Plaintiff sued defendant in a circuit court of the State of
Michigan on the cause of action for which this suit is brought.
Verdict and judgment were in plaintiff's favor in the trial court.
This judgment was reversed by the supreme court of the state, and a
new trial was ordered. When the case was remanded, plaintiff
voluntarily withdrew his action and submitted to a nonsuit which
was not to prevent his right to bring any suit in any court. He
then commenced this action in the circuit court of the United
States. The defendant contended (1) that plaintiff was estopped
from bringing this action by the judgment in the state court; (2)
that the record showed no negligence on the part of the defendant,
and that a verdict should have been directed in its favor. The
circuit court overruled the first contention of the defendant but
accepted the second and directed a verdict for defendant.
Held:
(1) That the plaintiff was not estopped from bringing this
action by the proceedings and judgment in the state court.
(2) That the evidence in regard to negligence was conflicting,
and the question should have been left to the jury under proper
instructions.
The question of negligence in such case is one of law for the
court only when the facts are such that all reasonable men must
draw the same conclusion from them, or, in other words, a case
should not be withdrawn from the jury unless the conclusion follows
as matter of law that no recovery can be had upon any view which
can be properly taken of the facts the evidence tends to
establish.
This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Western District of Michigan by Frederick Gardner, a
citizen of the State of Indiana, against the Michigan Central
Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Michigan, to
recover damages for injuries alleged to have been inflicted by
reason of the negligence of the defendant in causing, and allowing
to remain for some time prior to the accident complained of, a hole
in the planking of the crossing
Page 150 U. S. 350
of a thoroughfare near its stationhouse in Niles, Michigan,
known as Fifth Street, contrary to its duty in that behalf, whereby
the plaintiff was injured without negligence on his part, and also
in ordering the plaintiff, who was a night switchman at that
station, to do certain coupling and uncoupling of cars out of the
line of his employment as switchman and more dangerous.
Upon the trial before the district judge, the evidence tended to
show that Fifth Street in the City of Niles crossed the defendant
company's tracks, of which at this crossing there were, besides the
main track, several others, occupying a large portion of
defendant's right of way; that the defendant's stationhouse,
freight house, and other depot buildings were located at this
point; that thirty-two feet of the crossing were planked between
the tracks by the defendant; that near the southeast corner of the
planking, and about twelve or fifteen feet therefrom, stood a
switch which moved the track south, in adjusting it for the passage
of trains, and that a month or so before the injury to the
plaintiff, a car wheel had struck the end of a plank next to the
rail of the track by reason of the switch's not being properly
adjusted, making a hole in the surface several inches in length and
width; that it was the duty of the yardmaster and roadmaster of
defendant to keep the roadbed and crossings in good condition and
repair; that the yardmaster must have known of the fracture of the
plank, and that other employees had actual knowledge of its
existence, but that plaintiff, who worked only during the night,
had not been informed and did not know thereof. The yardmaster
testified that he did not remember "seeing any bad spots" in the
planking --
"not to amount to anything. . . . There might have been a car
off, and the ends of the plank broke down a little. There might
have been, but nothing that I would think would be dangerous."
The evidence further tended to show that the yardmaster of the
company had the control and management of the switches and of the
work belonging to the "making up trains;" that in 1881, he employed
the plaintiff to tend switches at night; that prior to March, 1882,
he had ordered
Page 150 U. S. 351
him not to engage in the work known as making up trains, which
included coupling and uncoupling cars, and afterwards, and prior to
May 16, 1882, the supply of help for making up trains in the
morning not being equal to the demand, he required the plaintiff to
assist in such making up, including coupling and uncoupling. It
appeared that the yard at night was in charge of a yard foreman or
assistant yardmaster, and the evidence tended to show that on the
16th of May. the plaintiff, acting in obedience to the orders of
such assistant yardmaster, attempted to uncouple cars just before
he received his injury, the hole in question being hidden under the
car being uncoupled; that there was a downgrade sloping west at the
place where the plaintiff was, and the cars, according to necessity
and general usage, were in slight motion at the time, and that, as
the plaintiff was stepping out from between the cars, one of his
feet was firmly caught in the hole, and the injuries inflicted in
consequence.
