Whether an offense described in an indictment in a state court
is an offense against the laws of that state and punishable
thereunder, or whether it is made by federal statutes an offense
against the United States, exclusively cognizable by their courts,
and whether the same act may be an offense against both national
and state governments, punishable in the tribunals of each without
infringing upon the constitutional guaranty against being twice put
in jeopardy of limb for the same offense, are questions which a
state court of original jurisdiction is competent to decide in the
first instance, and (its obligation to render such decision as will
give full effect to the supreme law of the land, and protect any
right secured by it to the accused, being the same that rests upon
the courts of the United States) the latter, if applied to for a
writ of habeas corpus in
Page 155 U. S. 90
such case, should decline to issue it unless it also appears
that the case is one of urgency.
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241,
followed, and distinguished from
In re Loney, 134 U.
S. 372.
The proper time in such case to invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court is after the claim of the accused of immunity from
prosecution in the state court has been passed upon by the highest
court of the state adversely to him.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellee presented to the court below his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was restrained of his
liberty by the warden of the City Prison in New York City; that he
had not been committed, and was not detained, by virtue of any
judgment, decree, final order, or process; that the cause or
pretense of such restraint was certain bench warrants issued upon
indictments against him in the Court of General Sessions of the
Peace of the City and County of New York, and that those
indictments, copies of which are exhibited with the petition,
charge him with the commission of certain offenses over which that
court "has not and never has had jurisdiction." The relief asked
was that the petitioner be discharged from the custody of the state
authorities.
The indictments referred to were five in number, and were based
upon the Penal Code of New York, which, among other things,
declares any person guilty of forgery in the second degree, and
punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years who,
with intent to defraud, forges an entry made in any book of records
or accounts kept by a corporation doing business within the state,
or in any account kept by such a corporation whereby any pecuniary
obligation, claim, or credit is or purports to be created,
increased, diminished,
Page 155 U. S. 91
discharged, or in any manner affected, and any person guilty of
forgery in the third degree, and punishable by imprisonment for not
more than five years who, with intent to defraud or conceal any
larceny or misappropriation of any money or property, alters,
erases, obliterates, or destroys an account, book of accounts,
record, or writing belonging to or appertaining to the business of
a corporation, association, public office or officer, partnership,
or individual, or makes a false entry in any such account or book
of accounts, or willfully omits to make true entry of any material
particular in any such account or book of accounts made, written,
or kept by him or under his direction. Penal Code, New York, §§
511, 515, 524, 525.
In some of the indictments, the offense is charged to have been
committed by Eno in 1883, in the others in the year 1884.
Each indictment alleges that the offense described was committed
by the accused while he was president of the Second National Bank
in the City of New York. It also appears from the indictments that
the alleged forgeries consisted in the making of certain false
entries in the books and accounts of that bank with intent to
defraud and to conceal the misappropriation of its moneys.
By the Revised Statutes of the United States it is provided:
"SEC. 563. The district courts shall have jurisdiction as
follows: first, of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the
authority of the United States committed within their respective
districts or upon the high seas, the punishment of which is not
capital, except in the cases mentioned in section 5412, Title
'Crimes.'"
"SEC. 629. The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction
as follows: . . . Twentieth. Exclusive cognizance of all crimes and
offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States,
except where it is or may be otherwise provided by law, and
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of crimes and
offenses cognizable therein."
"SEC. 711. The jurisdiction vested in the court of the United
States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned
Page 155 U. S. 92
shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states: first,
of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the
United States."
By section 5209, Title "National Banks," it is provided that
"Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of
any association, who embezzles, abstracts, or willfully misapplies
any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the association; . . . or
who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the
association, with intent in either case to injure or defraud the
association or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any
individual person, or to deceive any officer of the association, or
any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association,
and every person who with like intent aids or abets any officer,
clerk, or agent in violation of this section, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five
years nor more than ten."
"SEC. 5328. Nothing in this title ['Crimes'] shall be held to
take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several
states under the laws thereof."
The circuit court held that the several offenses for which the
defendant was indicted were cognizable under the authority of the
United States, and that the jurisdiction vested in the courts of
the United States to punish them was exclusive of the courts of the
state, and for that reason it was adjudged that the accused was
restrained on his liberty in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States. He was consequently discharged from custody.
The court in its opinion said that
"if any serious doubt were entertained as to the want of
jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions of the City of New
York, and the consequent want of authority to retain the petitioner
in custody, such a disposition of the present proceeding would be
made as would permit that question to be raised, in the event of a
conviction upon the indictment, after a trial."
54 F. 669.
The circumstances under which a court of the United States is at
liberty upon habeas corpus to discharge one held in custody under
the process of a state court were considered in
Ex
Page 155 U. S. 93
Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241,
117 U. S. 252,
6 Sup.Ct. 734. Royall was charged by indictments in one of the
courts of Virginia with having violated certain statutes of that
commonwealth. Being held in custody by the state authorities for
trial, he presented petitions for habeas corpus in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia,
and prayed to be discharged upon the ground that the statutes under
which he had been indicted were repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States, and, consequently, that he was restrained of his
liberty in violation of that instrument. Rev.Stat. §§ 751-755, 761,
764; Act March 3, 1885, c. 353, 23 Stat. 437. The petitions were
dismissed, and the cases were brought by appeal to this Court.
