In an appeal from a judgment of a territorial court, with no
exceptions to rulings of the court on the admission or rejection of
testimony, this Court is limited in its review to a determination
of the question whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain
the judgment rendered.
The Court bases its conclusion in this case upon the fact that
the record exhibits such gross laches on the part of complainant,
or those with whom he is in privity and upon whose rights his own
must depend, as to effectually debar him from a right to the relief
which he seeks.
The relief sought by appellant in the lower court was to have
the New Mexico Mining Company, to whom certain letters patent were
issued by the United States for a Mexican mining grant, declared a
trustee for his benefit to the extent of a one-fourth interest in
the land covered by said letters patent.
The territorial district court held that the statute of
limitations barred the suit, and therefore dismissed the bill. The
supreme court of the territory affirmed the decree of dismissal, 27
P. 318, holding the plea of the statute of limitations good and
also sustained the mining company's contention that Mrs. Ortiz,
under whom they claimed, acquired title through a valid mutual will
executed by herself and her husband in 1841. The cause was then
brought to this Court by appeal. From the findings in the record,
the following facts are extracted:
The property in controversy, covered by the United States
patent, embraced a mining grant made by the government of Mexico in
1833, to Jose Francisco Ortiz and Ignacio Cano. This grant
consisted of a gold mine or vein, and a small extent
Page 161 U. S. 574
of surface ground, as also commons of pasture and water to the
extent of four leagues from each of the four cardinal points of the
mine. Sometime prior to the cession of New Mexico to the United
States under the Treaty of February 2, 1848, Cano sold and
transferred all his interest in the grant in question to Ortiz, his
co-owner. On August 15, 1841, Ortiz and his wife executed before a
Mexican alcalde and two attending witnesses a mutual will in which
it was provided that the survivor should be the universal legatee
or heir of the other to all the property, both real and personal,
of every kind whatsoever. Ortiz died before his wife, July 22, 1848
at Santa Fe, New Mexico, and thereupon Mrs. Ortiz entered into the
possession of the mine and the enjoyment of the privileges
connected therewith, and retained this possession up to December
20, 1853, when she sold and delivered the possession thereof to
John Greiner, the deed to whom was recorded in the office of the
Probate Clerk of Santa Fe County on December 29, 1853. Greiner
remained in possession until August 19, 1854, when he transferred
the property to Elisha Whittlesley and six others. Contemporaneous
with the execution of the deed to Whittlesley
et al., they
and one other person executed articles of association under the
name of the New Mexico Mining Company, and on February 1, 1858, the
members of the association were incorporated by the Legislature of
the Territory of New Mexico, under a similar designation.
On November 8, 1860, Whittlesley
et al., as
representing the New Mexico Mining Company, petitioned the then
surveyor general of the territory to examine their title to said
grant. That official complied with the request, and made a
favorable report to Congress, which, by an act approved March 1,
1861, 12 Stat. 887, c. 66, confirmed the grant, the claim being
designated as "private land claim No. 43." A survey of the grant
was thereafter made, and was completed on August 14, 1861, but such
survey was not approved by the Secretary of the Interior until
April 22, 1876. On May 20, 1876, a patent issued in the name of the
New Mexico Mining Company, the lands embraced therein being stated
to
Page 161 U. S. 575
contain 69,458.33 acres, less 259 acres in conflict with another
grant.
In addition to the possession by Mrs. Ortiz, before stated, her
grantee, Greiner, and his assigns held actual, open, and notorious
possession of the property in question from the conveyance to
Greiner in December, 1853, until the commencement of this
litigation in 1883. Such possession was held by employing an agent
or agents to live on the property at the village of Dolores, near
the said mine, and by making large and extensive improvements on
the property, in building a large stamp mill at Dolores, near said
mine, and many other acts, open and notorious, indicative of
ownership of the property. No attempt was ever made by those
through whom Gildersleeve claimed to interfere with such possession
or enjoyment of the property or to actively assert any right or
interest in said property, except through a suit brought in 1880 by
Brevoort, as hereinafter stated. None of said parties ever
intervened in the proceedings instituted before the surveyor
general looking to the confirmation of the grant to the New Mexico
Mining Company, nor after the surveyor general's report to Congress
was an objection raised to the passage of the act confirming the
grant, nor, indeed at any time did the complainant or those under
whom he claims object to the mining company's assertion of title to
the property, or to the issuance of letters patent to the
company.
