Judgments in a district or circuit court of the United States in
cases brought under the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505,
are not required to be brought here for revision by appeal only,
but may be brought by writ of error; but they will be reexamined
here only when the record contains a specific finding of facts with
the conclusions of law thereon.
On the 1st day of May, 1870, the Postmaster General had no
authority to contract in writing for the lease of accommodations
for a local post office in a building for a term of twenty
years.
This writ of error brought up a judgment of the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of Indiana, dismissing
Page 155 U. S. 490
a suit instituted against the United States by the personal
representatives of Hiram W. Chase.
It appears from the statement of facts made by the court below
that on the 17th day of July, 1866, John K. Snider leased for a
term of ten years a certain lot with the building thereon in
Lafayette, Indiana, to be occupied by the United States as a post
office; that the building was so occupied until December, 1869,
when it was destroyed by fire; that James Montgomery, previous to
the fire, became the owner of the property, and entitled to the
benefit of the lease; that on the 1st day of May, 1870, Montgomery
made a lease, in form to the United States represented by the
Postmaster General, for the term of twenty years and at an annual
rental of $1,500, payable in equal quarterly instalments, of
certain parts of a building which he covenanted to erect upon the
same lot. He also covenanted to supply and keep in repair to the
satisfaction of the Postmaster General all boxes and fixtures
necessary for a post office in that building.
Montgomery erected the required building and the United States
took possession of it. On the 15th day of April, 1870, he assigned
his interest in the lease to one Tuttle, who, on the 10th of
February, 1871, assigned to Chase, tho. testator of the plaintiff.
Subsequently, May 10, 1886, the government, without complaining of
any violation of the terms of the lease, vacated the premises and
refused to pay rent thereafter.
During the occupancy of the premises Chase laid out and expended
for furniture, fixtures, and required changes the sum of $2,000,
and at the time the premises were vacated he was engaged in
conformity with the request of the postal officers in making other
repairs and additions.
The present action was brought on the lease to recover the
amount due for the unexpired term.
The Circuit Court adjudged that the Postmaster General had no
authority to execute the lease, and that the government was not
liable to suit upon it. For that reason, the suit was dismissed. 44
F. 732.
That judgment being brought here by writ of error, a motion was
made to dismiss the writ, on the ground that there
Page 155 U. S. 491
was no jurisdiction in this court by writ of error to review the
judgment complained of. The hearing of this motion was postponed to
the hearing on the merits.
Page 155 U. S. 495
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first question to be considered involves the jurisdiction of
this Court to review the judgment below upon writ of error. The
United States contends that a judgment rendered in a suit brought
under the Act of March 3, 1887, entitled "An act to provide for the
bringing of suits against the government of the United States," and
commonly known as the "Tucker Act," cannot be reexamined here
except upon appeal. 24 Stat. 505. So much of that act as can have
any bearing upon this case is printed in the margin.
*
Page 155 U. S. 496
The contention of the government as to the jurisdiction of this
Court is not well founded. Congress did not intend that
Page 155 U. S. 497
cases brought under this act in a district or circuit court of
the United States should be brought here by appeal only.
Page 155 U. S. 498
Throughout all the provisions relating to actions commenced in
those courts, there is shown a purpose to preserve the
distinction
Page 155 U. S. 499
between cases at law, cases in equity, and cases in admiralty.
The phrases, "judgment or decree," "right of exception or appeal,"
"equity or admiralty," "rights of appeal or writs of error," and
"appeal or writ of error," taken in connection with the clause in
the fourth section relating to the jurisdiction of the respective
courts of the United States proceeding under the act, and providing
that
"the course of procedure shall be in accordance with the
established rules of said respective courts, and of such additions
and modifications thereof as said courts may adopt,"
with that part of section 7 which in terms refers to the
distinction between cases at law and cases in equity and admiralty,
and directs that "if the suit be in equity or admiralty the court
shall proceed with the same according to the rules of such courts,"
with the express recognition in section 9 of the "same rights of
appeal or writs of error" in any suit brought under this act as
were reserved in the statutes of the United States in that behalf
at the date of the passage of the act; with the requirement, in the
same section, that
"the modes of procedure in claiming and perfecting an appeal or
writ of error shall conform in all respects, and as near as may be,
to the statutes and rules of court governing appeals and writs of
error in like causes,"
and with the provision in section 10 making it the duty of the
district attorney, when the Attorney General shall determine
"whether an appeal or writ of error shall be taken or not" in cases
in which "the judgment or decree" shall be adverse to the
government, to cause "an appeal or writ of error to be perfected in
accordance with the terms of the statutes and rules of practice
governing the same" -- these phrases, clauses, and provisions make
it, we think, reasonably clear that Congress intended that the
final determination of suits brought under this act in a district
or circuit court of the United States shall be reviewed here upon
writ of error, if the case be one at law, and upon appeal, if the
case is one cognizable in equity or in admiralty under the existing
statutes regulating the jurisdiction of those courts.
