Letters patent, No. 267,192, issued November 7, 1882, to James
M. Grant for "certain new and useful improvements in the art of
reeling and winding silk and other thread" are void for want of
patentable novelty, the alleged discovery being only that of a new
use for the old device of a cross-reeled and laced skein, and while
the fact that the patented article has gone into general use may be
evidence of its utility, it cannot control the language of the
statute, which limits the benefit of the patent laws to things
which are new, as well as useful.
Features in a patented invention which are not covered by the
claims are not protected by the letters patent.
In equity, to restrain the infringement of letters patent.
Decree dismissing the bill, from which the plaintiff appealed. The
case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity, in the usual form, for the alleged
infringement of letters patent No. 267, 192, issued to the
Page 148 U. S. 548
appellant, James M. Grant, on the 7th of November, 1882, for
"certain new and useful improvements in the art of reeling and
winding silk and other thread." The bill averred that the defendant
had infringed the patent by making, using, vending, and putting in
practice, without complainant's license, improvements described and
claimed in the patent. The prayer was for an injunction and for an
account of profits and damages. The answer set up, among other
defenses not necessary to be noticed, a denial that Grant was the
original inventor of the improvements described in the patent; that
there was a want of novelty in the invention, and a prior use of
the improvements claimed as patentable by various designated
parties. Replication was duly filed, proof taken, and the court
below, upon the hearing of the cause, found in favor of the
defendant and accordingly dismissed the bill. 38 F. 594. From this
decree the present appeal is prosecuted, and the appellant assigns
for error the lower court's "denial of patentability to the skein,
which Grant claims, while awarding it to the process, which he does
not claim." The court, however, did not decide that it was a valid
process patent, but suggested that if the improvement was a valid
invention, it was in the process, and not in the product.
The material parts of the specification, and the claims based
thereon, are as follows:
"My invention relates to a novel manner of winding silk or other
thread upon the reels in a reeling machine preparatory to its being
dyed."
"The object of my invention is to provide an improved skein of
silk whereby a greater quantity can be reeled upon the same machine
in a given time, and to provide at the same time for making these
skeins in a proper form to receive the dye in the best manner, and
be ready, after the dyeing, to be placed upon the swift for
unwinding upon bobbins in the customary manner."
"In the present method of manufacturing silk, the thread,
previous to dyeing, is wound into skeins upon a reeling machine in
which some twenty or more small skeins, containing generally one
thousand yards, or less, are wound upon
Page 148 U. S. 549
a set of parallel bars set around an axis forming a long reel.
Each skein is tied up by itself, and the reel is taken down, or
collapses, to release the separate skeins. These small skeins are
then dyed and then placed separately upon swifts to again unwind
them. Larger skeins than above named have been found inconvenient,
if not impracticable, on account of becoming tangled in the dyeing,
and difficult to unwind. By means of my improvement, I am enabled
to wind skeins of twenty-four thousand yards, or more, in each
separate skein, upon the reels, thus saving a great amount of labor
in taking down the reels to remove the skeins, and the larger
skeins, wound in my improved manner, can be placed at once upon the
swifts and unwound without difficulty."
"My improvement consists in winding the silk or other thread
upon the reel in the form of a wide band, in which the thread
crosses from side to side as it is wound, somewhat in the manner
now employed, but so arranged as not to form single skeins by
passing one layer over the other. I prefer to have the thread cross
in five sixths of one revolution of the reel, although other
proportions will answer. When the required quantity has been wound,
I lace the skein or band, before it is removed from the reel, in
one or more places, generally on opposite sides of the reel, so as
to divide it into a number of parts and hold it in its flat or
band-like condition. This lacing constitutes the chief point of my
invention, and is what preserves the skein in its shape and
prevents its becoming entangled in the process of dyeing. After
lacing, the skein is removed from the reel and passes into the
hands of the dyer. After winding in the manner above described, the
skein is so laid -- one thread crossing the other -- that its
texture is more open, even, than the small skeins wound in the
ordinary manner, and, although much larger, the dye easily
penetrates to every part, and insures a uniform color. The several
threads cannot become matted together, as with the ordinary skein
would in the customary manner."
