A circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction to hear
and determine, on appeal from the Board of General Appraisers, the
questions of law and of fact involved in a decision of that Board
sustaining the action of a collector of customs in exacting a
charge for gauging molasses under the provisions of Rev.Stat. §
3023.
Giving to the Act of March 3, 1591, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, to
establish circuit courts of appeals, taken as a whole, a reasonable
construction, it is, held:
(1) That if the jurisdiction of the circuit court is in issue
and decided in favor of the defendant, as that disposes of the
case, the plaintiff should have the question certified and take his
appeal or writ of error directly to this Court.
(2) That if the question of jurisdiction is in issue, and the
jurisdiction sustained, and then judgment or decree is rendered in
favor of the defendant on the merits, the plaintiff who has
maintained the jurisdiction, must appeal to the circuit court of
appeals, where, if the question of jurisdiction arises, the circuit
court of appeals may certify it.
(3) That if the question of jurisdiction is in issue, and the
jurisdiction sustained, and judgment on the merits is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, then the defendant can elect either to have
the question certified and come directly to this Court or to carry
the whole case to the circuit court of appeals, and the question of
jurisdiction can be certified by that court.
(4) That if in the case last supposed the plaintiff has ground
of complaint in respect of the judgment he has recovered, he may
also carry the case to the circuit court of appeals on the merits,
and this he may do by way of cross-appeal or writ of error if the
defendant has taken the case there, or independently, if the
defendant has carried the case to this Court on the question of
jurisdiction alone, and in this instance the circuit court of
appeals will suspend a decision upon the merits until the question
of jurisdiction has been determined.
(5) That the same observations are applicable where a plaintiff
objects to the jurisdiction and is, or both parties are,
dissatisfied with the judgment on the merits.
The docket title of this case being wrong, it is corrected by
this Court.
Page 155 U. S. 110
August 15, 1890, G. A. Jahn & Co. imported into New York
some casks of molasses, which on the 28th of that month they
withdrew from warehouse and exported to Montreal for the benefit of
the drawback. Upon such withdrawal and exportation, the collector
of customs at New York exacted a charge of ten cents per cask for
gauging the molasses under the provisions of section 3023 of the
Revised Statutes. The importers protested against the charge for
gauging, claiming that it had been abolished by the twenty-second
section of the act entitled "An act to simplify the laws in
relation to the collection of the revenue," approved June 10, 1890.
26 Stat. 131, 140, c. 407.
The matter was duly taken before the Board of General
Appraisers, which sustained the action of the collector, and the
importers appealed to the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York. The circuit court reversed the
decision of the Board of General Appraisers, and held that the
gauging charge exacted by the collector had been abolished.
Thereupon the United States appealed to the circuit court of
appeals, and assigned for error that the circuit court erred in
reversing the decision of the Board of General Appraisers, for the
reason that the decision of the board was final and conclusive, and
that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to make any decree or
order in said proceeding. The jurisdiction of the circuit court was
first challenged upon the appeal. The circuit court of appeals
certified to this Court the question:
"Whether the United States circuit court had jurisdiction to
hear and determine the questions of law and of fact involved in
said decision of the Board of General Appraisers."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was docketed here under the title "In the
Page 155 U. S. 111
Matter of the Application of Gustave A. Jahn & Co. upon
certain merchandise entered by the
Alps,' August 15, 1890;" but
the correct title is "United States v. Gustave v. Jahn et
al.," for the reasons given by MR. JUSTICE GRAY in
United
States v. Hopewell, 51 F. 798.
Counsel for the importers denies that the circuit court of
appeals had authority to certify the question of the jurisdiction
of the circuit court to this Court, because that question was not
in issue in the circuit court or raised in any way, and if it had
been in issue, it could only be certified by the circuit court to
this Court; that as it was not put in issue, and not certified, and
an appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals, the action of
the circuit court in proceeding to judgment was a final
determination in favor of its own jurisdiction, which could not be
revised by the circuit court of appeals, though under instruction
from this Court.
The Act of March 3, 1891, establishing the circuit courts of
appeals, provides, in its fourth section, that
"the review, by appeal, by writ of error, or otherwise, from the
existing circuit courts shall be had only in the Supreme Court of
the United States or in the circuit courts of appeals hereby
established according to the provisions of this act regulating the
same,"
in section five that
"appeals or writs of error may be taken from . . . the existing
circuit courts direct to the supreme court . . . in any case in
which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases the
question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the supreme
court from the court below for decision;"
in section six that the circuit courts of appeals
"shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal or by
writ of error final decision in the . . . existing circuit courts
in all cases other than those provided for in the preceding section
of this act, unless otherwise provided by law, and the judgments or
decrees of the circuit courts of appeals shall be final . . . in
all cases . . . arising . . . under the revenue laws, . . .
excepting that in every such subject within its appellate
jurisdiction the circuit court of appeals at any time may certify
to the Supreme Court of the
Page 155 U. S. 112
United States any questions or propositions of law concerning
which it desires the instruction of that court for its proper
decision, and thereupon the supreme court may either give its
instruction on the questions and propositions certified to it which
shall be binding upon the circuit courts of appeals in such case,
or it may require that the whole record and cause may be sent up to
it for its consideration, and thereupon shall decide the whole
matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought
there for review by writ of error or appeal,"
and excepting also that the supreme court, in the absence of
request for instruction, might, by certiorari or otherwise, require
any such case to be certified to it for review.
