The Act of the Legislature of Louisiana of July 12, 1888, No.
133, authorizing the enforcement by mandamus without a jury of
contracts by corporations with municipal corporations in that state
with reference to the paving, grading, repairing, etc., of streets,
highways, bridges, etc., simply gives an additional remedy to the
party entitled to the performance, without impairing any
substantial right of the other party, does not impair the
obligation of the contract sought to be enforced, and is not in
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
At October term, 1890, a motion was made by Mr. Samuel L.
Gilmore on behalf of the defendant in error to dismiss the
Page 157 U. S. 220
writ of error in this case, then No. 1314 on the docket of that
term, or to affirm the judgment of the court below. This motion was
opposed by Mr. Charles F. Buck for the plaintiff in error, and was
denied by the court April 6, 1891, without an opinion. The case now
decided is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the first section of an Act of the General Assembly of
Louisiana, approved July 12, 1888, and entitled
"An act providing a summary remedy against corporations to
compel a compliance with certain obligations and contracts with
municipal corporations, and providing ways and means to enforce
said remedy,"
it was provided that
"in all cases where any corporation has heretofore contracted
with, or may hereafter contract with, or shall be otherwise legally
bound to any parish or municipal corporation in this state with
reference to the paving, grading, repairing, reconstructing, or
care of any street, highway, bridge, culvert, levee, canal, ditch,
or crossing, and shall fail or neglect to perform said contract or
obligation, the said parish or municipal corporation, or any
officer thereof, or any five taxpayers thereof, shall have the
right to proceed by a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of
said contract or obligation, or any part thereof, which writ of
mandamus shall be made returnable in five days, shall be tried by
preference over all other cases, without a jury, in vacation as
well as in term time, and in case of appeal shall be tried by
preference in the appellate court."
The second section provided that
"in case any corporation shall fail or neglect to comply
satisfactorily with any judgment against it in such a proceeding
within the time therein
Page 157 U. S. 221
fixed (which time shall be fixed by the court at such period
within which the work can be reasonably done), it shall be the duty
of the court, on contradictory motion and proof taken in the same
case, to issue a writ of distringas against said company and to
order the sheriff to do the work required to be done, and to apply
the revenues and property of said company to defray the expenses
incurred in executing the judgment of the court."
The third section repeals all laws and parts of laws contrary to
the provisions of that act.
The State of Louisiana, on the relation of the City of New
Orleans, evidently proceeding under the above act, filed a petition
in the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, against the New
Orleans City & Lake Railroad Company in which it was alleged,
among other things:
That under the terms of certain contracts and ordinances whereby
the defendant was operating the Levee and Barracks, Camp and
Prytania, Camp and Magazine, Rampart and Dauphine, Canal Street,
Metaric Road and Bayou St. John, the Esplanade and Bayou Bridge
Lines, and the steam railway to the lake, the New Orleans City and
Lake Railroad Company was
"bound and obligated, among other things, to keep the paved and
unpaved streets through which its tracks pass, as well as all the
bridges on said streets, in good repair and condition from curb to
curb during the continuance of its franchise and right of way; to
raise, repair, and repave any and all intersections of streets,
when required by relator, upon lines and levels to be furnished by
the city surveyor; to widen and deepen any and all culverts and
sluices to such dimensions as may be required and directed by the
city surveyor; to keep in repair all bridges, and to make new ones,
when required by relator, on all streets through which its lines
pass; to pave, on all unpaved streets through which its lines pass
the lines of said tracks, within the rails, with either round
stones or with four by five-inch scantling, in the best workman
like manner, and to plank the space between the lines of the track
and the gutters of the streets with yellow pine planks three inches
thick, laid on stringers
Page 157 U. S. 222
four inches thick by eight inches wide, and to use flat rails
for its tracks, and to keep its tracks in repair and good
condition. That by the terms of the said contracts, acts, and
ordinances under which it is operating the extension of the Camp
and Prytania Line and the extension of the Camp and Magazine line,
the said New Orleans City and Lake Railroad Company is bound and
obligated, among other things, to construct all crossings, bridges,
culverts, and wings of the same on the streets through which its
tracks pass, which, in the opinion of the commissioner of public
works and the city surveyor, are at any time needed, and to keep
the said streets between the banquette curb lines, including all
plankings, crossings, bridges, culverts, and wings of the same, and
also all the intersections of the streets of this route at all
times in good roadway order and condition; to use flat rails, five
inches, resting on suitable flange at their ends, as well spiked
with six-inch wrought-iron spikes; to transversely plank the entire
space between the rails and tracks with three by twelve inches
milled pine, and to place along the two outer sides of the tramways
throughout this route, close to the stringers and on a level with
the top of the rail, one plank not less than three by twelve inches
in dimension, and to keep its tracks in good order and
condition,"
and that
"in violation of its said obligations, the said New Orleans City
and Lake Railroad Company, although thereunto often requested,
neglects and refuses to keep the streets through which its tracks
pass in good order and condition; to repair and keep in good
condition the bridges and intersections on said streets; to provide
the proper drainage, and to build and keep in repair the proper
culverts; to use the flat rails; to plank upon unpaved streets,
referred to in said contracts, the space between the lines of the
tracks and the gutters of the streets, as required by said
contracts, and to place the 3 by 12 inches plank level with the top
of the rails on the streets referred to in said contracts, where
there are double tracks, or to keep in repair such planking where
it has been placed on the streets referred to in said contracts
where there are single tracks, and has in many other divers
ways
Page 157 U. S. 223
violated its contracts with relator and the law, all of which
will more fully and at large appear from the report of the city
surveyor and the further bill of particulars which is hereunto
annexed and made part hereof."
