The provisions in the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, 26 Stat.
854, "to establish a Court of Private Land Claims and to provide
for the settlement of private land claims in certain states and
territories," authorizing this Court to amend the proceedings of
the court below and to cause additional testimony to be taken, are
not mandatory, but only empower the Court to direct further proofs
and to amend the record if in its judgment the case demands its
interposition to that effect.
The judicial action of all inferior courts established by
Congress may, in accordance with the Constitution, be subjected to
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
An appeal lies to this Court from a judgment of the Court of
Private Land Claims over property in the territories.
Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The case was as
follows:
On March 3, 1891, an act of Congress was approved entitled "An
act to establish a Court of Private Land Claims and to provide for
the settlement of private land claims in certain states and
territories." 26 Stat. 854, c. 539.
By the first section it was provided:
"That there shall be, and hereby is, established a court to be
called the Court of Private Land Claims, to consist of a chief
justice and four associate justices, who shall be, when appointed,
citizens and residents of some of the states of the United States,
to be
Page 155 U. S. 77
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to hold their offices for the term expiring on the
thirty-first day of December, Anno Domini eighteen hundred and
ninety-five; any three of whom shall constitute a quorum. Said
court shall have and exercise jurisdiction in the hearing and
decision of private land claims according to the provisions of this
act."
Under section six, it was made lawful
"for any person or persons or corporation, or their legal
representatives, claiming lands within the limits of the territory
derived by the United States from the Republic of Mexico and now
embraced within the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, or Utah, or
within the states of Nevada, Colorado, or Wyoming by virtue of any
such Spanish or Mexican grant, concession, warrant, or survey as
the United States are bound to recognize and confirm by virtue of
the treaties of cession of said country by Mexico to the United
States which at the date of the passage of this act have not been
confirmed by act of Congress, or otherwise finally decided upon by
lawful authority, and which are not already complete and perfect,
in every such case to present a petition, in writing, to the said
court in the state or territory where said land is situated and
where the said court holds its sessions, but cases arising in the
states and territories in which the court does not hold regular
sessions may be instituted at such place as may be designated by
the rules of the court."
Section seven provided:
"That all proceedings subsequent to the filing of said petition
shall be conducted as near as may be according to the practice of
the courts of equity of the United States, except that the answer
of the attorney of the United States shall not be required to be
verified by his oath, and except that, as far as practicable,
testimony shall be taken in court or before one of the justices
thereof. The said court shall have full power and authority to hear
and determine all questions arising in cases before it relative to
the title to the land the subject of such case, the extent,
location, and boundaries thereof, and other matters connected
therewith fit and proper to be heard and determined, and by a final
decree to settle and determine the question of the validity of the
title
Page 155 U. S. 78
and the boundaries of the grant or claim presented for
adjudication, according to the law of nations, the stipulations of
the treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of
Mexico at the City of Guadalupe Hidalgo, on the second day of
February, in the year of our Lord, eighteen hundred and
forty-eight, or the treaty concluded between the same powers at the
City of Mexico on the thirtieth day of December in the year of our
Lord, eighteen hundred and fifty-three, and the laws and ordinances
of the government from which it is alleged to have been derived,
and all other questions properly arising between the claimants or
other parties in the case and the United States, which decree shall
in all cases refer to the treaty, law, or ordinance under which
such claim is confirmed or rejected, and in confirming any such
claim, in whole or in part, the court shall in its decree specify
plainly the location, boundaries, and area of the land the claim to
which is so confirmed."
Under the eighth section,
"[a]ny person or corporation claiming lands in any of the states
or territories mentioned in this act under a title derived from the
Spanish or Mexican government that was complete and perfect at the
date when the United States acquired sovereignty therein"
was given the right to apply to the court in the manner in the
act provided for other cases, for a confirmation of such title.