The complainant bases his right to the equitable relief prayed
for in his bill upon the assertion that the authentic mutual will
of Ortiz and his wife heretofore referred to was void because not
executed with the formalities required by law as to the number of
witnesses, etc., and that subsequently Ortiz died intestate,
leaving no direct but certain collateral heirs, who conveyed in
1873 the interest inherited by them from Ortiz to one Brevoort, who
in 1880 conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the property
thus acquired by him jointly to appellant and Knaebel. The
consideration of the last conveyance from Brevoort to Gildersleeve
and Knaebel, they being attorneys at law, was money advanced and
services rendered and to be rendered to Brevoort for the
maintenance
Page 161 U. S. 576
of a suit then or about to be instituted to enforce Brevoort's
alleged title to the mine.
At the July, 1880, term of a district court of the territory,
Brevoort, through the attorneys in question, filed a bill against
the New Mexico Mining Company asserting his equitable title to an
undivided interest in the land covered by the patent, but after the
taking of testimony and the hearing of exceptions upon the report
of a master, the court, on July 16, 1884, dismissed the cause.
At the February term, 1883, of the same court, certain alleged
heirs and legal representatives of Ignacio Cano instituted suit
against the New Mexico Mining Company and others based upon the
claim that Cano had never conveyed his interest in the mine to
Ortiz and that, in consequence, he was seised at the time of his
death of an undivided interest in the property. The court, however,
sustained the plea of a former adjudication based on an action
which had been instituted in 1865 by the same persons or others
with whom the were in privity, and dismissed the bill. Brevoort was
a party defendant to this second suit of the Cano claimants. He
filed a cross-bill denying the rights of the heirs of Cano and
setting up title in himself to an undivided part of the mine and
land covered by the patents by virtue of the conveyances aforesaid
from the collateral heirs of Ortiz, and asked the same relief as
that prayed for in his former suit. Subsequently, the mining
company compromised their controversy with Brevoort and Knaebel,
and Brevoort was dismissed from the cause. Thereupon Gildersleeve
intervened, and was permitted by the court to set up his rights,
under the conveyance from Brevoort to himself, with the same effect
as though he had originally been made a defendant. The court,
treating the compromise between Brevoort and the mining company as
inoperative against Gildersleeve, by its order allowed Gildersleeve
to assert his rights
nunc pro tunc, as if they had been
advanced at the time Brevoort filed his cross-bill.
The issue thus formed between Gildersleeve and the New Mexico
Mining Company thereupon proceeded as a new action, with
Gildersleeve as complainant.
Page 161 U. S. 577
In 1880, the mining company transferred the property embraced in
the letters patent to Stephen B. Elkins and Jerome B. Chaffee, but
the greater portion of the property was reconveyed to the company
in 1884.
It is not material, however, to notice the disposition made by
Chaffee and Elkins of the land not reconveyed by them to the mining
company.
The issue between Gildersleeve and the mining company, as
heretofore stated, resulted adversely to complainant in the
territorial courts.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The appeal being from a judgment of a territorial court, and no
exceptions to rulings of the court on the admission or rejection of
testimony being presented for our consideration, we are limited in
our review to a determination of the question whether the facts
found are sufficient to sustain the judgment rendered.
Haws v.
Victoria Copper Mining Co., 160 U. S. 303,
160 U. S.
312.
In the trial court, the controversy between Gildersleeve and the
mining company was disposed of upon the ground that the statute of
limitations barred complainant's right to recover. The supreme
court of the territory, however, rested its judgment of affirmance
not only upon the bar of the statute, but upon the further fact
found by it that Ortiz and his wife had executed a valid mutual
will by which, upon the death of Ortiz, title to the mine in
question vested in his widow, through whom the mining company
claimed.
We shall, however, consider the case in another aspect, and
shall base our conclusion that the complainant is not entitled to
relief at the hands of a court of equity upon the fact that
Page 161 U. S. 578
the record exhibits such gross laches on the part of
complainant, or those with whom he is in privity, and upon whose
rights his own must depend, as to effectually debar him from a
right to the relief which he seeks.
In
Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.
