The facts admitted or proved in this case show that the
plaintiff was guilty of laches in failing to file his bills for so
long a time, and it is held that they were properly dismissed by
the court below.
Laches is an equitable defense, controlled by equitable
considerations, and the lapse of time must be so great, and the
relations of the defendant to the rights such, that it would be
inequitable to permit the plaintiff to assert them where he has had
for a considerable period knowledge of their existence, or might
have acquainted himself with them by the use of reasonable
diligence.
The length of time during which a party neglects the assertion
of his rights which must pass in order to show laches varies with
the peculiar circumstances of each case, and is not subject to an
arbitrary rule.
On January 24, 1885, plaintiff filed in the District Court of
the United States for the District of West Virginia his bill of
complaint against A. G. Griffinnan, the Forest Hill Mining &
Manufacturing Company, Robert Soutter, trustee, William Wyant, and
the unknown heirs of William K. Smith, deceased. At that time,
there was no circuit court in the district, the district court
having the powers of a circuit court, but before the final
disposition of this case, a circuit court was established by the
Act of Congress of February 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 Stat. 655, and to
it the case was transferred. On November 30, 1887, the plaintiff,
by leave of court, filed an amended and supplemental bill.
Intermediate those dates, and on May 4, 1887, there was filed in
that court the records of two cases transferred from the state
circuit court of Greenbrier County, entitled, respectively, "
A.
G. Griffinnan v. S. C. Long et al." and "
F. B. Chewning v.
J. F. Cowan et al." The plaintiff, Halstead, had been made
party defendant in those cases, and notified by publication, and
after decrees by default against him, he appeared in each case by
petition, praying for an opening of the decree and a rehearing,
and, while those applications
Page 152 U. S. 413
were pending, removed the cases, as above stated, to the United
States court. To the original and supplemental bills in the case,
commenced in the district court, Griffinnan and Wyant duly
answered. Proofs were taken, and the three cases being heard
together, on May 26, 1888, a final decree was entered as
follows:
"John Halstead v. Wm. Wyant and others, in Equity. A. G.
Griffinnan v. S. C. Long and others, in Equity. F. B. Chewning v.
J. F. Cowan and others, in Equity. (Heard Together.)"
"These causes this day came on to be heard together, and were
argued by counsel; whereupon, upon consideration hereof, it is
adjudged, ordered, and decreed that the bill and amended and
supplemental bill in the first above-mentioned cause be, and the
same are hereby, dismissed, and that the defendants therein recover
of the complainant, John Halstead, their costs about their defense
in that behalf expended."
"And it is further adjudged, ordered, and decreed that the
petition for rehearing filed by said Halstead in said second and
third suits above mentioned, and the rule awarded said Halstead in
said suits against the defendant William Wyant, be each of them,
and the same are hereby, dismissed, and it is further adjudged,
ordered, and decreed that the defendants in said petition and said
rule respectively recover their costs against said Halstead, but in
taxing the costs recovered in this decree but one attorney's fee
shall be allowed."
A petition for rehearing having been denied, an appeal was taken
to this Court.
The burden of this controversy rests in these facts: on June 15,
1859, A. G. Griffinnan, W. K. Smith, and A. G. Griffinnan as
Page 152 U. S. 414
trustee, conveyed to the Forest Hill Mining & Manufacturing
Company (hereinafter called the Forest Hill Company) a tract of
land in the County of Fayette, in the then State of Virginia (now
West Virginia), containing 2,000 acres, more or less, and also
another tract and a right of way described in the deed, as
follows:
"Also a certain piece or parcel of a certain tract of land known
as the Huddleston tract, to be surveyed off the western side of
said tract by a line running from the northerly to the southerly
side of said tract, to be bounded on the south by the tract
hereinabove conveyed, and on the north by the Great Kanawha River,
and containing one hundred acres, more or less. Also the perpetual
right of way to the said party of the second part their successors
and assigns, through a tract of land known as the 'Elk Ridge'
tract, lying between the tract of 2,000 acres, hereinabove
conveyed, and Armstrong's Creek, with the privilege of the said
party of the second part of entering thereupon by their agents and
servants, and constructing upon and over the same such roads or
railroads as they may deem necessary for convenient access to and
from the lands hereby conveyed."
