An order of the Postmaster General, made in the exercise of the
discretion given him by the Act of June 17, 1878, 20 Stat. 140, c.
259, § 1, withholding commissions from a postmaster and allowing a
stated compensation in place thereof in consequence of alleged
false returns in the postmaster's accounts, is not final and
conclusive in an action by the United States against the postmaster
and the sureties on his bond to recover moneys alleged to be
illegally withheld, but is competent evidence on the part of the
government, which may be explained or contradicted by the
defendants.
This was an action brought by the United States to recover from
Anna M. Dumas and the sureties on her official bond money alleged
to have been illegally retained by her while postmaster at
Covington, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana.
It appears from the record that Anna M. Dumas was postmaster at
the above-named place from January 1, 1881, to August 3, 1885, and
that on October 1, 1883, a bond, in lieu of a former one, was
executed. This bond was in the usual form, and was given to insure
the faithful performance of her
Page 149 U. S. 279
duties as postmaster. The accounts rendered by her as postmaster
at the end of each quarter were examined September 1, 1886, by the
auditor of the Treasury for the Post Office Department. This
examination resulted in a claim that she had made false returns of
the business done at the post office at Covington, whereby she is
alleged to have illegally retained from the government the sum of
$709.89 in excess of her commissions for the period from October 1,
1883, to August 3, 1885, the time covered by the conditions of the
bond last executed. A statement of accounts, certified to by the
auditor, to which is appended copies of papers pertaining to the
accounts, is made a part of the record. A demand was made on June
8, 1887, upon her and the sureties on her bond to make good the
deficit. Payment was not made, and the Postmaster General issued
the following order:
"Order No. 161 Post-Office Department"
"Office of the Postmaster General"
"Washington, D.C. August 11th, 1888"
"Being satisfied that A. M. Dumas, late P.M., Covington, St.
Tammany Co., La., has made false returns of business at the post
office at said place during the period from Jan. 1, 1881, to Aug.
3, 1885, thereby increasing her compensation beyond the amount
[s]he would justly have been entitled to have by law, now, in the
exercise of the discretion conferred by the act of Congress
entitled 'An act making appropriations for the service of the Post
Office Department for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1879, and for
other purposes,' approved June 17, 1878, section 1, chapter 259,
Supplement to Revised Statutes, I hereby withhold commissions on
the returns aforesaid, and allow as compensation, in place of such
commissions and in addition to box rents, deemed by me, under the
circumstances, to be reasonable during the period aforesaid, the
rate of $72.50 per quarter from Jan. 1, 1881, to March 31, 1883,
and $95 per quarter from April 1, 1883, to August 3, 1885, and the
auditor is requested to adjust her accounts accordingly."
"[Signed] Wm. F. Vilas"
"Postmaster General"
Page 149 U. S. 280
At the trial of the cause in the court below, the issue before
the jury was whether Anna M. Dumas, as postmaster, did collect and
receive in her official capacity from October 1, 1883, to August 3,
1885, in excess of the compensation fixed and allowed her in the
order of the Postmaster General, and above all proper expenditures,
the sum of $709.89. On this issue, the plaintiffs in error
requested the court to give the following instruction to the
jury:
"If the jury are satisfied that plaintiffs have proven that the
Postmaster General of the United States, being satisfied that Anna
M. Dumas, late postmaster at Covington, Louisiana, had made false
returns of business in said post office, withheld the commissions
of said Anna M. Dumas as such postmaster, and allowed her such
compensation, in lieu of said commission, as he, the said
Postmaster General, deemed reasonable, and if the jury further find
that the amount sued for by plaintiffs in the cause is arrived at
by reason of such withholding of said commissions and by the
allowance to her of such compensation by said Postmaster General,
then the jury must find for the United States."
This instruction the court refused to give, and charged the jury
in regard to the order (No. 161) of the Postmaster General as
follows: "This order was in its nature provisional. The adjustment
is only
prima facie evidence that the account is as stated
therein."
