Coal, shipped by the owners at Pittsburgh in their own barges to
Baton Rouge for the purpose of being sold there or sent thence to
supply orders, and moored at Baton Rouge in the original barges in
which it was shipped at Pittsburgh, is subject to local taxation
there as a stock in trade, and such imposition of a tax violates no
provision of the Constitution of the United States.
Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622,
affirmed and applied to this case.
The Pittsburgh and Southern Coal Company, a corporation
organized under the laws of Pennsylvania and domiciled in the City
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and a citizen of that state, filed its
petition in the Seventeenth Judicial District Court of the Parish
of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, alleging that the petitioner was
and had been for some time engaged in the business of buying and
selling coal from the mines in Pennsylvania upon the Mississippi
River and other navigable rivers of the country.
That it was the owner of a large number of vessels and barges,
which it had brought with cargoes of coal, and was
Page 156 U. S. 578
therewith engaged in trade, commerce, and navigation upon the
Mississippi River and other navigable rivers of the United
States.
That, in the course of the trips and voyages of its vessels and
barges down the Mississippi River, it was often convenient,
advantageous, or necessary that the vessels should be stopped and
moored at different places or landings on the Mississippi River for
different periods of time in the States of Tennessee, Mississippi,
Arkansas, and Louisiana, pending the arrangements being made by its
officers and agents for the reception and disposition of the
cargoes of the vessels.
That during the current year, it had sent down the Mississippi
River a large number of vessels, the property of the petitioner, to
supply the trade of Louisiana along the Mississippi and its
navigable tributaries, which vessels and cargoes of coal were
consigned to Schneidau, the agent of the petitioner in New
Orleans.
That the agent, Mr. Schneidau, not having yet made the necessary
arrangements to receive and dispose of the cargoes of the vessels
at New Orleans or elsewhere, the vessels, being about one hundred
in number, were stopped and moored in the Mississippi River at a
convenient mooring place about nine miles above the port of Baton
Rouge, where they awaited the orders of petitioner's agent, to be
thence navigated to such place or places as he might deem
convenient or advantageous to the trade in which petitioner was
engaged, and the vessels and the cargoes of coal therein were still
the property of the petitioner.
That one J. W. Bates, who was the sheriff and
ex
officio tax collector of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, had
notified the petitioner through said Schneidau, its agent, that it
was indebted for state taxes for the year 1887 on movable property
(as stock on hand) belonging to the petitioner, as per the
assessment rolls and state and parish books of 1887, in the sum of
$1,200, and threatened, unless the amount was paid within three
days, to seize, advertise, and sell movable property of the
petitioner sufficient to pay the debt.
Page 156 U. S. 579
And the petitioner was informed and believed, and so averred,
that by the movable property referred to, and designated as "stock
in trade," was intended to describe the cargoes of coal on board
the vessels of the petitioner which were moored in the Mississippi
River about nine miles above the City of Baton Rouge.
That the tax claimed by Bates, sheriff and
ex officio
tax collector of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, was not due or
owing by petitioner or by the cargoes of the vessels, and the
pretended assessment and tax claimed thereunder were illegal,
unconstitutional, null, and void, for the following reasons:
1. That the pretended assessment, under which the tax was
claimed, was vague, indefinite, erroneous, and informal, and not
such as was required by the laws of Louisiana.
2. That the coal formed the cargoes of vessels owned in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and engaged in trade and commerce between
different states; was still upon the vessels upon the navigable
waters of the United States; had never been landed in the Parish of
East Baton Rouge or the State of Louisiana; had never been mixed or
commingled with the mass of the movable property in that state, and
never ceased to be the property of the petitioner.
3. That petitioner was not carrying on any business in the
Parish of East Baton Rouge; had no agent there, and the coal was
not stock in trade on hand, but formed the cargoes of vessels
employed in interstate commerce, and lying temporarily off the
shore of East Baton Rouge, in the Mississippi River, from whence
they would proceed at proper and convenient times to places of
final destination.
4. That the tax was in violation of Article I, Section 8, clause
three of the Constitution of the United States, the clause which
provides that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states.
5. That it was in violation of Article I, Section 8, clause two
of the Constitution, the clause which provides that no state shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing the inspection
laws.
Page 156 U. S. 580
6. That it was in violation of Article IV, Section 2, clause one
of the Constitution of the United States, the clause which provides
that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
7. That it was in violation of Article I, Section 9, clause
five, of the Constitution -- the clause which declares that no tax
or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.
