An appeal lies to this Court from a final order of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of New Mexico ordering a writ of habeas
corpus to be discharged.
The cases deciding that there is a want of jurisdiction over a
similar judgment rendered in the District of Columbia are reviewed,
and it is held that the legislation in respect of the review of the
final orders of the territorial supreme courts on habeas corpus so
far differs from that in respect of the judgments of the courts of
the District of Columbia that a different rule applies.
Section 1852 of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico of 1884, which
provides that
"when any justice of the supreme court shall be absent from his
district, or shall be in any manner incapacitated from acting or
performing any of his duties of judge or chancellor, in his
district, or from holding court therein, any other justice of the
supreme court may perform all such duties, hear and determine all
petitions, motions, demurrers, grant all rules and interlocutory
orders and decrees, as also all extraordinary writs in said
district,"
was within the legislative power of the assembly which enacted
it, and is not inconsistent with the provision in the Act of July
10, 1890, c. 665, 26 Stat. 226, for the assignment of judges to
particular districts and their residence therein, and while, for
the convenience of the public, it was provided in the organic act
that a justice should be assigned to each district and reside
therein, there was no express or implied prohibition upon any judge
against exercising the power in any district other than the one to
which he had been assigned, and there was nothing in the language
of the provision requiring such a construction as would confine the
exercise of the power to the particular justice assigned to a
district when he might be otherwise incapacitated.
In that territory, a trial judge may continue any special term
he is holding until a pending case is concluded, even if the
proceedings of the special term are thereby prolonged beyond the
day fixed for the regular term.
Appellants were indicted at the June, A.D. 1894, term of the
District Court for the County of Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the First
Judicial District of that territory, for the murder of one
Francisco Chaves. On the 4th of March A.D.
Page 164 U. S. 613
1895, Hon. N. B. Laughlin, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of New Mexico, assigned to the First
Judicial District thereof -- the regular December term of the court
not having been held -- convened "a special term of the District
Court for the County of Santa Fe in and for the First Judicial
District in and for the Territory of New Mexico," to be begun on
March 18, 1895,
"for the term of four consecutive weeks, and for such further
time as in the discretion of the judge of said court may be deemed
proper and necessary for the disposition of any business now
pending in said court, or that may come before it in the usual
course of business of said court, and as provided by law."
The indictment coming on for trial, April 23, 1895, the
following order was entered:
"Now comes the said plaintiff, by her attorney, J. H. Crist,
Esquire, and the said defendants come in their own proper person,
attended by their counsel, Catron & Spiess, and the judge of
the court, Honorable N. B. Laughlin, considering himself
disqualified from presiding at the trial of this cause, owing to
the fact of his having been connected with the prosecution herein
previous to his appointment as judge, resigns the bench to the
Honorable H.B. Hamilton, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Territory of New Mexico and Judge of the Fifth Judicial
District Court thereof. Thereupon the said district attorney, on
behalf of said territory, and T. B. Catron, Esquire, on behalf of
said defendants, agree that no objections shall be hereafter raised
in case the Honorable N. B. Laughlin remains within this Judicial
District during the trial of this cause, and thereupon, a jury not
having been obtained for the trial of this cause, the jurors
already called are placed in the custody of the Sheriff of the
County of Santa Fe until tomorrow morning at ten o'clock."
The trial of the case, commencing on that day, continued until
May 29, 1895, when the jury found the defendants guilty as charged
in the indictment; and, motions in arrest of judgment and for new
trial having been submitted and denied, judgment was entered on the
verdict, and defendants sentenced to be executed. To review this
judgment and
Page 164 U. S. 614
sentence, defendants sued out a writ of error from the supreme
court of the territory, and the judgment was affirmed September 1,
1896. 46 P. 349. The order of affirmance was set aside September 4,
and a rehearing granted, and thereupon the territory suggested
diminution of the record and prayed for a certiorari, which was
issued. On the 9th of September, Judge Laughlin convened a special
term of the district court in and for the County of Santa Fe, to be
begun September 21, for the term of two consecutive weeks or such
further time as might be deemed necessary
"for the purpose of hearing and determining all causes that may
be pending in said court, both civil and criminal, and any business
pending in said court, or that may come before it in the usual
course of business of said court, will be taken up and acted upon
and disposed of in the same manner as at a regular term of said
court and as provided by law."
