This Court has no original jurisdiction of a suit between a
state on the one side, and citizens of another state and citizens
of the same state on the other side.
When an original cause is pending in this Court, to be disposed
of here in the first instance and in the exercise of an exceptional
jurisdiction, it does not comport with the gravity and the finality
which should characterize such an adjudication to proceed in the
absence of parties whose rights would be in effect determined, even
though they might not be technically bound in subsequent
litigations in some other tribunal.
The City of Oakland and the Oakland Waterfront Company are so
situated in respect of this litigation that the Court ought not to
proceed in their
Page 157 U. S. 230
absence, and as, if they were brought in, the case would then be
between the State of California, on the one hand, and a citizen of
another state and citizens of California, on the other, this Court
cannot, under such circumstances, take original jurisdiction of
it.
The State of California, by its Attorney General, by leave of
court, exhibited its bill in equity in this Court against the
Southern Pacific Company, a corporation and citizen of Kentucky, on
November 6, 1893, and an amended bill of complaint was filed on
like leave, and with the consent of the defendant, March 5, 1894.
The amended bill averred that the State of California was admitted
into the Union under an Act of Congress approved September 9, 1850,
with certain specified boundaries, and it was alleged that said
boundaries embraced all the soil of the beds of the Bay of San
Francisco, and all the arms of that bay, including what was known
as "San Antonio Creek," sometimes called "San Antonio Estuary;"
that the state, upon its admission into the Union, acquired and
continued to retain jurisdiction over the soil of the beds of said
bay, including San Antonio Creek, and absolute title to the same,
subject only to the right of the United States of supervision over
the navigable waters of the bay so far as necessary in exercising
its right to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states, and that the state, thus possessing the sovereign
power over the Bay of San Francisco and the San Antonio Creek, and
the beds thereof, had the right to protect and defend the same from
infringement, and to sue for relief in respect of encroachment or
infringement of its sovereign or proprietary rights therein.
The bill further alleged that certain lands, described by metes
and bounds, and designated as tracts numbered first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh, were situated in that part of
the Bay of San Francisco which, together with San Antonio Creek,
constituted the harbor of the City of Oakland, in the County of
Alameda; that the City of Oakland was situated upon that part of
the bay which included said lands, and upon San Antonio Creek; that
all the lands numbered first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and
sixth were situated within the limits of the City of Oakland, and
were formerly
Page 157 U. S. 231
situated within the limits of what was the Town of Oakland; that
that portion of the tract of land numbered seventh, which was
situated within the limits of the City of Oakland, was situated
within the limits of the Town of Oakland; that the lands at the
time the state was admitted into the Union, extended, and now
continued to extend (except so far as the defendant, or parties
under whom it claimed, had filled in portions of said land) to a
considerable distance under the navigable waters of the Bay of San
Francisco and of San Antonio Creek, to ship channel in said
navigable waters, and to a depth at ordinary low tide, of
twenty-four feet; that a large portion of the lands had always been
constantly covered by said waters; that the residue of the lands
had at all times been covered with navigable waters at ordinary
high tide, except so far as the defendant and those under whom it
claimed had filled in the same; that San Antonio Creek was and
always had been navigable, and the government had been and was
expending large sums of money in improving the navigation of the
creek and bay as a harbor for the City of Oakland, and that the Bay
of San Francisco was a tidal bay and a large body of navigable
water connected with the Pacific Ocean.
It was further averred that he City of Oakland contained a
population exceeding 60,000 inhabitants, which was constantly
increasing; that said city fronted upon the tidal waters of the bay
and of San Antonio Creek, and the lands embraced a large portion of
the shore of the bay and of the shores of the creek within the
city, and embraced a large portion of the waterfront of the city,
upon which landings, wharves, docks, piers, and other structures
for the landing, loading, and unloading of vessels at said city
could be constructed and maintained; that a large part of the
waterfront of the lands was now required for the erection of
wharves, docks, and piers for the use of vessels landing at the
city, and the necessity for the use of additional portions of these
shores and lands for the purpose aforesaid was constantly on the
increase; that there were large portions of the lands and shores
that were required for the termini of railroads hereafter seeking
to enter the City
Page 157 U. S. 232
of Oakland, and to obtain access to said navigable waters for
the purpose of connecting with vessels navigating those waters, and
of bringing ship and car together. The bill also stated that the
City of San Francisco contained a population of 350,000, and was
the largest city on the eastern side of the Pacific Ocean, lying
across the Bay of San Francisco and opposite the City of Oakland
about a distance of four miles; that the interest of the Cities of
San Francisco and Oakland and the general public, and the
convenience and necessities of commerce, both foreign and domestic,
required that the control of the state over these lands, and its
ownership thereof, should be enforced and maintained; that all the
commodities and passengers transported between the City of San
Francisco and other parts of California and the eastern and other
portions of the United States were carried over these lands; that
they were situated so as to practically control the harbor of the
City of Oakland, and especially that part thereof used in forming a
connection between the City of Oakland, by boats on the Bay of San
Francisco and of San Antonio Creek, with railroads extending
eastward, and that the exclusive use and occupation of such land
created a monopoly of any part thereof, and that the entry upon and
use and occupation of the public domain to other parts of the State
of California and the eastern portions of the United States.
The bill further averred that defendant claimed, as owner in
fee, title and right adverse to the state in and to all the tracts
of land described and numbered in the bill, and without the consent
of the state, and without any right whatever, defendant and those
under whom it claimed had taken possession of portions of said
tracts numbered 1 and 5, and had filled in parts thereof, and had
driven piles in other parts thereof, and had placed on said
portions of land railroad tracks and buildings which greatly
obstructed the navigation of said waters; that all of said tracks,
buildings, and other structures were now being unlawfully
maintained by defendant under its claim; that defendant claimed and
asserted exclusive control over the lands described in the bill,
and prohibited all vessels excepting its own and such vessels as
carried freight from the railroad of defendant from landing upon
any part of the shore embraced
Page 157 U. S. 233
by these lands, that defendant denied the right of the state to
exercise any control over any of these lands, or to authorize the
construction of wharves or landings of any kind upon any part of
them, or to regulate any wharf built upon said premises, and to
collect tolls or wharfage for the use of any part of said premises;
that but a small portion of these tracts of land were in the actual
occupation or use of defendant, and no part of the tracts numbered
3, 6, and 7 was being occupied or used by defendant.
The bill alleged that the ground on which defendant based its
claim was that, under and by virtue of an act of the Legislature of
California entitled "An act to incorporate the Town of Oakland and
to provide for the construction of wharves thereat," approved May
4, 1852 (a copy of which act was annexed to the amended bill, and
marked "Exhibit A"), the state granted to the Town of Oakland the
title to the whole waterfront of that town -- that is to say, all
the land lying within its corporate limits between high tide and
ship channel, including the lands described in the bill; that the
Town of Oakland, under said act, had authority to grant and convey,
and did grant and convey, by conveyance absolute and in fee, in
1852, to Horace W. Carpentier, all of the said waterfront of the
Town of Oakland; that, by mesne conveyances from him, defendant had
become and was the owner in fee simple of the tracts numbered 2 and
4, and that, by leases made and delivered to it by persons claiming
in fee under and by virtue of mesne conveyances from Carpentier,
defendant had acquired and now held an estate for the term of 99
years from the 17th of February, 1885, in all the remaining lands
and premises thereinbefore described. And it was further averred
that the state did not, by the Act approved May 4, 1852, or
otherwise, convey the waterfront, or any part thereof, to the Town
of Oakland, nor place the control of the same in the town, nor
divest the State of its control over the waterfront, nor had the
legislature of the state any power or authority to grant the lands
to the town or anyone, or to divest the state of its control
thereof, and that the town did not grant or convey to Carpentier,
and had no power or
Page 157 U. S. 234
authority under the Act of May 4, 1852, or otherwise, to grant
or convey to him, any part of the waterfront of the Town of
Oakland, and that the said lands at all times since the creation of
the State of California had been and now were held in trust by the
state for the benefit of the state, and at all times had been, and
now were, incapable of alienation to any person or of being reduced
to private ownership.
The bill then proceeded to set forth a number of other claims of
defendant in and to the premises adverse to the title of the state,
such as decrees to quiet title, conveyances under judgment sales,
and sales for taxes, all of which were alleged on various grounds
to be of no force or effect as against the state, and it was
averred that defendant had not, and never had, any estate, right,
title, or interest in or to the lands, or premises, or any in or to
the lands or premises, or any part thereof, or any right to the
possession of any part thereof, and that the entry upon and use and
occupation of the public domain, as set forth, was a purpresture
and a public nuisance, and interfered with the control and
development of the harbor of Oakland.
It was also alleged that the act entitled "An act to incorporate
the Town of Oakland, and to provide for the construction of wharves
thereat," approved May 4, 1852, was repealed by an act entitled "An
act to incorporate the City of Oakland," passed March 25, 1854.
