By the compact of 1802, settling the boundary line between
Virginia and Tennessee and the laws made in pursuance thereof, it
is declared that all claims and titles to lands derived from
Virginia, North Carolina, or Tennessee, which have fallen into the
respective states, shall remain as secure to the owners thereof, as
if derived from the government within whose boundary they have
fallen, and shall not be prejudiced or affected by the
establishment of the line. Where the titles both of the plaintiff
and defendant in ejectment were derived under grants from Virginia
to lands which fell within the limits of Tennessee, it was held
that a prior settlement right thereto which would, in equity, give,
the party a title, could not be asserted as a sufficient title, in
an action of ejectment brought in the Circuit Court of
Tennessee.
Although the state courts of Tennessee have decided that under
their statutes declaring an elder grant founded on a junior entry
to be void, a junior patent, founded on a prior entry, shall
prevail at law against a senior patent founded on a junior entry;
this doctrine has never been extended beyond cases within the
express purview of the statute of Tennessee, and could not apply to
the present case of titles deriving all their validity from the
laws of Virginia, and confirmed by the compact between the two
states.
The general rule is that remedies in respect to real property
are to be pursued according to the
lex loci rei sitae. The
acts of the two states are to be construed as giving the same
validity and effect to the titles in the disputed territory as they
had or would have in the state by which they were granted, leaving
the remedies to enforce such titles to be regulated by the
lex
fori.
The remedies in the courts of the United States at common law
and in equity are to be not according to the practice of state
courts, but according to the principles of common law and, equity,
as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive
our knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this doctrine
it may be admitted that where, by the statutes of a state, a title
which would otherwise be deemed merely equitable is recognized as a
legal title, or a title which would be valid at law is, under
circumstances of an equitable nature, declared void, the right of
the parties in such case may be as fully considered in a suit at
law, in the courts of the United States, as in any state court.
A conveyance by the plaintiff's lessor during the pendency of an
action of ejectment can only operate upon his reversionary
interests, and cannot extinguish the prior lease. The existence of
such lease is a fiction, but it is upheld for the purposes of
justice. If it expire during the pendency of a suit, the plaintiff
cannot recover his term at law without procuring it to be enlarged
by the court, and can proceed only for antecedent damages.
In the above case, it was held that the statute of limitations
of Tennessee was not a good bar to the action, there being no proof
that the lands in controversy were always within the original
limits of Tennessee, and the statute could not begin to run until
it was ascertained by the compact of 1802 that the land fell within
the jurisdictional limits of Tennessee.
Page 16 U. S. 213
This was an action of ejectment brought by the defendant in
error (the plaintiff's lessor in the court below) against the
present plaintiff and S. Martin on 4 February, 1807, in the
District Court for the District of East Tennessee, which possessed
circuit court powers. The defendant in that court pleaded
separately the general issue, as to 400 acres, and disclaimed all
right to the residue of the tract specified
Page 16 U. S. 214
in the declaration. A verdict was given for the plaintiff in
October term, 1812. From the statement contained in the bill of
exceptions taken at the trial of the cause, it appears that the
land for which the action was brought, is situated between two
lines run in 1779 by Walker and Henderson as the boundary lines of
Virginia and North Carolina. The former state claimed jurisdiction
to the line run by Walker, and the latter to the line run by
Henderson. After the separation of Tennessee from North Carolina,
the controversy between Virginia and Tennessee, as to boundary, was
settled in 1802, by running a line equidistant from the former
lines. The land in dispute fell within the State of Tennessee. Both
the litigant parties claimed under grants issued by the State of
Virginia, the titles to lands derived from the said state having
been protected by the act of Tennessee, passed in 1803 for the
settlement of the boundary line.
The plaintiff rested his title on a grant (founded on a Treasury
warrant) to John Jones, dated August 1, 1787, for 3,000 acres,
1,500 acres of which were conveyed to the lessor by Jones on 14
April 1788, and proved possession in the defendant when the suit
was commenced.
The defendant, to support his title to the said 400 acres,
offered in evidence a grant for the same to Joseph Martin dated
January 1, 1788, founded on a settlement right and intermediate
conveyances to himself. He also offered in evidence that a
settlement was made on said land, in 1778, by William Fitzgerald,
who assigned his settlement right to the said Joseph
Page 16 U. S. 215
Martin; that a certificate in right of settlement was issued to
Martin by the commissioners for adjusting titles to unpatented
lands, on which certificate, and on the payment of the composition
money, the above grant was issued. This evidence was rejected by
the court below. The defendant also offered in evidence a deed of
conveyance from the plaintiff's lessor to Arthur L. Campbell dated
January 2, 1810, for the land in dispute, but the same was also
rejected. He also claimed the benefit of the statute of limitations
of the State of Tennessee on the ground that he and those under
whom he claims had been in continued and peaceable possession of
the 400 acres since the year 1788.
The court decided that the statute did not apply. The cause was
then brought before this Court by writ of error.
Page 16 U. S. 218
MR. JUSTICE TODD delivered the opinion of the Court, and after
stating the facts, proceeded as follows:
The first question is whether the circuit court were right in
rejecting the evidence offered by the defendant to establish a
title in himself under the grant of Joseph Martin that grant being
posterior in date to the grant under which the plaintiff claimed,
and this depends upon the consideration, whether a prior settlement
right, which would, in equity, give the party a title to the land,
can be asserted also, as a sufficient title in an action of
ejectment.