This Huddleston tract was conveyed by Huddleston to Griffinnan
by metes and bounds, and in the deed was estimated to contain 200
acres, though in fact it contained nearer 250 acres. It was bounded
on the north by the Kanawha River, its west line straight, but its
east line quite a zigzag, with considerable frontage on the
Kanawha, but narrowing towards the southern end, and for some
little distance towards that end bordering on the tract of 2,000
acres previously described in the deed to the Forest Hill
Company.
On the same day of the conveyance to it, the Forest Hill Company
placed a trust deed upon the property to secure the payment of
sixteen promissory notes and eighty bonds. On June 6, 1864, the
trustee, in execution of the trust and in consideration of the sum
of $3,500, conveyed the property to plaintiff. In this trustee's
deed, the description of the Huddleston tract and the right of way
is as follows:
"Also a lot, piece, or parcel of land (containing 100 acres,
Page 152 U. S. 415
more or less, provided in said deed to be surveyed off the west
side of the tract of land known as the Huddleston tract, as the
same was ascertained and bounded by the survey made subsequently to
the execution of the said deed, and in pursuance thereof) adjoining
the above; also the right of way through and across the Elk Ridge
tract, also adjoining the above, which said lands and right of way
are more fully described in a deed from William K. Smith and wife
and Andrew G. Griffinnan and wife and the said Andrew G.
Griffinnan, trustee, to the aforesaid Forest Hill Mining and
Manufacturing Company, bearing the same date as the deed or
conveyance in trust first above mentioned."
The survey thus referred to was made in the year 1859 by Thomas
S. Robson, the County Surveyor of Fayette County. By this survey, a
tract of 105 acres was set off to the Forest Hill Company, on the
west side of the Huddleston tract, but so surveyed that no part of
the land given to the company touched the 2,000-acre tract
heretofore referred to. The contention of the plaintiff was that
such survey was inaccurate in that the part set off to the Forest
Hill Company did not at any point touch the 2,000-acre tract, and
therefore did not comply with the terms of the deed, and the prayer
was that he be decreed the owner of an undivided one-half interest
in the Huddleston tract, and that a partition and new survey be
made setting off to him the one-half, so as to connect with the
aforesaid tract of 2,000 acres.
The defendant Wyant claimed to have purchased the balance of the
Huddleston tract, not set apart to the Forest Hill Company at a
judicial sale, in April, 1883 at the price of $60.50 per acre,
amounting to over $9,000; that he bought relying upon a map shown
at the sale of the commissioner which conformed to the survey made
by Robson, and in ignorance of any claim of the plaintiff; that he
entered into possession, and had expended about $7,000 in building
houses and opening mines. This commissioner's sale was by virtue of
a decree rendered in the cases heretofore referred to as
transferred from the state court and consolidated with the suit in
the district court, and in which cases prior to the decree,
plaintiff had been served by publication.
Page 152 U. S. 416
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff, by this suit, invoked the aid of a court of
equity to set aside a survey which had stood unchallenged for over
twenty-five years. Such a long delay suggests laches, and a careful
examination of the testimony satisfies us that the circuit court
did not err in sustaining this defense. The defense itself is one
which, wisely administered, is of great public utility in that it
prevents the breaking up of relations and situations long
acquiesced in, and thus induces confidence in the stability of what
is, and a willingness to improve property in possession, and at the
same time it certainly works in furtherance of justice, for so
strong is the desire of every man to have the full enjoyment of all
that is his, when a party comes into court and asserts that he has
been for many years the owner of certain rights, of whose existence
he has had full knowledge, and yet has never attempted to enforce
them, there is a strong persuasion that, if all the facts were
known, it would be found his alleged rights either never existed or
had long since ceased. We have had before us lately several cases
in which this defense has been presented, and in which the rules
determining it have been fully stated and its value clearly
demonstrated.
Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.
S. 224, and cases cited in the opinion;
Felix v.
Patrick, 145 U. S. 317;
Foster v. Mansfield, Coldwater &c. Railroad,
146 U. S. 88;
Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U.
S. 360. The length of time during which the party
neglects the assertion of his rights which must pass in order to
show
Page 152 U. S. 417
laches varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case, and
is not, like the matter of limitations, subject to an arbitrary
rule. It is an equitable defense, controlled by equitable
considerations, and the lapse of time must be so great, and the
relations of the defendant to the rights such, that it would be
inequitable to permit the plaintiff to now assert them. There must,
of course, have been knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the
existence of the rights, for there can be no laches in failing to
assert rights of which a party is wholly ignorant and whose
existence he had no reason to apprehend. And yet, as said by MR.
