In an action brought by a circuit court commissioner for the
District of Louisiana to recover fees for alleged services rendered
the United States in prosecutions under Rev. Stat. § 1986, the
Court of Claims found that the prosecutions were the result of a
purpose on the part of party managers to purge, as they alleged,
the register of illegal voters; that the commissioner made no
inquiry or examination of witnesses to satisfy himself of probable
cause, but simply issued warrants on the affidavits filed; that the
warrants issued were not signed by himself, but by a number of
clerks who used a stamp, which was a facsimile of his signature,
until the stamp was broken, and then simply wrote his name; that in
the issuance of warrants, the commissioner exercised no discretion,
and made no personal examination of the complaints or witnesses,
but issued a warrant in all cases in which a complaint was made;
that the warrants were issued generally for the purpose of
affecting the register of votes to be used in the election, and not
to arrest and punish offenders; that in a large majority of the
1303 cases in which the defendants were discharged, it did not
appear that the commissioner performed any service in investigating
the offences charged, nor in judicially determining the guilt or
innocence of the parties.
Held that these findings
justified the further finding of that court that
"from said facts, the court finds the ultimate fact to be that
the claimant's testator did not perform the services for the United
States in good faith for the purpose of, enforcing the criminal
law,"
and the judgment entered thereon in favor of the United
States.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
On December 16, 1878, the testator of plaintiff filed his
petition in the Court of Claims praying judgment against the United
States for the sum of $82,830 for services as United
Page 161 U. S. 640
States commissioner for the District of Louisiana. The petition
alleged that proceedings were commenced before him as such
commissioner in 8,283 cases, and that under § 1986, Rev.Stat., he
was entitled to ten dollars for each case. A demurrer thereto
having been sustained and a judgment of dismissal rendered, his
executrix, the present appellant -- he having died pending the suit
-- appealed to this Court, and here the judgment of the Court of
Claims was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
151 U. S. 151 U.S.
179.
In the opinion then filed, this Court, while disapproving of the
contention that the mere multitude of cases was proof of a lack of
good faith, at the same time distinctly recognized that no cause of
action arose against the government unless the proceedings,
judicial in form, were instituted and carried on in good faith, and
with a view to the arrest and punishment of offenders, and the case
was remanded in order that that question of fact might be
considered and determined. Thereafter a trial was had in the Court
of Claims, and upon the testimony presented, that court found, in
its sixth finding, as follows:
"From said facts, the court finds the ultimate fact to be that
the claimant's testator did not perform the services for the United
States in good faith for the purpose of enforcing the criminal
law,"
and upon this finding judgment was entered in favor of the
defendant, from which judgment the plaintiff has again appealed to
this Court.
If nothing else were before us than the conclusion of the Court
of Claims, expressed in the sixth finding, there would be little
for consideration, because, as was held when the case was here
before, a lack of good faith on the part of a commissioner may
rightfully be pleaded in bar of any claim against the United States
for compensation.
But the contention is that this sixth finding is dependent on
facts stated in the prior findings, and that they do not warrant
the conclusion. Those findings show that "the prosecutions were the
result of a purpose on the part of party managers to purge, as they
alleged, the register of illegal voters;" that the commissioner
made no "inquiry or examination of witnesses to satisfy himself of
probable cause," but
Page 161 U. S. 641
simply "issued warrants on the affidavits" filed, and that the
warrants were not signed by himself, but by a number of clerks, who
used, until broken, a stamp, which made a facsimile of his
signature, and thereafter simply wrote his name; that of the 8,283
persons against whom warrants were issued, about 2,000 were persons
of respectability and character, residents of the City of New
Orleans, and, these facts being disclosed, the prosecutions were
summarily dismissed. It appears further that,
"in the issuance of warrants, the commissioner exercised no
discretion and made no personal examination of the complaints or
witnesses, but issued warrant in all cases in which a complaint was
made;"
"that the warrants were issued generally for the purpose of
affecting the register of votes to be used in the election, and not
to arrest and punish offenders;"
that in a large majority of the 1,303 cases in which the
defendants were discharged, it does not appear that the
commissioner "performed any service in investigating the offenses
charged nor in judicially determining the guilt or innocence of the
parties." Further findings show that there were 120 persons
swearing to the affidavits, each affidavit being sworn to by two
persons, there being sixty groups of two persons, and that these
affidavits were filed against persons who had registered for the
purpose of voting at elections prior to that of 1876, and who, in
the meantime, had removed from the ward or voting precinct in which
they had theretofore been registered, but had not caused their
names to be changed by the supervisors of registration.
Do these facts justify the conclusion stated in the sixth
finding? What is a judicial proceeding, and what function does a
commissioner perform in instituting a criminal proceeding? Is it
partisan in any sense of the term? May a judicial officer exercise
the powers conferred upon him to aid any party or faction in
respect to a coming election? It seems that the mere statement of
the inquiry carries an answer in condemnation. The very thought of
a judicial office is that its functions are not partisan or
political, and that he who occupies such office stands indifferent
to all questions of mere party success.
Page 161 U. S. 642
It carries also the further thought that, in the discharge of
his judicial functions, the magistrate exercises a personal and
judicial consideration of every charge made, and subjects no one to
the annoyance and disgrace of arrest until, after personal and
careful investigation, he, as a magistrate, believes him to be
guilty of a violation of law. The idea of a perfunctory discharge
of these duties, of a transfer of responsibility to mere clerks, of
a wholesale proceeding against a multitude of citizens without
personal inquiry as to the probability of the charge against each,
is something abhorrent to the true and reasonable understanding of
the conditions of judicial action. The testimony is not preserved,
and we must rest upon the findings of fact made by the Court of
Claims, and upon them, irrespective of what may be considered in
the sixth finding as partially a conclusion of law, it is evident
that the action of the commissioner was in no just sense the action
of a judicial officer, instituted for the sake of upholding the
laws of the United States and the punishment of crime. The facts,
as stated in the prior findings, we unhesitatingly affirm, justify
the conclusions stated in the sixth finding, and therefore hold
that the services rendered by the commissioner were partisan,
rather than judicial, and as such entitled to no compensation from
the government.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration and decision
of this case.