On September 22, 1896, in the said special term, Judge Hamilton
presiding, the motion of the Territory of New Mexico for an order
directing the clerk
"to make a proper and sufficient entry in the records of the
proceedings of this court had on the 23d day of April, 1895, of the
arraignment in said court at said time of the said defendants above
named upon the indictment in said cause, and of their respective
pleas of not guilty thereto"
came on to be heard, and it appearing to the court, from
evidence adduced, the recollection of the presiding judge, and
certain notes and memoranda deposited with the clerk in pursuance
of law, that the record "is not a full and correct record of the
proceedings had in said court upon said date in said cause," in
that the record failed to show the arraignment of the defendants
and their respective pleas of not guilty, it was ordered "that the
said proceedings be entered now upon the records of this Court in
this cause as of the 23rd day of April, 1895, according to the
facts thereof," and the arraignment and pleas were set forth in
said order. This order, together with the order convening the
special term at which it was entered, having been returned to the
supreme court of the territory, that court, on September 24, 1896,
the cause coming on to be heard
Page 164 U. S. 615
on the rehearing, "and upon the amended record," again affirmed
the judgment and sentence of the district court and fixed a day of
execution. 46 P. 361. Thereupon the defendants (plaintiffs in
error), on the same day, filed a petition in the Supreme Court of
the Territory of New Mexico for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging,
among other things, that they were unlawfully restrained of their
liberty pursuant to the judgment of the District Court of the First
Judicial District of New Mexico sitting within the County of Santa
Fe, inasmuch as the district court was without jurisdiction to
render the judgment, the verdict and judgment thereon being
coram non judice, because the special term of the district
court at which they were rendered overreached and conflicted with
the regular terms of the court; the record did not show that
defendants had been arraigned, and the amendment was improperly
made; the Judge of the Fifth Judicial District court had no power
or authority to preside over the First Judicial District Court, and
that his acts, while so presiding, were absolutely null and void.
The writ of habeas corpus was issued, and on consideration of the
sheriff's return to the writ and petitioners' answer thereto, it
was ordered that the writ be discharged and the petitioners
remanded to custody, to be dealt with in pursuance of the judgment,
conviction, and sentence. From this order petitioners prayed an
appeal, which was denied for reasons then stated. 46 P. 211.
Subsequently an appeal was allowed by one of the Justices of this
Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
Page 164 U. S. 616
appeals will not lie to this Court from final order of the
supreme courts of the territories on habeas corpus, and a motion in
the alternative to affirm the final order sought to be reviewed
because so manifestly correct that the appeal must be regarded as
taken for delay only.
In
Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, it
was held that we had no jurisdiction over the judgments of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in this class of cases.
The statutes in relation to habeas corpus were there reviewed, and
it is not necessary to go over them again in detail.
By section 763 of the Revised Statutes, it was provided that an
appeal to the circuit court might be taken from decisions on habeas
corpus: (1) in the case of any person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any law or
treaty of the United States; (2) in the case of the subjects or
citizens of foreign states, when in custody, as therein set forth.
By section 764, an appeal from the circuit court to this Court
might be taken in "the cases described in the last clause of the
preceding section."
Section 705 of the Revised Statutes read:
"The final judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, in any case where the matter in dispute,
exclusive of costs, exceeds the value of one thousand dollars, may
be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the
United States upon writ of error or appeal in the same manner and
under the same regulations as are provided in cases of writs of
error on judgments, or appeals from decrees rendered in a circuit
court."
Section 846 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia
was as follows:
"Any final judgment, order, or decree of the Supreme Court of
the District may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the
Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal,
in the same cases and in like manner as provided by law in
reference to the final judgments, orders, and decrees of the
circuit courts of the United States."