"By means of my invention, a great saving is made in the expense
of manufacture, the waste of silk is greatly reduced, and less
skill is required in the winding after the dyeing,
Page 148 U. S. 550
thereby dispensing with the high-priced, skilled operatives now
employed upon this work."
"What I claim as my invention is:"
"(1) A skein of silk or other thread wound upon a reel
diagonally from side to side in the manner described, and laced
back and forth across its width to preserve its form, substantially
as set forth."
"(2) The combination of the lacing, B, with a wide skein of
silk, or other thread, in which the strands are diagonally crossed,
substantially as described."
At the hearing of the case, a disclaimer was filed in the Patent
Office by the appellant
"to so much of said claim as does or might make such claim apply
to a skein which, by reason of being coated with gum, or by reason
of the manner of its lacing, or for any other reason, is not in
condition for dyeing for ordinary manufacturing purposes."
By stipulation of the parties, it was provided
"that this disclaimer may be made a part of the record in this
suit
nunc pro tunc, as of the date of hearing thereof, as
if the same had been filed on that date, to indicate the
willingness of the complainant to limit his patent by said
disclaimer, and as an aid in the construction of his patent, but
without prejudice to the rights of this defendant on the question
of delay in filing said disclaimer."
The circuit court held that the claims of the patent covered a
product, and not a process, and that the patent was void for want
of patentable novelty, for the reason that the form of skein
described in the specification and covered by the claims was well
known and in use long prior to Grant's invention, which consisted
in the method of dyeing and winding silk by the use of such well
known form of skein, and not in the skein itself, and, if valid to
any extent, it was only upon the process. The court further held
that the disclaimer could neither operate to give validity to the
patent for the skein nor change it into one for the process, and
accordingly dismissed the bill.
As found by the circuit court, the evidence fully and clearly
established the fact that skeins of silk diagonally reeled, and
laced across the width, so as to separate the skein into two or
more sections, were in use, and well known to the silk trade
Page 148 U. S. 551
long prior to Grant's improvement. The form of such skeins was
substantially the same as that adopted by Grant. These anticipating
skeins were in their construction similar to the construction of
the skeins of the patent. They were produced in the same manner by
the horizontal to and fro motion of a guide bar for carrying the
thread in front of the reel as the latter revolved, thus causing
the diagonal or cross-reeling in the formation of the skein. They
were laced into two or three sections across their width. The
object and purpose of this diagonal reeling and lacing was to
preserve the form of the skein and to prevent entanglement and
snarling in the handling and future winding of the silk. These old
skeins were made of raw silk -- that is, silk coated with, or
carrying, the silkworm's gum -- and were smaller in size, and more
tightly laced across their width, than the Grant skeins in
question. The diagonal reeling was somewhat wider in the skein of
the patent than in the old skeins. The raw silk having a more
delicate thread, and much more liable in handling to become
entangled, and therefore less easily wound than when the silk had
been brought to a condition of thread, necessitated this
cross-reeling and lacing to preserve the form of the skein, and to
facilitate the transportation and future handling of the silk in
its further development in the process of manufacturing. Nor could
the raw silk be dyed, because the filaments would separate, the gum
which holds them together would be dissolved out, so that they
would become snarled or entangled, without this cross-reeling and
lacing in the process of ungumming, and could not be subsequently
wound without great difficulty and loss. It had to be first "boiled
off," as it is called, or the gum removed, by being immersed for
some period in soap and water or other liquid.