By the compact settling the boundary line between Virginia and
Tennessee, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, it is declared
that all claims and titles to lands derived from the governments of
Virginia, or North Carolina, or Tennessee, which have fallen into
the respective states, shall remain as secure to he owners thereof,
as if derived from the government within whose line they have
fallen, and shall not be in any wise prejudiced or affected in
consequence of the establishment of the said line. The title both
of the plaintiff and defendant in this case were derived under
grants from Virginia, and the argument is that as in Virginia no
equitable claims or rights antecedent to the grants could be
asserted in a court of
Page 16 U. S. 219
law in an ejectment, but were matters cognizable in equity only,
that the rule must, under the compact between the two states, apply
to all the suits in the courts in Tennessee, respecting the lands
included in those grants.
The general rule is that remedies in respect to real estates are
to be pursued according to the law of the place where the estate is
situate. Nor does the Court
Page 16 U. S. 220
perceive any reason to suppose that it was the intention of the
legislature of either state, in the acts before us, to vary the
application of the rule in cases within the compact. Those acts are
satisfied by construing them to give the same validity and effect
to the titles acquired in the disputed territory, as they had, or
would have, in the state by which they were granted, leaving the
remedies to enforce such titles to be regulated by the
lex
fori.
The question then is whether in the circuit courts of the United
States, a merely equitable title can be set up as a defense in an
action of ejectment. It is understood that the state courts of
Tennessee have
Page 16 U. S. 221
decided that under their statutes, declaring an elder grant
founded on a younger entry, to be void, the priority of entries is
examinable at law, and that a junior patent founded on a prior
entry, shall prevail in an action of ejectment against a senior
patent founded on a junior entry. But this doctrine has never been
extended beyond the cases which have been construed to be within
the express purview of the statutes of Tennessee. The present case
stands upon grants of Virginia, and is not within the purview of
the statutes of Tennessee; the titles have all their validity from
the laws of Virginia, and are confirmed by the stipulations of the
compact. Assuming, therefore, that in the case of entries under the
laws of Tennessee, the priority of such entries is examinable at
law, this Court do not think that the doctrine applies to merely
equitable rights derived from other sources.
There is a more general view of this subject, which deserves
consideration. By the laws of the United States, the circuit courts
have cognizance of all suits of a civil nature at common law, and
in equity, in cases which fall within the limits prescribed by
those laws. By the 24th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is
provided that the laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States, shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply. The act of May, 1792, confirms
the modes of proceeding then used in suits at common law in the
courts of the United States, and declares that the modes of
proceeding in
Page 16 U. S. 222
suits of equity, shall be "according to the principles, rules,
and usages which belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished
from courts of common law," except so far as may have been provided
for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United
States. It is material to consider whether it was the intention of
Congress, by these provisions, to confine the courts of the United
States in their mode of administering relief to the same remedies,
and those only, with all their incidents, which existed in the
courts of the respective states.
In other words, whether it was their intention to give the party
relief at law, where the practice of the state courts would give
it, and relief in equity only, when according to such practice, a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not be had at law. In
some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer
equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognize
and enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights
which a court of equity would recognize and enforce; in others, all
relief is denied and such equitable claims and rights are to be
considered as mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore,
that would adopt the state practice in a its extent, would at once
extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
The acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common
law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The
Court therefore thinks that to effectuate the purposes of the
legislature, the remedies in the courts of the United States, are
to be, at common law or in equity, not
Page 16 U. S. 223
according to the practice of state courts, but according to the
principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined
in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those
principles. Consistently with this construction, it may be admitted
that where by the statutes of a state, a title, which would
otherwise be deemed merely equitable, is recognized as a legal
title, or a title which would be good at law, is under
circumstances of an equitable nature declared by such statutes to
be void, the rights of the parties, in such case, may be as fully
considered in a suit at law in the courts of the United States, as
they would be in any state court.
In either view of this first point, the Court is of opinion that
the circuit court decided right in rejecting the evidence offered
by the original defendant. It was matter proper for the cognizance
of a court of equity, and not admissible in a suit at law.
The next question is whether the circuit court decided correctly
in rejecting the deed of conveyance from the plaintiff's lessor to
Arthur L. Campbell for the land in controversy, made during the
pendency of the suit. The answer that was given at the bar is
deemed decisive; although an action of ejectment is founded in
fictions, yet to certain purposes it is considered in the same
manner as if the whole proceedings were real, for all the purposes
of the suit the lease is to be deemed a real possessory title. If
it expire during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff cannot
recover his term at law without procuring it to be enlarged by the
court, and can proceed only for antecedent damages. In the present
case, the lease is to
Page 16 U. S. 224
be deemed as a good subsisting lease, and the conveyance by the
plaintiff's lessor during the pendency of the suit could not
operate upon his reversionary interest, and consequently could not
extinguish the prior lease. The existence of such a lease is a
fiction, but it is upheld for the purposes of justice, and there is
no pretense that it works any injustice in this case.
The last question is whether the statute of limitation of
Tennessee was a good bar to the action. It is admitted that it
would be a good bar only upon the supposition that the lands in
controversy were always within the original limits of Tennessee,
but there is no such proof in the cause. The compact of the states
does not affirm it, and the present boundary was an amicable
adjustment by that compact. It cannot, therefore, be affirmed by
any court of law, that the land was within the reach of the statute
of limitations of Tennessee until after the compact of 1802. The
statute could not begin to run until it was ascertained that the
land was within the jurisdictional limits of the State of
Tennessee.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed with
costs.