On February 25, 1879, an act was passed which provided:
"The final judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of the
Page 164 U. S. 617
District of Columbia in any case where the matter in dispute,
exclusive of costs, exceeds the value of twenty-five hundred
dollars, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme
Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal in the
same manner and under the same regulations as are provided in cases
of writs of error on judgments or appeals from decrees rendered in
a circuit court."
20 Stat. 320, c. 99, § 4.
By Act of Congress of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 437, c. 353, § 764
of the Revised Statutes was so amended as to remove the restriction
to the second clause of § 763, and restore the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court from decisions of the circuit courts in
habeas corpus cases as it had existed prior to the passage of the
Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44, c. 34. But this did not have
that effect as to judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia in those cases, for the reasons given in
In re
Heath, 144 U. S. 92, and
Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82.
On the same third of March, A.D. 1885, Congress passed an act
"regulating appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia and the supreme courts of the several territories." 23
Stat. 443, c. 355. The first section of this act provided
"that no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from
any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or in the supreme court
of any of the territories of the United States, unless the matter
in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five
thousand dollars,"
and the second section, that the first section should not apply
to any case
"wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or
in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of or an authority exercised under the United States, but in all
such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard
to the sum or value in dispute."
We have repeatedly decided that this act did not apply, in
either section, to any criminal case, and that it was only
applicable to judgments and decrees in suits at law or in equity in
which there was a pecuniary matter in dispute.
Page 164 U. S. 618
Hence that, as it was well settled that a proceeding in habeas
corpus was a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding, and was only
availed of to assert the civil right of personal liberty, the
matter in dispute had no money value, and an appeal would not lie.
Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82;
Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104;
United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 320;
Washington & Georgetown Railroad v. District of
Columbia, 146 U. S. 227;
In re Lennon, 150 U. S. 395,
150 U. S. 397;
In re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211,
156 U. S. 215;
In re Belt, 159 U. S. 95,
159 U. S. 100;
Chapman v. United States, 164 U.
S. 436;
Perrine v. Slack, 164 U.
S. 452.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico declined to allow an appeal in
this case because of the rule laid down in
Cross v. Burke
and in
In re Lennon, supra, and it may be admitted that
the view that an appeal would not lie might well have been
entertained. But we think that the legislation in respect of the
review of the final orders of the territorial supreme courts on
habeas corpus so far differs from that in respect of the judgments
of the courts of the District of Columbia that a different rule
applies.
It will be perceived that the revision of the final judgments or
decrees of the Supreme Court of the District depended on the
provision that they should be so reexaminable in the same cases and
in like manner as the final judgments of the circuit courts of the
United States, and that there was no special provision in relation
to the review of final orders of such courts on habeas corpus.
Sections 702 and 1909 of the Revised Statutes are as
follows:
"SEC. 702. The final judgments and decrees of the supreme court
of any territory, except the Territory of Washington, in cases
where the value of the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, to be
ascertained by the oath of either party or of other competent
witnesses, exceeds one thousand dollars may be reviewed and
reversed or affirmed in the supreme court upon writ of error or
appeal in the same manner and under the same regulations as the
final judgments and decrees of a circuit court. . . . "
Page 164 U. S. 619
"SEC. 1909. Writs of error and appeals from the final decisions
of the Supreme Court of either of the territories of New Mexico,
Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, shall
be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States in the same
manner and under the same regulations as from the circuit courts of
the United States where the value of the property or the amount in
controversy, to be ascertained by the oath of either party or of
other competent witnesses, exceeds one thousand dollars, except
that a writ of error or appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme
Court of the United States from the decision of the supreme courts
created by this title, or of any judge thereof, or of the district
courts created by this title, or of any judge thereof, upon writs
of habeas corpus involving the question of personal freedom."
This section was one of those under title 23, "The Territories,"
and the exception was brought forward from section 10 of the
organic law of New Mexico, approved September 9, 1850, 9 Stat. pp.
446, 449, c. 49.