JUSTICE BROWN, speaking for the Court in
Foster v. Mansfield,
Coldwater &c. Railroad, 146 U. S. 88,
146 U. S.
99:
"The defense of want of knowledge on the part of one charged
with laches is one easily made, easy to prove by his own oath, and
hard to disprove, and hence the tendency of courts in recent years
has been to hold the plaintiff to a rigid compliance with the law
which demands not only that he should have been ignorant of the
fraud, but that he should have used reasonable diligence to have
informed himself of all the facts."
In this case, there is no question as to plaintiff's knowledge.
In the deeds from Griffinnan and Smith to the Forest Hill Company,
and from that company to the trustee, the description is of a piece
or parcel of a certain tract "to be surveyed off the western side
of said tract by a line running from the northerly to the southerly
side of said tract." And in the deed from the trustee to plaintiff,
which was made on June 6, 1864, the description is of a lot, piece,
or parcel of land containing 100 acres, more or less, "as the same
was ascertained and bounded by the survey made subsequently to the
execution of the said deed, and in pursuance thereof," so that in
the deed made to the corporation, of which he was a stockholder,
twenty-five years before the commencement of this suit, was a
provision for a survey, and in the deed to himself, made more than
twenty years before this suit, was a declaration that the survey
called for by the previous deed had been made. When, therefore, he
took title, he took it with notice that a survey had been made, and
would not now be heard to
Page 152 U. S. 418
say that he had no knowledge of that fact. Further, the survey
which was made by the county surveyor, Robson, was made in 1859. In
1861, the same surveyor made a plat showing the Forest Hill tract
of 2,000 acres and the Huddleston tract, as surveyed, with the
adjoining lands, which plat, or so much of it at least, as is
material is here inserted:
image:a
A mere glance at this plat shows that the Huddleston tract is so
surveyed that the part set off to the Forest Hill Company at no
point touches the 2,000-acre tract, but is separated therefrom by a
narrow strip, a part of the land reserved to Griffinnan and Smith.
Now in reference to this map, the plaintiff alleges, in this
amended and supplemental complaint, as follows:
"The map filed with the deposition of T. S. Robson, marked 'T.
S. R. No. 2,' was made from a survey made by said Robson in 1861,
and your orator believes that it shows correctly the location of
the Forest Hill tract of 2,000 acres and the Huddleston tract, and
the division made by him in 1859, and their relations to each
other. Your orator avers that he saw this map for the first time in
about 1867. It will be seen by this map, which is asked to be read
and considered as a part of this bill, that the division of the
Huddleston tract made by T. S. Robson in 1859 is so made that the
part retained by Griffinnan intercepts that part laid off to the
Forest Hill Company from the Forest Hill tract of 2,000 acres, so
that they do not join each other."
In other words, he admits that eighteen years before he brings
this suit, he saw the map which discloses the survey, and it is
apparent at a glance, as he himself alleges, that the part set off
to the Forest Hill Company does not at any point touch the
2,000-acre tract.
But beyond this direct admission, there is testimony tending to
show that both he and his grantor had knowledge at a much earlier
date. The Forest Hill Company was organized in the year 1859. The
plaintiff was a stockholder in the company. Dr. Hale was its
president, and, after the deed to plaintiff and up to the time of
this suit, he continued to reside, as the agent of the plaintiff,
on this 105 acres set off to the
Page 152 U. S. 420
Forest Hill Company. The northern part of this Huddleston tract
along the Kanawha River was comparatively level, and it is evident
that the Forest Hill Company bought with a view of putting up
buildings on this level ground near the river, and with the
understanding that the grantors should immediately cause the survey
to be made. The survey was in fact made that same fall, and the
company entered into possession of the land surveyed off to it, and
erected buildings thereon, in the course of its improvements
placing some fences along the division line between the two parts
of the tract as surveyed by the county surveyor. This is the
testimony of the president of the company in respect to the
matter:
"Ans. There were six or seven dwelling houses -- small cottage
houses -- a coal mine and oil factory, and all the necessary
machinery and plant, and my own house, some twelve or fifteen acres
enclosed in fence and cultivated. There was a blacksmith shop,
cooper's shop, barn, and stable. That is all I think of."
