The last clause of § 4 of the Act of March 2, 1891, c. 496, 26
Stat. 822, entitled
"An act to credit and pay to the several states and territories
and the District of Columbia all moneys collected under the direct
tax levied by the Act of Congress approved August 6, 1861,"
does not refer to or cover the cases of those owners who are
mentioned in the first clause of the same section.
Brewer v.
Blougher, 14 Pet. 178, affirmed to the point that
it is the duty of the Court, in construing a statute, to ascertain
the meaning of the legislature from the words used in it and from
the subject matter to which it relates, and to restrain its meaning
within narrower limits than its words import if satisfied that the
literal meaning of its language would extend to cases which the
legislature never designed to embrace in it.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellants herein have brought this appeal for the purpose
of obtaining a review of a judgment of the Court of Claims
dismissing their petition. No opinion was delivered by that court
in this case, but it was decided upon the authority of the case of
Sams v. United States, 27 Ct.Cl. 266, which involved the
construction of the same statute that is before us in this
case.
It appears by the finding of the court that one Henry McKee was
the owner of certain lands, which are therein described, in the
Town of Beaufort, in the Parish of St. Helena, South Carolina, and
that while he was such owner, the land was sold for the payment of
the direct tax provided for in section 9 and the following sections
of the act approved
Page 164 U. S. 288
August 5, 1861, and entitled "An act to provide increased
revenue from imports, to pay the interest on the public debt, and
for other purposes." 12 Stat. 292. The property was bid in by the
United States, and was thereafter resold by the government. The
direct tax on the property so sold amounted, in all, to $91.52, and
upon the resale of such property there was received into the
Treasury of the United States, in excess of the direct tax, the sum
of $5,003.41. Henry McKee, the legal owner of the property at the
time of its sale, died some time thereafter, leaving a will, and
the claimants are the beneficiaries thereunder, being his widow and
children. These same claimants have heretofore obtained judgment in
the Court of Claims against the government for the sum of $5,680.60
on account of the same real estate above described. That judgment
was obtained, and the claim in this case is founded, upon the Act
approved March 2, 1891, 26 Stat. 822, entitled
"An act to credit and pay to the several states and territories
and the District of Columbia all moneys collected under the direct
tax levied by the Act of Congress approved August 5th, 1861."
The act is set forth in full in the margin.
*
Page 164 U. S. 289
The judgment which the claimants have already obtained in the
Court of Claims was rendered under the first clause in section 4 of
the act. The claim now before the court rests upon the last clause
of section 4, which reads as follows:
"
And provided further that any sum or sums of money
received into the Treasury of the United States from the sale of
lands bid in for taxes in any state under the laws described
Page 164 U. S. 290
in the first section of this act in excess of the tax assessed
thereon shall be paid to the owners of the land so bid in and
resold, or to their legal heirs or representatives."
We think this proviso does not apply to the owners of lands
described in the first clause of the section.
A perusal of the entire act shows that its purpose was to pay
back to the states, or to individual citizens of states,
Page 164 U. S. 291
the amounts of money received from them in the course of the
execution of the direct tax act of 1861 and the acts amendatory
thereof. The first section of the act provides for the crediting by
the Secretary of the Treasury to each state, etc., a sum equal to
all collections, by set-off or otherwise, made from said states, or
from any of the citizens or inhabitants thereof, or other persons,
under the act of Congress therein mentioned. Provision is thus made
for the amount that had been collected by the United States.
The second section provides for the remission and relinquishment
of all moneys still due to the United States under the direct tax
apportioned by section 8 of the above-mentioned act of Congress.
The third section appropriates moneys for the purpose of
reimbursing each state for all money found due under the provisions
of the act, and various conditions are therein imposed relative to
the payment of such moneys. By the first clause of the fourth
section, special provision is made for the payment to the legal
owners, or their heirs, of such lands as were sold in the Parishes
of St. Helena and St. Luke's in the State of South Carolina under
this direct tax act. Those owners or their representatives were to
be paid for their lands, which had been sold, and the value thereof
was to be ascertained in the manner provided by the fourth section.
Full and special provision was thus made, in the clauses preceding
the last clause of section 4, for the owners of lands which had
been sold under the direct tax act in the Parishes of St. Helena
and St. Luke's in the State of South Carolina. The reimbursement of
the owners in those particular parishes for their lands, which had
been sold, was to be after the standard which was provided for in
the clauses quoted.
