A request made to the court by each party to instruct the jury
to render a verdict in his favor is not equivalent to the
submission of the case to the court without the intervention of a
jury within the intent of Rev.Stat. §§ 649, 700.
Page 157 U. S. 155
In March, 1887, the plaintiff in error imported a lot of rugs.
They were classed by the custom authorities as "Tournay velvet
carpets," and as such held subject to a duty of 45 cents per square
yard and 30 percent
ad valorem. The importer protested
against this levy, and claimed that the merchandise was only
dutiable at 40 percent
ad valorem. The collector refusing
to entertain the protest, appeal was in due time prosecuted to the
Secretary of the Treasury, and, upon adverse decision, suit was
brought to recover the difference between the duty enforced by the
collector and that which the importer conceded to be due. The
controversy depends on the proper construction of parts of the
Tariff Act of 1883, which was in force at the time of
importation.
On the trial of the case, two witnesses were examined -- one the
importer in his own behalf, the other a witness on behalf of the
government. The testimony of the importer was substantially to the
effect that the rugs in question were not pieces of carpet, or rugs
made from pieces of carpet, but were rugs woven as such; that they
were of various sizes,
viz., 36 inches long by 18 wide, 36
inches long by 36 inches wide, 54 inches long by 27 inches wide, 63
inches long by 36 inches wide, or 72 inches long by 44 inches wide.
The differences between Wilton carpet and the rugs, as to mode of
manufacture, as to material used, and when completed, were stated
thus: the rugs were made upon a loom of six frames, while Wilton
carpet was made upon one of five or less; so that looms fitted for
making the rugs were unsuited for making Wilton carpet. The
material used in the weft of the rugs was
Page 157 U. S. 156
different from that which was used in a Wilton carpet, and the
worsted in one was also a different quality from that used in the
other. The rugs in question, he said, were woven with cotton backs
in order to make them soft, while Wilton carpet was woven with a
jute and linen back. The design of Wilton carpet and that of the
rugs were also stated to be entirely different, the one being made
to match various lengths, the other being one pattern for the
entire rug. He testified that the rugs were sold by the rug, and
not by the yard, and were called "Wilton-Daghestan Rugs" because
they were "a plush fabric." He described a plush fabric as one
wherein the worsted in weaving was cut with a knife so as to leave
a plush surface, and declared that Saxony, Axminster, Moquette
velvet, and tapestry velvet carpets were also plush fabrics,
because their threads were cut so as to make the surfaces like
plush. In this sense, there was a similarity between the rugs in
question and Wilton carpet -- that is, they were both plush
fabrics, although in other respects there existed the differences
already recited. The witness, moreover, said that the name given to
the articles, "Wilton-Daghestan Rugs," in no way indicated that
they were made from Wilton carpet, but simply signified that they
were a plush fabric. There were two exhibits in the case, which
were shown the witness -- one a sample of the rugs in question and
the other a rug or "bedside" made from a piece of Wilton carpet. He
indicated in these the differences above pointed out, and also
stated the general similarity which they bore to each other by
reason of their being both "plush fabrics."
The witness for the government, after giving his experience in
the carpet trade, stated that articles like those imported were
known to the trade as Wilton rugs. He added: "A Wilton is a
Brussels carpet cut. It is a plush carpet, more correctly
speaking."
On the close of the testimony, counsel for plaintiff moved the
court to direct a verdict in his favor, "there seeming to be no
material dispute on any point in the case." Counsel for defendant
also asked the court "to direct a verdict for defendant on the
whole case." The court thereupon directed
Page 157 U. S. 157
the jury to find a verdict for defendant. To this instruction
exception was taken and allowed, and the case was thereupon brought
here by error. The bill of exceptions contains all the evidence.
The opinion of the court below is reported in 48 F. 157.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The contention is advanced that, as each party below requested
the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in his favor,
this was equivalent to a stipulation waiving a jury and submitting
the case to decision of the court. From this premise two
conclusions are deduced: first that, there being no written
stipulation, the decision below cannot be reviewed upon writ of
error; second, that even if the request in open court, made by both
parties, be treated as a written stipulation, the correctness of
the decision below cannot be examined, because it is in the form of
a general finding on the whole case, and findings of the court upon
the evidence are reviewable only when they are special.
The request made to the court by each party to instruct the jury
to render a verdict in his favor was not equivalent to a submission
of the case to the court without the intervention of a jury within
the intendment of §§ 649, 700, Rev.Stat. As, however, both parties
asked the court to instruct a verdict, both affirmed that there was
no disputed question of fact which could operate to deflect or
control the question of law. This was necessarily a request that
the court find the facts, and the parties are therefore concluded
by the finding made by the court, upon which the resulting
instruction of law was given. The facts having been thus submitted
to the court, we are limited, in reviewing its action, to the
consideration of the correctness of the finding on the law, and
must affirm if
Page 157 U. S. 158
there be any evidence in support thereof.