"25th Q. Were not said improvements confined exclusively to the
western side of the division line drawn by Robson as shown by
Exhibit B with this deposition?"
"Ans. Yes."
"26th Q. Were not a part of the fences around the enclosures
built on and along said division line?"
"Ans. I believe they were part of the way."
It is probably true, as some of the officers say, that it was
specially interested at the time only in the level ground along the
river, and paid no attention to the lines of the survey towards the
southern end, which runs up into steep, mountainous land, and yet,
according to the testimony of the engineer, the improvements made
by the company extended back between 1,500 and 1,800 feet from the
river. Giving full credence, however, to all this testimony, it
remains undisputed that the company knew that the land had been
surveyed, knew where the division line ran on the northern part of
the tract, accepted that line as correct, and made improvements
with reference to it, and simply did not consider the southern end
of the tract as of sufficient importance to examine and see
Page 152 U. S. 421
where the lines were run. If the company was in fact ignorant of
the location of the division line at the southern end of the tract,
it was an ignorance resulting from its own indifference to the
matter, and although it knew that the line had been run.
Still further, we find this in the testimony of the president,
Dr. Hale:
"It was a part of their agreement with the Forest Hill Company
that the survey should be made and that the lines should be run
properly. I was in New York when Griffinnan had the lines run by
Robson, and when I came back in 1859, I learned for the first time
that the lines had been run and the division had been made. This
survey was made and lines run in the fall of 1859. . . . The whole
tract of 2,000 acres was surveyed by Robson some time about
February, early in 1861, and after that survey was made we had a
plat given us, not only showing the 2,000 acres, but also the 100
acres of frontage. It was then for the first time that we knew, or
indeed had any suspicion, that the Huddleston frontage did not
unite with the Forest Hill tract. This occurred just at the
beginning of the war, in 1861."
There is more testimony to like effect coming from other
officers of the company. The plaintiff also, in his deposition,
testified as follows:
"When the Forest Hill Company took possession, in 1859, I was
told that Robson ran the lines for the purpose of laying off the
westerly half of the Huddleston tract so that they would know where
to locate their buildings. I don't know of anything more being done
until Robson surveyed the entire tract, as is shown by his map,
dated 1861."
In the amended bill, it is alleged
"that said company had no occasion to examine the lines run by
T. S. Robson in 1859, except to see that they were properly run for
a short distance back from the Kanawha River, about 1,000 feet,
where it was interested, and about to locate its buildings for the
manufacture of coal oil, and erect the necessary dwelling houses
for its officers and employees, and where it did so erect them. It
took no part in running the division lines in 1859 except to see
that they were properly run through the bottom land on
Page 152 U. S. 422
the Kanawha River, for the reasons above stated, and did not
accompany said surveyor any further on his survey; but said company
supposed, as a matter of course, until the mistake was discovered
by it, that A. G. Griffinnan had had the Huddleston tract divided
according to the requirements of his deed to and agreement with
said company."
It also appears from his own testimony that plaintiff's
attention was called to the fact that the two tracts did not join,
that he was urged to buy the intervening land, but declined on
account of the price, $30 an acre, and also because he supposed his
deed gave him a right of way through the Huddleston tract to the
Kanawha River as through the Elk Ridge tract to Armstrong Creek. We
quote from his deposition as follows:
"For several years, A. G. Griffinnan had been urging me to buy
his adjoining tract, and I told him I had already too much
unproductive property on hand, but in the year 1880, I wrote him to
this effect: that I would like to make the connection between the
front and back land more complete, so that it would show to better
advantage on the map, and that I would give him one hundred dollars
for so much of the land as he owned running back from about where
the Wilson line crosses the tract; that it was part of the frontage
intended to connect the two tracts, and, had not the Forest Hill
Company been obliged to suspend their operations on account of the
war, there is no doubt but they would have claimed it as their
right. I had somehow gotten the impression from seeing Robson's map
that I could only claim the right of way, because the survey was
not corrected whilst the company held possession, and that
impression was not removed from my mind until I hunted up the
Forest Hill Company's deed after A. G. Griffinnan had sold to Wyant
what did not belong to him, without giving me any notice, as any
fair-minded man would have done, knowing it would depreciate the
value of my property many thousands of dollars. An examination of
the deed showed, to my surprise, that the right of way did not
apply to the front tract, but that the deed called for a connection
of the two tracts."