S. 224, speaking through MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, this
Court said:
"No rule of law is better settled than that a court of equity
will not aid a party whose application is destitute of conscience,
good faith, and reasonable diligence, but will discourage stale
demands, for the peace of society, by refusing to interfere where
there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or where long
acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights has occurred."
In
Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.
S. 368, speaking through MR. JUSTICE BREWER, it was said
of the case then being considered (p.
145 U. S.
371):
"The question of laches turns not simply upon the number of
years which have elapsed between the accruing of her rights,
whatever they were, and her assertion of them, but also upon the
nature and evidence of these rights, the changes in value, and
other circumstances occurring during that lapse of years. The cases
are many in which this defense has been invoked and considered. It
is true that, by reason of their differences of fact, no one case
becomes an exact precedent for another; yet a uniform principle
pervades them all."
In
Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.
S. 377,
120 U. S. 387,
the Court said, speaking through MR. JUSTICE GRAY:
"Independently of any statute of limitations, courts of equity
uniformly decline to assist a person who has slept upon his rights
and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them. 'A court of
equity,' said Lord Camden,"
"has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party
slept upon his rights, and acquiesced for a great length of time.
Nothing can call forth this Court into activity but conscience,
good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the
court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always
discountenanced, and therefore, from the beginning of this
jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in this Court.
"
Page 161 U. S. 579
In
Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.
S. 193, and
Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.
S. 556, it was declared to be correct doctrine that the
mere assertion of a claim, unaccompanied by any act to give effect
to it, could not avail to keep alive a right which would otherwise
be precluded.
With the principles enunciated in these decisions to guide us,
we proceed to review the pertinent facts showing the conduct of the
persons in whom complainant contends the title to the mine vested
upon the death of Ortiz, in 1848, by reason of the alleged
intestacy of the latter.
It is undisputed, if the claim of the collateral heirs of Ortiz
as to the nullity of the will executed by Ortiz was well founded,
whatever title Ortiz had to what is now known as the "Ortiz Mine"
vested in them upon the decease of Ortiz in 1848, subject to such
confirmation by the United States, as the law required. By Article
VIII of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1846, 9 Stat. 922, 927,
this government agreed to respect rights of private property in the
ceded territory in existence at the date of the cession. To carry
into effect this agreement, Congress passed an act entitled
"An act to establish the office of surveyor general of New
Mexico, Kansas, and Nebraska, to grant donations to actual settlers
therein, and for other purposes,"
which act was approved July 22, 1854, 10 Stat. 308, c.103. By
section 8 of this act, it was made the duty of the surveyor
general, under rules and regulations to be established by the
Secretary of Interior, to inquire into and report to Congress upon
the validity or invalidity of all claims to lands within the
territory ceded by Mexico which had originated before such cession,
which report was to be laid before Congress for such action thereon
as might be deemed to be just and proper, with a view to the
confirmation of
bona fide grants. This act has been
considered by this Court.
Stoneroad v. Stoneroad,
158 U. S. 240;
Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Mining Co., 148 U. S.
80, and cases cited in the latter case.
The finding of facts does not recapitulate the various steps in
the proceedings initiated, by the mining company through
Whittlesley, before the surveyor general, under the act of 1854
Page 161 U. S. 580
to acquire a patent to the mining grant. Knowledge, in the
collateral heirs of Ortiz, of the passage of the act in question
and of their right to file a claim with the surveyor general is, of
course, to be presumed. It has not been asserted, however, that
these collateral heirs ever submitted their alleged title to the
surveyor general for examination or entered objection to the
validity of the claim to ownership of the entire grant filed with
that official by the New Mexico Mining Company. It is also not
pretended, after the surveyor general had reported the entire grant
to Congress for confirmation as belonging to the New Mexico Mining
Company, that the alleged collateral heirs of Ortiz ever in any way
presented their pretensions to that body or raised any objection to
the confirmation by Congress of the grant in the manner and form
recommended by the surveyor general, and after the grant was
confirmed by Congress, in the long interval which elapsed before
the issue of the patent (from 1861 to 1876), there is also no
pretense that the collateral heirs of Ortiz ever before any
administrative officer of the government asserted the existence in
themselves of the rights now advanced by them as the basis for the
equitable relief which they seek. Indeed, the record shows that
during twenty-two years, between the passage of the act of 1854 and
the issue of the patent in 1876, the collateral heirs remained
supinely indifferent to the assertion of their supposed title,
while during the greater portion of this time, the New Mexico
Mining Company was expending labor and incurring the expense
connected with the obtaining of the letters patent. So also these
alleged heirs, from the date of the death of Ortiz, permitted Mrs.