The petitioner represented that notwithstanding the illegality,
nullity, and unconstitutionality of the assessment and tax, for the
reasons given, and numerous other reasons, J. W. Bates, Sheriff and
ex officio Tax Collector of the Parish of East Baton
Rouge, had threatened and intended and would, unless restrained by
an injunction, seize, advertise, and sell the vessels of the
petitioner and their cargoes of coal, or some part thereof, in
order to pay the illegal tax, which action of Bates, if permitted,
would injure the petitioner in a sum exceeding six thousand dollars
and cause it irreparable injury.
Whereupon the petitioner prayed that a writ of injunction issue
to restrain Bates from thus seizing, advertising, or selling the
vessels and coal of the petitioner lying in the Mississippi River,
and hereinbefore fully described, in order to pay any tax of 1887,
and from in any manner interfering with the property under color of
enforcing the alleged tax.
The petition was signed by the attorneys of petitioner and
verified by one of them.
A writ was accordingly issued restraining Bates, the sheriff and
ex officio tax collector, from seizing or advertising the
vessels and coal of the petitioner for the alleged tax.
The sheriff and tax collector appeared in answer to the
petition, and denied its allegations, admitting, however, that in
his capacity as tax collector he had caused the demand to be served
upon the agent of the petitioner, and it was his intention, unless
restrained by order of the court, to seize and sell the
property.
And he averred that the coal was personal, taxable property,
belonging to the Pittsburgh and Southern Coal Company as "stock in
trade," situated in the Parish of East
Page 156 U. S. 581
Baton Rouge, and owed the state tax to the State of Louisiana,
and was legally assessed according to the laws of the state.
On the trial, it was admitted that the property on which the
demand was made was on the Mississippi River, in boats of the
plaintiff in injunction, which were moored to the shores, the boats
being known as "coal boats," and that the coal was brought down in
them from mines in Pennsylvania, on the navigable streams leading
therefrom.
Mr. Schneidau, the agent of the company, testified that the
company was taxed at Pittsburgh; that some of the coal moored at
Natchez was sold there and some at other points below; that the
company sold its coal in different states; that "East" Baton Rouge
was not the final destination of the coal stopped there, but that
some of it was there sold; that he had been the agent of the
company since December, 1886; that during the whole of that time,
the company had kept a fleet of canal boats up the river in this
parish -- on an average of about fifty boats -- averaging about one
hundred or more boats and barges; that coal was sold at different
times by the company along the river, but that all was sold within
the State of Louisiana.
It was admitted that the assessor made the assessment in due
form of law, and that the property, consisting of the vessels and
coal, had been assessed at $200.000.
The defendant at the hearing of the case, moved that the
injunction be dissolved, and the suit be dismissed, with costs.
And it was contended that the cargoes of vessels owned in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and engaged in trade and commerce between
different states, were still upon the vessels upon the navigable
waters of the United States, had never been landed in that parish
or in the State of Louisiana, had never been mixed or commingled
with the mass of movable property of the state, and had never
ceased to be the petitioner's property; that it carried on no
business in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, had no agent there, and
that the coal was not stock on hand in trade, but formed the
cargoes of vessels employed in commerce, and then lying temporarily
off
Page 156 U. S. 582
the shore of Baton Rouge, on the Mississippi, whence it would be
sent to its final destination, and that the tax violated Article I,
Section 8, clause three of the Constitution of the United States --
the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states -- and Article I, Section 10, clause two
of the Constitution, which declares that no state shall, without
the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or
exports, and that it was in violation of Article IV, Section 2,
clause one of the Constitution -- the article which provides that
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states, and of Article I,
Section 9, clause five of the Constitution, which provides that no
tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.
On the 24th of January, 1888, the court of the Seventeenth
Judicial District of East Baton Rouge gave judgment dissolving the
injunction in the case and decreeing that the suit be dismissed at
plaintiff's cost, and that the defendant proceed to collect the
tax.
From this judgment the Pittsburgh and Southern Coal Company
appealed to the supreme court of the state.
On the 5th of March, 1888, that court affirmed the judgment of
the Seventeenth Judicial Court of East Baton Rouge.
From this judgment of affirmance the case was brought to the
Supreme Court of the United States by the plaintiff in the original
suit on writ of error.
Page 156 U. S. 584
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff company in this Court objects to the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana dissolving the injunction in the
original suit which inhibited the state tax collector from selling
coal lying in boats on the Mississippi River to pay taxes alleged
to be due to the state thereon, and directing that the defendant
proceed to collect the tax.