This Court held that Congress intended to invest the courts of
the Union and the justices and judges thereof with power, upon writ
of habeas corpus, to restore to liberty any person within their
respective jurisdictions who is held in custody by whatever
authority in violation of the Constitution or any law or treaty of
the United States; that the statute contemplated that cases might
arise when the power thus conferred should be exercised during the
progress of proceedings instituted against the petitioner in a
state court or by or under the authority of a state on account of
the very matter presented for determination by the writ of habeas
corpus. But it was adjudged that the statute did not imperatively
require the circuit court, by writ of habeas corpus, to wrest the
petitioner from the custody of the state officers in advance of his
trial in the state court; that while the circuit court of the
United States has the power to do so, and could discharge the
accused in advance of his trial, if he be restrained of his liberty
in violation of the national Constitution, it is not bound in every
case to exercise such power immediately upon application being made
for the writ.
"We cannot suppose," the Court said,
"that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such means,
to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all
criminal prosecutions commenced in state courts exercising
authority within the same territorial limits where the accused
claims
Page 155 U. S. 94
that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of
the United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and
thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require,'
does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in
which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion
should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under
our system of government between the judicial tribunals of the
Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact that the
public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by
unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and
protect rights secured by the Constitution. When the petitioner is
in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done
in pursuance of a law of the United States or of an order, process,
or decree of a court or judge thereof, or where, being a subject or
citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein, he is in custody
under like authority for an act done or omitted under any alleged
right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption
claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign
state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof
depend upon the law of nations -- in such and like cases of
urgency, involving the authority and operations of the general
government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations
with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States have
frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged
prisoners who were held in custody under state authority. So also,
when they are in the custody of a state officer, it may be
necessary, by use of the writ, to bring them into a court of the
United States to testify as witnesses. The present cases involve no
such considerations. Nor do their circumstances, as detailed in the
petitions, suggest any reasons why the state court of original
jurisdiction may not, without interference upon the part of the
courts of the United States, pass upon the question which is raised
as to the constitutionality of the statutes under which the
appellant is indicted. The circuit court was not at liberty under
the circumstances disclosed to presume that the decision of the
state court would be otherwise than is
Page 155 U. S. 95
required by the fundamental law of the land, or that it would
disregard the settled principles of constitutional law announced by
this Court, upon which is clearly conferred the power to decide
ultimately and finally all cases arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States."
Again, in the same case:
"That these salutary principles may have full operation, and in
harmony with what we suppose was the intention of Congress in the
enactments in question, this Court holds that where a person is in
custody under process from a state court of original jurisdiction
for an alleged offense against the laws of such state, and it is
claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, the circuit court has a
discretion whether it will discharge him upon habeas corpus in
advance of his trial in the court in which he is indicted, that
discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special
circumstances requiring immediate action. When the state court
shall have finally acted upon the case, the circuit court has still
a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing,
the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of error from
the highest court of the state, or whether it will proceed, by writ
of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the petitioner is
restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."
See also Taylor v.
Carryl, 20 How. 583,
61 U. S. 595,
and
Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176,
111 U. S. 182.
Of course, the discretion here referred to is a legal discretion,
to be controlled in its exercise by such principles as are
applicable to the particular case in hand.
In addition to the petitions presented to the circuit court of
the United States, Royall made an original application to this
Court for a writ of habeas corpus based upon the same facts as
those set forth in the other petitions. The application was denied
upon the grounds stated in the previous cases.
Ex Parte
Royall, 117 U. S. 241,
117 U. S. 254.
At the same term of this Court,
Ex Parte Fonda,
117 U. S. 516,
117 U. S. 518,
was determined. That was an original application to this Court for
a writ of habeas corpus by one who was a clerk in a national bank,
and who alleged in his petition that
Page 155 U. S. 96
he had been convicted in one of the courts of Michigan under a
statute of that state, and sentenced to imprisonment, for having
embezzled the funds of that banking association. The principal
ground upon which he asked for a writ of habeas corpus and for his
discharge from custody was that the offense for which he was tried
was covered by the statutes of the United States, and was therefore
exclusively cognizable by the federal courts. This Court denied the
application upon the authority of
Ex Parte Royall,
observing that no reason had been suggested why the supreme court
of the state might not review the judgment of the inferior state
court upon the question as to the application of the statute under
which the conviction was had to embezzlement by the servants and
clerks of national banks, nor why it should not be permitted to do
so without interference by the courts of the United States; that
the question appeared to be one which, if properly presented by the
record, might be reviewed in this Court after a decision by the
supreme court of the state adverse to the petitioner. The judgment
of conviction in that case was subsequently reviewed in the Supreme
Court of Michigan, and that court held that jurisdiction of the
offense charged against Fonda was exclusive in the federal court.
People v. Fonda, 62 Mich. 401.
The rule laid down in the cases in this Court above cited has
been recognized in
In re Duncan, 139 U.
