The Supervising Architect of the Treasury is not entitled to
extra compensation, above his salary, for planning and supervising
the erection of a department building in Washington occupied by
other departments of the government.
In this case, the delay in bringing suit leads to the conclusion
that the architect recognized the work for which he sued as within
the scope of his regular duties.
On May 4, 1889, Alfred B. Mullett filed his petition in the
Court of Claims, seeking to recover for services as an architect
rendered in the year 1871 in preparing designs for the building now
occupied by the State, War, and Navy Departments, and working
drawings for the construction of the same. Other claims were stated
in the petition, but they have since been
Page 150 U. S. 567
abandoned by the petitioner. On June 2, 1890, the Court of
Claims made its findings of fact, as follows:
"I. The commission authorized by the resolution of December 14,
1869, and of which plaintiff, then Supervising Architect of the
Treasury, was a member, decided to erect a building for the
Department of State upon McPherson Square, in the City of
Washington. It was suggested that plaintiff prepare plans for the
building proposed, but he declined, and tentative plans were
prepared by another. These plans were not satisfactory. Plaintiff
thereupon, at the suggestion of the Assistant Secretary of State,
prepared tentative plans for the building then intended to be
erected upon McPherson Square for the Department of State
only."
"Later it was decided to erect at the corner of Pennsylvania
Avenue and Seventeenth Street, Washington, a building to
accommodate the Departments of State, War, and Navy, and the
McPherson Square site for the Department of State was abandoned.
This course was authorized by the Act of March 3, 1871, and prior
to the passage of this act, plaintiff was requested by the
Secretary of State to extend his former design so it would cover
the larger building then contemplated. This he did."
"II. After the passage of the Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat.
494, c. 113, the commissioners therein named selected the plaintiff
as architect to design and prepare the drawings for the building
contemplated by that act. Plaintiff designed these drawings,
superintended their preparation, made and suggested changes
therein, and the drawings so designed by him were accepted and
approved by the commissioners designated in the said act, and the
building now occupied by the Departments of State, of War, and of
the Navy was built in a substantial accordance with the drawings.
Plaintiff superintended the construction of the southern wing of
this building, now occupied by the Department of State, and the
east wing, from the beginning until January 1, 1875, at which date
the expenditures upon the building amounted to $3,876,096.47. The
total cost of the entire building was $10,030,028.99."
"III. Plaintiff, during all the time covered by the service
Page 150 U. S. 568
hereinbefore described, was Supervising Architect of the
Treasury Department. The labor performed by him as to the new
building was done by permission of the Secretary of the Treasury,
without sacrifice of time properly to be devoted to the duties of
the Supervising Architect and without promise of compensation
except as hereinafter shown. Plaintiff was not at personal expense
or outlay in the preparation of plans or otherwise in connection
with the new building, but he gave to it his individual genius and
individual labor, and this without injury to the interests
committed to his charge as Supervising Architect."
"IV. Plaintiff resigned his office as Supervising Architect of
the Treasury. This resignation took effect January 1, 1875. He was
requested by the Secretary of State to remain in charge of the new
building at a salary of $5,000 a year, giving to it his entire time
and attention. This he declined."
"V. Prior to the passage of the act authorizing the construction
of the building, plaintiff was told at a meeting where were present
the Secretary of State and representatives of the Committees on
Public Buildings and Grounds of the Senate and House of
Representatives that if he would make the plans, they had no doubt
that his services would be taken into consideration by Congress in
making the necessary appropriations for the erection of the
building, and that if his plans were accepted, and he should
superintend the construction of the building, that he would be
properly compensated."
"VI. The building for the Departments of State, War, and of the
Navy was begun June 21, 1871, and finished in 1888. It does not
appear that, prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff
made a demand for compensation as architect or superintendent of
said building, except in an application to Congress."
The opinion of the court was delivered by Davis, J., and is
reported in 25 Ct.Cl. 409. From such judgment the petitioner
appealed to this Court. After taking the appeal, he died, and the
action was revived in the name of his administratrix.
Page 150 U. S. 569
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
In addition to those that have been quoted above, there was a
seventh finding, with respect to the schedule of the charges of
architects and the rules governing the same, but in the view we
have taken of this case, that is immaterial. At the time the
services sued for were rendered, the plaintiff held the position of
Supervising Architect of the Treasury, the salary of which, as
fixed by Rev.Stat. ยง 235, was $5,000 a year. The nature and extent
of his duties were not specifically defined by law, but that they
were of the character of those described in this case is implied
from the title of "Supervising Architect."