But it is unnecessary to multiply these quotations from and
Page 152 U. S. 423
references to the testimony and pleadings. It will be difficult
to find a clearer case of ample and long continued knowledge of the
exact situation, and if ever the knowledge of a mistake created a
duty of taking some action to correct it, it surely did in the
present instance.
We have thus far considered this case on the assumption that the
survey made by Robson in 1859 was erroneous, and failed to give to
the Forest Hill Company that which it claimed and was entitled to,
yet there is testimony casting doubt, at least, upon this matter.
That of the surveyor is that both the grantor and the grantee were
represented at the time of the survey, and that it was made in
accordance with their instructions, those instructions being to
give an equal frontage on the river; that the deed to the Forest
Hill Company was not produced, nor his attention called to the
particular language of the description in that deed, nor anything
said with reference to forming a connection with the 2,000-acre
tract.
Further, while the deed to the Forest Hill Company requires that
this tract be surveyed off the western side of the Huddleston tract
"by a line running from northerly to southerly side of said tract,
to be bounded on the south by the tract hereinabove conveyed, and
on the north by the Great Kanawha River," it is apparent from the
plat that the 2,000-acre tract referred to does not join the
Huddleston tract on its south line, but only along the irregular
east line. Now if one call in the deed is explicitly followed, and
the partition line run from the north to the straight line on the
south, the land to the west of that will not connect with the
2,000-acre tract unless indeed the part reserved to Smith and
Griffinnan is separated into two parcels, the one south and the
other north of the place of such connection. Apparently the exact
situation of these two tracts was not at the time of the deed
accurately known, and it was supposed that the 2,000-acre tract ran
along the whole southerly side of the Huddleston tract, and so it
appears on some of the maps which were known to the parties at the
time of the conveyance, and it was in view of such supposed
location that this description was introduced.
Page 152 U. S. 424
One call, as we see, was explicitly followed in the survey --
that of a line from the northerly to the southerly side of the
tract. The amount to be set off was exceeded, 105 acres being
surveyed off to the Forest Hill Company, and if that part was not
bounded on the south by the 2,000-acre tract, it was because on the
south the 2,000-acre tract did not join the Huddleston tract.
Stress is now laid upon the supposed importance of having access
to the 2,000-acre tract from the Kanawha River, and the claim is
that such access was one of the main inducements to the purchase of
this 100 acres; but so far as can be judged from the testimony, the
steep, mountainous character of the land at the southern end of the
Huddleston tract would interfere greatly with easy access from the
Kanawha River and the bringing of coal or other products of this
2,000-acre tract to the water was apparently provided for by a
right of way through the Elk Ridge tract to Armstrong Creek. In
addition, the conduct of the parties at the time indicates that the
main thought in the purchase of this 100 acres was of the level
ground near the Kanawha River, and the desire of the company was to
get as large a portion of that as possible, ignoring wholly the
survey in the southern part of the tract. It is therefore, to say
the least, a doubtful question whether there was any mistake in the
survey as made, and also whether the surveyor did not, in obeying
the immediate directions of the respective parties, make a survey
which conformed as nearly as was practicable to the calls in the
deed. It is unnecessary, however, to lay stress upon this matter,
and we only notice it to show that there were likely other reasons
besides those given by the plaintiff why no challenge of the survey
was made until this late day.
It only remains to notice the fact that Wyant purchased in 1883,
at a judicial sale, the balance of the Huddleston tract; that at
such judicial sale, conducted by a commissioner duly appointed by
the court, a plat and description corresponding to the survey made
by Robson in 1859 were presented as the basis of the sale, and
that, relying upon that survey and description, Wyant made his
purchase and paid his money in
Page 152 U. S. 425
ignorance of any claim of plaintiff or of any question as to the
correctness of the survey; that he entered into possession and
expended several thousand dollars in improvements before any
challenge of his rights was made by plaintiff. Under those
circumstances, injustice would be done to him to disturb the survey
and his possession of the property. As this situation of affairs
was brought about through the negligence of the plaintiff, the
court rightfully held him guilty of laches, and properly dismissed
his bills. The decree is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, not having been a member of the Court when
this case was argued, took no part in its decision.