Section nine provided as follows:
"That the party against whom the court shall in any case decide
-- the United States, in case of the confirmation of a claim in
whole or in part, and the claimant, in case of the rejection of a
claim, in whole or in part -- shall have the right of appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, such appeal to be taken within
six months from date of such decision, and in all respects to be
taken in the same manner and upon the same conditions, except in
respect of the amount in controversy, as is now provided by law for
the taking of appeals from decisions of the circuit courts of the
United States. On any such appeal, the Supreme Court shall retry
the cause, as well the issues of fact as of law, and may cause
testimony to be taken in addition to that given in the court below,
and may amend the record
Page 155 U. S. 79
of the proceedings below as truth and justice may require, and
on such retrial and hearing every question shall be open, and the
decision of the Supreme Court thereon shall be final and
conclusive. Should no appeal be taken as aforesaid, the decree of
the court below shall be final and conclusive."
By paragraph five of section thirteen, it was provided:
"No proceeding, decree, or act under this act shall conclude or
affect the private rights of persons as between each other, all of
which rights shall be reserved and saved to the same effect as if
this act had not been passed, but the proceedings, decrees, and
acts herein provided for shall be conclusive of all rights as
between the United States and all persons claiming any interest or
right in such lands."
Section nineteen read thus:
"That the powers and functions of the court established by this
act shall cease and determine on the thirty-first day of December,
eighteen hundred and ninety-five, and all papers, files, and
records in the possession of said court belonging to any other
public office of the United States shall be returned to such
office, and all other papers, files, and records in the possession
of or appertaining to said court shall be returned to and filed in
the Department of the Interior."
The Court of Private Land Claims was accordingly duly organized,
and upon the pleadings and evidence in this case proceeded to a
decree confirming a Mexican grant in favor of the appellee to land
in the Territory of Arizona. An appeal having been duly prayed and
allowed, and the record having been filed in this Court, a motion
to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction was submitted.
Page 155 U. S. 82
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The motion to dismiss rests upon two grounds: (1) that the
Congress had no power to confer upon this Court jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal from the decree of the Court of Private Land
Claims, because the latter is not vested with judicial power in
virtue of any provision of the constitution; (2) that if this be
not so, nevertheless the act creating that court, in prescribing
the course of procedure upon appeal, imposed upon this Court the
exercise of original jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution, and that therefore no appeal would lie.
The second of these grounds does not appear to us to afford any
support to appellee's contention. This is not one of the cases
within the original jurisdiction of this Court, and if it be one of
those in respect of which the court has appellate jurisdiction,
that jurisdiction exists "both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall
make."
Page 155 U. S. 83
If the paragraph in the ninth section of the act, providing that
this Court shall retry causes coming up on appeal,
"as well the issues of fact as of law, and may cause testimony
to be taken in addition to that given in the court below, and may
amend the record of the proceedings below as truth and justice may
require, and on such retrial and hearing every question shall be
open,"
were obnoxious to the objection that in whole or in part it was
not such a regulation as the Congress had power to enact, then the
section would to that extent be invalid, but this would not take
away the right of appeal itself, nor could the question of such
invalidity arise except when particular action was asked under the
clause.
We understand the suggestion as made to relate to the authority
to allow further proofs or the record to be amended. Causes in the
Court of Private Land Claims are in effect equity causes, and
brought to this Court by appeal, and, as observed by Chief Justice
Ellsworth, in
Wiscart v.
Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321:
"An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause
entirely, subjecting the fact, as well as the law, to a review and
retrial, but a writ of error is a process of common law, and it
removes nothing for examination but the law."
The remedy by appeal in its original sense was confined to
causes in equity, ecclesiastical, and admiralty jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly appellate courts proceeding according to the course of
the civil law may allow parties to introduce new allegations and
further proofs, and such has been the settled practice of the
ecclesiastical courts in England and of the admiralty courts in
this country. Nevertheless, orders allowing this to be done are not
granted as matter of course, but made with extreme caution, and
only on satisfactory grounds. As to appeals to this Court from the
decrees of circuit courts in equity causes, it was provided by the
second section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1803, c. 40, 2
Stat. 244, c. 40, carried forward into section 698 of the Revised
Statutes, which was the first enactment giving the remedy by
appeal, "that no new evidence shall be received in the said court,
on the hearing of such appeal, except in admiralty and prize
causes.�
Holmes v.
Trout, 7 Pet. 171;
Mitchel v.
United States, 9 Pet.
Page 155 U. S. 84
711;
Boone v.