The process of manufacturing silk thread is thus described by a
witness for the complainant:
"The silk, in the shape in which it is formed by the silkworm,
exists in the shape of cocoons. These cocoons, in the countries in
which silk is grown, are soaked in a suitable bath, and the
filaments of silk that compose the cocoons are unwound from the
cocoons, and formed in skeins on reels or
Page 148 U. S. 552
swifts. In this shape, it forms the raw silk of commerce, and is
imported into America in large quantities, mostly from Europe and
Asia. The skeins of raw silk are treated by the manufacturer of
silk thread (I do not mean by this term 'thread' sewing silks and
braids only, but rather that known as 'tram' and 'organzine,' that
is used in making textile fabrics) usually as follows: the raw silk
is ungummed. It is dried to a sufficient degree, and is then, in
skein form, put on swifts, from which it is wound onto spools or
bobbins. The silk, according to the use to which it is to be put,
is further doubled, in which operation it goes from spool to spool;
is twisted, in which operation it goes from spool to spool, and
when of sufficient size, as to number of threads, and of condition,
as to twisting, it is reeled from the spool or bobbin into skein
form. In this skein form it is dyed, and, with the old form of
skeins, is then parted, to separate the several small skeins that
compose the larger skein, such as I now produce, and is then put on
'risers,' so called, and wound onto bobbins, in which shape the
silk is used, usually, in the manufacture of textile fabrics. I
will state that the 'risers,' as used in this old process of
manufacture that I am describing, consisted of two small drums or
pulleys, usually of about five or six inches in diameter, and that
the skein was wound from these 'risers.'"
"In this art, the term 'winding' means the changing of the silk
from the skein form to its form on a bobbin or spool, and by
'reeling' is meant the putting of the silk into the skein
form."
The contention of the appellant is that the skein of the patent
should be considered in connection with the specification and
knowledge of the art possessed by the persons to whom the
specification is addressed, and if the prior art requires
limitations in order to leave validity in the patent, then it is
right and proper for the court to read such limitations into the
claims by construction, and on the basis of this proposition it is
urged that Grant's skein differed from the earlier skeins shown by
the testimony in at least two particulars: first, that the earlier
skeins were gummed, and Grant's skeins are ungummed, which
prevented the former from being dyed,
Page 148 U. S. 553
while the latter can be; and secondly that the earlier skeins
were laced tightly for the purposes of transportation and handling,
while Grant's skeins are laced loosely, so that they are in a
condition for dyeing. The Grant skein is shown to be an improvement
over the earlier skeins for the purposes of dyeing, but neither the
specification nor the claims of the patent limit it to that
purpose. The disclaimer undertakes so to do, or rather to limit it
to a condition in which the skein may be dyed.
The court below properly held that the disclaimer did not give
any increased validity to the patent for the skein or change it
into one for a process. And the simple question presented is
whether Grant's skein possesses features of patentable novelty over
the earlier skeins shown by the testimony. The cross-reeling and
lacing in the skein of the patent perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way as in the earlier skeins,
but at a later and different stage or condition of the silk thread
forming the skein. It is perfectly manifest that if a patent had
existed on the earlier skein, the skein of the patent would be an
infringement thereof as being simply for a double or analogous use.
Such analogous use, under the authorities, is not patentable.
Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37;
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Locomotive Truck Co.,
110 U. S. 491;
Miller v. Foree, 116 U. S. 22;
Dreyfus v. Searle, 124 U. S. 60. And
the same result must follow, although the earlier skein is not
patented, if it embodies substantially the same form and for a like
use.
The function and purpose of the prior skein and the patented
device were exactly analogous, operated in the same way, and were
serviceable in both cases to preserve the skein from entanglement,
the patented skein being applicable to a later stage of the thread.
This, within the principle announced in
Smith v.
Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, would constitute simply a
mere carrying forward or extended application of the original
device with the change only in degree, but doing substantially the
same thing, in the same way, by substantially the same means, with
some better results, and would not therefore be patentable.
Page 148 U. S. 554
The difference insisted upon in support of the patent -- that
the looser lacing of the skein across the band to preserve its
form, and keep it in condition suitable for dyeing the thread -- is
clearly a matter of mechanical skill, which does not involve
invention. It is said by one of complainant's witnesses that such
loose lacing as is insisted upon as a requisite for effective
dyeing is neither shown in the drawings nor in the specification
nor claims, but that it should be read into the patent because "a
man that understands his business must know that it must be laced
loosely, or that the silk would be spoiled in dyeing," and that if
this were not noticed or not known, it would be taught him by the
first experiment. It is perfectly evident that it would readily
occur to anyone skilled in the art that, as the skeins are
increased in size or width of band, the necessity for lacing in
order to preserve the form, and keep the skein in a condition for
dyeing, would be correspondingly increased, and that the looser the
lacing, the more perfect would be the dyeing. Such changes in
degree, merely, would not constitute an invention.