But Congress, while recognizing the settled distinction between
law, equity, and admiralty, did not intend that the
Page 155 U. S. 500
records of cases brought against the government under this act
should contain all that is required in suits instituted in the
courts of the United States under the general statutes regulating
their jurisdiction and the modes of procedure therein. Neither the
mode of procedure in the Court of Claims nor the mode in which
cases there determined may be brought here for reexamination was
changed by the Act of March 3, 1887. But under that act, a judgment
of a district or circuit court of the United States in an action at
law brought against the government will be reexamined here only
when the record contains a specific finding of facts, with the
conclusions of law thereon. In such cases, this Court will only
inquire whether the judgment below is supported by the facts thus
found. And we think it was also the purpose of Congress to require
like specific findings or statements of fact and conclusions of law
in cases in equity and in admiralty brought under that act in the
district and circuit courts of the United States, and to restrict
our inquiry in such cases, as in actions at law, to the sufficiency
of the facts so found or stated to support the final judgment.
For the reasons stated, the motion to dismiss the writ of error
for want of jurisdiction in this Court to review in that mode the
final judgment of the court below is overruled.
Was the United States liable upon the written contract of lease
which is the foundation of this action?
By the law in force when the lease sued on was executed, it was
made the duty of the Postmaster General "to establish post
offices." By section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, it is provided,
as did, substantially, the statutes in force when that lease was
made, that
"no contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be
made unless the same is authorized by law, or is under an
appropriation adequate to its fulfillment, except in the War and
Navy Departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel,
quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the
necessities of the current year."
Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 102, c. 64, § 1; Act of March 2,
1861, 12 Stat. 220, c. 84, § 10.
Much stress is placed by counsel for the plaintiff upon the
Page 155 U. S. 501
clause making it the duty of the Postmaster General to establish
post offices, the contention being that the power to establish a
post office carries with it authority to lease rooms or a building
in which the postmaster may conduct the business of his office. In
support of this position,
Ware v. United
States, 4 Wall. 617, is cited. But that case does
not justify any such interpretation of the act of Congress. The
question there was as to the power of the Postmaster General to
discontinue a post office that had once been established by him
under the authority conferred by the act of 1825, 4 Stat. 102, "to
establish post offices." This Court, observing that the power to
discontinue post offices is incident to the power to establish
them, unless there was some provision in the acts of Congress
restraining its exercise, said:
"Undoubtedly Congress might discontinue a post office which they
had previously established by law, and it is difficult to see why
the Postmaster General may not do the same thing, when acting under
an act of Congress expressed in the very words of the Constitution,
from which Congress derives its power."
Again:
"Power to establish post offices and post roads is conferred
upon Congress, but the policy of the government, from the time the
general post office was established, has been to delegate the power
to designate the places where the mail shall be received and
delivered to the Postmaster General."
P.
71 U. S.
632.
There was no issue in that case as to the extent of the
authority of the Postmaster General to bind the government by
contract for the payment of money or for the lease of a building
for a post office. That case did not call for any consideration of
the general question whether the words in the statute "to establish
post offices" had the full meaning of the same words found in the
section of the Constitution enumerating the powers of Congress.
Nor is it necessary to determine all that may be done by the
Postmaster General under the power "to establish post offices"
conferred upon that officer, for those words are to be interpreted
in connection with the above statutory provision forbidding the
making, except in the war and Navy Departments, and in those
departments only for certain
Page 155 U. S. 502
things and under specified conditions, of any contract or
purchase on behalf of the United States, unless the same be
authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its
fulfillment. There is no claim that the lease in question was made
under any appropriation whatever -- much less one adequate to its
fulfillment. So that the only inquiry is whether the contract of
lease was "authorized by law" within the meaning of the statute
relating to contracts or purchases on behalf of the government.