As to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, its final
judgments, orders, and decrees were reviewable by this Court on
writ of error or appeal, by section 705 of the Revised Statutes,
and section 846 of the Revised Statutes of the District, in the
same cases and in like manner as provided by law in reference to
the final judgments, orders, and decrees of the circuit courts of
the United States, and there was no mention of final orders on
habeas corpus; but, as to the supreme courts of the territories,
the right of appeal in habeas corpus was given in addition by the
special provision of section 1909 of the Revised Statutes. When the
Revised Statutes and the Revised Statutes of the District were
approved, both on the same day, June 22, 1874, appeals could not be
taken from the decisions of circuit courts on habeas corpus except
in the instance of the subjects or citizens of foreign states, and
the Act of March 3, 1885, c. 353, 23 Stat. 437, restoring the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court in respect of final decisions
of the circuit courts on habeas corpus in cases of persons alleged
to be restrained of their liberty in
Page 164 U. S. 620
violation of the Constitution or any law or treaty of the United
States, did not operate to give the same right of appeal to the
courts of the District of Columbia. And then the second Act of
March 3, 1885, c. 355, 23 Stat. 443, came in to furnish the
exclusive rule as to appeals and writs of error to review the final
judgments and decrees of the courts of the District. And this would
have been equally true as to the courts of the territories if
jurisdiction had depended solely on section 702 of the Revised
Statutes; but under section 1909 an appeal would lie to this Court
from the decisions of the territorial supreme courts on habeas
corpus when it would not lie from circuit courts or courts of the
District of Columbia in like case, and the question on this record
as to the right of appeal is whether Congress intended to repeal
that special provision as to final orders on habeas corpus by
including the supreme courts of the territories in the Act of March
3, 1885, c. 355. The intention to do so is not expressed, and
repeals by implication are not favored. The act covered
substantially the entire ground as to the District of Columbia as
the statutes stood, but, while it might be fairly argued that it
did so as to the territories, it does not necessarily follow that
the exception in respect of final orders on habeas corpus was
designed to be affected. The act has its obvious field of operation
without being assumed to be in every respect a substitute for the
earlier law in relation to the territories, and since the last
clause of section 1909 was directed to a special object, and
applicable to particular cases, we think it may properly be held
that the Act of March 3, 1885, had only general cases in view, and
that it was not intended to do away with the special provision.
Indeed, it was distinctly ruled in
In re Snow,
120 U. S. 274,
that an appeal would lie under section 1909 from a final order
entered in 1886 on habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Utah, and this notwithstanding the Act of March 3,
1885, c. 355, which was quoted and referred to in
Snow v.
United States, 118 U. S. 346.
Jurisdiction was also entertained of such an appeal in
Nielsen,
Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176,
from a final order of a district court of the Territory of Utah,
and in
In re
Delgado, 140
Page 164 U. S. 621
U.S. 586, from a final order of a district court of New
Mexico.
This result is not affected by the Judiciary Act of March 3,
1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517.
Shute v. Keyser, 149 U.
S. 649;
Folsom v. United States, 160 U.
S. 121;
In re Lennon, 150 U.
S. 393;
In re Heath, 144 U. S.
92.
But, although the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction
will be overruled, we are of opinion that the motion to affirm must
be sustained. The general rule is well established that a writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used to perform the office of a writ of
error, and that this doctrine applies not only to original writs of
habeas corpus issued by this Court, but on appeals to it from
courts below in habeas corpus proceedings.
In re
Schneider, 148 U. S. 162;
Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457,
127 U. S. 461;
Stevens v. Fuller, 136 U. S. 468,
136 U. S.
478.
The contention here is that the proceedings before Judge
Hamilton were
coram non judice and void because, being the
member of the supreme court assigned to the Fifth District, he
could not exercise judicial power in the First District.
By section 1851 of the Revised Statutes, it was provided
that
"the legislative powers of every territory shall extend to all
rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States."
By section 1865, that
"every territory shall be divided into three judicial districts,
and a district court shall be held in each district of a territory
by one of the justices of the supreme court at such time and place
as may be prescribed by law, and each judge, after assignment,
shall reside in the district to which he is assigned."