The prayer of the amended bill was that
"said defendant, the Southern Pacific Company, be required to
set forth in its answer the nature of its claim or claims, and that
all adverse claims of said defendant to said premises be determined
by a decree of this Honorable Court, and that in and by said decree
it be adjudged that your orator is the owner of the whole of said
premises, and has lawful right to control the same, and that said
defendant, Southern Pacific Company, has no estate or interest
whatever in or to said premises, as against your orator, and no
right to the possession of any part thereof, and that the clouds
and doubts cast thereby on the title of your orator be removed;
that the structures so as aforesaid unlawfully placed upon said
premises by said defendant
Page 157 U. S. 235
be abated, and that the writ of injunction issue out of this
Honorable Court, and under the seal thereof, commanding the removal
thereof, and that said defendant, and all persons claiming or to
claim by or under it, be perpetually enjoined, restrained, and
debarred from asserting any claim of, interest in, or title to or
control over said lands or any part thereof adverse to your orator;
that your orator be declared to have the sole and exclusive right
to develop and control the said harbor of said City of Oakland and
to dispose of such rights at its pleasure for the interests of the
public, and that it be adjudged by said decree that said Town of
Oakland did not grant or convey, and had no authority to grant or
convey, to said Carpentier all the waterfront of said town, to-wit,
all the land lying within the corporate limits of said town
situated between ordinary high tide and ship channel, or any part
thereof, and that by said decree it be further adjudged that the
State of California did not and could not grant or convey the said
waterfront, or any part thereof, to the said Town of Oakland, and
that any control over said waterfront, if any, that was conferred
on said Town of Oakland by said Act approved May 4, 1852, was
revoked and annulled by said Act passed March 25, 1854."
On March 6, 1894, the defendant filed its answer, claiming title
in fee simple to tracts numbered 3 and 4, a leasehold estate, under
the Central Pacific Railroad Company, in tracts numbered 1, 2, 6,
and 7, and, under the South Pacific Coast Railroad Company, in
tract numbered 5. The answer admitted that by virtue of its
sovereignty, the State of California became the owner and
proprietor of the beds of the Bay of San Francisco and San Antonio
Estuary, but averred that by the grant thereinafter set forth, the
state lost the proprietary right and title over the described
property situated between high water mark and ship channel in the
City of Oakland. It admitted that the lands were ordinarily below
the line of ordinary high tide, but denied that they all continued
to lie below that line, and averred that a portion of the land
which formerly formed a part of the bay and estuary was now above
the high tide line, having been
Page 157 U. S. 236
filled in and reclaimed by defendant and its grantors and
lessors; that at least one-half of tracts 1, 5, 6, and 7, and
nearly all of tracts 2, 3, and 4 were entirely bare at low tide. It
denied that any portion of the lands claimed by defendant
interfered with the harbor of Oakland or of the City of San
Francisco, or hindered or obstructed commerce, or infringed upon or
obstructed the practicable navigable waters constituting the
harbors of either of those cities, and averred that all the lands
described in the bill except parcel numbered 6 were occupied by
wharves, warehouses, depots, and other structures necessary for the
convenience of commerce and navigation, and that all of said
structures were used in the interest of the same, and were lawfully
erected and maintained.
The answer admitted that the defendant claimed the title and
right adverse to the state in and to all the premises particularly
described, except that portion which was included within the harbor
lines of the creek of San Antonio, as established by authority of
the United States, and that defendant asserted exclusive control
over all of the lands except those outside of the pier-head lines
of the harbor, but denied that it prohibited all vessels except its
own from landing, or excluded any person from using said wharves,
although it admitted that it would prohibit anyone from using any
part of the shores or buildings without defendant's consent, or
unless compensation was made therefor.
The answer denied the right of the state to exercise any control
over any of the lands not covered by navigable waters, except
governmental, and, while admitting that the state had the right to
regulate wharves built upon said premises, denied that it had any
power to collect wharfage or dockage from the use of any part
thereof. The answer denied that the only ground on which defendant
based its claim was that by virtue of the Act of the legislature of
May 4, 1852, the state granted to the Town of Oakland the title to
the whole of the waterfront of that town -- that is to say, of the
land lying within the then corporate limits of the Town of Oakland,
situated between high tide and ship channel, and which included
Page 157 U. S. 237
the lands hereinbefore described, but admitted that it was one
of the grounds, and insisted that by said act, the Town of Oakland
was vested with the absolute control and ownership of the
waterfront, with power to dispose of and convey the same absolutely
and in fee simple to any person, and that thereby the state
divested itself of all control and supervision over the land as
proprietor thereof, and could only control the same politically.
And defendant claimed that the Town of Oakland under said act had
lawful authority to grant and convey, and had granted and conveyed,
both by ordinances and by a deed of conveyance, the land
absolutely, in fee, to H. W. Carpentier, in 1852, and that, by
mesne conveyances from said Carpentier, defendant became and was
the owner in fee simple of the tracts of land described in the bill
and numbered third and fourth; that by mesne conveyances from said
Carpentier, the Central Pacific Railroad Company became and was the
owner in fee simple of the tracts of land described as first,
second, sixth, and seventh, and that defendant had a leasehold
interest therein; that the South Pacific Coast Railway Company, by
mesne conveyances from said Carpentier, became and was the owner in
fee simple of the tract of land numbered fifth in said amended bill
of complaint, and that the defendant had a leasehold interest
therein. The answer set forth minutely and in detail all the
grounds on which defendant rested its claim, and which need not be
repeated here.
Replication was filed March 12, 1894, and on the same day the
Court denied a motion of the City of Oakland for leave to be joined
by intervention as co-complainant in the bill, but granted leave to
the city to file briefs, accompanied by such documents and maps,
illustrative of its alleged title, as it might be advised. On April
30, 1894, an order was made by the Court in reference to
depositions theretofore placed in the custody of the clerk of the
Court, together with maps and exhibits, and appointing a
commissioner to take testimony herein; instructing him to take and
return such testimony as might be offered by either of the parties,
and to receive and return such documents and maps illustrative of
the alleged title of the City of Oakland as it might deem proper to
offer, pursuant to the order of March 12, 1894.
Page 157 U. S. 238
The depositions and exhibits referred to in this order were
thereupon opened and filed, and subsequently the evidence adduced
before the commissioner, and transmitted with his report to the
Court. This embraced many depositions on both sides and a large
number of maps, papers, and documents. The cause was heard upon
pleadings and proofs December 19, 20, and 21, 1894.
The record is voluminous, but only so much of the matters
disclosed as will tend to explain the nature and scope of the case,
chiefly as presented by defendant, need be stated.
The Legislature of California, on May 4, 1852, passed an act
entitled "An act to incorporate the Town of Oakland and to provide
for the construction of wharves thereat;" the boundaries of the
town embracing some 7,840 acres of land between high tide and ship
channel, 1,549 acres of upland, and 493 acres of salt marsh. The
corporate duties and powers of the town were vested in a board of
trustees, including the usual powers of such municipalities in
regard to streets, roads, bridges, wharves, ferries, docks, piers,
etc., and the act also provided that
"with a view to facilitate the construction of wharves and other
improvements, the lands lying within the limits aforesaid, between
high tide and ship channel, are hereby granted and released to said
town,
provided that said lands shall be retained by said
town as common property, or disposed of for the purposes
aforesaid."
The trustees were chosen as prescribed by the act in May, 1852,
and organized as a board thereunder. On the 18th of May, the board
of trustees passed an ordinance entitled "An ordinance for the
disposal of the waterfront belonging to the Town of Oakland, and to
provide for the construction of wharves," which was engrossed and
signed by the president and clerk of the board on May 27, 1852.
This ordinance granted, in its first section, to Horace W.