It thus appears that the revisory power of this Court and of the
circuit courts of appeals under the act is to be exercised only in
accordance with its provisions, and that the circuit courts of
appeals exercise appellate jurisdiction under the sixth section in
all cases other than those in which the jurisdiction of this Court
is exercised under the fifth, among which cases are included all
revenue cases -- that is, cases under laws imposing duties on
imports or tonnage or providing in terms for revenue (
United
States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681),
which can only come here on the merits on certificate or
certiorari, yet if in such a case a final judgment were rendered
because of want of jurisdiction, that judgment could be reviewed by
this Court upon a certificate of the circuit court, while if
jurisdiction were sustained and the merits adjudicated, although
the question of jurisdiction might be brought up directly, the
circuit court of appeals would undoubtedly have jurisdiction to
review the case upon the merits. The provision that any case in
which the question of jurisdiction is in issue may be taken
directly to this Court necessarily extends to other cases than
those in which the final judgment rests on the ground of want of
jurisdiction, for in them that would be the sole question, and the
certificate, though requisite to our jurisdiction under the
statute, would not be, in itself, essential, however valuable in
the interest of brevity of record. But in such other cases, the
requirement that the question of jurisdiction alone should be
certified for decision was intended to operate as a limitation
Page 155 U. S. 113
upon the jurisdiction of this Court of the entire case and of
all questions involved in it, a jurisdiction which can be exercised
in any other class of cases taken directly to this Court, under
section 5.
Horner v. United States, 143 U.
S. 570,
143 U. S. 577.
The act certainly did not contemplate two appeals or writs of error
at the same time by the same party to two different courts, nor
does it seem to us that it was intended to compel a waiver of the
objection to the jurisdiction altogether or of the consideration of
the merits. By taking a case directly to this Court on the question
of jurisdiction, the contention on the merits would be waived; but
it does not follow that the jurisdictional question could not be
considered if the case were taken to the circuit court of appeals.
The act was passed to facilitate the prompt disposition of cases in
this Court and to relieve it from the oppressive burden of general
litigation, but the rights of review by appeal or writ of error,
and of invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this tribunal, were
sought to be amply secured, and should not be circumscribed by too
narrow a construction.
If, in the case at bar, the question of jurisdiction had been
raised by the United States in the circuit court, and the
jurisdiction sustained, and the decision on the merits had then
been rendered against the government, would the United States have
been compelled to waive their contention on the merits, and have
the question of jurisdiction certified to this Court, or would they
have waived the question of jurisdiction by taking the case to the
circuit court of appeals? We do not think the act involves such a
dilemma, but, on the contrary, are of opinion that the government
would have had the right to carry the cause to the court of
appeals, which could have then certified the question of
jurisdiction to this Court for determination. Of course, the power
to certify assumes the power to decide; but, if decided there, by
certiorari, when necessary, the same review could be obtained here
as on certificate for instruction; and, although the question of
jurisdiction was not put in issue in the circuit court, still, as
the objection in the circuit court of appeals went to jurisdiction
over the subject matter, no omission in that regard could
Page 155 U. S. 114
supply absolute want of power, and the circuit court of appeals
was bound to take notice of the question.
It is conceded that the United States assigned errors on the
merits as well as the error under consideration, and as the
question of jurisdiction lay at the threshold, and the intent of
the Act of March 3, 1891, was that that question should be
determined by this Court, the circuit court of appeals properly
suspended any consideration of the case upon the merits until that
question could be determined upon certificate. This was in
accordance with the early case of
McLish v. Roff,
141 U. S. 661, in
which it was held that the writ of error or appeal could be taken
only after final judgment, except in the cases specified in section
seven of the act, and Mr. Justice Lamar, delivering the opinion,
said:
"When that judgment is rendered, the party against whom it is
rendered must elect whether he will take his writ of error or
appeal to the Supreme Court upon the question of jurisdiction
alone, or to the circuit court of appeals upon the whole case. If
the latter, then the circuit court of appeals may, if it deem
proper, certify the question of jurisdiction to this Court."
