When a vessel, libeled for smuggling and for violations of the
Chinese Exclusion Act, is discharged on giving the bond required by
law, it may be again libeled in another district for similar
offenses alleged to have been committed prior to the offences
charged in the first libel; but if both suits proceed to judgment,
there can be but one forfeiture of the vessel.
On June 7, 1893, in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Washington, the United States libeled the steamship
Haytian Republic for violations of the Chinese Exclusion
Act and for smuggling opium. It was averred that the violations of
the Exclusion Act occurred at the following dates: first, September
20, 1892; second, October 8, 1892; third, October 12, 1892; fourth,
October 15 and 16, 1892; fifth, November 1, 1892; sixth, November
26, 1892; seventh, December 12, 1892; eighth, December 13, 1892;
ninth, January 2, 1893; tenth, January 26, 1893; eleventh, February
2, 1893; twelfth, March 28, 1893; thirteenth, May 11, 1893.
The offenses of opium smuggling, according to the libel, were
committed as follows:
Page 154 U. S. 119
November 21, 1892 at Portland, Oregon, 2,000 pounds, of the
value of $22,000; December 7, 1892 at St. Johns, on the Columbia
River, 1,000 pounds, of the value of $11,000.
The prayer was for the forfeiture of the vessel on account of
the violations of the Exclusion Act, and for judgment for $32,000,
the value of the opium, with recognition of a lien on the ship for
that amount.
The Northwest Loan and Trust Company claimed the vessel, and,
after due appraisement, she was bonded.
On the 6th day of July, 1893, in the District Court of the
United States for the District of Oregon, the United States again
libeled the same steamship for violations of the Chinese Exclusion
Act and for smuggling opium. In this libel it was alleged that the
violations of the act were committed at the following dates: 1st,
October 29, 1892; 2d, June 14, 1893, and 3d, June 28, 1893, all at
the port of Portland, Oregon. And the opium smuggling was charged
as follows:
1st, October 29, 1892 at Portland, Oregon, 1,640 cans,
containing 820 pounds, of the value of $9,840; 2d, December 27,
1892 at St. Johns, Oregon, 1,000 pounds, valued at $12,000.
The prayer of this second libel was for forfeiture of the vessel
for the violations of the Exclusion Act, and for judgment for
$28,840, the value of the opium, with recognition of a lien on the
vessel for that amount.
On the 14th of July, 1893, an amended libel was filed charging
the smuggling of opium: 1st, on July 28, 1892, Willamette River,
300 pounds of opium, of the value of $3,300; 2d, on August 30,
1892, on the Columbia River, near the mouth of the Willamette
River, of 800 pounds, of the value of $8,800; 3d, on the second of
September, 1892, near Swan Island, 1,400 pounds, worth $15,400;
4th, on the 27th of January, 1893 at Portland, Oregon, 1,200
pounds, worth $11,220, and 5th, on the 22d of February, 1893 at
Portland, Oregon, 900 pounds, value $9,900.
The prayer of the amended libel was also for the forfeiture of
the vessel and for a decree for the penalty to the value of the
opium, which was $48,620, with lien upon the vessel.
The original and amended libel claimed therefore the
forfeiture
Page 154 U. S. 120
of the vessel for three violations of the Chinese Exclusion Act,
the first occurring in October, 1892, and the last two after June
7, 1893, and also sought to enforce against the vessel an aggregate
penalty of $77,460 for seven acts of opium smuggling, which, they
charged, had taken place at various dates between the 28th of July,
1892, and the 22d of February, 1893.
Thus, all the offenses against the Chinese Exclusion Act charged
by these libels except the two last occurred prior to June 7, 1893,
the date of the filing of the libel in the District Court of
Washington, and all the offenses of opium smuggling therein charged
occurred prior to the filing of the suit in Washington.
The Northwest Loan and Trust Company appeared as claimant in the
new suit. It excepted to all the averments as to violations of the
Exclusion Act and smuggling which, according to the allegations,
were committed before the filing of the suit in the District of
Washington. Its exception therefore covered all the charges of
smuggling opium and one of the charges of violation of the Chinese
Exclusion Act. To the two averments of violation of the act which
were not excepted to an answer was filed.
The court sustained the exception and dismissed the libels
except as to the two charges of violation of the Exclusion Act
subsequent to the filing of the suit in the Washington District. As
to these, it held that the averments of the libel stated no
violation of the laws of the United States.
The case was taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, where the judgment of the district court was
affirmed. This action of the circuit court of appeals was brought
up for review under a writ of certiorari.
Page 154 U. S. 123
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
All question as to the correctness of the rulings below, that
the two alleged violations of the Exclusion Act after June, 1893,
constituted no offense against the laws of the United States, was
waived in the discussion at bar.
The first question, then, for consideration is was the action of
the court correct in dismissing all the charges, both as to the
introduction of Chinese and as to the importation of opium prior to
June 7, 1893, because of the pendency of the suit in the District
of Washington?