Carpentier and his legal representatives, for the period of
thirty-seven years, the exclusive right and privilege of
constructing wharves, piers, and docks at any points within the
corporate limits of the town, with the right of collecting wharfage
and dockage at such rates as he might deem reasonable, subject to a
proviso for the erection of these wharves
Page 157 U. S. 239
within a specified time and at particular locations, and the
payment to the town of a certain percentage of the receipts for
wharfage, and, by its second section, granted to him and to his
assigns or legal representatives, with the view, as expressed
therein, to more speedily carry out the intentions and purposes of
the act of incorporation, and in consideration of the premises, and
of a contract on Carpentier's part to build for the town a public
schoolhouse,
"the waterfront of said town -- that is to say, all the land
lying within the limits of the Town of Oakland between high tide
and ship channel, as described in said act, together with all the
right, title and interest of the Town of Oakland therein,"
and by the third section, the president of the board of trustees
was "charged with the duty of executing, on behalf of the town
Oakland, a grant and conveyance in accordance with the provisions
of this ordinance." On May 31, 1852, the president or the board
executed and delivered to Carpentier a deed of conveyance which
declared that the president, in conformity to the provisions of the
ordinance of May 27, 1852, and in virtue of the authority vested in
him by the Constitution and laws of California, and especially by
the Act of May 4, 1852, in his official capacity "as said
president, and in view of the public convenience," granted to
Carpentier the exclusive right and privilege of constructing
wharves, etc., with the right of collecting wharfage and dockage
for thirty-seven years, and "in consideration of the covenants
hereinafter mentioned, and of five dollars paid to the town," in
obedience to the ordinance aforesaid, and by virtue of the
authority as aforesaid vested in him as president of the board of
trustees, and by virtue of said office, sold, transferred, granted,
and released to Carpentier and his legal representatives
"all the right, title, and interest of the said Town of Oakland
in and to the waterfront of said town -- that is to say, all the
land lying within the now corporate limits of the Town of Oakland
and situated between high tide and ship channel -- as granted to
said town by, and as described in, said above-entitled act,"
provided that Carpentier or his legal representatives should
construct certain wharves within times specified, and also that two
percent of the receipts for wharfage should
Page 157 U. S. 240
be payable to the Town of Oakland. Upon this deed an agreement
by Carpentier, under seal, was endorsed bearing the same date,
covenanting and agreeing to carry out the objects and purposes of
the grant and conveyance, to construct the wharves as provided for
in the deed, and to build for the town a public schoolhouse,
agreeably to the terms of an earlier obligation in reference
thereto. This conveyance and contract were filed for record January
12, 1853. Thereupon, Carpentier built one of the wharves, upon the
completion of which the board of trustees, on January 1, 1853,
passed a further ordinance, entitled "An ordinance to approve the
wharf at the foot of Main Street, and to extend the time for the
construction of the other wharves," which declared that the wharf
at the foot of Main Street had been built and completed to the
entire satisfaction of the board of trustees and according to the
terms and within the time specified in the ordinance of May 18,
1852, accepted the same, and extended the time for the completion
of the other two wharves. Carpentier constructed a second wharf and
built and delivered to the town a public schoolhouse conformably to
his contract, and thereafter, and on August 27, 1853, the town
passed another ordinance ratifying and confirming the original
ordinance of May 18, 27, 1852, and granting, selling, and conveying
the waterfront of the Town of Oakland
"unto the said Carpentier and his legal representatives, in fee
simple forever, with the right to erect wharves, piers, docks and
buildings at any and all points thereon, not obstructing
navigation, and to freely use and occupy the lands herein
conveyed."
This ordinance approved of the second wharf as built within the
time and in accordance with the provisions of the preceding
ordinances, and accepted and approved of the schoolhouse as
completed to the satisfaction of the board and according to the
terms of the ordinance and contract, and provided that the third
wharf might be built at the foot of another street than that
originally mentioned, which third wharf, the evidence tended to
show, was subsequently constructed.
On March 25, 1854, an act of the legislature of California was
approved entitled "An act to incorporate the City of Oakland,"
which provided in its first section
Page 157 U. S. 241
that
"the corporation or body corporate now existing and known as the
Town of Oakland. shall remain and continue to be a body politic and
corporate by the name of the City of Oakland,"
and that "the boundaries of said city shall be the same as the
boundaries of the present Town of Oakland." Section 12 of this act
provided:
"The corporation created by this act shall succeed to all the
legal and equitable rights, claims, and privileges, and be subject
to all the legal liabilities and obligations made
bona
fide of the Town of Oakland, and the common council shall have
full power to maintain suits in the proper courts to recover any
right, or interest, or property which may have accrued to the Town
of Oakland."
Section 19 was as follows:
"The act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Town of Oakland,
and to provide for the construction of wharves thereat' is hereby
repealed, and any ordinance of said 'Town of Oakland' providing for
the levying and collection of taxes and directing or authorizing
the expenditure of money or the assumption of any debts or
liabilities are hereby suspended until the organization of the
government created by this act."
By the fifth section of an Act of the Legislature of California
approved May 14, 1861, "amendatory and supplementary to" the Act of
March 25, 1854, it was provided,
"The Common Council of the City of Oakland is hereby authorized
and empowered to ratify and confirm any ordinance or resolution of
the board of trustees of the late Town of Oakland."
On May 15, 1861, the legislature of the state passed another act
to amend the Act of March 25, 1854, reincorporating the City of
Oakland, the twelfth section of which read as follows:
"The corporation created by this act shall succeed to all the
legal and equitable rights, claims, and privileges, and be subject
to all the legal or equitable liabilities and obligations of the
Town of Oakland, and the ordinances of the board of trustees of
said town are hereby ratified and confirmed, and the common council
shall have power to maintain suits in the proper courts to recover
any right or interest or property which may have accrued to the
Town of Oakland."
On March 21, 1868, the Legislature
Page 157 U. S. 242
of California passed an act authorizing and empowering the
Council of the City of Oakland, the mayor concurring, "to
compromise, settle and adjust any and all claims, demands,
controversies and causes of action in which the said city is
interested." On March 27, 1868, the Oakland Waterfront Company was
organized under an act of the legislature of April 14, 1853, having
the objects, among others,
"to acquire, build, construct, own, hold, manage, use and
control wharves, docks, basins, dry docks, piers and warehouses in
the City of Oakland and in the vicinity thereof in the State of
California, and to lease, sell, convey, grant, mortgage,
hypothecate, alienate or otherwise dispose of the same."
The Council of the City of Oakland on April 1, 1868, passed an
ordinance
"for the settlement of controversies and disputes concerning the
waterfront of the City of Oakland, the franchises thereof and other
matters relating thereto,"
which ordained that
"the claims, demands, controversies, disputes, litigations, and
causes of action, heretofore existing between the City of Oakland
on the one part, and Horace W. Carpentier and his assigns on the
other part, relating to the force validity and effect of the
Ordinance of May 18, 27, 1852, and of the conveyance to Carpentier
by the president of the board of trustees, dated May 31, 1852, and
of the Ordinance of the Town of January 1, 1853, and of the
Ordinance of August 27, 1853, are hereby compromised, settled, and
adjusted, and the said above mentioned ordinances and conveyances
are made valid, binding, and ratified and confirmed, and all
disputes, litigations, controversies, and claims in and to the
franchises and property described in said ordinances and deed of
conveyance, and every part thereof are abandoned and released by
the said City of Oakland to the said Carpentier and his assigns,
upon the following conditions, to-wit, that the said Carpentier and
his assigns shall convey by proper and sufficient deeds of
conveyance all the property and franchises mentioned and described
in said ordinances and deeds of conveyance hereinbefore referred to
to the Oakland Waterfront Company, to be used and applied in
accordance with the terms, conditions, stipulations, and agreement
contained in certain contracts between
Page 157 U. S. 243
the said Oakland Waterfront Company and the Western Pacific
Railroad Company and other parties bearing even date herewith, with
the exceptions in the said agreement specified."
On April 2, 1868, the council passed another ordinance entitled
"An ordinance finally settling, adjusting and compromising the
question of the waterfront," reciting that it appearing that all
the terms and conditions of the previous ordinances had been fully
satisfied and complied with by Carpentier and his assigns, all the
ordinances and deed therein mentioned and described were finally
ratified and confirmed, and all disputes, controversies, causes of
action, between the city and Carpentier and his assigns, were
released to the said Carpentier and his assigns,
"provided, that nothing herein contained shall release the right
of the City of Oakland to the reversion of the property, franchises
and rights released, as provided in the contract between the
Western Pacific Railroad Company and the Oakland Waterfront
Company, in case said City of Oakland shall become entitled to the
same under said contract."
The contracts mentioned in the first ordinance were a contract
between the Oakland Waterfront Company, the Western Pacific
Railroad Company, the City of Oakland, Horace W. Carpentier, John
B. Felton, and Leland Stanford, not in fact executed by the City of
Oakland, and a contract between the Western Pacific Railroad
Company, Stanford, and the Oakland Waterfront Company. The first
contract recited the deed, dated March 31, 1863, acknowledged April
1, 1868, of Horace W. Carpentier to the Oakland Waterfront Company
for the waterfront property, and that
"the said deed was executed to the Oakland Waterfront Company,
upon the express trusts, and subject to the covenants and
agreements, herein set forth."
