The decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that
a creditor of an insolvent debtor who proves his debt in insolvency
and accepts the benefit of proceedings under the state statute of
May 13, 1884, entitled "An act to provide for composition with
creditors in
Page 150 U. S. 362
insolvency," Mass.Stats. 1854, c. 236, and the act amending the
same, thereby waives any right which he might otherwise have had to
object to the validity of the composition statutes as impairing the
obligation of contracts presents no federal question for review by
this Court.
To give this Court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state
court, it must appear affirmatively not only that a federal
question was presented for decision by the state court, but that
its decision was necessary to the determination of the cause and
that it was decided adversely to the party claiming a right under
the federal laws or Constitution, or that the judgment, as
rendered, could not have been given without deciding it.
Where the record discloses that if a question has been raised
and decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a
provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States, another
question, not federal, has been also raised and decided against
such party, and the decision of the latter question is sufficient,
notwithstanding the federal question, to sustain the judgment, this
Court will not review the judgment.
When this Court, in a case brought here by writ of error to a
state court, finds it unnecessary to decide any federal question,
its logical course is to dismiss the writ of error.
On February 14, 1887, Charles H. Bolles and George F. Wilde, as
surviving members of the firm of B. Collender & Co., filed a
petition in insolvency in the Insolvency Court within and for the
County of Suffolk, State of Massachusetts. On February 16, 1887,
they filed in the same insolvency court a written proposal for
composition with their copartnership creditors under the so-called
"composition acts" of 1884 and 1885, and they therein proposed to
pay fifty cents on the dollar of their debts in money. On February
24, 1887, the first meetings of creditors were held in both the
ordinary insolvency proceedings, which were begun on February 14,
and in the composition proceedings, which were begun on February
16, and William T. Eustis proved a claim on a promissory note for
$16,000, dated January 1, 1880, and due on demand, and voted for
assignees in the ordinary insolvency proceeding, but the record
does not show that he proved his claim in the composition
proceedings. On March 10, 1887, an adjourned hearing in the
composition proceedings was held in the insolvency court to
determine whether said proposal for composition should be
confirmed, and Eustis appeared by counsel at said hearing and
opposed the confirmation of said
Page 150 U. S. 363
proposal, and the granting of a discharge to said Bolles and
Wilde, on the ground that the said composition acts were
unconstitutional and void. Eustis also filed written objections to
the discharge of the debtors, alleging that the composition acts,
having been passed after the execution and delivery of the note
held by Eustis, were in violation of that part of the Constitution
of the United States which forbids any state to pass a law
impairing the obligation of contracts.
Bolles and Wilde, having filed in the insolvency court the
written assent of a majority in number and value of their creditors
who had proved their claims, and having deposited in court one-half
the aggregate amount of their debts, were granted by the court, on
March 31, 1887, certificates of discharge under and in pursuance of
the composition acts. On May 14, 1887, Eustis received the sum of
$8,020, being one-half the amount of his claim, and signed a
receipt therefor, reciting that it was "according to the
composition confirmed by the court in the case." All the other
creditors of said Bolles and Wilde accepted the offer and signed
similar receipts.
Subsequently, in July, 1887, Eustis brought an action in the
Supreme Judicial Court against Bolles and Wilde wherein he sought
to recover the balance of his note remaining unpaid after the
receipt of the one-half received under the insolvency proceedings.
The defendants pleaded the proceedings in insolvency, their offer
of composition, its acceptance by the majority in number and value
of their creditors, their discharge, and the acceptance by Eustis
of the amount coming to him under the offer of composition, and to
this answer the plaintiff demurred. Subsequently, the death of
William T. Eustis was suggested, and Isabel B. Eustis and Florence
D. Eustis were permitted to appear and prosecute said action as
executrices.
The trial court, which overruled the demurrer, made a finding of
facts, and reported the case for the determination of the full
court. The Supreme Judicial Court was of opinion that Eustis, by
accepting the benefit of the composition, had waived any right that
he might otherwise have had to object
Page 150 U. S. 364
to the validity of the composition statutes as impairing the
obligation of contracts. 146 Mass. 413. Final judgment was entered
for the defendants on November 26, 1889, and on January 29, 1890, a
writ of error was allowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court to this Court.
Page 150 U. S. 366
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case as above reported,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is settled law that to give this Court jurisdiction of a writ
of error to a state court, it must appear affirmatively not only
that a federal question was presented for decision by the state
court, but that its decision was necessary to the determination of
the cause and that it was actually decided adversely to the party
claiming a right under the federal laws or Constitution or that the
judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it.
Murdock v.
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590;
Cook County v. Calumet
& Chicago Canal Co., 138 U. S. 635.
It is likewise settled law that where the record discloses that
if a question has been raised and decided adversely to a party
claiming the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, another question, not federal, has been also
raised and decided against such party, and the decision of the
latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding the federal
question, to sustain the judgment, this Court will not review the
judgment.
In
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 257,
80 U. S. 263,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Bradley, said:
"The rules which govern
Page 150 U. S. 367
the action of this Court in cases of this sort are well settled.
Where it appears by the record that the judgment of the state court
might have been based either upon a law which would raise a
question of repugnancy to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States, or upon some other independent ground, and it
appears that the court did in fact base its judgment on such
independent ground, and not on the law raising the federal
question, this Court will not take jurisdiction of the case even
though it might think the position of the state court an unsound
one. But where it does not appear on which of the two grounds the
judgment was based, then, if the independent ground on which it
might have been based was a good and valid one, sufficient of
itself to sustain the judgment, this Court will not assume
jurisdiction of the case; but if such independent ground was not a
good and valid one, it will be presumed that the state court based
its judgment on the law raising the federal question, and this
Court will then take jurisdiction."