It is contended that the law under which the sheriff and tax
collector assumed to act exempted the coal from taxation as
property in process of transportation and not on consignment for
sale. Such would seem to be the direct declaration of the law of
Louisiana, and, independently of that direction, such would seem to
be the import of the decision of this Court in
Brown v.
Houston, 114 U. S. 622.
That case resembles, in important features, the present one. It was
brought by the plaintiff in error in the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans in the State of Louisiana, in December, 1880,
to enjoin the state tax collector from seizing and selling a
certain lot of coal belonging to the plaintiff situated in New
Orleans. They alleged that they were residents and did business in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania that the state tax collector had
officially notified their agents that they were indebted to the
State of Louisiana in the sum of $352.80, state tax for the year
1880, upon a certain lot of Pittsburgh coal assessed as
Page 156 U. S. 585
their property, and valued at $58,800; that they were delinquent
for the tax to the tax collector, who was about to seize,
advertise, and sell the coal to pay the tax.
They alleged that they were not indebted to the State of
Louisiana for the tax, and that they were the sole owners of the
coal, and were not liable for any tax thereon, having paid all
taxes legally due for the year 1880 on the coal in Pennsylvania,
and that the coal was simply under the care of their agents, Brown
and Jones, in New Orleans, for sale.
They further alleged that the coal was mined in Pennsylvania,
and was from that state imported into the State of Louisiana, as
their property, and was then and had always remained in its
original condition, and never had become mixed or incorporated with
other property in that state. That when the assessment was made,
the coal was afloat on the Mississippi River, in the Parish of
Orleans, in the original condition in which it was exported from
Pennsylvania, and that the agents notified the board of assessors
of the parish that the coal did not belong to them, but to the
plaintiffs, and was held as stated, and was not subject to
taxation, and they protested against the assessment for that
purpose.
The tax collector notified the agents of the plaintiffs that, in
conformity with provisions of the law of 1880, the state tax
assessed to them on movable property in the parish, which amounted
to the sum of $352.80, fell due and should have been paid before
the first day of the current month; that they had become delinquent
for the tax on the first day of December, and that after the
expiration of twenty days, he, as tax collector, would advertise
for sale the movable property upon which the taxes were due, in the
manner provided by law for judicial sales, when he would sell such
portion of the property for cash, and without appraisement, as they
should point out and deliver to him, and, in case they did not
point out and deliver to him sufficient property, that he would
sell, without appraisement, the least quantity of the movable
property which any bidder would buy for the amount of the taxes
assessed.
Page 156 U. S. 586
The defendant answered with a general denial, admitting the
assessment of the taxes and his intention to sell the property for
its payment.
Witnesses were produced to sustain the allegations of the
petition.
One of the witnesses testified that he was the general agent and
manager of the business of Brown and Jones, of New Orleans, and
that when the assessment complained of was made, the firm had paid
the state taxes due upon their capital stock, and had paid state
and city licenses to do business for that year; that at the time of
assessment of the tax, the coal upon which it was levied was in the
hands of Brown and Jones, as agents of the plaintiffs, for sale,
having just arrived from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by flatboats,
and was in the boats in which it had arrived and afloat on the
Mississippi River; that it was held by Brown and Jones to be sold
for the account of plaintiffs by the boatload, and that since that
time, more than one-half of it had been exported from the county on
foreign steamships, and the balance sold in the interior of the
state for plantation use, by the flatboat load.
One of the plaintiffs testified that they were the owners of the
coal in question; that it was mined in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania; that the tax of two or more mills was paid on it in
Pennsylvania, as a state tax thereon in 1880, and that a tax was
also paid in the County of Allegheny in the year 1880; that it was
shipped from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1880, and was received in
New Orleans in its original condition and its original packages,
and was still owned by the plaintiffs.
The Louisiana statute of April 9, 1880, under which the
assessment was made, provided:
That in the calendar year 1880, and for every succeeding
calendar year, there should be levied, annually, taxes amounting in
the aggregate to six mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation
to be made on all property situated within the State of Louisiana,
except such as was expressly exempted from taxation.
Exemptions from taxation, under the Constitution of Louisiana,
did not affect the question considered, and upon the case
Page 156 U. S. 587
as thus made the district court of the parish dissolved the
injunction and dismissed the suit. On appeal to the supreme court
of the state, the judgment was affirmed, and it came to this Court
on writ of error.