By this contract, it was provided that the Western Pacific
Railroad Company should select from and locate upon the premises
described in the deed from Horace W. Carpentier to the Oakland
Waterfront Company five hundred acres of land, in one or two
parcels; that it should have frontage on ship channel not exceeding
one-half mile in length, and also select and locate within said
time, over the
Page 157 U. S. 244
remainder of said premises, certain right of way. And the
Oakland Waterfront Company, on its part, covenanted that it would
at any time after such selection and location, upon demand, convey
by proper conveyances the said five hundred acres, and the right of
way aforesaid, and that such conveyance or conveyances should
contain a covenant that if the parcels, or either of them, should
be located out to a westerly waterfront of twenty-four feet of
depth of water at low tide, no lands should be sold westerly
therefrom and no obstruction or impediment should ever be placed or
put in front or westerly of the same, or anything be done to
prevent the free and unobstructed approach of vessels to said
parcels. It was further covenanted on the part of the Oakland
Waterfront Company that it would, upon demand, convey to the City
of Oakland a certain described part of the premises, and that it
would, within a reasonable time, designate and dedicate as a
navigable waterfront for public use the channel of San Antonio
Creek from ship channel to the Town of San Antonio, stating the
width. In the contract between the Western Pacific Railroad
Company, Stanford, and the Oakland Waterfront Company, the Western
Pacific Railroad Company covenanted that, upon conveyance being
made to it, so as to vest a good title in fee simple in said
company, and upon the performance and execution by the municipal
authorities of the City of Oakland of all instruments, ordinances,
acts, and proceedings necessary to perfect, complete, and make good
the title to said premises described in said deed from said
Carpentier to said Oakland Waterfront Company, within a reasonable
time, and with reasonable dispatch, it would proceed and construct,
or purchase and complete, a railroad connection from its main line
to the said parcels thus selected by it, or one of them, and would,
within said time, complete such connecting railroad thereto, and
would construct on said parcels, or one of them, the necessary
buildings and structures for a passenger and freight depot, and
would expend, within three years, not less than five hundred
thousand dollars upon said premises, and, if it should fail or
neglect or refuse to do the same with in three years, that the five
hundred acres of land thus conveyed
Page 157 U. S. 245
should be forfeited, and should be conveyed by the company to
the City of Oakland.
By deed dated March 31, 1868, and acknowledged April 1, 1868,
Horace W. Carpentier conveyed to the Oakland Waterfront Company,
its successors or assigns, the waterfront to the City of Oakland,
and the rights and franchises therein mentioned. The Oakland
Waterfront Company, by deed dated January 12, 1868, conveyed to the
City of Oakland the land agreed to be conveyed in the above
contract. The Oakland Waterfront Company, July 12, 1879, dedicated
for the purposes of a harbor and navigable water course nearly the
whole of the estuary of San Antonio, and, to the fullest extent,
all the land in the estuary set aside by the government for harbor
purposes. On July 27, 1870, the Oakland Waterfront Company conveyed
to the Western Pacific Railroad Company the tract of land on the
waterfront selected and located by it for railroad purposes under
the terms of the contract of April 1, 1868, as desired and required
by the City of Oakland, and these are tracts one and six, and a
portion of five. The Western Pacific Railroad Company, in 1868 or
1869, established its terminus on tract first; built a long wharf
and station at the end of it, with buildings, docks, wharves, and
depot for passengers and freight by vessels and ferryboats. Tract
second was conveyed by the Oakland Waterfront Company to the
Central Pacific Railroad Company on May 3, 1878. The greater
portion of this tract is occupied by a slip for freight steamers,
and the tracks and appurtenances necessary in handling freight
cars. Large sums of money were expended by the railroad companies,
and the fulfillment of conditions on their part may be assumed. The
area of the seven tracts embraced 838 acres. It was stipulated that
the Central Pacific Railroad Company, since the year 1870, had
been, and still was, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of California by the consolidation and
amalgamation of the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California,
the Western Pacific Railroad Company, San Francisco & Oakland
Railroad Company, San Francisco & Alameda Railroad Company, and
other railroad companies, all theretofore organized and doing
business under
Page 157 U. S. 246
the laws of the State of California; that the South Pacific
Coast Railway Company, since the year 1887, had been, and still
was, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of California; that the Oakland Waterfront Company was
organized as a corporation under and in pursuance of its articles
of incorporation set forth in the record, and was created for the
purposes therein specified, as such corporation, and none other,
and had ever since existed, and still existed, under such articles,
and none other, under the laws of the State of California; that the
defendant, Southern Pacific Company, was a corporation, citizen,
and resident, as set forth in the original and amended bills of
complaint; that the different pieces or parcels of land described
were parts and portions of the Bay of San Francisco and of San
Antonio Estuary, and, in their natural state, were covered by their
waters at ordinary high tide, and were so at the time California
was admitted into the Union; that tracts first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh were separated from the upland by
the patent line of the Mexican grant known as the "Peralta Grant,"
confirmed by the United States to the heirs of Peralta, which line
was designated as meandering along the line of ordinary high tide;
that the Central Pacific Railroad Company was the owner of the
upland down to the Peralta grant line in front of tracts first,
second, and seventh, and was the owner of an undivided one-half
interest in
brk:
the upland down to the Peralta line fronting upon tract sixth;
that the Central Pacific Railroad Company leased all of said tracts
of land, both upland and tidewater, to defendant Southern Pacific
Company on February 17, 1885, for a period of ninety-nine years,
and the Southern Pacific Company ever since that time had been in
the actual occupancy of tracts first and second; that the Southern
Pacific Company was the owner of the upland in front of and bounded
by tract third, and in the actual occupation thereof; that said
company was not the owner of any upland adjoining tract fourth, but
was in the actual occupancy of that tract; that the South Pacific
Coast Railway Company was the owner of at least an undivided
one-half interest in the upland down to the Peralta grant line in
front of tract fifth, and that
Page 157 U. S. 247
company, on July 1, 1887, leased that tract, together with the
upland, to defendant Southern Pacific Company for a term of
ninety-nine years, and ever since that time said Southern Pacific
Company had been occupying and using said tract; that defendant,
Southern Pacific Company, acquired by mesne conveyances from Horace
W. Carpentier all the right, title, and interest of Carpentier, if
any he had, in and to tracts third and fourth; that the South
Pacific Coast Railway Company acquired by like conveyances such
interest, if any there were, to tract fifth, and that the Central
Pacific Railroad Company had acquired by like conveyances such
interest, if any, to tracts first, second, sixth, and seventh.
Certain proceedings and decree in a suit in 1857 between the City
of Oakland and Carpentier were also put in evidence; also, a
sheriff's deed to one Watson, dated April 24, 1856, purporting to
convey the waterfront; also, tax deed dated October 14, 1871, to
Thomas Lemon, on judgment for taxes against the Oakland Waterfront
Company and the waterfront of the City of Oakland; also, tax deed,
dated May 14, 1880, of the waterfront to Watson. It was agreed that
whatever right, title, or interest was acquired through these
deeds, or either of them, became vested by mesne conveyances in the
Central Pacific Railroad Company, as to tracts first, second,
sixth, and seventh; in defendant. Southern Pacific Company, as to
tracts third and fourth, and in the South Pacific Coast Railway
Company, as to tract fifth.
On July 12, 1882, the Council of the City of Oakland passed an
ordinance directing the withdrawal of defenses in certain cases,
and the filing of a disclaimer of any interest or estate in the
property described therein, and the discontinuance of an action in
which the City of Oakland was plaintiff and the Oakland Waterfront
Company and others were defendants, with a stipulation that the
Oakland Waterfront Company might have a final judgment and decree
quieting its title to the land described in its cross-bill of
complaint, provided that the reversion of the city to collect
wharfage, tolls, and dockage at the expiration of the original
grant to Carpentier should not be affected, and further providing
that all claims, demands, controversies, actions, and causes of
action against
Page 157 U. S. 248
the Central Pacific Railroad Company and the Oakland Waterfront
Company, or against either of them, in which the City of Oakland
was interested were thereby released, compromised, settled, and
adjusted forever. Certain decrees in the suits referred to in the
ordinance, quieting title to the tracts in the Central Pacific, the
Oakland Waterfront Company, and Huntington, as against the City of
Oakland, are in the record.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the third of our general rules it is provided:
"This Court considers the former practice of the Courts of
King's Bench and of chancery, in England, as affording outlines for
the practice of this Court, and will from time to time make such
alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary."
108 U.S. 574. This rule is, with the exception of some slight
verbal alterations, and the addition of the word "former"
before
Page 157 U. S. 249
the word "practice," in the first line, the same as original
General Rule 7, adopted August 8, 1791. 1 Cranch vii; 2 Dall. 411.
And in cases of original jurisdiction, it has been determined that
this Court will frame its proceedings according to those which had
been adopted in the English courts in analogous cases, and that the
rules of court in chancery should govern in conducting the case to
a final issue,
Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657,
38
U. S. 13 Pet. 23,
39 U. S. 14 Pet.
210, and
40 U. S. 15 Pet.
233;
Georgia v.
Grant, 6 Wall. 241, although the Court is not bound
to follow this practice when it would embarrass the case by
unnecessary technicalities, or defeat the purposes of justice.
Florida v.
Georgia, 17 How. 478.
It was held in
Mallow v.
Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193, that where an equity cause
may be finally decided between the parties litigant without
bringing others before the Court, who would, generally speaking, be
necessary parties, such parties may be dispensed with in the
circuit court if its process cannot reach them or if they are
citizens of another state, but if the rights of those not before
the Court are inseparably connected with the claim of the parties
litigant, so that a final decision cannot be made between them
without affecting the rights of the absent parties, the peculiar
constitution of the circuit court forms no ground for dispensing
with such parties. And the Court remarked:
"We do not put this case upon the ground of jurisdiction, but
upon a much broader ground, which must equally apply to all courts
of equity, whatever may be their structure as to jurisdiction. We
put it upon the ground that no court can adjudicate directly upon a
person's right without the party's being actually or constructively
before the Court."