The counsel of the plaintiff contends that a contract of lease
on behalf of the United States is authorized by law if made by the
Postmaster General for the purpose of procuring rooms or a building
for a post office established by him. The same argument would
sustain a purchase by the Postmaster General, on behalf of the
United States, of a building to be used for a post office so
established by that officer. We cannot give our sanction to this
interpretation of the statute. It would give the Postmaster General
much larger powers than we believe Congress intended to give him.
While the Postmaster General, under the power to establish post
offices, may designate the places -- that is, the localities -- at
which the mails are to be received, he cannot bind the United
States by any lease or purchase of a building to be used for the
purposes of a post office unless the power to do so is derived from
a statute which, either expressly or by necessary implication,
authorizes him to make such lease or purchase. The general
authority "to establish post offices" does not itself, or without
more, necessarily imply authority to bind the United States by a
contract to lease or purchase a post office building, although an
appropriation of money to pay for the rent of a post office
building at a named place might give authority to the Postmaster
General to lease such building in that locality as he deemed proper
for the service, always keeping within the amount so appropriated.
So also, the power to lease a building to be used as a post office
may be implied from a general appropriation of money to pay for
rent of post offices in any particular fiscal year or years.
We have considered the case in the light of the statutes in
Page 155 U. S. 503
force when the lease of May 1, 1870, was executed. Shortly after
that date, by the Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat. 251, c. 251, § 7,
it was provided that no department of the government should expend
in anyone year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress
for that fiscal year, or involve the government in any contract for
the future payment of money in excess of such appropriations. And
that provision is reproduced in section 3679 of the Revised
Statutes.
We are of opinion that the lease used on was not authorized by
law, and consequently no action can be maintained thereon
The judgment is
Affirmed.
*
"Section 1. That the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the following matters:"
"First. All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United
States, or any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract,
expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, or
for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in
tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to
redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity,
or admiralty if the United States were suable,
provided,
however, that nothing in this section shall be construed as
giving to either of the courts herein mentioned jurisdiction to
hear and determine claims growing out of the late Civil War, and
commonly known as 'war claims,' or to hear and determine other
claims, which have heretofore been rejected, or reported on
adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to
hear and determine the same."
"Second. All set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages,
whether liquidated or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on
the part of the government of the United States against any
claimant against the government in said court,
provided
that no suit against the government of the United States shall be
allowed under this act unless the same shall have been brought
within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is
made."
"SEC. 2. That the district courts of the United States shall
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims as to all
matters named in the preceding section where the amount of the
claim does not exceed one thousand dollars, and the circuit courts
of the United States shall have such concurrent jurisdiction in all
cases where the amount of such claims exceeds one thousand dollars
and does not exceed ten thousand dollars. All causes brought and
tried under the provisions of this act shall be tried by the court
without a jury."
"SEC. 3. That whenever any person shall present his petition to
the Court of Claims alleging that he is or has been indebted to the
United States as an officer or agent thereof, or by virtue of any
contract therewith, or that he is the guarantor, or surety, or
personal representative of any officer, or agent, or contractor so
indebted, or that he, or the person for whom he is such surety,
guarantor, or personal representative has held any office or agency
under the United States, or entered into any contract therewith,
under which it may be or has been claimed that an indebtedness to
the United States has arisen and exists, and that he or the person
he represents has applied to the proper department of the
government requesting that the account of such office, agency, or
indebtedness may be adjusted and settled, and that three years have
elapsed from the date of such application and said account still
remains unsettled and unadjusted, and that no suit upon the same
has been brought by the United States, said court shall, due notice
first being given to the head of said department and to the
Attorney General of the United States, proceed to hear the parties
and to ascertain the amount, if any, due the United States on said
account. The Attorney General shall represent the United States at
the hearing of said cause. The court may postpone the same from
time to time whenever justice shall require. The judgment of said
court or of the Supreme Court of the United States, to which an
appeal shall lie, as in other cases, as to the amount due, shall be
binding and conclusive upon the parties. The payment of such amount
so found due by the court shall discharge such obligation. An
action shall accrue to the United States against such principal, or
surety, or representative to recover the amount so found due, which
may be brought at any time within three years after the final
judgment of said court. Unless suit shall be brought within said
time, such claim and the claim on the original indebtedness shall
be forever barred."
