The jurisdiction of this Court is to be determined by the amount
directly involved in the decree appealed from, and not by any
contingent demand which may be recovered, or any contingent loss
which may be sustained by either party, through the probative
effect of the decree, however direct its bearing upon such
contingency. A decree in favor of plaintiff, but remanding the case
to the trial court for further proceedings to ascertain the amount
of the indebtedness, is not a final decree from which appeal can be
taken.
This was a bill in equity, filed by the firm of Fechheimer,
Goodkind & Co., against Justus Hollander, a judgment debtor,
Samuel Bieber, his assignee, and a number of preferred creditors
under such assignment, alleging that the assignment was fraudulent
and void, and praying that Hollander might be required to disclose
the amount of his indebtedness to each of his preferred creditors,
the amount of goods purchased by him immediately prior to his
failure, and the names of the persons from whom purchased, the
amount of his indebtedness to each of his creditors before making
such purchases, the amount and character of goods he had in stock
prior to his last purchases, and sundry other particulars, the
amount of property turned over to Bieber under the assignment, and
also praying for the appointment of a receiver, the setting aside
of the assignment, the payment of the plaintiffs' claim, and an
injunction against the defendant Bieber from further proceeding
under the assignment.
The bill set forth, as the basis of plaintiffs' right to sue, an
indebtedness in the sum of $1,000, by judgment recovered in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, upon which execution had
been issued and returned
nulla bona, a note for $1,000,
and goods purchased to the amount of $1,846.50.
Demurrers were filed to this bill by Bieber and certain of the
preferred creditors, which were sustained, and the bill
Page 162 U. S. 327
dismissed. Upon appeal to the general term, the decree of the
special term dismissing the bill was reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings. Answers were subsequently filed by the
several defendants, and testimony taken, and upon a hearing upon
pleadings and proofs, the bill was again dismissed, and an appeal
taken to the general term, which again reversed the decree of the
special term declared the assignment to be fraudulent and void and
decreed that the complainants recover from the defendant Bieber the
amount of their judgment, set out in the bill of complaint,
together with their costs, to be taxed by the clerk, and that the
case be remanded to the special term for further proceedings. From
this decree defendants appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is clear that this appeal must be dismissed for the want of
jurisdiction. The decree from which the appeal was taken declares
the assignment from Hollander to the defendant Bieber to be
fraudulent and void as against the complainants, and
"that said complainants do have and recover from the said
defendant Bieber the amount of their judgment, set out in the bill
of complaint, together with their costs in this cause, to be taxed
by the clerk, and it is further ordered that this cause be remanded
to the special term for further proceedings."
The amount of the judgment referred to in the decree was $1,000,
with interest at 7 percent from February 15, 1886, and costs, and
the total amount due thereon at the time the decree was rendered
was but $1,454.11.
It is true that the bill alleged a further indebtedness upon a
note for $1,000, and an open account of $1,846.50, and it is
claimed that at the time the decree was rendered, there was
Page 162 U. S. 328
due upon these two items the sum of $3,778.16, which, added to
the amount due upon the judgment, made the total amount due at the
time of the decree $5,232.27.
The whole basis of the decree, however, was the judgment for
$1,000, which was the amount for which the general term directed a
recovery. It is true that it also decreed the assignment to be void
and remanded the case for further proceedings, that upon such
further proceedings the court might direct an account to be taken,
and the property to be divided generally among the creditors, and
that upon such accounting the plaintiffs might be admitted to prove
the full amount of their claim. This amount, however, is not one
directly involved in the decree, and the law is well settled that
the jurisdiction is to be determined by the amount directly
involved in the decree appealed from, and not by any contingent
demand which may be recovered, or any contingent loss which may be
sustained by either one of the parties through the probative effect
of the decree, however direct its bearing upon such contingency.
New England Mortgage Co. v. Gay, 145 U.
S. 123. In that case, which was an action in assumpsit
upon promissory notes, there had been a finding by a jury that the
transaction was usurious. The amount involved in the particular
suit was less than $5,000, but the effect of the judgment, under
the laws of Georgia, was to invalidate a mortgage given as security
upon property worth over $20,000. It was held that notwithstanding
such indirect effect, this Court had no jurisdiction, the amount
directly in dispute being only the usurious sum. All the prior
authorities upon the point are cited in this case.
But again, if the decree appealed from be a final decree at all,
it is final only for the amount of the judgment. If it be regarded
as a decree for the whole amount of the plaintiffs' claim against
Hollander, then it is clearly not a final decree, since the case
was remanded for further proceedings, and until those proceedings
were had, the amount of such indebtedness could not be fixed in
such manner as to give this Court jurisdiction of an appeal, and
was purely conjectural upon the court finding that amount to be
due.
Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff,
160 U. S. 374.
This conclusion is not the less
Page 162 U. S. 329
irresistible from the fact that the note and open account were
reduced to judgment after the bill was filed, since this judgment
was not made the basis of the bill, and the finding in the decree
is restricted to the amount of the first judgment of $1,000.
The appeal must therefore be
Dismissed.