"It is not claimed that any new office was created. On the
contrary, the averment in the petition is that be was employed 'in
his professional capacity as an architect' -- in other words, that
he rendered certain services not within the scope of his official
duties as Supervising Architect of the Treasury. It will also be
perceived that no express promise of payment for these services was
made by any officer or representative of the government, for the
suggestion and request in respect to the preparation of plans
spoken of in the first finding carried with it no mention of
compensation. Nor is there disclosed in the fifth finding any such
promise. An expression to the plaintiff, on the part of persons
representing the government, of their belief that his services
would be compensated, is very far from a promise to pay. There is
no pretense of any act of Congress authorizing payment, or in terms
directing employment. Reliance is placed not upon an express but an
implied promise, and recovery is sought upon a
quantum
meruit. Here we are confronted by these provisions of the
Revised Statutes, which were in force at the time of these
transactions:"
"SEC. 1763. No person who holds an office, the salary or annual
compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of two thousand
five hundred dollars, shall receive compensation
Page 150 U. S. 570
for discharging the duties of any other office, unless expressly
authorized by law."
"SEC. 1764. No allowance or compensation shall be made to any
officer or clerk by reason of the discharge of duties which belong
to any other officer or clerk in the same or any other department,
and no allowance or compensation shall be made for any extra
services whatever which any officer or clerk may be required to
perform, unless expressly authorized by law."
"SEC. 1765. No officer in any branch of the public service, or
any other person whose salary, pay, or emoluments are fixed by law
or regulations, shall receive any additional pay, extra allowance,
or compensation in any form whatever for the disbursement of public
money, or for any other service or duty whatever, unless the same
is authorized by law, and the appropriation therefor explicitly
states that it is for such additional pay, extra allowance, or
compensation."
Obviously the purpose of Congress, as disclosed by these
sections, was that every officer or regular employee of the
government should be limited in his compensation to such salary or
fees as were by law specifically attached to his office or
employment. "Extras," which are such a fruitful subject of disputes
in private contracts, were to be eliminated from the public
service. Such purpose forbids a recovery in this case. Mr. Mullett,
as Supervising Architect of the Treasury, was in the regular employ
of the government at a stated salary of $5,000. He was employed to
render services which, if not strictly appertaining to his office
or position, were of the same general character, and to be
performed at the same place. No new office was created. No express
promise of payment was made. No act of Congress, in terms, gave
authority to promise payment, or made any provision or
appropriation for compensation. The case is one simply of a claim
for compensation for extra services, when no express authority
therefor can be found in any act of Congress.
These sections have been in force many years, and have received
the consideration of this Court in several cases:
Hoyt v.
United States, 10 How. 109;
Converse
v. United States,
Page 150 U. S. 571
21 How. 463;
United States v.
Shoemaker, 7 Wall. 338;
Stansbury
v. United States, 8 Wall. 33;
Hall v. United
States, 91 U. S. 559;
United States v. Brindle, 110
U. S. 689;
United States v. Saunders,
120 U. S. 126;
Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S. 430,
130 U. S. 451,
and
United States v. King, 147 U.
S. 676, in which most of the former cases were reviewed,
and in which it was held that a clerk of a circuit court is not
entitled to compensation for services in selecting juries in
connection with the jury commissioner, there being no statute
expressly authorizing such compensation.
A still later case is that of
Gibson v. Peters, decided
at the present term,
ante, 150 U. S. 342, in
which Gibson, a United States district attorney, claimed that,
having the right to represent the receiver of a national bank in a
suit brought by such receiver, he had rendered of offered to render
such services, and was therefore entitled to payment for such
services out of the funds in the hand of the receiver, and this by
reason of the provision in the Revised Statutes, section 5238, that
all expenses of any such receivership should be paid out of the
assets of the bank before distribution. It was held that his
compensation was fully prescribed by sections 823 to 827 of the
Revised Statutes, and that he could not recover anything in
addition for these services, notwithstanding the general language
of section 5238.
The present case illustrates the propriety of such legislation
as is found in these sections. Eighteen years after the services
were rendered, fourteen years after he had left the employ of the
government, the petitioner commences his action to recover
compensation. No written contract for the services is shown. No
legislation appears which directs that any services be called for
outside of those to be rendered by the officers and employees of
the government, or which recognizes that any extra services have
been rendered, or provides any payment therefor. In the rapid
changes which attend public life, many if not most of those who
participated in the negotiations and arrangements which led up to
the doing of this work by the petitioner, and who could doubtless
have thrown light upon the matter, have passed away. Petitioner was
in the employ
Page 150 U. S. 572
of the government, and employed for work of like character to
that sued for. He was the one officer or employee to whom, when
this work had to be done, attention would naturally have been
directed. It would seem from his delay in bringing suit that he
recognized this work as within the scope of his regular duties. At
the most, it can only be regarded as extra service cast upon him as
an officer of the government, and by reason of his official
position, and as such there is no express provision of law for its
compensation.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is right, and it must be
Affirmed.