Estey v.
Burdett, 109 U. S.
632.
It is settled that distinct and formal claims are necessary to
ascertain the scope of the invention.
Merrill v. Yeomans,
94 U. S. 568;
Western Electric Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co.,
114 U. S. 447.
If, therefore, the elements of "boiling off," or ungumming the
silk, or the dyeing thereof, and of improving the winding facility,
were patentable, in view of the prior skeins, they should have been
covered by the claims of the patent.
James v. Campbell,
104 U. S. 356, and
authorities cited above.
The disclaimer takes away nothing from the claims, except what
is not in condition for dyeing, and no silk thread is in condition
for dyeing by simply being cross-reeled and laced. The patent,
notwithstanding the disclaimer, is still for an old device of a
cross-reeled and laced skein, for whatever purpose it may be
designed, and is void for want of patentable novelty. The counsel
for the appellant, while claiming the benefit of his disclaimer and
insisting that Grant's skein is distinguishable from the earlier
anticipating skeins, for the reason that the latter were coated
with gum, and were not loosely laced, states that
Page 148 U. S. 555
"Grant's specification addresses its direction wholly to the
skein maker, never to the dyer. It says:"
"My invention relates to a novel manner of winding silk or other
thread upon the reels in a reeling machine preparatory to its being
dyed. . . . My improvement consists in winding the silk or other
thread upon the reel in the form of a wide band. . . . When the
required quantity has been wound, I lace the skein or band . . . so
as to divide it into a number of parts, and hold it in its flat or
band-like condition."
"Grant had a clear idea of the real nub of his invention. He
says:"
"This lacing constitutes the chief point of my invention, and is
what preserves the skein in its shape and prevents its becoming
entangled in the process of dyeing."
"Grant gives no instructions to the dyer or the winder, for the
simple reason that in dyeing his skein, and afterwards winding it
upon bobbins, the procedure is identical with the procedure of the
old art.
All that is novel is found in the skein, and that
answers the question is Grant's improvement a skein or a process?
That answer is, Grant's improvement is a new skein."
So that the whole invention must be tested by the simple
question whether the looser lacing, for the purpose of dyeing, over
the more tightly laced skeins, for the purpose of preserving their
form and winding qualities while being "boiled off," or ungummed,
constitutes a patentable invention. Considering the purpose for
which it is now claimed, it cannot be anything more than a mere
application of an old process to a new use, which does not rise to
the dignity of invention, the looser lacing for the purposes of
dyeing being perfectly apparent to anyone skilled in the art of
silk manufacture or in the preparation of thread for that purpose.
But while it is thus claimed that the Grant specification addresses
itself to the direction, wholly, of the skein maker, and never to
the dyer, the disclaimer undertakes to confine such direction
solely to the dyer, rather than to the skein maker, as the effect
of the disclaimer is intended to exclude skeins
"which, by reason of being coated with gum or by reason of the
manner of its lacing, or for any other reason, is not in condition
for dyeing for ordinary manufacturing purposes."
So that, under the operation of the disclaimer,
Page 148 U. S. 556
the specification and claims would have to be read as addressed
to the dyer, rather than to the skein maker. This would involve a
complete change of what was covered by the specification and
claims, which must be held controlling.
The most that can be said of this Grant patent is that it is a
discovery of a new use for an old device, which does not involve
patentability. However useful the nature of the new use to which
the skein is sought to be confined by the disclaimer, compared with
the former uses to which the old skein was applied at the date of
the improvement, it forms only an analogous or double use, or one
so cognate and similar to the uses and purposes of the former
cross-reeled and laced skein as not to involve anything more than
mechanical skill, and does not constitute invention, as is well
settled by authorities already referred to.
The advantages claimed for it, and which it no doubt possesses
to a considerable degree, cannot be held to change this result, it
being well settled that utility cannot control the language of the
statute, which limits its the benefit of the patent laws to things
which are new as well as useful. The fact that the patented article
has gone into general use is evidence of its utility, but not
conclusive of that, and still less of its patentable novelty.
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419,
141 U. S. 425,
and authorities there cited.
Our conclusion is that there was no error in the decree of the
court below, and the same is accordingly
Affirmed.