In
Shields v.
Barrow, 17 How. 130, the subject is fully
considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the Court. The case
of
Russell v. Clark's
Executors, 7 Cranch 89, is there referred to as
pointing out three classes of parties to a bill in equity:
"1. Formal parties. (2) Persons having an interest in the
controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the
Court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on and
finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete
Page 157 U. S. 250
justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it. These
persons are commonly termed 'necessary parties,' but if their
interests are separable from those of the parties before the Court,
so that the Court can proceed to a decree and do complete and final
justice without affecting other persons not before the Court, the
latter are not indispensable parties. 3. Persons who not only have
an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature
that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that
interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its
final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience."
Reference is made to the Act of Congress of February 28, 1839,
c. 36, 5 Stat. 321, and the 47th rule of equity practice. The first
section of the statute, carried forward into section 738 of the
Revised Statutes, enacted:
"That where, in any suit at law or in equity commenced in any
court of the United States, there shall be several defendants, any
one or more of whom shall not be inhabitants of or found within the
district where the suit is brought or shall not voluntarily appear
thereto, it shall be lawful for the Court to entertain
jurisdiction, and proceed to the trial and adjudication of such
suit between the parties who may be properly before it, but the
judgment or decree rendered therein shall not conclude or prejudice
other parties not regularly served with process or not voluntarily
appearing to answer, and the nonjoinder of parties who are not so
inhabitants or found within the district shall constitute no matter
of abatement or other objection to said suit."
But Mr. Justice Curtis remarked that while the act removed any
difficulty as to jurisdiction between competent parties regularly
served with process, it did not attempt to displace that principle
of jurisprudence on which the Court rested
Mallow v.
Hinde, and, so far as the forth-seventh rule was concerned,
that was only a declaration for the government of practitioners and
courts of the effect of the act of Congress and of the previous
decisions of the Court on the subject of that rule. And Mr. Justice
Curtis added:
"It remains true notwithstanding the act of Congress and the
forty-seventh rule that a circuit court can make no decree
affecting
Page 157 U. S. 251
the rights of an absent person, and can make no decree between
the parties before it, which so far involves or depends upon the
rights of an absent person that complete and final justice cannot
be done between the parties to the suit without affecting those
rights. To use the language of this Court in
Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 10 Wheat. 167:"
"If the case may be completely decided as between the litigant
parties, the circumstance that an interest exists in some other
person whom the process of the Court cannot reach, as if such party
be a resident of another state, ought not to prevent a decree upon
its merits."
"But if the case cannot be thus completely decided, the Court
should make no decree."
Mr. Daniell thus lays down the general rule:
"It is the constant aim of a court of equity to do complete
justice, by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons
interested in the subject of the suit, so as to make the
performance of the order of the Court perfectly safe to those who
are compelled to obey it, and to prevent future litigation. For
this purpose, all persons materially interested in the subject
ought generally, either as plaintiffs or defendants, to be made
parties to the suit, or ought, by service upon them of a copy of
the bill or notice of the decree, to have an opportunity afforded
of making themselves active parties in the cause, if they should
think fit."
1 Dan.Ch.Pl. & Prac., 4th Am. ed. 190.
The rule, under some circumstances not important to be
considered here, may be dispensed with when its application becomes
extremely difficult or inconvenient. Equity Rule 48.
Sitting as a court of equity, we cannot, in the light of these
well settled principles, escape the consideration of the question
whether other persons who have an immediate interest in resisting
the demand of complainant are not indispensable parties, or at
least so far necessary that the cause should not go on in their
absence. Can the Court proceed to a decree, as between the state
and the Southern Pacific Company, and do complete and final justice
without affecting other persons not before the Court, or leaving
the controversy in such a condition that its final termination
might be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience?
Page 157 U. S. 252
The boundaries of the State of California, as defined and
established in the Constitution under which the state was admitted
into the Union, by the Act of Congress approved September 9, 1850,
embraced all the soil of the beds of the Bay of San Francisco and
the arms of the bay, including what was and is known as "San
Antonio Estuary," or "San Antonio Creek," on the eastern side of
the bay, opposite to San Francisco. The tide ebbs and flows
naturally in the estuary, which contains a natural tidal basin, and
the bay and estuary are connected with the waters of the Pacific
Ocean by the Golden Gate.
The contention of the state was that the legislature did not
have the power to grant the waterfront to the Town of Oakland, nor
to anyone, so as to create any title or interest in the grantee,
nor to authorize the town to grant the entire waterfront to any
person, to be held and owned as his private property; that the Act
of May 4, 1852, did not authorize the town to grant its waterfront,
namely, the lands lying within the limits of that town between high
tide and ship channel, to Carpentier, nor to anyone to be held as
private property; that the ordinance of May 27, 1852, was not
designed to confer on Carpentier an interest in the Oakland
waterfront beyond thirty-seven years; that the ordinance was
against public policy and void; that the deed of the president of
the board of trustees was his individual deed, and, if valid, only
conveyed for the life of Carpentier, because it did not run to him
and his heirs; that the alleged grant was not consistent with the
policy of the state; that the grant was revoked by the Act of March
25, 1854, and was not confirmed by the Act of May 15, 1861; that
the Act of March 21, 1868, did not authorize the City of Oakland to
convey away the waterfront, or to settle existing controversies in
that way; that such a settlement would be contrary to public policy
and contrary to the charter of the city.
The defendant contended that it is the settled law of this
country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over
lands covered by tidewaters belong to the respective states within
which they are found, with the consequent right
Page 157 U. S. 253
to use or dispose of any portion thereof when that can be done
without substantial impairment of the interests of the public in
such waters, and subject to the paramount right of Congress to
control their navigation so far as might be necessary for the
regulation of commerce; that the State of California, in and by the
Act of May 5, 1852, made an irrevocable grant
in praesenti
to the Town of Oakland of the title and property in all the lands
lying within the corporate limits of the town between high tide and
ship channel, with the power and right to alien and convey the
lands, or any part of them, for the purposes contemplated by the
act; that the Act of March 25, 1854, did not, by its own terms or
otherwise, operate as a repeal of that grant; that the grant was
confirmed and ratified by the Legislature of California by the Act
of May 15, 1861, and by the Council of the City of Oakland by and
under the authority of the Act of March 21, 1868; that the grant
was made in pursuance of the settled policy of the state, and
created no interference with or impairment to the Bay of San
Francisco, nor impaired or interfered with the interests of the
public in the waters of that bay or any part thereof, or with the
legislative power of the state to regulate or use all the waters in
behalf of the public for the purposes of navigation. It was further
contended that the state was estopped from denying the effect of
the Act of May 4, 1852, to convey and pass a valid title to the
lands embraced by it to the Town of Oakland, and estopped by the
acts of May 15, 1861, and of March 21, 1868, respectively, to deny
the validity of the title of Carpentier and those claiming under
him, and that the City of Oakland was also estopped to deny the
effect of the ordinances of the Town of Oakland of May 27, 1852,
January 1, 1853, August 27, 1853, and of the deed of conveyance by
the president of the board of trustees of the town, to grant and
convey a valid title in fee simple in the lands in controversy to
Carpentier, by the operation of the ordinances of the City of April
1 and 2, 1868, under the Act of the legislature of March 21, 1868,
authorizing the city to settle its controversies with Carpentier.
And, further, that the confirmation of the ordinances and deed of
the Town of Oakland by the ordinances
Page 157 U. S. 254
of the City of Oakland under the act of 1868, besides again
validating the ordinances and the deed of conveyance of the town,
operated as a grant by the City of Oakland and the State of
California of the land, in fee simple absolute, to the Oakland
Waterfront Company, as grantee or alienee of Carpentier.
On behalf of the City of Oakland, which was permitted to be
heard at the bar by counsel as
amici curiae, it was
insisted that the original grant of the waterfront to the Town of
Oakland had never been revoked; that the city was simply the town's
successor in that regard, and that its rights thereunder, of
whatever nature, had in no manner been affected by any exertion of
the legislative power of the state. Admitting that a municipal
corporation, as such, has no proprietary interest or riparian
rights in tide lands situated within its corporate limits, the city
claimed that title had passed to it from the state; that, regarded
as holding in trust as a governmental agency, nevertheless it had
an interest in the grant of individual advantage, and that, in any
view, as an existing corporate entity, clothed with powers to be
locally exercised, though for the general public good, it could not
be divested thereof in the absence of legislation to that end, by
proceedings in which it was not allowed to participate as a
litigant. But counsel for the state argued that whatever
construction might be put upon the acts of the legislature relating
to the City of Oakland, in connection with the waterfront, the
state retained its sovereign power to preserve it for the use of
the public free from obstruction, and could alone, by its Attorney
General, maintain the action; that the city was no more interested
in the suit, directly or collaterally, than any administrative
agency would be; that the grant by the Act of May 4, 1852, was not
in absolute ownership, but in trust for improvement, and that the
grant was revoked by the repeal of the Act of May 4, 1852, by
section 19 of the Act of March 25, 1854.