"SEC. 4. That the jurisdiction of the respective courts of the
United States proceeding under this act, including the right of
exception and appeal, shall be governed by the law now in force,
insofar as the same is applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this act, and the course of procedure shall be in
accordance with the established rules of said respective courts,
and of such additions and modifications thereof as said courts may
adopt."
"SEC. 5. That the plaintiff in any suit brought under the
provisions of the second section of this act shall file a petition,
duly verified with the clerk of the respective court having
jurisdiction of the case, and in the district where the plaintiff
resides. Such petition shall set forth the full name and residence
of the plaintiff, the nature of his claim, and a succinct statement
of the facts upon which the claim is based, the money or any other
thing claimed, or the damages sought to be recovered, and praying
the court for a judgment or decree upon the facts and law."
"SEC. 6. That the plaintiff shall cause a copy of his petition
filed under the preceding section to be served upon the district
attorney of the United States in the district wherein suit is
brought, and shall mail a copy of the same, by registered letter,
to the Attorney General of the United States, and shall thereupon
cause to be filed with the clerk of the court wherein suit is
instituted an affidavit of such service and the mailing of such
letter. It shall be the duty of the district attorney upon whom
service of petition is made as aforesaid to appear and defend the
interests of the government in the suit, and within sixty days
after the service of petition upon him unless the time should be
extended by order of the court made in the case to file a plea,
answer, or demurrer on the part of the government, and to file a
notice of any counter-claim, set-off, claim for damages, or other
demand or defense whatsoever of the government in the premises,
provided that should the district attorney neglect or
refuse to file the plea, answer, demurrer, or defense, as required,
the plaintiff may proceed with the case under such rules as the
court may adopt in the premises; but the plaintiff shall not have
judgment or decree for his claim, or any part thereof, unless he
shall establish the same by proof satisfactory to the court."
"SEC. 7. That it shall be the duty of the court to cause a
written opinion to be filed in the cause, setting forth the
specific findings by the court of the facts therein and the
conclusions of the court upon all questions of law involved in the
case, and to render judgment thereon. If the suit be in equity or
admiralty, the court shall proceed with the same according to the
rules of such courts."
"SEC. 8. That in the trial of any suit brought under any of the
provisions of this act, no person shall be excluded as a witness
because he is a party to or interested in said suit, and any
plaintiff or party in interest may be examined as a witness on the
part of the government."
"Section ten hundred and seventy-nine of the Revised Statutes is
hereby repealed. The provisions of section ten hundred and eighty
of the Revised Statutes shall apply to cases under this act."
"SEC. 9. That the plaintiff or the United States, in any suit
brought under the provisions of this act, shall have the same
rights of appeal or writ of error as are now reserved in the
statutes of the United States in that behalf made, and upon the
conditions and limitations therein contained. The modes of
procedure in claiming and perfecting an appeal or writ of error
shall conform in all respects, and as near as may be, to the
statutes and rules of court governing appeals and writs of error in
like causes."
"SEC. 10. That when the findings of fact and the law applicable
thereto have been filed in any case as provided in section six of
this act, and the judgment or decree is adverse to the government,
it shall be the duty of the district attorney to transmit to the
Attorney General of the United States certified copies of all the
papers filed in the cause, with a transcript of the testimony
taken, the written findings of the court, and his written opinion
as to the same; whereupon the Attorney General shall determine and
direct whether an appeal or writ of error shall be taken or not,
and when so directed, the district attorney shall cause an appeal
or writ or error to be perfected in accordance with the terms of
the statutes and rules of practice governing the same,
provided that no appeal or writ of error shall be allowed
after six months from the judgment or decree in such suit. From the
date of such final judgment or decree, interest shall be computed
thereon at the rate of four percentum per annum until the time when
an appropriation is made for the payment of the judgment or
decree."
"SEC. 11. That the Attorney General shall report to Congress,
and at the beginning of each session of Congress, the suits under
this act in which a final judgment or decree has been rendered,
giving the date of each, and a statement of the costs taxed in each
case."
"SEC. 16. That all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with this
act are hereby repealed."