The Act of March 3, 1883,c. 111, 22 Stat. 804, authorizing the
Court of Claims to hear and determine the claims of the successors
and representatives of Sterling T. Austin, deceased, for cotton
alleged to have been taken from him in Louisiana by the authorities
of the United States in 1863, 1864, and 1865,
"any statute of limitation to the contrary notwithstanding,
provided, however, that it be shown to the satisfaction of the
court that neither Sterling T. Austin, Senior nor any of his
surviving representatives gave any aid or comfort to the late
rebellion, but were throughout the war loyal to the government of
the United States,"
made the establishment of loyalty in fact, as
contradistinguished from innocence in law produced by pardon, a
prerequisite to jurisdiction, and the Court of Claims, having found
that the claimant was not thus loyal, properly dismissed the
petition.
Claimant filed a petition in the Court of Claims, June 5, 1883,
alleging that Sterling T. Austin, of the Parish of Carroll, in the
State of Louisiana, died in that state July 9, 1879; that March 20,
A.D. 1883, claimant was duly appointed administratrix of the estate
of said decedent, and duly qualified as such, and that her letters
of administration were in full force.
The petition set up an Act of Congress approved March 3, 1883,
c. 111, 22 Stat. 804, entitled "An act for the relief of the
representatives of Sterling T. Austin, deceased," which referred
the claims of the successors in interest and legal representatives
of Sterling T. Austin for cotton taken by the military authorities
of the United States during the war to the Court of
Page 155 U. S. 418
Claims to adjust and settle, and to render judgment for the net
amount realized by the United States therefrom, removing the bar of
any statute of limitation and providing that it be shown to the
satisfaction of the court that neither Austin nor any of his
surviving representatives "gave any aid or comfort to the late
rebellion, but were throughout the war loyal to the government of
the United States."
It was then charged that in the years 1863, 1864, and 1865, the
military authorities took from Sterling T. Austin, claimant's
decedent, in the States of Louisiana and Texas, large amounts of
cotton; that the United States sold said cotton and realized
therefrom various sums, aggregating $367,500, which they
appropriated to their own use; that Sterling T. Austin left him
surviving a widow and children; that neither he nor his widow, nor
either of his children, "gave any aid or comfort to the late
rebellion, but they and each of them were and was throughout the
war loyal to the government of the United States." Judgment was
asked
"for the sum of three hundred and sixty-seven thousand, five
hundred dollars, being the net amount realized by the United States
from the sale of the cotton hereinbefore referred to and
described."
The averments of the petition were traversed by the United
States. The Court of Claims filed findings of fact and a conclusion
of law.
The court was not satisfied that Sterling T. Austin did not give
aid or comfort to the late rebellion and that he was loyal
throughout the war to the government of the United States, and
found him disloyal, but the court was satisfied that the surviving
representatives did not give any aid and comfort to the late
rebellion, but were throughout the war loyal to the government of
the United States.
The conclusion of law was that "the court decides, upon the
foregoing facts, that the petition be dismissed." The opinion of
the court, by Weldon, J., will be found in 25 Ct.Cl. 437. Judgment
having been thereupon entered dismissing the petition, claimant
appealed to this Court.
Page 155 U. S. 419
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
An act amending the act establishing the Court of Claims was
approved March 3, 1863, which by its tenth section prescribed a
limitation of six years on the prosecution of claims, and in its
twelfth section provided
"that in order to authorize the said court to render a judgment
in favor of any claimant, if a citizen of the United States, it
shall be set forth in the petition that the claimant, and the
original and every prior owner thereof where the claim has been
assigned, has at all times borne true allegiance to the government
of the United States, and whether a citizen or not, that he has not
in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to
rebellion against the said government, which allegations may be
traversed by the government, and if on the trial such issue shall
be decided against the claimant, his petition shall be
dismissed."