On the trial of the cause, it appeared that the plaintiff had
originally commenced suit in the Circuit Court for the County of
Berrien, Michigan, and that the cause had there been tried, and
resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
whereupon the defendant brought error to the supreme court of the
state, which reversed the judgment and granted a new trial, and
counsel for defendant gave in evidence the printed record used in
said supreme court, together with a copy of the opinion of that
court in the premises, and also a certified copy of the judgment in
the state circuit court in obedience to the mandate of the supreme
court, and it was agreed by the parties that on the filing of its
opinion, the supreme court entered judgment in the usual form,
reversing the judgment of the court below and granting a new trial
in the suit. The judgment of the state circuit court recited that,
upon the filing of a certified copy of the judgment of the supreme
court reversing the prior judgment and vacating the verdict of the
jury and the placing of the cause upon the calendar for trial, the
plaintiff came by his counsel and voluntarily withdrew his suit and
submitted to a nonsuit therein, wherefore,
"on motion of said plaintiff by his said attorneys, it is
Page 150 U. S. 352
ordered by the court now here that the said plaintiff be, and is
hereby, nonsuited, but not to prevent the right of the plaintiff to
bring any suit in any court,"
and for costs in favor of defendant. The opinion of the supreme
court is reported in 58 Mich. 584.
The headnotes are as follows:
"1. A switchman who had been strictly cautioned against having
anything to do with coupling cars tried to uncouple some while the
train was moving, and had his foot caught where the planking had
been for some time slightly broken, though the defect had not been
seen by him as yardman and the railroad company had no notice of
it.
Held that he could not recover for the injury
resulting to him."
"2. A railroad employee takes the ordinary risks of the work for
which he hires, and if the company has used proper diligence in
choosing competent servants, it is not liable in damages for an
injury to one of them caused by the carelessness of another."
The case in the circuit court, having gone to the jury, resulted
in a verdict in plaintiff's favor, and a motion for new trial was
made by defendant, which was heard before the circuit and district
judges. The circuit judge was of opinion that, upon the record,
there was no negligence on the part of the company, and that the
case should have been withdrawn from the jury, and a verdict
directed for the defendant. The district judge thought otherwise,
but a new trial was granted, and, the case being retried upon the
same evidence, the district judge, accepting in that regard the
views of the circuit judge, instructed the jury to find for the
defendant, which was done, and, judgment having been entered, the
cause was brought to this Court by writ of error.
Page 150 U. S. 355
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Counsel for plaintiff in error does not contend that the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan operated as a bar to this
action, but he insists that that judgment precluded
"the plaintiff from successfully maintaining a new action
against the defendant upon evidence tending to prove only the same
state of facts which the evidence before the supreme court of the
state tended to prove."
This assumes a final adjudication on matter of law, binding
between the parties, and, treating the judgment reversing and
remanding the cause as final, applies it as an estoppel
notwithstanding the fact that a nonsuit was subsequently taken. We
cannot concur in this view, and are of opinion that the circuit
court was not obliged to give any such effect to the proceedings in
the state court, nor
Page 150 U. S. 356
do we think that the Supreme Court of Michigan committed itself
to the definitive rulings supposed.
In
Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Broughton,
109 U. S. 121, an
action had been brought upon a life insurance policy in the state
court, and a nonsuit had been granted on the defendant's motion. A
new action was subsequently instituted in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York, and upon the
trial, the court was requested to direct a verdict for the
defendant because the former judgment was a bar, and the defendant
afterwards objected to the introduction by the plaintiff of certain
evidence because the question to which the evidence related had
been tried and determined in the former action. The court denied
the request and overruled the objection, and, upon error to this
Court, it was held that these rulings were correct; that a judgment
of nonsuit did not determine the rights of the parties, and was no
bar to a new action, and that "a trial upon which nothing was
determined cannot support a plea of
res judicata, or have
any weight as evidence at another trial."
Homer v.
Brown, 16 How. 354,
57 U. S. 366,
was cited, in which it was held, upon a writ of right for the
recovery of certain property, that
"a judgment of
non pros. given by a state court in a
case between the same parties, for the same property, was not a
sufficient plea in bar to prevent a recovery under a writ of right;
nor was the agreement of the plaintiff to submit his case to that
court upon a statement of facts sufficient to prevent his recovery
in the circuit court."
