assigned as error the allowance of certain items specifically
set forth in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. The first assignment of error is taken to the allowance to
the petitioner of clerk's fees for recording in the final record
books the entries and proceedings in various criminal cases,
consisting of the indictment or information, warrants,
recognizances, judgments, and other proceedings, as required by
rule of court at fifteen cents per folio. It seems that these
records were made by him in compliance with a rule of the circuit
court adopted November 3, 1890, requiring the clerk to keep a
criminal final record book, in which should be recorded
"the indictment or information, and all recognizances, warrants,
process (except writs of subpoena and proceedings thereunder),
judgments, and other proceedings in every prosecution for violation
of the criminal laws of the United States."
For making up these records the clerk charged a fee of fifteen
cents per folio, in pursuance of the eighth subdivision of
Rev.Stat. § 828, which entitles him to this amount "for entering
any return, rule, order, continuance, judgment, decree or
recognizance, or drawing any bond, or making any record, return or
report." The only objection was to the clerk's method of computing
folios by treating each document, judgment, order, and direction of
the court as a separate instrument for the enumeration of folios,
instead of counting the folios of the record as one instrument
continuously from beginning to end.
The assignment is well taken. By his method of computation, the
clerk charges for each entry, many of which are less than a dozen
words in length, as for one hundred words. This may be proper where
the charge is made under the first clause of the paragraph, "for
entering any return, rule,
Page 164 U.S. 51
order," etc., upon the journal of the court, but the evident
intent of the statute is that, for the purpose of making up the
record as a history of the case, the entire record shall be taken
as one instrument.
2. The next item to which the government objects is to the
allowance for making dockets, indexes, taxing costs, etc., in nine
cases, in which defendants at first pleaded not guilty, and at a
later day, with no steps or proceedings intervening, withdrew such
plea, pleaded guilty, and judgment was entered upon such plea.
In this connection, section 828 provides as follows:
"For making dockets and indexes, issuing venire, taxing costs
and all other services on the trial or argument of a cause where
issue is joined and testimony given, three dollars."
For like services "in a cause where issue is joined, but no
testimony is given, two dollars."
For like services "in a cause which is dismissed or
discontinued, or where judgment or decree is made or rendered
without issue, one dollar."
The argument of the government is that, as the plea of not
guilty, which constituted the issue, was withdrawn and a plea of
guilty subsequently entered, upon which judgment was rendered, the
case should be treated as one in which no issue was ever joined,
and that the condition in which the case stands when finally
disposed of is the criterion for the fee to be charged; in other
words, if the case be finally disposed of upon a plea of guilty,
regardless of the issue previously joined, the clerk is only
entitled to the fee which would have been allowed him if no issue
had ever been joined.
While we have held that a docket fee is not taxable until the
case is finally disposed of,
United States v. McCandless,
147 U. S. 692,
147 U. S. 694,
� 3, we are still of the opinion that the clerk's right to the
docket fee as upon issue joined attaches at the time such issue is
in fact joined, and is not lost by the subsequent withdrawal of the
plea which constituted the issue. Even when the clerk is allowed
three dollars, there is no requirement that judgment shall be
entered upon the issue, but
Page 164 U.S. 52
only that testimony shall be given, the only difference between
the first and second paragraphs being that testimony must be taken
to entitle the clerk to three dollars, while where none is taken,
he is entitled to two dollars. If the position of the government be
sound, it would seem to follow that if the defendant plead not
guilty and a jury trial be had, and the jury disagree, or before
verdict actually rendered the defendant withdraw such plea and
enter a plea of guilty, the clerk is entitled to no more than he
would have been if the defendant had pleaded guilty upon first
being arraigned. We think this could not have been the design of
the statute.
3. The next item differs from the last only in the fact that,
after issue was joined, the case was subsequently discontinued upon
nol. pros. entered. Literally it falls within the third
paragraph of a cause "dismissed or discontinued," but we think that
clause applies only to those cases where the case is dismissed or
discontinued before issue has been joined, and that, as in the
previous case, the clerk's right to the larger docket fee attaches
at the time issue is joined. There is somewhat more doubt as to the
construction of this paragraph than the last, but upon the whole,
we think that it was the design of the statute to allow the larger
docket fee in every case where issue was joined in the course of
the proceedings.
4. Objection is made to a folio charge for making a record of
the names of jurors, with their residences, as drawn by the jury
commissioner. In the case of
United States v. King,
147 U. S. 676,
147 U. S. 678,
we held that the statute creating jury commissioners, Act of June
30, 1879, c. 52, 21 Stat. 43, did not make the clerk of the court
such commissioner, although it required him to act with the
commissioner in selecting the names of jurors and placing them in
the jury box, and that a new duty was thereby imposed upon him as
clerk, for which no compensation was provided by law. The question
in that case was whether the clerk was entitled to a
per
diem fee of five dollars for services in selecting jurors, in
analogy to the compensation allowed to the jury commissioner, and
it was held that he was not. But it was not intended in that case
to hold that the clerk was bound to forego any of his ordinary
Page 164 U.S. 53
fees as clerk simply because he was aiding the jury commissioner
in the performance of a new duty, and it seems to us that if the
practice in that court requires the clerk to make a record of the
names of jurors, with their residences, or to do any other
incidental work in connection with the names of the jurors drawn,
he is entitled to charge for that as for "making a record." It does
not appear that a list of the jurors, with their residences, is
strictly a part of the records of the court, but assuming that such
list is required to be made by the order or the practice of the
court and posted up in the clerk's office or preserved in the
files, and no other method of compensating the clerk is provided,
we think it may be properly charged for by the folio.
5. The final objection of the government is made to an item for
entering an order of court directing the clerk as to what
disposition to make of the money received for fines in certain
cases, and for filing thirteen certificates of deposit of the bank
for fines paid in to the credit of the Treasurer of the United
States. The claim of the government is that the statutory fee of
one percent "for receiving, keeping and paying out money in
pursuance of any statute, or order of court" covers all incidental
services in this connection, including the entry of all orders for
the payment of the money and a filing of all receipts given by the
persons to whom it is paid.
We think, however, the commission of one percent was intended to
compensate the clerk for his services and responsibility in the
receipt, the safekeeping, and the proper disbursement of the money,
and was not intended to deprive him of fees to which he would have
been entitled if the money had been kept and disbursed by another
officer. As the charge seems to be equitable, and has the sanction
not only of the Court of Claims, but of several other courts, we
are not disposed to disturb it.
Goodrich v. United States,
42 F. 392, 394;
Van Duzee v. United States, 48 F. 643,
646.
It results that, for the error of the Court of Claims in respect
to the first item, its judgment must be
Reversed, and the case remanded for a new judgment in
conformity to this opinion.