12 Stat. 765, 767. On the same day, an act was passed
authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint special agents
to collect and receive all abandoned or captured property in any
state or territory, or any portion of any state or territory, of
the United States designated as in insurrection, the second section
of which required that "all sales of such property shall be at
auction to the highest bidder, and the proceeds thereof shall be
paid into the Treasury of the United States," and the third
section, after making provision for the giving of bonds, and the
keeping of books "showing from whom such property was received, the
cost of transportation, and proceeds of the sale thereof,"
proceeded thus:
"And any person claiming to have been the owner of any such
abandoned or captured property may at any time within two years
after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the
proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims, and on proof to the
satisfaction of said court of his ownership of said property, of
his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never given any
aid or comfort to
Page 155 U. S. 420
the present rebellion, to receive the residue of such proceeds,
after the deduction of any purchase money which may have been paid,
together with the expense of transportation and sale of such
property, and any other lawful expenses attending the disposition
thereof."
Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 820, c. 120.
By joint resolution approved March 30, 1868, it was resolved
"that all moneys which have been received by any officer or
employee of the government or any department thereof from sales of
captured and abandoned property in the late insurrectionary
districts under or under color of the several acts of Congress
providing for the collection and sale of such property, and which
have not already been actually covered into the Treasury, shall
immediately be paid into the Treasury of the United States,
together with any interest which has been received or accrued
thereon."
June 25, 1868, an act was approved entitled "An act to provide
for appeals from the Court of Claims and for other purposes,"
allowing an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from
all final judgments of the Court of Claims adverse to the United
States. The third section of this act provided
"that whenever it shall be material in any suit or claim before
any court to ascertain whether any person did or did not give any
aid or comfort to the late rebellion, the claimant or party
asserting the loyalty of any such person to the United States
during such rebellion shall be required to prove affirmatively that
such person did, during said rebellion, consistently adhere to the
United States, and did give no aid or comfort to persons engaged in
said rebellion, and the voluntary residence of any such person in
any place where at any time during such residence the rebel force
or organization held sway shall be
prima facie evidence
that such person did give aid and comfort to such rebellion and to
the persons engaged therein."
15 Stat. 75, c. 71.
On the 20th of August, 1866, the President issued his
proclamation declaring the rebellion suppressed throughout the
whole of the United States of America. 14 Stat. 814. And that day
was recognized as the close of the rebellion by
Page 155 U. S. 421
an Act of Congress passed March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 422, c. 145,
and by this Court in
United States v.
Anderson, 9 Wall. 56.
July 4, 1868, the President issued a proclamation of pardon and
amnesty to all persons who had directly or indirectly participated
in the late rebellion, those under indictment for treason or felony
excepted,
"for the offense of treason against the United States or of
adhering to their enemies during the late civil war, with
restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves and
except, also, as to any property of which any person may have been
legally divested under the laws of the United States"
(15 Stat. 702), and on December 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 711, a
proclamation of universal amnesty, unconditionally and without
reservation, to all persons who had directly or indirectly
participated in the rebellion, "with restoration of all rights,
privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws
which have been made in pursuance thereof."
In the case of
United States v. Anderson, supra,
decided at December term, 1869, it was ruled that it was not
necessary under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act for a party
preferring his claim in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of
property taken and sold under it, to prove, in addition to his own
loyalty, the loyalty of the person from whom he bought the
property, it having been purchased by him in good faith and without
intent to defraud the government or anyone else. Mr. Justice Davis,
delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"During the progress of the war, it was expected that our forces
in the field would capture property, and, as the enemy retreated,
that property would remain in the country without apparent
ownership, which should be collected and disposed of. In this
condition of things, Congress acted. While providing for the
disposition of this captured and abandoned property, Congress
recognized the status of the loyal Southern people, and
distinguished between property owned by them and the property of
the disloyal. It was not required to do this, for all the property
obtained in this manner could, by proper proceedings, have been
appropriated to the necessities of the war. But Congress did
not
Page 155 U. S. 422
think proper to do this. In a spirit of liberality, it
constituted the government a trustee for so much of this property
as belonged to the faithful Southern people, and while directing
that all of it should be sold, and its proceeds paid into the
Treasury, gave to this class of persons an opportunity at any time
within two years after the suppression of the rebellion to bring
their suit in the Court of Claims and establish their right to the
proceeds of that portion of it which they owned, requiring from
them nothing but proof of loyalty and ownership."
In
United States v.