S. 449,
139 U. S. 454;
In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278,
140 U. S. 289;
Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183,
146 U. S. 194,
and
In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70,
149 U. S.
75.
It may be well to refer to the case of
In re Loney,
134 U. S. 372,
134 U. S. 375.
It will be observed that this Court in
Ex Parte Royall
recognized certain cases as constituting exceptions to the general
rule -- among which are cases of urgency, involving the authority
and operations of the general government.
Loney's Case was
of that class. It appeared from the record that he was duly
summoned to give his deposition in a contested election case
pending in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
United States, a summons he was obliged to obey unless prevented by
sickness or unavoidable accident, under the penalty of forfeiting a
named sum to the
Page 155 U. S. 97
party at whose instance he was summoned, and of becoming subject
to fine and imprisonment, Rev.Stat. § 116; that he appeared before
a notary public in obedience to such summons and proceeded to give
his deposition, and that, while in the office of an attorney for
the purpose of completing his testimony, he was arrested under a
warrant issued by a justice of the peace, and based upon the
affidavit of one of the parties to the contested election case,
charging him with willful perjury committed in his deposition.
Having been arrested under that warrant, he sued out a writ of
habeas corpus from the circuit court of the United States upon the
ground that he was restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. That court, in advance of any
trial in the state court for the offense charged against Loney,
adjudged that the offense was punishable only under section 5392 of
the Revised Statutes, and was exclusively cognizable by the courts
of the United States. He was discharged, and the judgment was
affirmed by this Court.
It is clear from this statement that that case was one of
urgency, involving in a substantial sense the authority and
operations of the general government. The obvious effect of Loney's
arrest under the circumstances disclosed was to embarrass one of
the parties in the contested election case in obtaining evidence in
his behalf, intimidate witnesses whom he might desire to introduce,
and delay the preparation of the case for final determination by
the House of Representatives. This Court therefore said:
"It is essential to the impartial and efficient administration
of justice in the tribunals of the nation that witnesses should be
able to testify freely before them, unrestrained by legislation of
the state, or by fear of punishment in the state courts. The
administration of justice in the national tribunals would be
greatly embarrassed and impeded if a witness testifying before a
court of the United States, or upon a contested election of a
member of Congress, were liable to prosecution and punishment in
the courts of the state upon a charge of perjury, preferred by a
disappointed suitor or contestant, or instigated by local passion
or prejudice. "
Page 155 U. S. 98
Whether the offenses described in the indictments against Eno
are offenses against the State of New York, and punishable under
its laws, or are made by existing statutes offenses also against
the United States, and are exclusively cognizable by courts of the
United States, and whether the same acts upon the part of the
accused may be offenses against both the national and state
governments, and punishable in the judicial tribunals of each
government without infringing upon the constitutional guaranty
against being twice put in jeopardy of limb for the same offense --
these are questions which the state court of original jurisdiction
is competent to decide in the first instance. And its obligation to
render such decision as will give full effect to the supreme law of
the land, and protect any right secured by it to the accused, is
the same that rests upon the courts of the United States. When the
claim of the accused of immunity from prosecution in a state court
for the offenses charged against him has been passed upon by the
highest court of New York in which it can be determined, he may
then, if the final judgment of that court be adverse to him, invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court for his protection in respect of any
federal right distinctly asserted by him, but which may be denied
by such judgment.
Without considering the merits of the several questions
discussed by counsel, we are of opinion that the circuit court
erred in granting the prayer of the accused. He should not have
been discharged from the custody of the state authorities,
especially as he does not appear to have been under indictment in
any court of the United States for the offenses alleged to have
been committed by him.
The judgment is reversed with direction to dismiss the writ
of habeas corpus and to remand the accused to the custody of the
proper state authorities.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the majority of the Court in the
reversal of the judgment of the circuit court of the United
Page 155 U. S. 99
States directing the dismissal of proceedings against the
defendant upon the indictments against him found in the state court
of New York.
The 711th section of the Revised Statutes provides that the
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the several states, of all crimes and offenses
cognizable under the authority of the United States, and section
5209 of the Revised Statutes, relating to national banks, provides
that
"Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of
any association, who embezzles, abstracts, or willfully misapplies
any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the association; . . . or
who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the
association, with intent in either case to injure or defraud the
association or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any
individual person, or to deceive an officer of an association, or
any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association,
and every person who with like intent aids or abets any officer,
clerk, or agent in violation of this section, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five
years nor more than ten."
The circuit court was thus cognizable, under the authority of
the United States, of the several offenses for which the defendant
was indicted, and the jurisdiction vested in the court of the
United States was exclusive of all jurisdiction of the offenses in
the state courts. It would therefore subserve no useful purpose to
proceed with the cases in the state court, and thus ascertain what
that court might have done or would have done had it possessed
jurisdiction. Until its jurisdiction was established, its
determination, either one way or the other, would be only an idle
proceeding. It could not, under any circumstances, take cognizance
of the cases charged against the defendant, and hold him under
them. He was therefore entitled to his discharge whenever the
matter was properly brought to the attention of the federal
court.