Pretermitting all question as to whether the pendency of suits
in district courts of the United States sitting in different states
is a subject matter of the defense "other suit pending," the issue
is did the suit in Washington prevent the
Page 154 U. S. 124
bringing of suit in Oregon? Both the introductions of Chinese
and the importations of opium which were averred in the suit in
Oregon were distinct and different acts from those charged in the
libel filed in the district court of Washington. The elementary
principle which governs the availability of the plea of "other suit
pending" was thus stated in
Watson v.
Jones, 13 Wall. 715:
"When the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat another,
the case must be the same. There must be the same parties, or at
least such as represent the same interests, there must be the same
rights asserted and the same relief prayed for, the relief must be
founded upon the same facts, and the title, or essential basis, of
the relief sought must be the same."
Tested by these principles, it is obvious that the plea of
pendency of the suit in Washington was not available here. There
were the same parties, but not the same rights asserted, and the
claim of relief was not founded upon the same facts. In the case
just cited, it was said that the true test of the sufficiency of a
plea of "other suit pending" in another forum was the legal
efficacy of the first suit, when finally disposed of, as "the thing
adjudged," regarding the matters at issue in the second suit.
Dick v. Gilmer, 4 La.Ann. 520;
Bischoff v.
Theurer, 8 La.Ann. 15.
The efficiency of the test thus applied results from the fact
that the elements constituting the thing adjudged and those
necessary for the plea of "other suit pending" are identical.
It is obvious that the decision of the suit in Washington would
not have constituted the thing adjudged as to the matters averred
in the suit in the District of Oregon. The charges were different.
If the court in Washington had found that at the times and places
named, the vessel had not smuggled opium, and had not illegally
imported Chinese, and adjudged accordingly, such judgment would not
have affected the question of whether or not similar offenses had
been committed at other times and places.
It is contended, however, that, although the two suits involved
the assertion of different rights, as the rights asserted
Page 154 U. S. 125
in the last suit were in existence at the time the first suit
was brought, therefore they should have been asserted in that suit,
and could not be afterwards relied upon in a separate suit in a
different forum. In support of this proposition, we are referred to
the case of
Stark v. Starr, 94 U. S.
477, and this language is quoted from the opinion in
that case:
"It is undoubtedly a settled question that a party seeking to
enforce a claim legally or equitably must present to the court,
either in pleading or in proof, or both, all the grounds upon which
he expects a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split
up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a
portion of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and
leave the rest to be presented in a second suit if the first fail.
There would be no end to litigation if such a practice were
permissible."
This statement, however, is qualified by the following, which is
not included in the citation:
"But this principle does not require distinct causes of action
-- that is to say, distinct matters, each of which would authorize
by itself independent relief -- to be presented in a single suit,
though they existed at the same time, and might be considered
together."
The qualification states the elementary rule. One of the tests
laid down for the purpose of determining whether or not the causes
of action should have been joined in one suit is whether the
evidence necessary to prove one cause of action would establish the
other.
Crips v. Talvande, 4 McCord 20.
It is evident that proof showing that a particular lot of opium
had been smuggled on a particular day, or a particular number of
Chinese had been imported at a particular time, would have no
relevancy or tendency to prove the smuggling of a different lot of
opium at a different time or the importation of a different number
of Chinese at a different date.
It was conceded in argument that where a vessel had been bonded
and then committed an offense which made her liable to forfeiture,
she could be proceeded against in a court other than where the bond
was given. This admission practically involves the whole point at
issue here. If the
Page 154 U. S. 126
vessel, after the bond had been given, was not in the custody of
the court of first resort to the extent of preventing a second
libel from being filed against her in another court for a
subsequently arising offense, she was not in the custody of the
court so as to prevent a seizure for an offense which existed at
the time of the first libel, and which the libellants were under no
legal necessity to join therein. The attempted distinction rests
upon the theory that, after bonding, the vessel was in the custody
of the court for the purposes of all claims existing at the time of
the bonding, and out of the custody of the court as to all claims
arising subsequent thereto. But if the vessel was in the custody of
the court at all, it was there for all purposes, and the admission
that it was not in the custody of the first court so as to preclude
proceedings against it in another forum under certain circumstances
carries with it the concession that it was not in that custody to
such an extent as to affect the question of proceedings elsewhere
under any circumstances whatever.
It is true that where a fraudulent appraisement has been had or
a fraudulent or illegal bond has been given in an admiralty
proceeding, the court has the power to recall the vessel for the
purpose of requiring an honest appraisement and of exacting a legal
bond.
United States v. Ames, 99 U. S.
35;
The Union, 4 Blatchford 90;
The
Favorite, 2 Flippin 87;
The Thales, 3 Ben. 327; 2
Parsons on Shipping 411. This special power, however, to meet a
particular contingency does not affect the general rule or imply
that the vessel, after a legal bond has been given, remains in the
exclusive custody and jurisdiction of the court.
The Union,
supra.