Padelford, 9 Wall. 531, also decided at December
term, 1869, Padelford, the owner of the property, had taken the
oath, and secured the benefit of the proclamation of pardon issued
by President Lincoln, December 8, 1863, 11 Stat. 737, before the
property was seized, and it was held that his status as a loyal
citizen had been thereby restored, and with it all his rights and
property, although he had previously given aid and comfort to the
rebellion, and the Chief Justice remarked:
"If, in other respects, the petitioner made the proof which,
under the act, entitled him to a decree for the proceeds of his
property, the law makes the proof of pardon a complete substitute
for proof that he gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion."
The act making appropriations for the legislative, executive,
and judicial expenses of the government for the year ending June
30, 1871, was passed July 12, 1870, c. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235, and
contained an appropriation of $100,000 for payment of judgments
which might be rendered by the Court of Claims, to which a proviso
was attached, as follows:
"
Provided that no pardon or amnesty granted by the
President, whether general or special, by proclamation or
otherwise, nor any acceptance of such pardon or amnesty, nor oath
taken, or other act performed in pursuance or as a condition
thereof, shall be admissible in evidence on the part of any
claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence in support of any claim
against the United States, or to establish the standing of any
claimant in said court, or his right to bring or maintain suit
therein; nor shall any such pardon, amnesty,
Page 155 U. S. 423
acceptance, oath, or other act as aforesaid, heretofore offered
or put in evidence on behalf of any claimant in said court, be used
or considered by said court, or by the appellate court on appeal
from said court, in deciding upon the claim of said claimant, or
any appeal therefrom, as any part of the proof to sustain the claim
of the claimant, or to entitle him to maintain his action in said
Court of Claims or on appeal therefrom, but the proof of loyalty
required by the twelfth section of the Act of March three, eighteen
hundred and sixty-three, entitled 'An act to amend an act to
establish a court for the investigation of claims against the
United States,' approved February twenty-four, eighteen hundred and
fifty-five, and by the third section of the act entitled 'An act to
provide for the collection of abandoned property, and for the
prevention of frauds, in insurrectionary districts within the
United States,' approved March twelve, eighteen hundred and
sixty-three, and by the third section of the act entitled 'An act
to provide for appeals from the Court of Claims, and for other
purposes,' approved June twenty-five, eighteen hundred and
sixty-eight, shall be made by proof of the matters required by said
sections, respectively, irrespective of the effect of any executive
proclamation, pardon, amnesty, or other act of condonation or
oblivion."
"And in all cases where judgment shall have been heretofore
rendered in the Court of Claims in favor of any claimant on any
other proof of loyalty than such as is above required and provided,
and which is hereby declared to have been and to be the true intent
and meaning of said respective acts, the supreme court shall, on
appeal, have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall
dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction;
and provided
further that whenever any pardon shall have heretofore been
granted by the President of the United States to any person
bringing suit in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of abandoned
or captured property under the said act approved March twelve,
eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and the acts amendatory of the
same, and such pardon shall recite in substance that such person
took part in the late rebellion against the government of the
United States, or was guilty of any act of rebellion against or
disloyalty to the
Page 155 U. S. 424
United States, and such pardon shall have been accepted in
writing, by the person to whom the same was issued, without an
express disclaimer of and protestation against such fact of guilt
contained in such acceptance, such pardon and acceptance shall be
taken and deemed in such suit in the said Court of Claims, and on
appeal therefrom, conclusive evidence that such person did take
part in and give aid and comfort to the late rebellion, and did not
maintain true allegiance or consistently adhere to the United
States, and on proof of such pardon and acceptance, which proof may
be heard summarily on motion or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the
court in the case shall cease, and the court shall forthwith
dismiss the suit of such claimant."