In
Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300,
137 U. S. 307,
the record showed that in the Supreme Court of Tennessee, two
grounds of defense had been urged, one of which involved the
construction of the provisions of the federal Bankrupt Act of March
2, 1867, and the other the bar of the statute of limitations of the
State of Tennessee, and this Court held that
"where, in action pending in a state court, two grounds of
defense are interposed, each broad enough to defeat a recovery, and
only one of them involves a federal question, and judgment passes
for the defendant, the record must show, in order to justify a writ
of error from this Court, that the judgment was rested upon the
disposition of the federal question, and if this does not
affirmatively appear, the writ of error will be dismissed unless
the defense which does not involve a federal question is so
palpably unfounded that it cannot be presumed to have been
entertained by the state court."
Different phases of the question were presented, and the same
conclusion was reached, in
Murray v. Charleston,
96 U. S. 432,
96 U. S. 441;
Jenkins v. Loewenthal, 110 U. S. 222;
Hale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 554.
Page 150 U. S. 368
In this state of the law, we are met at the threshold in the
present case with the question whether the record discloses that
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided adversely to
the plaintiffs in error any claim arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or whether the judgment of that court
was placed on another ground, not involving federal law and
sufficient of itself to sustain the judgment.
The defendants in the trial court depended on a discharge
obtained by them under regular proceedings under the insolvency
statutes of Massachusetts. This defense the plaintiffs met by
alleging that the statutes under which the defendants had procured
their discharge had been enacted after the promissory note sued on
had been executed and delivered, and that to give effect to a
discharge obtained under such subsequent laws would impair the
obligation of a contract within the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States. Upon such a state of facts, it is plain that a
federal question, decisive of the case, was presented, and that if
the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
adjudged that question adversely to the plaintiffs, it would be the
duty of this Court to consider the soundness of such a
judgment.
The record, however, further discloses that William T. Eustis
represented in this Court by his executors, had accepted and
receipted for the money which had been awarded him as his portion
under the insolvency proceedings, and that the court below,
conceding that his cause of action could not be taken away from him
without his consent by proceedings under statutes of insolvency
passed subsequently to the vesting of his rights, held that the
action of Eustis in so accepting and receipting for his dividend in
the insolvency proceedings was a waiver of his right to object to
the validity of the insolvency statutes, and that accordingly the
defendants were entitled to the judgment.
The view of the court was that when the composition was
confirmed, Eustis was put to his election whether he would avail
himself of the composition offer or would reject it and
Page 150 U. S. 369
rely upon his right to enforce his debt against his debtors
notwithstanding their discharge.
In its discussion of this question, the court below cited and
claimed to follow the decision of this Court in the case of
Clay v. Smith,
3 Pet. 411, where it was held that the plaintiff, by proving his
debt and taking a dividend under the bankrupt laws of Louisiana,
waived his right to object that the law did not constitutionally
apply to his debt, he being a creditor residing in another state.
But in deciding that it was competent for Eustis to waive his legal
rights and that accepting his dividend under the insolvency
proceedings was such a waiver, the court below did not decide a
federal question. Whether that view of the case sound or not it is
not for us to inquire. It was broad enough in itself to support the
final judgment without reference to the federal question.
The case of
Beaupre v. Noyes, 138 U.
S. 397,
138 U. S. 401,
seems to cover the present one. There, the plaintiff in error
complained that an assignment of property, not accompanied by
delivery and an actual change of possession, was, as to him,
fraudulent, and as his contention to that effect was denied to him,
he claimed he was denied a right arising under an authority
exercised under the United States. But this Court said:
"Whether the state court so interpreted the territorial statute
as to deny such right to the plaintiff in error we need not
inquire, for it proceeded in part on another and distinct ground
not involving any federal question and sufficient in itself to
maintain the judgment without reference to that question. That
ground is that there was evidence tending to show that the
defendants acquiesced in and assented to all that was done and
waived any irregularity in the mode in which the assignee conducted
the business, and that the question whether the defendants so
acquiesced and assented with knowledge of all the facts, and
thereby waived their right to treat the assignment as fraudulent,
was properly submitted to the jury. The state court evidently
intended to hold that even if the assignment was originally
fraudulent as against the creditors by reason
Page 150 U. S. 370
of Young, the assignor, remaining in apparent possession, it was
competent for the plaintiffs in error to waive the fraud and treat
the assignment as valid. That view does not involve a federal
question. Whether sound or not we do not inquire. It is broad
enough in itself to support the final judgment without reference to
the federal question."
Having reached the conclusion that we are not called upon to
determine any federal question nor to consider whether the state
court was right or wrong in its decision of the other question in
the case, it only remains to inquire whether that conclusion
requires us to affirm the judgment of the court below or to dismiss
the writ of error. An examination of our records will show that in
similar cases, this Court has sometimes affirmed the judgment of
the court below and sometimes has dismissed the writ or error. This
discrepancy may have originated in a difference of views as to the
precise scope of the questions presented. However that may be, we
think that when we find it unnecessary to decide any federal
question, and when the state court had based its decision on a
local or state question, our logical course is to dismiss the writ
of error. This was the judgment pronounced in
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 263;
N.O. Waterworks v.
Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 39;
Kreiger v. Shelby Railroad, 125 U. S.
46;
De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.
S. 216;
Hale v. Akers, 132 U.
S. 565;
Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U.
S. 387;
Johnson v. Risk, 137
U. S. 307, and in numerous other cases which it is
unnecessary to cite.
Accordingly, our judgment is that in the present case the writ
of error must be
Dismissed.