There were, however, cases where lands had been sold under this
direct tax act in other parishes of the State of South Carolina and
in other states. There was added to the act of 1891 the last clause
of section 4, which would cover all such cases, and we are of
opinion that this last clause does not refer to or cover the cases
of those owners who are mentioned in the first clause of the same
section. Otherwise this curious result might, and in this
particular case would, follow: the owners of the
Page 164 U. S. 292
land at the time of its sale would recover, under the first
clause, a greater amount than the government actually received upon
its resale of the land pursuant to the provisions of the direct tax
act. That result would be accomplished by the rule, provided in the
first clause, for arriving at the sum to be paid by the government
without reference to the amount actually received by it. But in
addition to that, and under the provisions of the last clause as
construed by plaintiffs in error, the owners would be entitled to
recover all the moneys received into the Treasury of the United
States upon the sale of such lands for taxes, under the direct tax
act, in excess of the taxes assessed thereon. In this case, these
claimants have already obtained judgment against the government for
$5,680.60, and all that the government has received upon the sale
of the property (above the taxes on such land, which were $91.52)
is $5,003.41. By that judgment, therefore, the government must pay
nearly six hundred dollars more than it ever received on account of
the land, and, in addition to that, if the claimants'
interpretation of the statute be the correct one, the government
must pay $5,000 more to the owners of the same lands. We cannot
think that this was the intention of Congress. To give back as much
as it has received over and above the original tax would seem to be
dealing with a good deal of liberality with the owners. The fact is
well known as a matter of contemporaneous history, and it was so
stated by counsel on the argument, that upon the sale of lands
which the United States had bid in by virtue of the provisions of
the direct tax act of 1861, and which were sold thereafter under
the provisions of section 11 of the Act of June 7, 1862, entitled
"An act for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary
districts within the United States, and for other purposes," .12
Stat. 422, the amounts of such sales were frequently, and
generally, very much less than the real value of the property sold.
This was no fault of the government, however, and resulted in no
benefit to it. By the rule adopted in the first clause of section 4
of the act of 1891 for ascertaining the amount which was to be paid
the former owners of the property that had been sold, the sum which
the United States
Page 164 U. S. 293
would have to pay to those legal owners might, and probably
would, be much in excess of the sums which the government had
actually received, so that in numerous cases there would be a pure
gratuity on the part of the government to those owners. The
language would have to be very plain to call for such a
construction of the last proviso in section 4 as would give, in
addition to a gratuity, a still further sum amounting to the
surplus received by the government over and above the amount of the
tax levied upon the property sold. The fact that there were lands
sold in other parishes than those named in the State of South
Carolina and also lands lying in other states furnishes a rational
and proper foundation for the last proviso in section 4 of the act
of 1891, without construing it to involve these owners who had
already been specially provided for. There is full opportunity thus
given for the application of the clause in question to other
landowners, without including within its benefits the owners of
those lands who had already been particularly mentioned and
provided for by other clauses in the same section. It is true that
if the language used in that last clause be given its widest and
broadest application, it would include all owners of real estate
which had been sold in any portion of the country under the
provisions of the direct tax act. But we think a perusal of the
whole act prevents our giving this unlimited construction, because
to do so would conflict with what we think was the intention of
Congress, gathered from the provisions of the whole act. Under such
circumstances, it is not only the right, but it is the plain duty,
of the court to limit, by a proper construction, the otherwise
boundless application of the general language used in the statute.
As was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney:
"It is undoubtedly the duty of the court to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature from the words used in the statute, and
the subject matter to which it relates, and to restrain its
operation within narrower limits than its words import, if the
court are satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would
extend to cases which the legislature never designed to embrace in
it."
Brewer v.
Blougher, 14 Pet. 178, at
39 U. S. 198;
Petri v. Bank, 142 U. S. 644,
142 U. S.
650.
Page 164 U. S. 294
It is true that in the first case cited, the Court refused to
limit the application of the statute as contended for by one of the
parties to the controversy, but such refusal was based on the view
of the statute taken by the Court, which was that the intention of
the legislature was not so plainly within the contention of counsel
as to permit of the limitation in that case. The rule for the
construction of a statute and of the duty of the Court was given as
above stated.
In this case, we think the intention of Congress was plain, and
that the general language of the last clause of section 4 should
not be held to include the class of owners of lands mentioned in
the first clause of the same section, for whose case special
provision was therein made. We think that the construction given by
the Court of Claims to the statute of 1891, as set forth in its
opinion in
Sams v. United States, 27 Ct.Cl. 266, was
correct, and its judgment in this case should therefore be
Affirmed.
*
"An act to credit and pay to the several states and territories
and the District of Columbia all moneys collected under the direct
tax levied by the act of Congress approved August fifth, eighteen
hundred and sixty-one."