At December term, 1871, in the case of
United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, which was a case
decided by the Court of Claims, May 26, 1869, and pending here on
appeal filed herein December 11, 1869, this Court held, the Chief
Justice delivering the opinion, that the captured and abandoned
property act did not confiscate, or in any case absolutely divest,
the property of the original owner, even though disloyal, and that
by the seizure the government constituted itself a trustee for
those who were entitled, or whom it should thereafterwards
recognize as entitled; that persons who had faithfully accepted the
provisions offered by the proclamation of pardon of December 8,
1863, became entitled to the proceeds of their property thus paid
into the Treasury, on application within two years from the close
of the war, and that the proviso in question was unconstitutional
and void, its substance being that an acceptance of a pardon
without a disclaimer should be conclusive evidence of the acts
pardoned, but should be null and void as evidence of rights
conferred by it, both in the Court of Claims and in this Court;
that the proviso denied to pardons granted by the President the
effect which this Court had adjudged them to have; that the denial
of jurisdiction to this Court, as well as the Court of Claims, was
founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes
pending, prescribed by Congress, amounting to a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way, and that the proviso
invaded
Page 155 U. S. 425
the powers both of the judicial and executive departments of the
government. Mr. Justice Miller and Mr. Justice Bradley dissented on
the ground that, although they agreed that the proviso was
unconstitutional, they could not concur in the proposition that
under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, there remained
"in the former owner, who had given aid and comfort to the
rebellion, any interest whatever in the property or its proceeds,
when it had been sold and paid into the Treasury, or had been
converted to the use of the public, under that act."
This was followed in
Armstrong's
Case, 13 Wall. 154, and
Pargoud's
Case, 13 Wall. 156.
In
Carlisle's
Case, 16 Wall. 147,
83 U. S. 153,
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, speaking for the Court, after referring to the
foregoing cases, observed:
"After these repeated adjudications, it must be regarded as
settled in this Court that the pardon of the President, whether
granted by special letters or by general proclamation, relieves
claimants of the proceeds of captured and abandoned property from
the consequences of participation in the rebellion and from the
necessity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their
claims. This result follows whether we regard the pardon as
effacing the offense -- blotting it out, in the language of the
cases, as though it had never existed -- or regard persons pardoned
as necessarily excepted from the general language of the act which
requires claimants to make proof of their adhesion during the
rebellion to the United States. It is not to be supposed that
Congress intended by the general language of the act to encroach
upon any of the prerogatives of the President, and especially that
benign prerogative of mercy which lies in the pardoning power. It
is more reasonable to conclude that claimants restored to their
rights of property by the pardon of the President were not in
contemplation of Congress in passing the act, and were not intended
to be embraced by the requirement in question. All general terms in
statutes should be limited in their application so as not to lead
to injustice, oppression, or any unconstitutional operation if that
be possible. It will be presumed that exceptions were intended
which would avoid results of that nature. "
Page 155 U. S. 426
In
Haycraft v. United
States, 22 Wall. 81,
89 U. S. 92, it
was held at October term, 1874, that under the provision of the Act
of March 12, 1863, that any person claiming to be the owner of
captured or abandoned property might
"at any time within two years after the suppression of the
rebellion prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of
Claims, and, on proof . . . that he has never given any aid or
comfort to the present rebellion,"
receive the proceeds of the sale of such property, a person who
had given aid and comfort to the rebellion, and who had not been
pardoned until after two years from the suppression of the
rebellion, could not, on then preferring his petition, obtain the
benefit of the act, even though in cases generally the limitation
of actions in that court was one of six years; that the question
was not one of limitation, but of jurisdiction, and that the
inability of an unpardoned rebel to sue in the Court of Claims did
not control the operation of the statute. The Court said, through
Mr. Chief Justice Waite:
"A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts except with his
consent. This is an action against the United States in its own
Court of Claims. The appellant must therefore show that consent has
been given to its prosecution. That being done, the jurisdiction of
the court is established, and he may proceed. Otherwise, not."
The Chief Justice pointed out that the required consent was not
contained in the Captured and Abandoned Property Act itself, for
the only action there consented to was one to be commenced within
two years after the suppression of the rebellion, and that such
consent could not be found in the provision of the Act of March 3,
1863, reorganizing the Court of Claims, c. 92, 12 Stat. 765, 767,
that the court might determine all claims "founded upon . . . any
contract express or implied with the government of the United
States," unless there was an implied promise by the United States
to pay to every owner of captured or abandoned property, whether
loyal or disloyal, the proceeds of his property taken and sold. But
that involved the assumption that the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act contained an undertaking by the United States at that
time to receive and hold the property, or its proceeds if sold,
Page 155 U. S. 427
in trust for the use and benefit of the owner, whoever he might
be, and that the trust in favor of the owner having then been
created, the remedy for its enforcement in the Court of Claims as a
contract was restored to a disloyal owner by the operation of the
President's proclamation. Now the statute was a war measure, and
embraced private property abandoned by its owner, or liable to
capture, and the capture of cotton was legitimate under the
circumstances.
