The language of commerce, when used in laws imposing duties on
importations of goods, and particularly when employed in the
denomination of articles, must be construed according to the
commercial understanding of the terms employed.
This rule is equally applicable where a term is confined in its
meaning not merely to commerce, but to a particular trade, and in
such case also the presumption is that the term was used in its
trade signification.
In an action against a collector to recover an excess of duties
paid under protest, the defendant is entitled to show that words
employed in a tariff act have a special commercial meaning in the
trade, and to have it submitted to the jury whether the imported
goods in question came within them.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court.
At various times in the year 1886, the defendants in error
imported into the port of New York certain articles of furniture
for the account of Jacob and Josef Kohn, of Vienna, Austria, the
manufacturers and consignors thereof, which the collector of the
port classified as "furniture finished," under the provision for
"cabinet ware and house furniture, finished," contained in Schedule
D of the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, and upon which he laid and
collected duty at the rate of 35 percent
ad valorem.
Against this classification and exaction the importers duly
protested, claiming that the furniture was in piece, and not
finished, and therefore dutiable at 30
Page 149 U. S. 347
ad valorem under the provision for "house or cabinet
furniture in piece, or rough, and unfinished," and on March 23,
1887, they brought an action in the Superior Court of the City of
New York, which was duly remanded by certiorari into the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York,
against Edward L. Hedden, the collector, alleging that they had
been compelled to pay him a certain amount in excess of the lawful
duty on the goods, and demanded judgment for the amount of such
excess, with interest. The defendant answered, asserting that the
duty collected by him as aforesaid was assessed at the lawful rate,
and the issue thus joined came for trial in the court on May 14,
1886, before the court and a jury.
On the trial, the plaintiffs in the action introduced testimony
tending to show that the furniture in question consisted of Vienna
bent wood chairs, settees, etc., which were imported into this
country in separate parts or pieces, but varnished or polished, and
requiring nothing but to be screwed together, the holes for screws
or bolts being already prepared, and to have the ends of the screws
or bolts "touched up" with paint or varnish, to form articles of
furniture fit for use. The bolts or screws used came over with the
furniture, and all the parts of the articles, as received by the
importer, were ready to be put together. A sample chair, in the
condition in which it was received by the importers, was brought
into court by the plaintiffs, and the manner of putting the parts
together was explained to the jury. The plaintiffs also introduced
the testimony of a liquidator of duties at the customhouse of New
York to the effect that the difference between the amount of duties
exacted from the plaintiffs and the sum which would have been
collectible from them if the furniture had been assessed at 30
percent
ad valorem amounted, with interest, to
$443.34.
The testimony on behalf of the defendant tended to show that the
articles of furniture described were first put together at the
factory in completed form, then varnished or polished, and then
taken apart and packed for shipment. The term "finished," as
applied to furniture, had, in the furniture trade,
Page 149 U. S. 348
on and prior to March 3, 1883, a particular trade meaning,
namely that an article had been varnished, stained, oiled,
polished, or the like. The chair exhibited by the plaintiffs had
been "finished," and was what was known to the trade as a "finished
knocked-down" chair. The terms "in piece" and "rough" had no
special meaning in the trade different from their general meaning,
though the trade used the expression "in the rough" in the sense of
"unfinished."
Upon the conclusion of the testimony, the defendant's counsel
moved the court (1) to direct the jury to find a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that the uncontradicted evidence in the
case and the exhibit showed that the furniture imported was
"furniture finished" within the meaning of the statute, (2) that
the jury be directed to find a verdict for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiffs had not proven facts sufficient to
enable them to recover, and (3) to allow the case to go to the jury
on the question of whether the furniture imported was "furniture
finished," or "furniture in piece, or rough, and not finished,"
within the meaning of the statute. These motions having been
successively made and denied and exceptions to the denials duly
taken, the court, on motion of the plaintiffs' counsel, directed
the jury to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum
of $443.34. The jury then found a verdict for the plaintiffs in the
said amount, and judgment was entered October 7, 1889, in
accordance therewith. The defendant thereupon sued out a writ of
error.
The subject of contention presented by this record is simply as
to the proper construction of the statute. The collector put in
testimony to show that in the furniture trade the word "finished"
had a particular trade meaning, and the court below refused to
admit the application of such meaning, if it should be found to
exist, to the word as used in the act. The question is therefore
whether, if a term used in a tariff law has a general meaning, as
understood by society at large and also a special trade
signification, it is to be presumed that Congress used the word in
its general sense or in its trade sense.
With regard to the language of commerce, the general rule
Page 149 U. S. 349
laid down by this Court is that it must be construed, when used
in laws imposing duties on importations of goods and particularly
when employed in the denomination of articles, according to the
commercial understanding of the terms used.
United
States v. One Hundred and Twelve Casks of Sugar, 8
Pet. 277;
Elliott v.
Swartout, 10 Pet. 137. While it is true that
"language will be presumed to have the same meaning in commerce
that it has in ordinary use, unless the contrary is shown,"
Swan v. Arthur, 103 U. S. 597,
yet
"the commercial designation of an article among traders and
importers, where such designation is clearly established, fixes its
character for the purpose of the tariff laws. . . . A specific
designation
eo nomine must prevail over general terms, and
a commercial designation is the standard by which the dutiable
character of the article is fixed."
Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S. 113.
This rule is equally applicable where a term is confined in its
meaning not merely to commerce, but to a particular trade, and in
such case also the presumption is that the term was used in its
trade signification.
While a customs law taxing an article which everyone in the
community might be expected to import, such as "wearing apparel,"
may use words which everyone understands, and which, unless taken
in the ordinary sense, would mislead the whole community, and
cannot therefore be supposed to be intended in any other sense
unless there is something to indicate such intention, yet, on the
other hand, a tariff law may use language not intended for the
community at large, but for merchants or for a particular trade,
and such as to mislead those for whom it is intended if not taken
in the commercial or trade sense, and such language is that under
consideration, speaking of a manufactured article in various stages
of its construction. In such a case, as in the other case, the
words are to be taken in the sense in which they will be naturally
understood by those to whom they are addressed.
We are of opinion that as the collector offered to prove that
the word in question had at and prior to the passage of the act of
1883 a particular trade meaning, the court should have considered
the trade meaning, if established, as applicable to
Page 149 U. S. 350
the matter at issue, and should have submitted the case to the
jury with instructions to render a verdict for the importers if
they found that the furniture was not "finished" within the trade
meaning of the term, and for the collector if they found the
contrary.
The judgment of the court below should be reversed, and the
case remanded, with directions to award a new trial, and proceed in
conformity with this opinion.