The prayer of the bill was, among other things, for a decree
adjudging that the state could not make such a grant to the town;
that the Town of Oakland had no authority to grant or convey all
its waterfront, or any part thereof, and that any
Page 157 U. S. 255
control conferred on the town by the act of 1852 was annulled by
the act of 1854.
But it was said that notwithstanding the breadth of the prayer,
relief, if accorded, would be confined to the seven specified
parcels, and that the decree would not bind those claiming
interests in other parts of the waterfront, although, as to the
particular parcels, defendant's lessors, the Central Pacific
Railroad Company and the South Pacific Coast Railway Company, and
its grantor, the Oakland Waterfront Company, all corporations and
citizens of California, would be bound. Considered, however, in
reference to the main contention of the state, namely the want of
power to make the grant of the entire waterfront at all, the
argument treated the waterfront as one and indivisible for the
purposes of the case. Indeed, it was insisted that even if it were
conceded that the legislature could empower a municipality to deal
with parts of its waterfront, in the interest of the public, by
authorizing the construction of improvements to a certain extent,
creating so far a proprietary interest in those thus authorized,
yet that such action, as to portions of the grant, though
sustainable if independent thereof, must be regarded as involved in
the invalidity of the entire grant. Irrespective, then, of the
extent, technically speaking, of the effect and operation of a
decree as to the seven parcels, based on that ground, as
res
adjudicata, it is impossible to ignore the inquiry whether the
interests of persons not before the Court would be so affected, and
the controversy so left open to future litigation, as would be
inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
Without questioning in any way the authority of the Attorney
General of the State of California to institute this suit, it is
admitted that it was not directed to be commenced by any act of the
legislature of that state. If this Court were of opinion that the
City of Oakland occupied the position of the successor merely of
the Town of Oakland, that the grant of the waterfront to the town
was as comprehensive as is claimed by defendant, and that it had
not been annulled by any act of the legislature, but also held that
the state had no power to make such grant, then the City of Oakland
would be deprived
Page 157 U. S. 256
of the rights it claims under the grant not by the exercise of
the legislative power of the state as between it and its
municipality, but by a judicial decree in a suit to which the city
was not a party.
And if the proceedings which purported to vest title in the
Oakland Waterfront Company were held ineffectual for the same
reason, then the latter company would find the foundation of its
title swept away in a suit to which it also was not a party.
This is not an action of ejectment, or of trespass
quare
clausum, but a bill in equity, and the familiar rule in
equity, as we have seen, is the doing of complete justice by
deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons materially
interested in the subject of the suit, to which end such persons
should be made parties.
We are constrained to conclude that the City of Oakland and the
Oakland Waterfront Company are so situated in respect of this
litigation that we ought not to proceed in their absence.
When heretofore the City of Oakland applied to be made a
co-complainant herein, the question of parties was necessarily
suggested, although that application was such, and presented at
such a stage of the case, that the Court was neither called on to
nor could properly deal with the general subject. As original
jurisdiction only subsisted in that the state was party, and the
moving party (Eleventh Amendment;
Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U. S. 1), the
motion of the city was denied. But we at the same time granted
leave to the city to file briefs, accompanied by such maps and
documents illustrative of its alleged title as it might be advised.
The matter was thus left to the consideration of counsel as to
whether indispensable or necessary parties had not been joined,
while if the case was permitted to go to a hearing, the Court would
then be able to dispose of it understandingly. We may add that even
if reference could be made to the 47th rule in equity by way of
analogy, that rule does not apply when indispensable parties are
lacking, and that in respect of necessary parties, the cause may or
many not be proceeded in without
Page 157 U. S. 257
them, as the Court may determine in the exercise of sound
discretion. We have no hesitation in holding that when an original
cause is pending in this Court, to be disposed of here in the first
instance, and in the exercise of an exceptional jurisdiction, it
does not comport with the gravity and finality which should
characterize such an adjudication to proceed in the absence of
parties whose rights would be in effect determined, even though
they might not be technically bound in subsequent litigation in
some other tribunal.
This brings us to consider what the effect would be if the
Oakland Waterfront Company and the City of Oakland were made
parties defendant. The case would then be between the State of
California, on the one hand, and a citizen of another state and
citizens of California, or the other. Could this Court exercise
original jurisdiction under such circumstances?
By the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution, it is provided that
"the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; . . . to controversies to which the United
States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more
states; between a state and citizens of another state; between
citizens of different states. . . ."
And by the second clause, that
"in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme
court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases
before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction. . . ."
The language, "in all cases in which a state shall be party,"
means in all the cases above enumerated in which a state shall be a
party, and this is stated expressly when the clause speaks of the
other cases where appellate jurisdiction is to be exercised. This
second clause distributes the jurisdiction conferred in the
previous one into original and appellate jurisdiction, but does not
profess to confer any. The original jurisdiction depends solely on
the character of
Page 157 U. S. 258
the parties, and is confined to the cases in which are those
enumerated parties, and those only. Among those in which
jurisdiction must be exercised in the appellate form are cases
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In
one description of cases, the character of the parties is
everything, the nature of the case nothing. In the other
description of cases, the nature of the case is everything, the
character of the parties nothing.
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
19 U. S.
393.
By section 13 of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20,
1 Stat. 73, it was provided
"that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature where a state is a party, except
between a state and its citizens, and except also between a state
and citizens of other states or aliens, in which latter case it
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. In all the
other cases above mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction. . . ."
This was carried forward into section 687 of the Revised
Statutes. Under the Constitution, the cases in which a state may be
a party are those between two or more states; between a state and
citizens of another state; between a state and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects, and between the United States and a state,
as held in
United States v. Texas, 143 U.
S. 621. By the Constitution, and according to the
statute, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
of a civil nature where a state is a party, but not of
controversies between a state and its own citizens, and original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between a state and
citizens of another state or aliens.
In
Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver
Company, 10 Wall. 553, it was ruled that a state
might bring an original suit in this Court against a citizen of
another state, but not against one of its own, and it has never
been held that the Court could take original jurisdiction of
controversies between a state and citizens of another state and its
own citizens.
In
Georgia v.
Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402, the State of Georgia filed
a bill in equity in this Court against Brailsford and others,
copartners, who were aliens, and Spalding, a citizen
Page 157 U. S. 259
of Georgia, against whom they had obtained judgment, to restrain
payment thereof to Brailsford & Company upon the ground that
the bond on which judgment had been recovered belonged to the
state, Spalding having refused to sue out a writ of error. The
question of jurisdiction, as presented in the case at bar, does not
appear to have been suggested. And the bill, without that
question's being considered, was finally dismissed because the
remedy of complainant was at law. 2 Dall.
2
U. S. 415. An action at law was brought accordingly
against Brailsford and others, but not against Spalding, and
resulted in a verdict for the defendant.
3 U.
S. 3 Dall. 1.
In
Florida v. Anderson, 91 U. S.
667,
91 U. S. 676, a
bill in equity was filed by Florida against citizens of Georgia,
and the Marshal of the United States for the Northern District of
Florida was made a formal defendant by reason of having in his
hands an execution at the suit of some of the other defendants.
Jurisdiction was sustained on the ground that the marshal was
merely a formal party, against whom no relief was sought.
In
Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S.
379, the bill was originally filed against the City of
Duluth, as a corporation of the State of Minnesota, and the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation organized under an
act of Congress, but was dismissed as to the latter before the
final hearing, and no question of the jurisdiction of the Court
over the company was passed upon.
These and other cases were considered in
Wisconsin v.
Pelican Insurance Company, 127 U. S. 265, in
which it was held that this Court had not original jurisdiction of
an action by a state upon a judgment recovered by it in one of its
own courts against a citizen or corporation of another state for a
pecuniary penalty for a violation of its municipal law.
It was asserted in argument that, in respect of the clause
extending the judicial power "to controversies between citizens of
different states," it had been decided that it is within the power
of Congress to confer upon the circuit courts of the United States
jurisdiction over controversies between a citizen of one state and
a citizen of another state joined with a citizen of the plaintiff's
state, and that the same rule of construction
Page 157 U. S. 260
must be applied to controversies between "a state and citizens
of another state."
But the decisions referred to relate to the removal of cases
from state courts, and prior to the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat.