Mrs. Alexander's
Cotton, 2 Wall. 404,
69 U. S. 419.
As, however, friends as well as foes might suffer in the
indiscriminate seizure likely to follow the authority given, it was
provided that any owner might, within two years after the
suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim, and, upon proof of
his ownership and loyalty, receive the money realized by the United
States. Under the ruling in
Klein's Case, the effect of
the act was to provide a reward for submission to the government
and the acceptance of amnesty, as well as authority for the seizure
of the property, and according to the doctrine of that case, if a
suit was commenced within two years, a pardoned enemy could recover
as well as a loyal friend, but the commencement of the suit within
the prescribed time was a condition precedent to the ultimate
relief. There was no promise, except to such as should commence the
suit in time, and upon the trial be in a condition to bring
themselves within the requirements of the act. The promise was
express, and there was no room left for implication. Both the right
to persons to demand and receive a restoration of their property
taken and the remedy by which that right was to be enforced were
created by the same statute, and in such cases the remedy afforded
was exclusive of all others. That remedy was the only one of which
the Court of Claims, or any other court, had been authorized to
take jurisdiction; and, as the claimant had neglected to avail
himself of that remedy, he was consequently without any, and the
Court of Claims was right in concluding that it had no
jurisdiction.
In
Knote v. United States, certain personal property of
the claimant had been seized, libeled, condemned, and forfeited by
the decree of a district court, on the ground of his treason,
Page 155 U. S. 428
and the proceeds paid into the Treasury, prior to the
proclamation of December 25, 1868, after which claimant brought
suit for the proceeds, relying on that proclamation; but the Court
of Claims (10 Ct.Cl. 397) decided that he was not entitled to
recover, and dismissed the petition. The judgment was affirmed by
this Court at October term, 1877.
Knote v. United States,
95 U. S. 149. It
was held that the general pardon and amnesty granted by the
proclamation of December 25, 1868, did not entitle one receiving
their benefits to the proceeds of his property previously condemned
and sold under the confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, after such
proceeds had been paid into the Treasury of the United States.
Although a full pardon released the offender from all penalties
imposed by the offense pardoned, and restored to him all his civil
rights, it did not affect any rights which were vested in others
directly by the execution of the judgment for the offense, or which
had been acquired by others while that judgment was in force. And
if the proceeds of the property of the offender had been paid into
the Treasury, the right to them had so far become vested in the
United States that they could only be recovered by him through an
act of Congress. Moneys once in the Treasury could only be
withdrawn by an appropriation by law.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, announcing the decision, referred, among
other cases, to
Osborn v. United States, 91 U. S.
474, and said:
"An attempt is made by counsel to give some expressions used in
the opinion of the court a wider meaning, so as to support the
claim here presented, but the language will not sustain the
conclusion sought. There was no consideration of the effect of the
pardon upon the proceeds of the forfeited property when paid into
the Treasury, but only of its effect upon those proceeds whilst
under the control of the court in its registry. Any language which
seemingly admits of a broader interpretation must be restricted to
the facts of the case. There was no intention of expressing any
opinion that a pardon could do away with the constitutional
requirement as to money in the Treasury; whilst there, it is the
property of the United States. . . . The claim here presented
rests
Page 155 U. S. 429
upon a supposed implied contract to pay to the claimant the
money received as the proceeds of the forfeited property. To
constitute such a contract, there must have been some consideration
moving to the United States, or they must have received the money,
charged with a duty to pay it over, or the claimant must have had a
lawful right to it when it was received, as in the case of money
paid by mistake."
In
Hart v. United States, 118 U. S.
62, it was decided, on appeal from the Court of Claims
(adjudged there June 7, 1880, and, on rehearing, May 16, 1881),
that that court, which had found the claimant to be a person who
had "sustained the late rebellion," and that the claim accrued
before April 13, 1861, did not err in deciding that it had no
jurisdiction to proceed to judgment, as the payment of such a claim
was forbidden by joint resolution No. 46, approved March 2, 1867,
14 Stat. 571; that although before the joint resolution was passed
the claimant had received from the President a pardon "for all
offenses committed by him arising from participation, direct or
implied, in the rebellion," the pardon did not authorize the
payment of the claim, nor did the joint resolution take away
anything which the pardon had conferred, and that it was entirely
within the competency of Congress to declare that the claims
mentioned in the joint resolution should not be paid until the
further order of Congress.