The jury found a verdict for the defendants, and judgment was
entered accordingly. The bill of exceptions does not show the
character of the evidence admitted or refused to be admitted. The
plaintiffs sued out a writ of error, and assign as errors that the
court below erred in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by
the attorney of the United States, and in charging the jury as to
the force and effect of the order of the Postmaster General, and
the accounts of the postmaster as certified by the auditor.
Page 149 U. S. 282
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 149 U. S. 283
It is insisted for the government that the order of the
Postmaster General and the certified transcript of the accounts,
which state the amount of the liability of Anna M. Dumas at
$709.89, are final and conclusive. If this proposition is correct,
and the order and the transcript constitute conclusive, rather than
prima facie, evidence of the balance due the United
States, then the instruction given was erroneous, and that
requested should have been given.
The order of the Postmaster General was made, as it recites, in
the exercise of the discretion conferred by the first section of
the Act of Congress approved June 17, 1878, which provides
"that in any case where the Postmaster General shall be
satisfied that a postmaster has made a false return of business, it
shall be within his discretion to withhold commissions on such
returns and to allow any compensation that under the circumstances
he may deem reasonable."
Now an order made in pursuance of this provision is certainly
not conclusive upon a postmaster that his returns of business are
actually false in fact when by the same section of the act it is
made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, to
make a false return to the auditor for the purpose of fraudulently
increasing his compensation. Neither can it be properly held that
when the Postmaster General is satisfied that a postmaster has made
a false return of business, and exercises his discretion "to
withhold commissions on such returns," his order in the matter is a
final and conclusive determination that the postmaster is not
entitled to any commissions as such, or that his compensation shall
be absolutely fixed and limited by the allowance made. In a suit
for his commissions or compensation, such an order, withholding the
one and making a discretionary allowance as to the other, would
certainly not conclude the postmaster. It was not the intention of
Congress by this provision of the statute to confer upon the
Postmaster General the discretion to deprive a postmaster of his
commissions, or to vest him with authority to deny all commissions,
and allow only such compensation as he might deem proper as a final
settlement and adjudication of the postmaster's rights in the
premises.
Page 149 U. S. 284
By a preceding clause of the same section, it is provided
"that when the compensation of any postmaster of this class
[4th] shall reach one thousand dollars per annum, exclusive of
commissions on money order business, and when the returns to the
auditor for four quarters shall show him to be entitled to a
compensation in excess of that amount under section seven of the
Act of July twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six,, the auditor
shall report such fact to the Postmaster General, who shall assign
him to his proper class, and fix his salary as provided by said
section."
A similar provision in the Act of March 3, 1883, was before this
Court in the case of
United States v. Wilson, 144 U. S.
24, and it was held that a postmaster who is assigned by
the Postmaster General to a particular class at a designated salary
from a designated date was entitled to compensation at the rate
thus fixed from such date, without regard to his appointment by the
President and confirmation by the Senate. The action of the
Postmaster General in assigning a postmaster to his proper class
and fixing his salary accordingly under such provisions of the
statute is essentially different from the exercise of the
discretion conferred of withholding commissions on such returns as
the Postmaster General may be satisfied are false. "To withhold"
commissions seems fairly to imply a temporary suspension, rather
than a total and final denial or rejection of the same. If such
withholding is not conclusive upon the postmaster, how can the
allowance made, while the commissions are being withheld, be
treated or regarded as a final and conclusive adjudication as to
the compensation the postmaster is, or shall be, entitled to
receive? The court below regarded the order in question as
provisional in its character, and accordingly held in substance
that it did not so conclusively fix and determine the commissions
and compensation of the postmaster as to make the statement of her
accounts based thereon conclusive against her and her sureties.
The contrary proposition urged on behalf of the United States
involves the assertion that the falsity of the postmaster's returns
is actually and finally established by the order of the Postmaster
General, and that the accounts adjusted in accordance
Page 149 U. S. 285
therewith amount to more than
prima facie evidence of
the correctness of the balance claimed to be due from the
defendants.