The relief asked was a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant
to perform all the above matters and things which, under said
contracts and by law, it was obligated to do and perform.
An exception and answer were filed, one of the grounds of
exception and of defense being that the above act of 1888 was in
violation of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United
States.
By the final judgment of the court of original jurisdiction, the
mandamus was made peremptory, and the defendant was required to
commence, and to complete within three months from the date of the
rendition of the judgment, certain described work and repairs on
streets and roads specified in the petition.
Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the
judgment was amended by striking out that portion that imposed on
the defendant company the obligation of keeping in good order and
condition the streets or roadways on the sides of the middle or
neutral grounds on Canal, Rampart, and Esplanade Streets in New
Orleans, and by rejecting the demands in that respect. Thus,
amended, the judgment was affirmed at the cost of the railroad
company.
The only federal question presented upon this writ of error is
whether the act of 1888 is repugnant to the clause of the
Constitution forbidding states from passing a law impairing the
obligation of contracts.
That statute does not embrace contracts between private
individuals, nor contracts of every description, but only those by
or under which private corporations, parties to such contracts,
become legally bound to a parish or to a municipal corporation in
reference to the paving, repairing, reconstructing, or care of any
street, highway, bridge, culvert, levee, canal, ditch, or crossing
belonging to, or under the control of, such municipal corporation.
The prompt discharge of the duties
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imposed by contracts of that character is of importance to the
public. Indeed, the refusal to meet the obligations imposed by such
contracts often endangers both the health and safety of the people.
Delay in such matters may seriously imperil the interests of an
entire community. An action at law to recover damages for a failure
or refusal of the defaulting corporation to do what its contract
obliges it to do might prove to be inadequate for the protection of
those interests.
What the act of 1888 does is to give a parish or municipal
corporation an additional and more summary remedy for the
enforcement of the obligation of any contract relating to the
paving, repairing, reconstructing, or care of its streets,
highways, bridges, culverts, levees, canals, ditches, or crossings.
It does not enlarge the obligation assumed by the defaulting
corporation, nor impose new burdens upon such corporation, but only
enables the other party to the contract -- the public, as
represented by the parish or municipality -- to compel the
performance of that obligation. Modes of procedure in the courts of
a state are so far within its control that a particular remedy
existing at the time of the making of a contract may be abrogated
altogether without impairing the obligation of the contract if
another and equally adequate remedy for the enforcement of that
obligation remains or is substituted for the one taken away.
Bronson v.
Kenzie, 1 How. 311,
42 U. S. 315;
Von Hoffman v.
Gunney, 4 Wall. 552;
Conn. Life Ins. Co. v.
Cushman, 108 U. S. 64;
McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 693.
Much more may the state give an additional and more efficacious
remedy for the enforcement of contracts in the performance of which
the public health and the public safety are involved, provided
always that the new remedy is consistent with the nature of the
obligation to be enforced, and does not impair any substantial
right given by the contract. One who engages by contract to do a
certain thing cannot claim that the obligation he has assumed is
impaired by legislation that is designed only to enforce
performance of his obligation.
The plaintiff in error relies with confidence upon
State ex
Rel. New Orleans v. N.O. & Carrollton Railroad
Company,
Page 157 U. S. 225
37 La.Ann. 589, determined by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in
1885. That was an application for a writ of mandamus against a
railroad company to compel it to perform the obligation it had
assumed by what the court regarded as an express written contract
with the City of New Orleans to repair certain streets in that
municipality. The court held that the writ was properly refused,
the principal reason being that, according to the principles of the
law of mandamus, the remedy by mandamus cannot be invoked to
enforce obligations arising simply from contract, as distinguished
from a duty imposed by law. It is said, and it is probably true,
that the act of 1888 was passed in order to overcome the
difficulties suggested by that decision. However this may be, it is
clear that the question here is wholly different from that
presented in the other case. That question, as we have seen, is
whether a statute authorizing the enforcement, by writ of mandamus
sued out by a parish or by a municipal corporation, of contracts
such as are described in the act of 1888 is a law forbidden by the
contract clause of the Constitution.
We hold, for the reasons we have stated, that such a law, simply
giving an additional remedy to the party entitled to performance,
without impairing any substantial right of the other party, does
not impair the obligation of the contract sought to be
enforced.
Judgment affirmed.