On the same day that the Austin act was passed, March 3, 1883,
an act entitled "An act to afford assistance and relief to Congress
and the executive departments in the investigation of claims and
demands against the government," 22 Stat. 485, c. 116, was
approved, of which the fourth section was as follows:
"Sec. 4. In any case of a claim for supplies or stores taken by
or furnished to any part of the military or naval forces of the
United States for their use during the late war for the suppression
of the rebellion, the petition shall aver that the person who
furnished such supplies or stores, or from whom such supplies or
stores were taken, did not give any aid or comfort to said
rebellion, but was throughout that war loyal to the government of
the United States, and the fact of such loyalty shall be a
jurisdictional fact, and unless the said court
Page 155 U. S. 430
shall, on a preliminary inquiry, find that the person who
furnished such supplies or stores, or from whom the same were taken
as aforesaid, was loyal to the government of the United States
throughout said war, the courts shall not have jurisdiction of said
cause, but the same shall, without further proceedings, be
dismissed."
Twenty years after the passage of the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act; nearly fifteen years after the close of the rebellion
and the proclamation of amnesty; twelve years after the decision of
Klein's, Armstrong's, and
Pargoud's cases;
eighteen years after the conversion of the cotton for whose
proceeds the suit was brought; fifteen years after the proceeds
were covered into the Treasury, and nearly four years after the
death of Austin, the act proceeded on was passed. Referring to
Austin's neglect to sue, the Court of Claims remarked:
"This court was open to him until August 20, 1868; ready to
adjudicate the claim in the freshness of the memory of witnesses
then living, and able to testify with absolute certainty. . . .
From the facts and circumstances, indicated by the proof, we
conclude that the decedent was embarrassed by his inability to
establish in this Court his adherence to the United States, as
required by law, and from that embarrassment originates his failure
to prosecute his case within this jurisdiction."
Loyal or not, he did not bring suit within the time prescribed
by either of the acts of 1863, and if disloyal, whether his
transgression was obliterated by the proclamation of July 4, or
that of December 25, 1868, was not important.
Since it cannot be controverted that it is for Congress to
determine when and under what circumstances the government may be
sued, and that the Court of Claims has the right to entertain
jurisdiction of cases against the United States, and proceed to
judgment, only by virtue of acts of Congress granting such
jurisdiction, and is limited precisely to such cases, both in
regard to parties and the cause of action, as Congress has
prescribed,
De Groot v. United
States, 5 Wall. 419,
72 U. S. 431,
the inquiry is whether this suit can be sustained under the act
authorizing it to be commenced, on the theory that loyalty in fact
was not a condition to the exercise of jurisdiction, and,
Page 155 U. S. 431
on the merits, was rendered immaterial by the general amnesty.
The act, 22 Stat. 158, c. 111, reads as follows:
"That the claims of the successors in interest and legal
representatives of Sterling T. Austin, deceased, late of the Parish
of Carroll, in the State of Louisiana, for cotton taken by the
military and civil authorities of the United States, or by either
of them, during the years eighteen hundred and sixty-three,
eighteen hundred and sixty-four, and eighteen hundred and
sixty-five, in the States of Louisiana and Texas, be, and the same
are hereby, referred to the Court of Claims, with full jurisdiction
and power in the said court to adjust and settle such claims, and
to render a judgment in said cause for the net amount realized by
the United States from the sale of such cotton as shall appear from
the evidence to have been so taken by said authorities, and in such
action the said representatives shall be entitled to recover as
aforesaid, any statute of limitation to the contrary
notwithstanding:
provided, however, that it be shown to
the satisfaction of the court that neither Sterling T. Austin,
Senior, nor any of his surviving representatives gave any aid or
comfort to the late rebellion, but were throughout the war loyal to
the government of the United States."
In
Voorhees v.