Ortiz, Greiner, and those holding under him, including the mining
company, to remain in undisturbed possession of the property and to
engage in large outlay for its development without, so far as
appears, even claiming rights in themselves, until more than four
years had elapsed from the final granting of the patent. It is
proper also to observe that when the first suit was brought, in
1880, it was commenced not on behalf of the collateral heirs of
Ortiz, but was initiated for the benefit of one who, with full
knowledge of all the circumstances, acquired the supposed title of
such
Page 161 U. S. 581
collateral heirs for the purpose of speculating upon the chance
of wresting from the mining company the title acquired by it under
the patent, although at that time the laches of the collateral
heirs, whose rights the suit championed, had effectually debarred
them from invoking the aid of a court of equity to relieve them
from the results of their own acquiescence and neglect.
It is true, as held in
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, that where the title to land
had passed from the government, and the question becomes one of
private right, courts may inquire whether the party holding the
patent should be treated as owning it absolutely in his own right,
or as a trustee for another, and therefore that courts of equity
have the power to inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice, and
wrong. But when the aid of a court of equity is invoked in effect
to annul the confirmation by Congress, or to overrule the final
conclusion of the administrative department as to the person
entitled to a patent from the United States, the fact that the
complainant who asks such equitable relief theretofore possessed
not only ample opportunity to assert his own claim, but also
abundant occasion to contest the right of the person to whom a
patent was granted, has completely failed to do either, and has
been guilty of the grossest and most inexcusable laches, is
necessarily a conclusive reason against the allowance of the relief
asked.
When Brevoort acquired his alleged rights, in 1873, the New
Mexico Mining Company was in possession of the property, and
Brevoort knew this fact. When, on June 30, 1880, Brevoort executed
the conveyance of an undivided interest to Gildersleeve and Knaebel
for the consideration of their assistance by advance of money or
otherwise in contemplated litigation with the mining company,
Brevoort's grantees knew the fact to be that he was not in
possession, and that the New Mexico Mining Company was in actual
possession.
To recapitulate, there was an uninterrupted use and enjoyment by
the widow of Ortiz, and those claiming by conveyance from her of
the property in question, from the death of Ortiz in 1848. No
attempt was ever made to assert rights, if
Page 161 U. S. 582
any, of the collateral heirs of Ortiz in this property until the
year 1880. They stood by and witnessed the expenditure of large
sums of money upon the property, and did nothing exhibiting an
intention to assert their supposed rights. No attempt was made in
the pleading of Gildersleeve to offer any explanation of this long
continued acquiescence in the rights of those in possession of the
mine and of the privilege connected therewith. Under such
circumstances, we think the heirs and those claiming under them are
not entitled to equitable relief. Finding at the very threshold of
the case the existence of such laches on the part of complainant as
debars him from obtaining the equitable relief which he invokes, we
have not deemed it necessary to express any opinion on the other
questions presented by the record. The court below, in the
concluding sentences of its opinion, aptly conveyed the reasons
which, apart from a consideration of the other questions by it
considered, demonstrates the entire want of equity in the
complainant's case. The expressions to which we refer, by O'Brien,
C.J., are as follows:
"Ortiz dies in 1848. The widow claims and asserts her rights
under the will as the absolute owner of all the property of which
he died possessed. She disposes of such rights to
bona
fide purchasers. For nearly forty years before this suit was
commenced, they occupy, improve, and pay taxes on this property.
Plaintiff's grantor and those through whom such grantor claims
title, relatives of the deceased Ortiz, and residing in the
vicinity of the grant, remain silent; acquiesce, by such silence,
in the disposition so made of the property for so long a period,
while the same is being enhanced in value by the capital and labor
of honest purchasers or occupants. In fact, not a word is heard
from any of the kindred in relation to the matter until they
relinquish, for a trifling consideration, all their interest
therein to plaintiff's grantor."
The judgment of the supreme court of the territory is
Affirmed.