Mr. Justice Wayne, delivering the opinion of the Court, among
other things, said:
"The court was also asked to instruct the jury that the
demandant was estopped from prosecuting this action by his
agreement in his previous suit to submit it upon a statement of
facts. In every view which can be taken of an estoppel, that
agreement cannot be such here, because the demandant does not make
in this case any denial of a fact admitted by him in that case. He
rests his title here to the demanded premises upon the same proofs
which were then agreed by him to be facts. This he has a right to
do. His agreement only estopped him from denying that he had
submitted himself
Page 150 U. S. 357
to be nonsuited or that he was not liable to its
consequences."
In
Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad, 125 U.
S. 555,
125 U. S. 578,
the plaintiff had sued in the state court and recovered judgment,
and the highest appellate court of the state, reviewing the case,
decided the points of law involved in it against the plaintiff, set
aside the judgment, and sent the case back for a new trial. The
plaintiff then became nonsuit, and brought suit in the United
States court on the same cause of action, and it was held that he
was not estopped. The action was one for damages for personal
injuries inflicted by reason of the defendant's negligence, and one
of the defenses was that plaintiff was traveling on Sunday, in
violation of statute. The circuit court refused to submit to the
jury the evidence upon the question of whether or not his act of
traveling on the Lord's Day was a work of necessity or charity
under the statute of Massachusetts in that behalf, and this Court
sustained the ruling for the reasons given by Mr. Justice Miller,
who said:
"It is not a matter of estoppel which bound the parties in the
court below, because there was no judgment entered in the case in
which the ruling of the state court was made, and we do not place
the correctness of the determination of the circuit court in
refusing to permit this question to go to the jury upon the ground
that it was a point decided between the parties, and therefore
res judicata as between them in the present action, but
upon the ground that the supreme court of the state, in its
decision, had given such a construction to the meaning of the words
'charity' and 'necessity' in the statute as to clearly show that
the evidence offered upon that subject was not sufficient to prove
that the plaintiff was traveling for either of those purposes."
This Court felt itself constrained to follow the decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in accordance with the
rule that the decisions of state courts relating to laws of a local
character, which may have become established by those courts or had
always been a part of the law of the state, are usually conclusive,
and always entitled to the highest respect of the federal
courts.
Page 150 U. S. 358
But in the present case, only the responsibility of a railroad
company to its employees was involved, and it is settled that that
question is matter of general law, and that, in the absence of
statutory regulations by the state in which the cause of action
arises, this Court is not required to follow the decisions of the
state courts.
Railroad Co. v.
Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357;
Hough v. Railway
Co., 100 U. S. 213;
Myrick v. Michigan Central Railroad, 107 U.
S. 102;
Lake Shore &c. Railway v. Prentice,
147 U. S. 101;
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Baugh, 149 U.
S. 368.
Apart from this, while it is true that it was apparently ruled
in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan not only that, upon
the record as it was before that court, plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, but also that the defendant was free from
negligence, since that of which plaintiff complained was the
negligence of a fellow servant, yet an analysis of the language
used satisfies us of the correctness of the statement in the
principal opinion in
Van Dusen v. Letellier, 78 Mich. 492,
505, that the case was really decided "upon the ground that the
plaintiff was injured in going into a place and at work in
violation of orders not to do so," which might or might not appear
to be so upon a retrial, and upon which the evidence in the circuit
court was far from being undisputed. We therefore conclude that the
opinion of the state supreme court should be given only such weight
as its reasoning and the respectability of the source from whence
it proceeds entitles it to receive.
And here reference may properly be made to the fact that
considerable differences appear to exist between the evidence on
the trial under review and that exhibited in the record before the
state court, differences bearing chiefly upon the question of
contributory negligence. But, assuming the evidence as to the other
branch of the case to have been unchanged, we are not prepared to
concede that the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan
proceeded upon the proposition that defendant must necessarily be
absolved from negligence because all its employees, including
plaintiff, were, as matter of law, fellow servants with those who
should have
Page 150 U. S. 359
kept the planking in good condition, as that proposition is
untenable.
In
Hough v. Railway Company, 100 U.
S. 213, where the injury was the result of defective
appliances, it was held that to the general rule exempting the
common master from liability to a servant for injuries caused by
the negligence of fellow servants there are well defined
exceptions; one of which arises from the obligation of the master
not to expose the servants, when conducting his business, to perils
from which they may be guarded by proper diligence on his part.