Jackson, 10 Pet. 449,
35 U. S. 471,
certain acts required to be done previous to a sale were prescribed
by a proviso, and were held to be conditions precedent, it being
stated by Mr. Justice Baldwin that the effect of a proviso in deeds
and laws is to declare that the grant made shall not operate, or
the authority conferred shall not be exercised, unless in the case
provided.
"The office of a proviso, generally," said Mr. Justice Story in
Minis v. United
States, 15 Pet. 423,
40 U. S.
445,
"is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to
qualify or restrain its generalities, or to exclude some possible
ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not
intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview."
While we concede that the law does not attach a fixed and
invariable meaning to a proviso, we think it clear that this
proviso negatived the authority granted beyond the limit
Page 155 U. S. 432
defined. It operated upon the entire enacting clause, and made
loyalty a jurisdictional fact, since the consent to the prosecution
of the suit was given upon the condition that that fact should be
established. The Court of Claims was vested with jurisdiction to
adjust the claim and render judgment, and the representatives of
Austin were declared entitled to recover, notwithstanding the
two-year or the six-year bar, provided Austin were shown, to the
satisfaction of the court, not to have given any aid or comfort to
the late rebellion, and to have been loyal throughout the war to
the government of the United States, and not otherwise, and the
effect of the proviso cannot be confined to the right of recovery
merely.
Congress, in making this requirement, in no respect attempted to
defeat the operation of the President's proclamation of fifteen
years before, which could not control the power of Congress in the
matter of giving or withholding jurisdiction. In declining to
bestow jurisdiction in favor of pardoned offenders, whose claims
were barred, Congress did not deny its proper constitutional effect
to amnesty. To whom the privilege of suit should be accorded was
for Congress alone to determine.
It is contended that the words in reference to the establishment
of loyalty are in substance the same as those used in the third
section of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, and that
Congress must be held to have employed them in the Austin Act in
view of the interpretation of the former act by the decisions of
the courts of the United States, and that that interpretation
became as much a part of the Austin Act as if written out there. If
this were so, it would be difficult to assign any reason for the
insertion of the proviso, so far as Austin was concerned, for it
would be made to read, "provided, however, that it be shown to the
satisfaction of the court that Austin was loyal in fact," although
the amnesty proclamations have rendered that immaterial.
But it is not so. Undoubtedly Congress framed this act with due
regard to the state of decision under the prior act, and hence,
instead of making proof of loyalty an integral part of claimant's
case, with his ownership of the property and his right to the
proceeds, as in the Captured and Abandoned Property
Page 155 U. S. 433
Act, it made the establishment of loyalty in fact, as
contradistinguished from innocence in law produced by pardon, a
prerequisite to jurisdiction. Consent to be sued was given only on
this condition.
Nor do we perceive any ground for imputing the intention to
Congress to revive the Captured and Abandoned Property Act for the
purposes of this action. This is not the case of the revival of a
law by express reenactment, or by the repeal of a repealing clause;
and, if such had been the intention of Congress, no reason suggests
itself why Congress should not have unequivocally said so.
Again, it is argued that because in the fourth section of the
general act of March 3, 1883, the fact of loyalty was stated to be
"a jurisdictional fact," therefore the proviso of the Austin Act
should not be construed to have that effect, because, while the
same language was used as to the existence of loyalty, its
establishment was not in terms expressed to be jurisdictional. But
the structure of the two acts was different, and required different
treatment, and the special act cannot properly be construed as if
it were a general act and part of a general system, and the change
of phraseology in this particular significant. On the contrary, as
we have no doubt that the effect of the proviso is such as we have
attributed to it, we think the argument for the government not
unreasonable that Congress, in employing the same language in both
acts as to the condition of loyalty, did so in effectuation of a
common object to be attained by the requirement.
As the President's proclamation could neither give jurisdiction
to nor take it away from the Court of Claims, and Congress had the
power to determine what classes of persons should be recognized in
that court, and over what claims its jurisdiction should be
exercised, we are of opinion that the court rightly held it to be
its duty to determine, as a preliminary question, whether the
decedent had given any aid or comfort to the late rebellion, or was
loyal throughout the war to the government of the United States,
and, having found that he was not thus loyal properly dismissed the
petition.
Judgment affirmed.