The errors assigned were that the tax in question violated
Article IV, Section 2, clause one, of the federal Constitution, and
Article I, Section 8, clause three, and Article I, Section 10,
clause two of the same instrument. The clauses herein referred to
were:
1. That the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
2. That the Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes, and
3. That no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.
In considering the questions presented, the court observed that
it was decided in the case of
Woodruff v.
Parham, 8 Wall. 123, that the term "imports," as
used in that clause of the Constitution which declares that "no
state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or
duties on imports or exports," does not refer to articles carried
from one state to another, but only to articles imported from
foreign countries into the United States, and therefore it was not
necessary to consider the questions thus raised, and which were
based upon the assumption that the tax complained of was an impost
or duty upon imports.
The power to regulate commerce among the several states was
granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations. If not in all respects an
exclusive power, if, in the absence of congressional action, the
states may continue to regulate matters of local interest only
incidentally affecting foreign and interstate commerce, such as
pilots, wharves, harbors, roads, bridges, tolls, freights, etc.,
still, according to the rule laid down in
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S. 319,
the power of Congress is exclusive wherever the matter is national
in its character or admits of one uniform system or plan of
Page 156 U. S. 588
regulation, and is certainly so far exclusive that no state has
power to make any law or regulation which will affect the free and
unrestrained intercourse and trade between the states, as Congress
has left it, or which will impose any discriminating burden or tax
upon the citizens or products of other states coming or brought
within its jurisdiction.
So long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate commerce
among the several states, it thereby indicates its will that
commerce shall be free, and any regulation upon the subject by the
states is repugnant to such freedom. Thus, as observed Mr. Justice
Strong:
"It seems hardly necessary to argue at length that unless the
statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state, it is an usurpation of the power vested
exclusively in Congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate
commerce -- a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be
the power of a state over commerce that is completely internal, it
can no more prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it
can that which is with foreign nations."
Such being the recognized law, the question arose before the
court in the case of
Brown v. Houston whether the
assessment of the tax upon the coal in question in the barges
afloat amounted to any interference with or restriction upon the
free introduction of the plaintiffs' coal from the State of
Pennsylvania to the State of Louisiana -- in other words, whether
the tax amounted to a regulation or restriction upon commerce of
the states or only to the exercise of local administration under
the general taxing power, which, though it may incidentally affect
the subjects of commerce, is entirely within the power of the state
until Congress shall see fit to interfere and make express
regulations on the subject, and that is one of the precise
questions in the present case. And it was held that, as to the
character and mode of the assessment, it was not a tax imposed upon
the coal as a foreign product, or as the product of another state
than Louisiana, nor a tax imposed by reason of the coal's being
imported or brought into Louisiana, nor a tax imposed while it was
in a state of transit through that state to some other place of
destination. It was imposed after the
Page 156 U. S. 589
coal had arrived at its destination and was put up for sale. The
coal had come to its place of rest, for final disposal or use, and
was a commodity in the market of New Orleans. It might continue in
that condition for a year or two years, or only for a day. It had
become a part of the general mass of property in the state, and as
such it was taxable for the current year as all other property in
the City of New Orleans was taxable. Under the law, it could not be
taxed again until the following year. It was subjected to no
discrimination in favor of goods which were the product of
Louisiana. It was treated exactly in the same manner as such goods
were treated.
And the Court held that it could not be seriously contended, at
least in the absence of any congressional legislation to the
contrary, that goods which are the product of other states are to
be free from taxation in the state to which they might be carried
for use or sale. And it may be added that the correct rule is for
the assessor or tax collector to assess all property found within
his jurisdiction, being there for the purpose of remaining till
used or sold, and constituting part of the great mass of the
general property of the country, provided always that the
assessment does not discriminate between the products of different
states.
And the court further observed that it saw no conflict in that
case, either in the law itself or in the proceedings which had been
had under it and sustained by the state tribunals, nor any conflict
with the general rule that a state cannot pass a law which shall
interfere with the unrestricted freedom of commerce between the
states.
The decision of the Court in
Brown v. Houston, thus
rendered, seems to be conclusive of the case now before the court.
The property in this case, as in that, still belongs to the
original owners in Pennsylvania, but is brought on the navigable
waters of the United States in boats and barges to Louisiana for
purposes of sale, and is subject to taxation and sale as any other
property of the citizens of the United States is subject when it
becomes incorporated into the bulk of the property of the country,
unless there be some special exemption set forth way it should not
be thus taxed and sold, of which there is none here.
Judgment affirmed.