By section 1874, that
"the judges of the Supreme Court of each territory are
authorized to hold court within their respective districts, in the
counties wherein, by the laws of the territory, courts have been or
may be established, for the purpose of hearing and determining all
matters and causes except those in which the United States is a
party."
Section 1907 provided that
"the judicial power in New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Colorado,
Dakota, Idaho, Montana,
Page 164 U. S. 622
and Wyoming shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts,
probate courts, and in justices of the peace."
These provisions,
mutatis mutandis, were contained in
the organic law of New Mexico.
The number of judges of that territory having been raised to
five, it was provided by an Act of July 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 226, c.
665:
"SEC. 3. That the said territory shall be divided into five
judicial districts, and a district court shall be held in each
district by one of the justices of the supreme court at such time
and place as is or may be prescribed by law. Each judge, after
assignment, shall reside in the district to which he is
assigned."
"SEC. 4. That the present Chief Justice and his associates are
hereby vested with power and authority, and they are hereby
directed, to divide said territory into five judicial districts,
and make such assignments of the judges provided for in the first
section of this act as shall in their judgment be meet and
proper."
Section 1852 of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico of 1884 is as
follows:
"When any justice of the supreme court shall be absent from his
district or shall be in any manner incapacitated from acting or
performing any of his duties of judge or chancellor in his district
or from holding court therein, any other justice of the supreme
court may perform all such duties, hear and determine all
petitions, motions, demurrers, grant all rules and interlocutory
orders and decrees, as also all extraordinary writs in said
district."
It appears to us that this enactment was within the power of the
legislative assembly under the Revised Statutes, and that it is not
inconsistent with the provision for the assignment of the judges to
particular districts, and their residence therein.
By the organic act and the Revised Statutes, the whole of the
judicial power of the territory was vested in the supreme court,
district and probate courts, and justices of the peace, and the
supreme court and district courts possessed common law and chancery
jurisdiction. The supreme court of the territory held that the
judicial power which was thus vested in plenary terms in the
district courts was to be exercised in
Page 164 U. S. 623
each district "by one of the justices of the supreme court," and
that the organic law did not require that it should be exercised by
any particular one of the justices; that while, for the convenience
of the public, it was provided that a justice should be assigned to
each district, and reside therein, there was no express or implied
prohibition upon any judge against exercising the power in any
district other than the one to which he had been assigned, and that
there was nothing in the language of the provision requiring such a
construction as would confine the exercise of the power to the
particular justice assigned to a district when he might be
otherwise incapacitated. 46 P. 363. We concur in these views, and
are unable to perceive any want of jurisdiction on the part of the
district court in the proceedings had against petitioners, or any
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States in that
regard.
And this disposes of the objection that the amendment of the
record so as to show the arraignment and pleas of defendants was
improvidently made. Jurisdiction existed, and the action of the
district court and its recognition by the supreme court were in
accordance with the rule as to entries
nunc pro tunc.
In re Wright, 134 U. S. 136;
United States v.
Vigil, 10 Wall. 423.
It is insisted, however, that jurisdiction to render the
judgment was lacking because of the expiration of the special term
or its termination by conflict with the regular terms of the
district court before the trial was concluded.
The sections of the Compiled Laws of New Mexico of 1884 bearing
on this subject, and the first section of the Territorial Act of
February 22, 1893 (Laws New Mex. 1893, p. 51, c. 34), are given in
the margin.
*
Page 164 U. S. 624
These compiled laws were prepared by a commission authorized to
make "a careful and accurate compilation of all of the laws,
general local, and private, which shall be in force on the fifth
day of May, 1884," and the commissioners were careful, as they say
in the preface to their work, to avoid "making changes in any
original law." The compilation of general laws embraced the
Revision of 1865 and the session laws thereafter. Section 553 was
taken from section 4 of chapter 18 of the Revised Laws of 1865, the
chapter embodying the previous law of January 13, 1862. Section 552
was section 3 of chapter 26 of the Laws of 1874, approved January
3, and section 552
a was section 3 of chapter 27 of the
Laws of 1874, approved January 6. Laws 1874, pp. 47, 49. The
compilation of 1884 was published in accordance with the act
authorizing it to be made.