While it is implied in the contract between the parties that the
servant risks the dangers which ordinarily attend or are incident
to the business in which he voluntarily engages for compensation,
among which are the carelessness of his fellow servants, with whose
habits, conduct, and capacity he has, in the course of his duty, an
opportunity to become acquainted and against whose neglect and
incompetency he may himself take precautions, it is equally implied
in the same contract that the master shall supply the physical
means and agencies for the conduct of his business, and that he
shall not be wanting in proper care in selecting such means. The
master is not to be held as guaranteeing or warranting the absolute
safety under all circumstances, or the perfection of the machinery
or apparatus which may be provided for the use of employees, but he
is bound to exercise the care which the exigency reasonably demands
in furnishing such as is adequate and suitable, and in keeping and
maintaining it in such condition as to be reasonably safe for
use.
These principles are reiterated in very many authorities, and
among them in
Snow v. Housatonic Railroad, 8 Allen 441,
referred to with approval by the Supreme Court of Michigan in this
case, and much in point. It was there ruled that a railroad company
many be held liable for an injury to one of its servants which is
caused by want of repair in the roadbed of the railroad, and that
if it is the duty of a servant to uncouple the cars of a train, and
this cannot be easily done while the train is still, and he
endeavors to uncouple them while the train is in motion, and steps
between the cars, and meets with
Page 150 U. S. 360
an injury which is caused by want of repair to the roadbed, the
court cannot rule as a matter of law that he is careless, but
should submit the case to the jury, although he continued in the
employment of the company after he knew of the defect. The
proximate cause of the injury was a hole in one of the planks laid
down between the rails of the defendant's railroad where it crossed
the highway, which had existed for more than two months, to the
knowledge of the plaintiff, who had complained of it to the
repairer of the tracks of the railroad. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that the defendant was not relieved of its
liability to the plaintiff by reason of any relation which
subsisted between him and it at the time of the accident arising
out of the employment in which he was engaged, because, among other
reasons, it did not appear that the defect in the road was the
result of any such negligence in the servant as to excuse the
defendant, but was caused by a want of repair in the superstructure
between the tracks of the defendant's road, which defendant was
bound to keep in a suitable and safe condition, so that plaintiff
could pass over it without incurring the risk of injury. The
liability was rested on the implied obligation of the master, under
his contract with those whom he employs, to use due care in
supplying and maintaining suitable instrumentalities for the
performance of the work or duty which he requires of them, and
renders him liable for damages occasioned by a neglect or omission
to fulfill this obligation, whether it arises from his own want of
care or that of his agents to whom he entrusts the duty.
We regarded this doctrine as so well settled that in
Texas
& Pacific Railway v. Cox, 145 U.
S. 593,
145 U. S. 607,
we contented ourselves, without discussion, with a reference to
some of the cases in this Court upon the subject. The decisions in
the State of Michigan are to the same effect.
Van Dusen v.
Letellier, 78 Mich. 492;
Sadowski v. Michigan Car
Company, 84 Mich. 100;
Roux v. Blodgett & Davis Lumber
Co., 85 Mich. 519;
Ashman v. Flint & Pere Marquette
Railroad, 90 Mich. 567. Upon the whole, we see no ground for
excepting this case from the rules governing other cases involving
questions of fact.
Page 150 U. S. 361
The question of negligence is one of law for the court only
where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same
conclusion from them, or, in other words, a case should not be
withdrawn from the jury unless the conclusion follows as matter of
law that no recovery can be had upon any view which can be properly
taken of the facts the evidence tends to establish.
Railway
Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408,
144 U. S. 417;
Railway Company v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593,
145 U. S. 606;
Railroad Company v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274;
Sadowski v.
Car Company, 84 Mich. 100.
Tested by this rule, we are of opinion that the case should have
been left to the jury under proper instructions, inasmuch as an
examination of the record discloses that there was evidence tending
to show that the crossing was in an unsafe condition, that the
injury happened in consequence, that the defect was occasioned
under such circumstances, and was such in itself, that its
existence must have been known to defendant, the sufficient time
for repairs had elapsed, and that the plaintiff was acting in
obedience to orders in uncoupling at the place and time, and as he
was, was ignorant of the special peril, and was in the exercise of
due care.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with a
direction to grant a new trial.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD did not hear the argument, and took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