It is urged that as in the first case the issue was the
forfeiture of the vessel, and this involved her entire value, and
as the bond given represented that entirety, the existence of the
bond in the Washington court precluded the raising of any question
concerning the liability of the vessel to forfeiture elsewhere. The
fallacy here lies in supposing that the bond took the place of the
entire value of the vessel for any other purpose than the subject
matter of the suit in which the bond
Page 154 U. S. 127
was given. The claim for forfeiture alleged in the cause wherein
the bond was given was alone covered by the bond, and therefore the
assertion of a right to forfeiture for another and distinct cause
was not embraced in its condition, although its penalty was the
full value of the vessel. The authorities are clear upon this
point. In
The Wild Ranger, decided by Dr. Lushington, the
facts were these: a collision occurred between the
Wild
Ranger and the
Coleroon. The
Wild Ranger was
libeled by the owners of the other vessel, who claimed �3,500, and
was released under bond. Subsequently she was libeled by the owners
of the cargo of the
Coleroon. In this last proceeding, a
decree of condemnation was rendered, the vessel was sold, and the
proceeds of sale were paid into court. The price of the sale
exceeded the sum of the damages awarded to the owners of the cargo.
Pending these proceedings under the second libel, the damages due
to the owners of the
Coleroon were ascertained to be
greater than the sum of the bond given in their case. The owners of
the
Coleroon thereupon claimed the balance realized by the
sale of the
Wild Ranger over and above the amount which
had been decreed to the owners of the cargo. Upon this state of
facts, Dr. Lushington thus ruled:
"In order to justify me in directing these proceeds to be paid
to the owners of the
Coleroon, it is not sufficient that
they should show that the debt is due them from the owners of the
Wild Ranger. They must either prove that they have a lien
upon the proceeds or produce a statute authorizing me to apply
these proceeds in satisfaction of the judgment they have obtained.
Now there is no lien on these proceeds by reason of the action's
being in the nature of an action
in rem. The proceeds of
the ship sold are in legal consideration the same as the ship
itself, and the ship was wholly released from all claim by the
owners of the
Coleroon from the moment that they took
bail."
2 New.Rep. 402, 403.
In the
T. W. Snook, 51 F. 244, the
Snook had
been libeled by the
Georgia, and released under bond for
$4,000, double the amount of the
Georgia's claim. After
the
Page 154 U. S. 128
release of the
Snook, the Continental Insurance
Company, which had paid for a loss on the cargo of the
Georgia, intervened and asserted its right to be
reimbursed for its expenditure out of the balance of the bond over
and above the claim of the
Georgia. The court (Blodgett,
J.) said:
"I do not think this application on the part of the insurance
company should prevail, my reasons being briefly that at the time
the bond was given on which the
Snook was released, no
claim was made in the proceedings except for damage to the hull of
the
Georgia, and in fact it was not until about two months
after this bond had been given that the insurance company paid the
loss on the cargo, and thereby acquired any right of intervention
or subrogation. The sureties on the bond must be presumed to have
signed it on the understanding that their liability was only to
satisfy the cause of action set out in the libel, which was for the
damages to the hull of the
Georgia."
See also The Union, supra.
There is no force in the argument that, as the suit in
Washington claimed the forfeiture of the vessel, and the suit in
Oregon claimed the same thing, there was a practical identity
between them. The fallacy results from a failure to distinguish
between the right and the remedy. True, the remedy sought in
Washington was the forfeiture of the vessel, and the same remedy
was invoked in Oregon, but the causes of action upon which the
remedy was prayed in the two cases were entirely different. As we
have seen, not only identity of relief but identity of cause of
action is essential to the plea of pending suit, and both are also
necessary to the efficacy of the plea of the thing adjudged.
It is urged that as the matters could have been joined in the
Washington suit, therefore they would have been concluded by a
decree rendered therein, the argument being that a judgment
concludes not only the matters actually in controversy, but all
those which might have been adjudged.
In support of this contention we are referred to
Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, to
Beloit v.
Morgan, 7 Wall. 619, and other authorities. It is
unnecessary to examine these in detail. The proposition which they
support
Page 154 U. S. 129
is well stated in an excerpt from Freeman on Judgments quoted in
the brief of counsel:
"An adjudication is final and conclusive not only as to the
matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the
parties might have litigated and have decided as incident to or
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and
every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original
action, both in respect to matters of claim and of defense."
If the deduction drawn by counsel from this and similar language
were true, then a judgment upon one cause of action would be
conclusive as to every other existing at the time, although not
embraced in the suit and although the parties were not obliged to
join it therein. This would destroy the right of parties to sue
separately upon distinct causes of action, and would be subversive
of the entire theory of the thing adjudged. The mistake lies in
construing the words "which might have been raised" as applying to
a cause of action other than the cause of action embraced in the
suit. In other words, the doctrine is that the thing adjudged
includes not only the direct results of the cause of action which
the judgment concludes, but also all things necessarily incident to
and growing out of that cause which the parties might have joined
in the suit.
Dowell v. Applegate, 152
U. S. 343. Of course, whilst concluding that the
separate causes of the action here under consideration need not
have been joined in one suit, and that the suit in Washington was
no bar to the suit in Oregon, we must not be considered as
intimating that there could be more than one forfeiture of the
vessel. The distinct charges give rise to distinct causes of
action, but the forfeiture for either would have consummated the
proceedings.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.