The same course was pursued in
New Orleans v. Benjamin,
153 U. S. 411. The
case was one in which the question of jurisdiction was raised in
the circuit court, the jurisdiction maintained, and judgment
rendered on the merits. The defendant did not ask that the question
of jurisdiction be certified to this Court by the circuit court,
but carried the whole case to the circuit court of appeals, and
that court certified to us the questions involving the
jurisdiction, which were accordingly answered.
Giving the act a reasonable construction, taken as a whole, we
conclude: (1) if the jurisdiction of the circuit court is in issue,
and decide in favor of the defendant, as that disposes of the case,
the plaintiff should have the question certified, and take his
appeal or writ of error directly to this Court; (2) If the question
of jurisdiction is in issue, and the jurisdiction sustained, and
then judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the defendant on
the merits, the plaintiff, who has maintained the jurisdiction,
must appeal to the circuit court of
Page 155 U. S. 115
appeals, where, if the question of jurisdiction arises, the
circuit court of appeals may certify it; (3) if the question of
jurisdiction is in issue, and the jurisdiction sustained, and
judgment on the merits is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, then
the defendant can elect either to have the question certified and
come directly to this Court, or to carry the whole case to the
circuit court of appeals, and the question of jurisdiction can be
certified by that court; (4) if, in the case last supposed, the
plaintiff has ground of complaint in respect of the judgment he has
recovered, he may also carry the case to the circuit court of
appeals on the merits, and this he may do by way of cross-appeal or
writ of error if the defendant has taken the case there, or
independently if the defendant has carried the case to this Court
on the question of jurisdiction alone, and in this instance the
circuit court of appeals will suspend a decision upon the merits
until the question of jurisdiction has been determined; (5) the
same observations are applicable where a plaintiff objects to the
jurisdiction, and is, or both parties are, dissatisfied with the
judgment on the merits.
Glaspell's Case illustrates this situation, though
arising under somewhat different circumstances. Glaspell brought an
action in the District Court of Stutsman County, in the then
Territory of Dakota, against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
and recovered a verdict of $12,545.43. After the State of North
Dakota was admitted into the Union, including Stutsman County, the
defendant petitioned for the removal of the case into the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota, and it
was removed accordingly. Glaspell moved to remand, which motion was
denied. The circuit court then granted a new trial, and the case
was retried in that court, Glaspell insisting throughout upon his
objection to the jurisdiction, and resulted in a verdict for the
plaintiff of $1,120, upon which judgment was entered with costs.
From that judgment, Glaspell prosecuted a writ of error on the 16th
day of June, 1891, from this Court, upon the question of
jurisdiction. While his writ of error was pending, July 30, 1891,
the defendant, upon alleging errors occurring upon the trial
Page 155 U. S. 116
on the merits, sued out a writ of error from the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and Glaspell filed in that court
a motion to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction for the reason that the action was pending
on the writ of error from this Court, which was duly issued and
served before the writ from the circuit court of appeals was
allowed. But the motion to dismiss was overruled and the cause
continued, awaiting our decision upon the question of jurisdiction.
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Glaspell, 49 F. 482.
This Court subsequently held that the Circuit Court for the
District of North Dakota had no jurisdiction, and reversed the
judgment and remanded the case with directions to remand it to the
state court.
Glaspell v. Northern Pacific Railroad,
144 U. S. 211.
In
Carey v. Houston & Texas Railway, 150 U.
S. 170, it appeared that two appeals had been prayed
from the decree by the losing party, one to this Court and one to
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which appeals
had been severally allowed and duly perfected, but as we held for
reasons therein given that we had no jurisdiction, the circumstance
became unimportant.
In
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Amato, 144 U.
S. 465, a suit was brought in the supreme court of New
York against a railroad corporation created by an act of Congress
to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff
from the negligence of the defendant, and was removed by the
defendant into the circuit court of the United States, where a
trial was had, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff. The defendant took a writ of error from the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the
judgment. On a writ of error taken by the defendant from this Court
to the circuit court of appeals, a motion was made by the plaintiff
to dismiss or affirm, and it was ruled, among other things, that as
it did not appear by the record that on the trial in the circuit
court the defendant made any objection to the jurisdiction of that
court, and the petition for removal recognized the jurisdiction,
the plaintiff could not be
Page 155 U. S. 117
heard to assert as a ground for the motion to dismiss that the
defendant might have taken a writ of error from this Court to the
circuit court under section five of the said act of 1891, and had,
by failing to do so, waived this right.
We are of opinion that the circuit court of appeals was in the
proper exercise of jurisdiction in certifying the question which it
did, and that our jurisdiction to answer it is properly
invoked.
The decision in
United States v. Klingenberg,
153 U. S. 93,
covers the case, and requires
The question certified to be answered in the affirmative,
and it is so ordered.