 10, the record opens with what
is termed "Specifications of Error and Prayer for Reversal," in
which it is stated that the action was commenced on the second of
October, 1891, by filing a petition in the court, and that, on the
same day, a mutilated portion of an attachment bond was filed in
the same case, but that the bond was never approved by the judge,
and that on the 6th of October, 1891, the respondent, Alfred
Clarke, filed and served an objection to the bond, which objection
is set forth. Then it is stated that no other bond was ever filed.
An order to show cause then follows, ordering Clarke to show cause
why he should not be adjudged an insolvent debtor and restraining
his transfer of any property in the meantime. This order is signed
by one of the judges of the superior court. It would
Page 165 U. S. 173
appear that the order was served on the respondent personally,
and after such service it was filed, and was not served upon him
after filing. The respondent thereafter objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground of absence of summons. The
objection was overruled, subsequent proceedings were had, and on
May 18, 1892, the respondent was adjudged an insolvent. The
respondent claims that in the above proceedings he has been
deprived of liberty and property without due process of law and
denied by the state the equal protection of the laws. He specifies
the errors on which he will rely:
"(1) That the judgment complained of is null and void for want
of jurisdiction, and the court never obtained jurisdiction of his
person, and therefore he has not been accorded due process of
law."
"(2) That said judgment is made in violation of the fourteenth
article, United States Constitution, and section 1979 of Revised
Statutes of United States."
"Wherefore respondent prays that the said judgment may be
reversed."
"This paper is made and filed
nunc pro tunc as of May
10, 1894, by leave of court, for good cause shown."
"(Signed) Alfred Clarke"
"Respondent and Plaintiff in Error"
It is then stated that the foregoing bill of exceptions is
allowed and authenticated as and for the transcript on writ of
error from the United States Supreme Court to the superior court as
provided by law. It is signed by a judge of the superior court.
Upon such a record, a writ of error is allowed, and the citation
and return of the judges of the foregoing matters follows.
This is everything that is in the record. No pleadings, no
judgment, other than an allegation, in what is called a "bill of
exceptions," of an adjudication in insolvency, and the recital in
such bill of objections taken of the character above set forth, and
from this proceeding in insolvency before one of the judges of the
Superior Court of San Francisco, the plaintiff in error sues out a
writ of error from this Court, and claims the
Page 165 U. S. 174
right to review the proceedings (whatever they were) of the
Superior Court of San Francisco County. The same objection, among
others, applies to this that we have stated in regard to the other
records.
There is no final judgment, such as is provided for in section
709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and there does
not appear to have arisen any federal question whatever.
We have carefully looked through these entire records,
notwithstanding the mass of confusion which appears in all of them.
We find nothing which shows that we have jurisdiction in the cases,
and for these reasons, the various writs of error must be
Dismissed.