P. being arrested in Texas on a requisition from the Governor of
Alabama for his extradition for trial in Alabama on an indictment
for embezzlement and larceny, sought his discharge through a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground of the invalidity of the indictment
under the laws of Alabama. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
decided that as it appeared that P. was charged by an indictment in
Alabama with the commission of an offense there, and that all the
other prerequisites for his extradition had been complied with, he
should be extradited, leaving the courts of Alabama to decide
whether the indictment was sufficient, and whether the statute of
that state was in violation of the Constitution of the United
States.
Held that this decision did not deny to P. any
right secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and did not erroneously dispose of a federal question.
Motion to dismiss or affirm.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
George A. Pearce was arrested in the State of Texas on an
executive warrant issued by the governor of that state, upon the
requisition of the Governor of the State of Alabama, to be
delivered up to the State of Alabama to answer two indictments
against him in the City Court of Mobile, Alabama, each charging him
with embezzlement and grand larceny, and while in the custody of
the agent of the State of Alabama to be transported to Mobile for
trial upon said indictments, he sued out a writ of habeas corpus
before the judge of the 42d District of
Page 155 U. S. 312
the State of Texas, praying, for the reasons therein stated, to
be discharged. On the hearing of the petition, the district judge
refused to discharge Pearce, and remanded him to the custody of the
agent. Pearce thereupon appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals
of the State of Texas, the court of last resort in criminal
matters, where the judgment below was affirmed. 32 Tex.Crim.App.
301.
The grounds on which the relator contended that he was entitled
to be discharged were, as stated by the court of appeals, that the
indictments were insufficient to authorize his extradition because
it was not alleged therein that the offenses were committed in the
State of Alabama and in violation of her laws; that the indictments
were wholly void, in that no time or place was laid therein, and it
did not appear where the offenses were committed, nor that they
were not long since barred. Relator further showed that he had been
a citizen of Texas for more than three years, and that his
whereabouts were known to interested parties in Alabama, this proof
being made under the statute of limitations, presumably of Texas,
as it did not appear how long the offenses were committed prior to
the February term, 1889, of the Mobile City Court at which term the
indictments were found, nor what was the statute of limitations in
Alabama, if any, for embezzlement and theft. The relator did not
deny that he was a fugitive from justice within the rule on that
subject, or raise any issue thereon. The record showed the
requisition made by the Governor of Alabama, copies of the
indictments duly certified, and the warrant of the governor of
Texas, and, in effect, the relator relied for his discharge
entirely upon the invalidity of the indictments.
The district judge certified that on the hearing below he had
examined the laws of the State of Alabama, and found the
indictments sufficient thereunder, or "at least not void."
An opinion was filed in the court of appeals by Simkins, J., in
which it was held that any indictment which, under the laws of the
demanding state, sufficiently charges the crime, will sustain a
requisition, even though insufficient under the laws of the asylum
state; that in this case there was no question as to the nature of
the crimes charged, and that they were
Page 155 U. S. 313
offenses against the laws of Alabama; that indictments
dispensing with the allegations of time and venue in conformity
with the Code of Alabama had been sustained by judicial decision in
that state,
Noles v. State, 24 Ala. 693;
Thompson v.
State, 25 Ala. 41, and were not necessarily fatally defective
in every state of the Union, whatever its statutes or forms of
proceeding. The majority of the court did not concur in all the
propositions stated in the opinion, but expressed their views as
follows:
"We desire to modify certain propositions stated in the opinion
of Judge Simkins. It is intimated, if not stated directly, that the
relator would have the right to show by proper evidence that the
indictment in substance was not sufficient under the laws of the
demanding state. Our position upon this question is that if it
reasonably appears upon the trial of the habeas corpus that the
relator is charged by indictment in the demanding state, whether
the indictment be sufficient or not under the law of that state,
the court trying the habeas corpus case will not discharge the
relator because of substantial defects in the indictment under the
laws of the demanding state. To require this would entail upon the
court an investigation of the sufficiency of the indictment in the
demanding state, when the true rule is that if it appears to the
court that he is charged by an indictment with an offense, all
other prerequisites being complied with, the applicant should be
extradited. We are not discussing the character of such proof; this
must be made by a certified copy of the indictment, etc."
It was not disputed that the indictments were in substantial
conformity with the statute of Alabama in that behalf, and their
sufficiency as a matter of technical pleading would not be inquired
into on habeas corpus.
Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U.
S. 642. Nor was there any contention as to the proper
demand having been made by the executive authority of the state
from whence the petitioner had departed, or in respect of the
discharge of the duty imposed by the Constitution and laws of the
United States on the executive authority of the asylum state to
cause the surrender. The question resolved itself, therefore, into
one of the validity of the statute on the ground
Page 155 U. S. 314
of its repugnancy to the Constitution, and the court of appeals
declined to decide in favor of its validity. And if it could be
said upon the record that any right under the Constitution had been
specially set up and claimed by plaintiff in error at the proper
time and in the proper way, the state court did not decide against
such right, for the denial of the right depended upon a decision in
favor of the validity of the statute. What the state court did was
to leave the question as to whether the statute was in violation of
the Constitution of the United States, and the indictments
insufficient accordingly, to the demanding state. Its action in
that regard simply remitted to the courts of Alabama the duty of
protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his constitutional
rights, and if any of those rights should be denied him, which is
not to be presumed, be could then seek his remedy in this
Court.
We cannot discover that the court of appeals, in declining to
pass upon the question raised in advance of the courts of Alabama,
denied to plaintiff in error any right secured to him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or that the court, in
announcing that conclusion, erroneously disposed of a federal
question.
Judgment affirmed.