June 14, 1858, Congress passed an act, carried forward as § 1874
of the Revised Statutes, providing
"that the judges of the Supreme Court of each territory of the
United States are hereby authorized to hold court within their
respective districts, in the counties wherein, by the laws of said
territories, courts
Page 164 U. S. 625
have been or may be established, for the purpose of hearing and
determining all matters and causes except those in which the United
States is a party,
provided that the expenses thereof
shall be paid by the territory, or by the counties in which said
courts may be held and the United States shall in no case be
chargeable therewith."
11 Stat. 366, c. 166. Accordingly, terms of court in the several
counties were duly provided for by the territorial legislature, and
these terms in the counties in the First Judicial District were
fixed by the first section of the Territorial Act of February 22,
1893.
By other sections than those before given it was provided that
district courts in the several counties in which they might be held
should have power and jurisdiction of all criminal cases that
should not otherwise be provided for by law, of all criminal cases
that might originate in the several counties which according to law
belong to the district courts or that might be presented by
indictment, information, or appeal, and that the costs, charges,
and expense of holding and maintaining the district courts and the
costs in causes determined against the territory should be paid by
the territory. Comp.Laws, 1884, §§ 531, 532, 540.
Page 164 U. S. 626
By section 20 of chapter 61 of the Acts of 1893, the respective
counties of the territory were required to provide for the expenses
of the district courts by levy of taxes as therein prescribed. Laws
1893, p. 108.
The supreme court of the territory held that the requirement
that the respective counties should provide for the expenses of
their district courts under this section, which we have not felt
called upon to set forth
in extenso, practically inhibited
terms in counties in which there were no funds, and declared that
it had been a frequent consequence of this system that courts could
not be, and were not, held in some of the counties at the time
fixed by the statute. The laws of New Mexico contained the usual
provision for adjournment of terms to terms in course on the
nonattendance of the judge (§ 537), and it was not contended here
that in fact regular terms of the district court were held in the
County of San Juan in April, in the County of Rio Arriba in May,
and in the County of Taos in May, while the special term was in
session. From the various provisions of the acts referred to, it
appears that no specific duration of either regular or special
terms was prescribed by law, but that they were subject, when
lawfully commenced, to be continued until adjourned by order of
court, and that therefore they could not be necessarily determined
by the advent of the particular days designated for the
commencement of regular terms, and that special terms might be
ordered when regular terms failed to be held, and also whenever, in
the discretion of the judge of any district court, a furtherance of
justice required it.
Under section 552, which was section 3 of chapter 26 of the Laws
of 1874, when special terms were held because the regular term had
failed, it was provided that any such special term should not
conflict with the regular term in any other county in the same
Judicial District -- that is, that it should not be so called as to
produce a conflict or be held in actual conflict, while by section
3 of chapter 27 of the Laws of 1874, being section 552
a,
no specific limitations were imposed in respect of a special term
called thereunder. There was nothing in any of these provisions
which controlled the discretion
Page 164 U. S. 627
of the trial judge in continuing any special term he may have
been holding until a pending case was concluded, and nothing which
operated to invalidate the proceedings of such special term because
prolonged beyond the day fixed for a regular term. Jurisdiction did
not depend on the stroke of the clock.
Election Cases, 65
Penn.St. 34;
Briceland v. Commonwealth, 74 Penn.St. 463;
Mechanics' Bank v.
Withers, 6 Wheat. 106;
Maish v. Arizona,
164 U. S. 599.
This trial was commenced on April 23, 1895, which was, as the
record declared, the thirty-second day of the special term, which
had commenced March 18 and was concluded on May 29, 1895, the
sixty-third day of said special term, by the return of a verdict of
guilty. The motions for new trial and in arrest were denied, and
the sentence pronounced on June 15, 1895, one of the days of the
regular term of the district court, the postponement to that day
having been granted on the request of defendants. Under these
circumstances, the proceedings, in any view, cannot be held void
for want of jurisdiction.
McDowell v. United States,
159 U. S. 596.
Order affirmed.