470, c. 137, the uniform ruling was that all of the necessary
parties on one side of the suit should be citizens of different
states from those on the other, while under that act it has been
always held that in order to justify the removal of a suit because
of "a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different
states," the whole subject matter of the suit must be capable of
being finally determined between them, and complete relief afforded
as to the separate causes of action without the presence of other
persons originally made parties to the suit, and that when there
was but one indivisible controversy between the plaintiff and the
defendants, the suit could not be removed by one of several
plaintiffs or defendants. Whether the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373,
24 Stat. 552, as corrected by the Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866,
25 Stat. 434, permits one of two or more defendants to remove any
case which he could not have removed under earlier statutes is a
question upon which no opinion has as yet been expressed by this
Court.
Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U.
S. 192;
Cotton Press Company v. Insurance
Company, 151 U. S. 368,
151 U. S. 382;
Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S.
530.
It was also contended that the clause of the Constitution
extending the judicial power to controversies "between citizens of
different states" was intended to secure the citizen against local
prejudice which might injure him if compelled to litigate his
controversy with another in the tribunal of a state not his own,
and that, for the attainment of this object, Congress could have
vested the circuit court with original jurisdiction, although some
of the defendants were citizens of the same state with the
plaintiff; that a single federal principle or ground of
jurisdiction would be sufficient to the exercise of the power to
confer such authority, and that the federal ingredient existed here
in the necessity for an impartial tribunal in suits to which a
state is a party, and that, moreover, the jurisdiction in the case
at bar did not rest exclusively on a controversy
Page 157 U. S. 261
between the State of California and a citizen of another state,
but that it was one arising under the Constitution, in that the
effect claimed by the state for the Act of March 25, 1854, involves
the decision of the question whether that act was a law impairing
the obligation of a contract, and therefore invalid, and also that
a question under the same constitutional prohibition arises in
regard to ordinances of the City of Oakland repealing the
settlement ordinances of 1868, and all others purporting to dispose
of the land in question.
We are aware of no case in which this Court has announced the
conclusion that power is conferred on Congress to authorize suits
against citizens of other states joined with citizens of the same
state as that of which plaintiff is a citizen to be originally
commenced in, or to be removed to, the circuit courts as arising
under the Constitution on the ground indicated, where there is no
separable controversy or the citizens of plaintiff's state are
indispensable parties; but we are not called on to consider that
question, or whether any federal question is involved, since the
original jurisdiction of this Court in cases between a state and
citizens of another state rests upon the character of the parties,
and not at all upon the nature of the case.
If, by virtue of the subject matter, a case comes within the
judicial power of the United States, it does not follow that it
comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court. That
jurisdiction does not obtain simply because a state is a party.
Suits between a state and its own citizens are not included within
it by the Constitution, nor are controversies between citizens of
different states.
It was held at an early day that Congress could neither enlarge
nor restrict the original jurisdiction of this Court.
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
5 U. S. 173-174.
And no attempt to do so is suggested here. The jurisdiction is
limited and manifestly intended to be sparingly exercised, and
should not be expanded by construction. What Congress may have
power to do in relation to the jurisdiction of circuit courts of
the United States is not the question, but whether, where the
Constitution provides that this Court shall have original
Page 157 U. S. 262
jurisdiction in cases in which the state is plaintiff and
citizens of another state defendants, that jurisdiction can be held
to embrace a suit between a state and citizens of another state and
of the same state. We are of opinion that our original jurisdiction
cannot be thus extended, and that the bill must be dismissed for
want of parties who should be joined but cannot be without ousting
the jurisdiction.
Bill dismissed.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, concurring.
It is greatly to be regretted that the controversies between the
State of California, the Southern Pacific Railway Company, and the
City of Oakland cannot now, in view of the limited character of the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, be
heard, determined, and settled by this Court, for those
controversies will be a fruitful source of disturbance and vexation
to the interests of the state until they are thus determined and
settled. But from the views of the Court expressed in its recent
decision, proceedings for such determination and settlement must
find their commencement in the courts of the state, and can only
reach this Court from their decision upon appeal or writ of error.
And the sooner proceedings are taken to reach that disposition of
the controversies, the earlier will be their final settlement.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE BREWER,
dissenting.
In my judgment, it is competent for the Court, in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, to proceed to a final decree in this
cause, that will determine the present controversy between the
State of California and the Southern Pacific Company.
By the second section of the third article of the Constitution,
it is declared that the judicial power of the United States shall
extend
"to all cases in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
Page 157 U. S. 263
to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to
controversies between two or more states, between a state and
citizens of another state, between citizens of different states,
between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof and
foreign states, citizens or subjects."
And it is provided in the same section that
"in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make."
It is beyond dispute that the case before us presents a
controversy between the State of California and a corporation
created under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and
therefore a controversy between a state and a citizen of another
state. And as the judicial power of the United States extends to
such a controversy, and as this Court is invested with original
jurisdiction "in all cases" to which the judicial power of the
United States extends, in which a state is a party, I do not see
how we can escape the obligation imposed by the Constitution to
hear this cause upon its merits and pass such decree as will
determine at least the matters in dispute between California and
this Kentucky corporation.
It is said that we cannot proceed further because it appears
from the evidence that a municipal corporation of California
asserts, and a private corporation of the same state may have, an
interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and could not be
made parties of record without ousting our jurisdiction. Upon that
ground alone, it is held that we are without jurisdiction to pass a
final decree as between the state and the defendant
corporation.
I submit that the same course should be pursued in this case
that was pursued in
Florida v.
Georgia, 17 How. 478,
58 U. S. 493.
The State of Florida invoked the original jurisdiction of this
Court to determine a question of boundary
Page 157 U. S. 264
between it and the State of Georgia. The latter state appeared
and filed its answer. The jurisdiction of this Court rested upon
the constitutional provisions extending the judicial power of the
United States "to controversies between two or more states," and
giving this Court original jurisdiction in all cases in which a
state is a party.
The Attorney General of the United States appeared and filed an
information in which he asked leave to intervene on behalf of the
government, on the ground that it was interested in the settlement
of the boundary in dispute. The application to intervene was
resisted by the State of Georgia upon the ground that, under the
Constitution, this Court had not and could not have jurisdiction of
the cause except as a controversy between states of the Union, and
that the appearance of any other party would determine the
jurisdiction and put the cause out of court.
The court, speaking by Chief Justice Taney, said:
"The Constitution confers on this Court original jurisdiction in
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. And it is
settled by repeated decisions that a question of boundary between
states is within the jurisdiction thus conferred. But the
Constitution prescribes no particular mode of proceeding, nor is
there any act of Congress upon the subject. And at a very early
period of the government, a doubt arose whether the Court could
exercise its original jurisdiction without a previous act of
Congress regulating the process and mode of proceeding. But the
Court, upon much consideration, held that although Congress had
undoubtedly the right to prescribe the process and mode of
proceeding in such cases as fully as in any other court, yet the
omission to legislate on the subject could not deprive the Court of
the jurisdiction conferred; that it was a duty imposed on the
Court, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress, the Court
itself was authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding,
so as to accomplish the ends for which the jurisdiction was
given."
After observing that it was the duty of the Court to mold its
proceedings for itself in a manner that would best attain
Page 157 U. S. 265
the ends of justice and enable it to exercise conveniently the
power conferred -- disengaging such proceedings from all
unnecessary technicalities and niceties and conducting them in the
simplest form -- the Chief Justice proceeded:
"It is manifest, if the facts stated in the suggestion of the
Attorney General are supported by testimony, that the United States
must have a deep interest in the decision in this controversy. And
if this case is decided adversely to their rights, they are without
remedy, and there is no form of proceeding in which they could have
that decision revised in this Court, or anywhere else. Justice
therefore requires that they should be heard before their rights
are concluded. And if this were a suit between individuals in a
court of equity, the ordinary practice of the Court would require a
person standing in the present position of the United States to be
made a party, and would not proceed to a final decree until he had
an opportunity of being heard."
"But it is said that they cannot, by the terms of the
Constitution, be made parties in an original proceeding in this
Court between states; that if they could, the Attorney General has
no right to make them defendants without an act of Congress to
authorize it."
"We do not, however, deem it necessary to examine or decide
these questions. They presuppose that we are bound to follow the
English chancery practice, and that the United States must be
brought in as a party on the record, in the technical sense of the
word, so that a judgment for or against them may be passed by the
Court. But, as we have already said, the Court are not bound, in a
case of this kind, to follow the rules and modes of proceeding in
the English chancery, but will deviate from them where the purposes
of justice require it or the ends of justice can be more
conveniently attained."