Lehnen v.
Dickson, 148 U. S. 71;
Runkle v. Burnham, 153 U. S. 216.
There was obviously no disputed question of fact. The plaintiff
introduced proof tending to show that the rugs had been woven as
rugs on a loom prepared for that purpose, and which was therefore
not suitable for weaving carpeting; that they contained materials
used in making rugs which were not the kind or quality of materials
used in making carpets; that their size, shape, pattern, back, and
other qualities made them distinctly rugs
eo nomine, as
distinguished from rugs made "from portions of carpet or
carpeting." From this evidence was deduced the conclusion of law
that they were dutiable as rugs at 40 percent
ad valorem.
Defendant's testimony tended to show that the rugs were called
Wilton rugs, were a plush fabric (which was not traversed by the
plaintiff's testimony), and hence were of a "like character and
description" with Wilton carpet. Upon these facts the defendant
based his claim that as matter of law they were dutiable at the
rate imposed on such carpets. From this undisputed evidence, then,
arose the legal question whether rugs of the kind stated, not being
"portions of carpet or carpeting," were taxable as Wilton carpets
because they were of like character or description -- that is,
because they were plush fabrics. Wilton carpets were also a plush
fabric. The correctness of the ruling below depends upon an
interpretation of the language of the statute, which we quote:
"Saxony, Wilton, and Tournay velvet carpets forty-five cents a
square yard, and in addition thereto 30 percentum
ad
valorem. . . . Carpets and carpetings of wool, flax, or
cotton, or parts of either, or other material not otherwise herein
specified, 40 percentum
ad valorem, and mats, rugs,
screens, covers, hassocks, bedsides, and other portions of carpets
and carpetings shall be subjected to the rate of duty herein
imposed on carpets or carpeting of like character or description,
and the duty on all other mats not exclusively of vegetable
material, screens, hassocks, and rugs shall be forty percentum
ad valorem."
22 Stat. 509, 510.
It is clear that rugs, in the generic sense, are
specifically
Page 157 U. S. 159
dutiable as such under the foregoing provisions. The imposition
of a different duty on rugs of a particular kind is an exception to
the general rule established by the statute. The exception is as
"to rugs, screens, covers, hassocks, bedsides, and other portions
of carpets and carpetings," which are made to pay the duty imposed
on "carpets and carpetings of like character and description." The
obvious construction of this language is that which makes the words
"other portions of carpets and carpetings" qualify the enumerated
articles, and, of course, if they be thus construed, only rugs made
from "portions of carpets and carpetings" would be subject to the
exceptional classification.
It is urged that this interpretation is erroneous because the
limiting words "other portions of carpets and carpetings" simply
qualify the last of the enumerated articles -- that is, the word
"bedside" -- and none other. It is self-evident that the qualifying
words must be held to relate to some of the items embraced in the
enumeration which they qualify. To hold otherwise would be to read
them out of the statute. Do they qualify all or one is the
question. To hold that they qualify only one of the items of the
enumeration is to make that item an exception, and therefore make
the statute operate an absurdity. If the qualifying words only
apply to "bedsides," then all the other items enumerated,
viz., "mats, rugs, screens, covers, and hassocks," are
dutiable at the rate imposed on "carpets and carpetings of like
character and description," although they be not made from "other
portions of carpets and carpetings," while "bedsides," whatever may
be their similarity to "carpets or carpetings," will only be
dutiable at the rate of carpets and carpetings if made from pieces
of carpets. It cannot be supposed the intention of the statute was
to operate this inequality, or to work out this unjust result. The
articles are all enumerated together, and the manifest purpose is
that all of them shall pay a like duty under similar conditions. We
cannot violate the express language in order to dissociate things
classed together by the law, and thus make one of the class subject
to a higher duty than the others, although they be of like
character and description.
Page 157 U. S. 160
We think the purpose of the statute, plainly conveyed by its
text, was to tax carpets as enumerated therein. That the effect of
its language and its intent were also to tax rugs, made as rugs and
clearly distinguishable as such by reason of their process of
manufacture, size, shape, pattern, etc., at the duty imposed on
rugs, but to tax rugs made from pieces of carpets or carpetings at
the rate imposed on the carpet from which they were made, since,
although answering the purpose of a rug, they were really carpeting
itself, being made from parts or portions thereof. A construction
contrary to that which we thus reach having been adopted by the
court below, its judgment is
Reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to grant a
new trial.