Chiles, 10 Pet. 177;
Blease v. Garlington,
92 U. S. 1. And in
respect, of the allowance of amendments, when the ends of justice
require it, the course has been to remand the cause with
directions.
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Mississippi
Railway, 142 U. S. 396, and
cases cited.
Under what circumstances and to what extent the power to amend
the record of the proceedings below under this act or to cause
additional testimony to be taken was intended to be exercised we
are not now called on to consider. The statute is not mandatory,
but empowers the court to direct further proofs and to amend the
record if, in its judgment, the case demands its interposition to
that effect, and as the question is one of power merely, and not
properly arising for determination on this motion, we need not
prolong these observations.
The principal ground relied on by appellee is that the Court of
Private Land Claims is not a tribunal vested with judicial power in
virtue of any provision of the Constitution, and therefore the
Congress had no power to confer upon this Court jurisdiction to
entertain appeals from its decisions.
By article 8 of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and article 5 of
the Gadsden Treaty, the property of Mexicans within the territory
ceded by Mexico to the United States was to be "inviolably
respected," and they and their heirs and grantees were to enjoy
with respect to it "guaranties equally ample as if the same
belonged to citizens of the United States." 9 Stat. 929, 930; 10
Stat. 1035. While claimants under grants made by Mexico or the
Spanish authorities prior to the cession had no right to a judicial
determination of their claims, Congress nevertheless might provide
therefor if it chose to do so.
Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land
& Mining Co., 148 U. S. 80,
148 U. S. 13
Sup.Ct. 457. And it was for this purpose that the Act of March 3,
1891, was passed, establishing the Court of Private Land Claims for
the settlement of claims against the United States to lands
"derived by the United States from the Republic of Mexico, and
now embraced within the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, or Utah
or within the States of Nevada, Colorado, or Wyoming. "
Page 155 U. S. 85
The argument is that the court thus created, composed of judges
holding office for a time limited, is not one of the courts
mentioned in Article III of the Constitution, whereby the judicial
power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time establish,
the judges of which hold their offices during good behavior,
receiving at stated times for their services a compensation that
cannot be diminished during their continuance in office, and are
removable only by impeachment, and that the appellate power of this
Court cannot be extended to the revision of the judgments and
decrees of such a court. Granting that the Court of Private Land
Claims does not come within the third article, the conclusion
assumes either that the power of Congress to create courts can only
be exercised in virtue of that article or that judicial tribunals
otherwise established cannot be placed under the supervisory power
of this Court.
It must be regarded as settled that Section 1 of Article III
does not exhaust the power of Congress to establish courts. The
leading case upon the subject is
American
Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511,
26 U. S. 546,
in which it was held in respect of territorial courts (Chief
Justice Marshall delivering the opinion) that while those courts
are not courts in which the judicial power conferred by Article III
can be deposited, yet that they are legislative courts, created in
virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the
government over the territories, or of the clause which enables
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory belonging to the United States. The authorities are
referred to and commented on by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN in
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.
S. 174.
The case before us relates to the determination of a claim
against the United States to lands situated in the Territory of
Arizona, and, as it was clearly within the authority of Congress to
establish a court for such determination, unaffected by the
definitions of Article III, the question is not presented whether
it was within the power of Congress to create a judicial tribunal
of this character for the determination
Page 155 U. S. 86
of title to property situated in the states, where the courts of
the United States proper are parts of the federal system,
"invested with the judicial power of the United States expressly
conferred by the Constitution, and to be exercised in correlation
with the presence and jurisdiction of the several state courts and
governments."
Hornbuckle v.
Toombs, 18 Wall. 648,
85 U. S.
655.
And as wherever the United States exercise the power of
government, whether under specific grant or through the dominion
and sovereignty of plenary authority, as over the territories,
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1,
152 U. S. 48,
that power includes the ultimate executive, legislative, and
judicial power, it follows that the judicial action of all inferior
courts established by Congress may, in accordance with the
Constitution, be subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme judicial tribunal of the government. There has never been
any question in regard to this as applied to territorial courts,
and no reason can be perceived for applying a different rule to the
adjudications of the Court of Private Land Claims over property in
the territories.
The motion to dismiss is
Denied.