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled that it
shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to credit to
each state and Territory of the United States and the District of
Columbia a sum equal to all collections by set off or otherwise
made from said states and territories and the District of Columbia
or from any of the citizens or inhabitants thereof or other persons
under the act of Congress approved August fifth, eighteen hundred
and sixty-one, and the amendatory acts thereto."
"SEC. 2. That all moneys still due to the United States on the
quota of direct tax apportioned by section eight of the act of
Congress approved August fifth, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, are
hereby remitted and relinquished."
"SEC. 3. That there is hereby appropriated out of any money in
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to reimburse each state, territory, and the District of
Columbia for all money found due to them under the provisions of
this act, and the Treasurer of the United States is hereby directed
to pay the same to the governors of the states and territories and
to the commissioners of the District of Columbia, but no money
shall be paid to any state or territory until the legislature
thereof shall have accepted, by resolution, the sum herein
appropriated, and the trusts imposed, in full satisfaction of all
claims against the United States on account of the levy and
collection of said tax, and shall have authorized the governor to
receive said money for the use and purposes aforesaid:
provided
that where the sums, or any part thereof, credited to any
state, territory or the District of Columbia, have been collected
by the United States from the citizens or inhabitants thereof, or
any other person, either directly or by sale of property, such sums
shall be held in trust by such state, territory or the District of
Columbia for the benefit of those persons or inhabitants from whom
they were collected, or their legal representatives,
and
provided further that no part of the money collected from
individuals and to be held in trust as aforesaid shall be retained
by the United States as a setoff against any indebtedness alleged
to exist against the state, territory or District of Columbia in
which such tax was collected,
and provided further that no
part of the money hereby appropriated shall be paid out by the
governor of any state or territory or any other person to any
attorney or agent under any contract for services now existing or
heretofore made between the representative of any state or
territory and any attorney or agent. All claims under the trust
hereby created shall be filed with the governor of such state or
territory and the commissioners of the District of Columbia,
respectively, within six years next after the passage of this act,
and all claims not so filed shall be forever barred, and the money
attributable thereto shall belong to such state, territory or the
District of Columbia, respectively, as the case may be."
"SEC. 4. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the
Treasury to pay to such persons as shall in each case apply
therefor, and furnish satisfactory evidence that such applicant was
at the time of the sales hereinafter mentioned the legal owner, or
is the heir at law or devisee of the legal owner of such lands as
were sold in the parishes of Saint Helena and Saint Luke's in the
State of South Carolina, under the said acts of Congress, the value
of said lands in the manner following, to-wit: to the owners of the
lots in the Town of Beaufort, one-half of the value assessed
thereon for taxation by the United States direct tax commissioners
for South Carolina; to the owner of lands which were rated for
taxation by the State of South Carolina as being usually
cultivated, five dollars per acre for each acre thereof returned on
the proper tax book; to the owners of all other lands, one dollar
per acre for each acre thereof returned on said tax book,
provided that in all cases where such owners, or persons
claiming under them, have redeemed or purchased said lands, or any
part thereof, from the United States, they shall not receive
compensation for such part so redeemed or purchased, and any sum or
sums held or to be held by the said State of South Carolina in
trust for any such owner under section three of this act shall be
deducted from the sum due to such owner under the provisions of
this section,
and provided further that in all cases where
said owners have heretofore received from the United States the
surplus proceeds arising from the sale of their lands, such sums
shall be deducted from the sum which they are entitled to receive
under this act. That in all cases where persons, while serving in
the army or navy or marine corps of the United States, or who had
been honorably discharged from said service, purchased any of said
lands under section eleven of the act of Congress approved June
seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and such lands afterwards
reverted to the United States, it shall be the duty of the
Secretary of the Treasury to pay to such persons as shall in each
case apply therefor, or to their heirs at law, devisees, or
grantees, in good faith and for valuable consideration, whatever
sum was so paid to the United States in such case. That before
paying any money to such persons, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall require the person or persons entitled to receive the same to
execute a release of all claims and demands of every kind and
description whatever against the United States arising out of the
execution of said acts, and also a release of all right, title, and
interest in and to the said lands. That there is hereby
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, the sum of five hundred thousand dollars, or so much
thereof as may be necessary to pay for said lots and lands, which
sum shall include all moneys in the Treasury derived in any manner
from the enforcement of said acts in said parishes, and not
otherwise appropriated. That section one thousand and sixty-three
of the Revised Statutes is hereby made applicable to claims arising
under this act without limitation as to the amount involved in such
claim,
and provided further that any sum or sums of money
received into the Treasury of the United States from the sale of
lands bid in for taxes in any state under the laws described in the
first section of this act in excess of the tax assessed thereon
shall be paid to the owners of the land so bid in and resold, or to
their legal heirs or representatives."
Approved March 2, 1891.