"It is evident that this object can be more conveniently
accomplished in the mode adopted by the Attorney General than by
following the English practice in cases where the government have
an interest in the issue of the suit. In a case like the one now
before us, there is no necessity for a judgment
Page 157 U. S. 266
against the United States, for when the boundary in question
shall be ascertained and determined by the judgment of the Court,
in the present suit, there is no possible mode by which that
decision can be reviewed or reexamined at the instance of the
United States. They would therefore be as effectually concluded by
the judgment as if they were parties on the record, and a judgment
entered against them. The case then is this: here is a suit between
two states, in relation to the true position of the boundary line
which divides them. But there are twenty-nine other states, who are
also interested in the adjustment of this boundary, whose interests
are represented by the United States. Justice certainly requires
that they should be heard before their rights are concluded by the
judgment of the Court, for their interests may be different from
those of either of the litigating states. And it would hardly
become this tribunal, entrusted with jurisdiction where
sovereignties are concerned and with power to prescribe its own
mode of proceeding, to do injustice rather than depart from English
precedents. . . . And if, as has been urged in argument, the United
States cannot, under the Constitution, become a party to this suit
in the legal sense of that term, and the English mode of proceeding
in analogous cases is therefore impracticable, it furnishes a
conclusive argument for the mode proposed, for otherwise there must
be a failure of justice."
The mode adopted in
Florida v. Georgia was to allow the
United States to file its proofs without becoming a party, in the
technical sense of the term, but without right to interfere in the
pleading or evidence or admissions of the states, or of either of
them, the Attorney General of the United States to be heard in
argument, and the Court, in deciding upon the true boundary line,
to take into consideration all the evidence offered by the United
States and by the states.
Now that is substantially the course pursued at the outset in
this case. The City of Oakland, by leave of the Court, has
presented its proofs. It has been allowed to file briefs and such
documents and maps as would illustrate its alleged title. It has
participated in the taking of all the evidence in the
Page 157 U. S. 267
cause. The case has been fully heard upon its merits as they
involve the rights of California, the Southern Pacific Company, and
the City of Oakland. All of those parties earnestly desire this
Court to proceed, as between them, to a final decree on the merits.
If any other party is interested in the issues, we can hold the
cause until that party, if it so wishes, can make proof of such
interest, and its nature, just as the City of Oakland has done.
As this Court, having original jurisdiction of controversies
between two or more states, would not refuse to determine the
controversy between Florida and Georgia because other parties had
an interest in the subject matter of that controversy, and could
not, as was claimed, be admitted as parties of record without
defeating its jurisdiction, ought we to dismiss a suit between a
state and a corporation or citizen of another state because other
parties interested in the result of that suit cannot be admitted as
parties of record, but may be admitted to occupy such position with
reference to the case as will enable the Court to attain the ends
of justice as between all who assert any interest in the result of
the litigation? The suggestion that the Oakland Waterfront Company
has such an interest as entitles it to be heard comes from the
Court, not from that company or from any of the parties before us.
If it be deemed proper to give that company an opportunity to
assert its claims, we could, as just suggested, direct notice to be
given to it of the pendency of this litigation, so that it could,
if so advised, appear in the same way in which the City of Oakland
has been allowed to appear.
I have thus far considered the question upon the assumption that
a decree, as between California and the Southern Pacific Company,
might legally affect the claims of others who are not formal
parties of the suit. The court does not say in words that such a
decree could be pleaded in bar in any subsequent suit, or would
affect in law the rights of the City of Oakland or the Waterfront
Company. And I take it that the Court does not mean to be
understood as attaching any such effect to a decree simply between
the parties to the present bill. Now if a decree between the
parties to the bill
Page 157 U. S. 268
will not, in law, bar any claim of parties who are not admitted
to be heard in some form, it is difficult to understand why the
Court should not recognize its constitutional obligation to
determine this controversy between a state and a corporation of
another state. It is nonetheless a controversy between a state and
a citizen of another state because others, not parties of record,
may have an interest in its determination. Let us suppose a decree
was passed, only as between California and the Kentucky
corporation, dismissing the suit for want of equity. That decree
would be conclusive as between the state and that corporation. But
it would not have any effect as a bar in a subsequent litigation
respecting the same or some of the same matters between the
Southern Pacific Company and the City of Oakland, or between the
Southern Pacific Company and the waterfront company, or between the
state and one or both of the corporations not parties of record.
Undoubtedly, any decree rendered by this Court would be cited by
the successful party, when involved in litigation with other
parties, as evidence as to what the law is. But it would not be
obligatory upon any court in other suits between different parties.
A suit upon coupons of bonds issued by a municipal corporation
might be so framed as to involve the validity of the bonds
themselves -- a question in which every holder of such bonds would
in a sense be interested. But a judgment in such a suit that the
bonds were void for the want of power to issue them, while
conclusive as between the parties to that suit, would not conclude
the holders of bonds who were not before the Court in some
effective form. A suit to foreclose a second mortgage upon the
property of a corporation might result in a decree declaring that
the corporation was without power to give any mortgage whatever
upon its property. But that decree would not conclude the parties
interested in a first mortgage, who were not in court nor
represented by the trustee named in the mortgage under which they
claimed. So a decree as between California and the Southern Pacific
Company would not conclude outside persons neither admitted as
parties nor permitted to appear and be heard in respect of their
rights. In this view, this
Page 157 U. S. 269
Court can decline to determine finally the rights of any except
those who are parties of record, and as the controversy between
those parties is one between a state and a corporation and a
citizen of another state, it is one within our original
jurisdiction.
It seems to me that according to both the letter and spirit of
the Constitution, this Court cannot refuse to exercise its original
jurisdiction over a controversy between a state and a citizen of
another state because a citizen of the plaintiff state has or may
assert some interest in the subject matter of that controversy, and
that in such a case it is our duty either to permit the latter
citizen to be heard, without becoming a party of record, if thereby
our jurisdiction would be defeated, or proceed to a decree between
the original parties to the controversy, leaving unaffected, in
law, the rights of others.
Our constitutional duty is to determine the "case" in which the
state is a party, taking care to give all who are interested in its
determination a reasonable opportunity to produce evidence and to
be heard in support of their rights. In this way only can we give
full effect to the Constitution and at the same time attain the
ends of justice, unembarrassed by mere forms. We should not impose
undue restrictions upon the right of the states to invoke our
original jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to determine all cases to which
the judicial power of the United States extends, in which a state
is a party, gives authority to decide every controversy that arises
in such cases the determination of which is either necessary or
proper in order to dispose of the case in which it arises.
If this be not a sound interpretation of the Constitution, the
result will be that this Court will not, in any case, exercise its
original jurisdiction over a case "between two or more states" if
it appears that individual citizens have an interest in its
determination. A controversy capable of judicial solution may arise
between two states, and it may be important to the peace of those
states -- indeed, of the whole country -- that it should be
determined by this Court. But under the interpretation of the
Constitution adopted in this case, our
Page 157 U. S. 270
jurisdiction cannot be invoked in any mode for its final
settlement if it appears in evidence that some individual or
corporation is interested in that settlement. Still more, although
this Court is given original jurisdiction of a case between one of
the states of the Union and a foreign state, it will not exercise
it, even in such a case, if individual parties are interested in
the controversy.
As the presence in a case arising under the Constitution or the
laws or the treaties of the United States of a question or
controversy depending upon general principles of law will not oust
the jurisdiction of the courts as conferred by the Constitution,
Osborne v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, so the presence, in a case
brought by a state against a citizen of another state, of a
question or controversy in which others besides the parties of
record are interested ought not to oust the jurisdiction of the
Court to determine the controversy between the original parties,
especially where the decree between the parties of record will not,
in law, conclude, or is so framed that it will not conclude, the
rights of others who were not, in some form, before the Court.
Under the ruling now made, how is the State of California to
obtain a judicial determination of the controversy between it and
this foreign corporation? It is said that a suit may be brought in
one of its own courts against all persons asserting an interest in
the property rights here in question. The effectiveness of such a
suit would depend upon the ability of the state to bring the
Kentucky corporation into court so that it would be bound by the
final decree. It may be that that corporation does business in
California under the condition, among others, that it will have an
agent there upon whom process can be served. But surely the duty of
this Court, under the Constitution, to exercise its original
jurisdiction in respect to a controversy between a state and a
corporation of another state cannot depend upon the question
whether the plaintiff state can compel that corporation to answer
in its own courts. Suppose the defendant is an individual citizen
of another state, who cannot be served with process in the state
desiring to bring suit against him. In
Page 157 U. S. 271
such a case, the state must, under the principles now announced,
be without a remedy for the protection of its rights, or it will be
driven to sue its adversary in the courts of his own state, whose
decision will be final unless the controversy happens to involve
some question of a federal nature, and even then this Court could
only decide the federal question presented, and must accept the
decree of the state court as conclusive upon all other questions.
The state could not sue in any circuit court of the United States,
for that court has no jurisdiction, under the acts of Congress, of
a suit brought by a state against a citizen of another state,
unless perhaps such suit be one arising under the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States. The framers of the
Constitution did not intend to subject a state under any
circumstances to the indignity of being compelled to submit its
controversies with citizens of other states to the courts of such
other states. They opened the doors of this Court to every state
having a cause of action against a citizen of another state. In my
judgment, we have no right to refuse a hearing to a state having
such a cause of action because of the circumstance that one or more
of its people assert an interest in the subject matter of its
controversy with the defendant citizen of another state.
For these reasons, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion
and judgment of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER authorizes me to say that he concurs in this
opinion.