We think this contention of the government cannot be sustained,
and that the ruling of the circuit court on the question was
correct.
As to the competency, merely, of this evidence, there can be no
question, for it is provided by section 889, Revised Statutes,
that
"in any civil suit in case of delinquency of any postmaster or
contractor, a statement of the account, certified as aforesaid,
shall be admitted in evidence, and the court shall be authorized
thereupon to give judgment and award execution, subject to the
provisions of law as to proceedings in such civil suits."
The force and effect of such testimony has been several times
considered by this Court. Thus, in
United
States v. Eckford's Executors, 1 How. 250, a
statement of account by the officers of the Treasury was held not
to be conclusive, but only
prima facie, evidence. So in
United States v.
Hodge, 13 How. 478, a Treasury transcript offered
in evidence was held to be competent, but not conclusive.
In Watkins v. United
States, 9 Wall. 759, nothing more appeared in the
shape of evidence than the certified transcript of accounts, and,
being held to be
prima facie evidence, it warranted
judgment for the government for the amount therein shown to be due,
in the absence of any testimony explaining or contradicting it. But
that case does not hold that certified transcripts of accounts are
conclusive upon the officer. So in
Soule v. United States,
100 U. S. 8, it was
held that
"Treasury settlements of the kind are only
prima facie
evidence of the correctness of the balance certified, but it is as
competent for the accounting officers to correct mistakes and to
restate the balance as it is for a judge to change his decree
during the term in which it was entered. Errors of computation
against the United States are no more vested rights in favor of
sureties than in favor of the principal. All such mistakes in cases
like the present may be corrected by a restatement of the
account."
In the same line, it has been held by this Court that the
adjustment of accounts made by the auditor is
prima
facie
Page 149 U. S. 286
evidence not only of the fact and the amount of the
indebtedness, but also of the time when and the manner in which it
arose, and that an objection to the statement does not lie to its
competency, but to its effect.
United States v. Stone,
106 U. S. 525.
It would be manifestly unjust to compel the principal and
sureties of a bond to pay an alleged indebtedness based upon a
statement of account when there are palpable errors upon the face
of the statement or when the defendants are prepared to show by
affirmative evidence that there are in fact errors in the accounts.
As already stated, the bill of exceptions contains nothing to show
the character of the evidence introduced by way of explanation or
contradiction of the certified transcript of accounts presented by
the government. The single question raised and presented by
plaintiffs in error was whether the order of the Postmaster
General, in connection with the certified statement of account, was
final and conclusive on the defendants in error. We hold that it
was merely evidence which, unexplained or uncontradicted, would
have warranted a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in error for
the balance shown thereby to be due. But this evidence did not
conclude the defendants, and, for aught that appears from the
record, they may have explained or contradicted the statement, or
shown it to be incorrect, and as it does not appear what the
evidence was on this subject, we are unable to say that the
judgment was wrong, there being no error in the charge of the
court.
Nor is there anything said or decided in
United States v.
Barlow 132 U. S. 271,
132 U. S. 280,
cited and relied on by plaintiffs in error, in conflict with this
conclusion. In that case, MR. JUSTICE FIELD, speaking for the
Court, said:
"We admit that where matters appertaining to the postal service
are left to the discretion and judgment of the Postmaster General,
the exercise of that judgment and discretion cannot in general be
interfered with and the results following defeated. But the very
rule supposes that information upon the matters upon which the
judgment and discretion are invoked is presented to the officer for
consideration, or knowledge respecting them is possessed
Page 149 U. S. 287
by him. He is not at liberty, any more than a private agent, to
act upon mere guesses and surmises, without information or
knowledge on the subject."
This ruling of the court falls far short of holding that the
transcript of accounts is conclusive upon the officer.
Our conclusion is that the order of the Postmaster General and
the certified accounts produced by the government in the present
case were only
prima facie evidence of the balance claimed
against the defendants in error, and that there was no error in the
court below in so holding, and the judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.
