Page 147 U. S. 635
it was no new invention to use an old machine for a new purpose,
and that the inventor of a machine was entitled to the benefit of
all the uses to which it could be put, no matter whether he had
conceived the idea of the use or not.
It is contended, as against the wire bells, that the evidence
does not show the application of the patented process to an article
designed to be used as a spring. But the clock hairsprings are
quite as truly springs as the furniture springs, for they require
the exercise and use of the resiliency of tempered steel. Both are
subjected to the same strains in coiling; both, for the same
reasons, need restoration, and in both the application of a blue
heat produces the same desirable results.
Within the rule laid down by this Court in
Hollister v.
Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59, there
was nothing more than mechanical skill in arriving at the alleged
invention, in view of the state of the art. Cary says in his
specification that "in bending or coiling the wire into the proper
shape, the metal is unavoidably weakened;" that "this greatly
reduces the elasticity, strength, and durability of the spring;"
that "being a manufacturer of furniture springs, and aware of this
difficulty," he had made many experiments with a view to restoring
the wire, after being bent or formed into springs, to its normal
condition, and that he had discovered that that could be done
"by subjecting the spring to a degree of heat known as
'spring-temper heat,' which is about 600�, more or less, and that a
subjection to this temperature for about eight minutes is
sufficient to produce the result desired."
It is contended, however, by the plaintiffs that the application
of the former processes is contradicted by the fact that no one had
used them for the manufacture of furniture springs, and that, as
soon as Cary's process was made known, the art of making furniture
springs was revolutionized. But it was said by this Court in
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419,
141 U. S.
428:
"That the extent to which a patented device has gone into use is
an unsafe criterion even of its actual utility is evident from the
fact that the general introduction of manufactured articles is as
often effected by extensive and judicious advertising, activity in
putting the goods upon the
Page 147 U. S. 636
market, and large commissions to dealers as by the intrinsic
merit of the articles themselves,"
and (p.
141 U. S. 429)
that while,
"in a doubtful case the fact that a patented article had gone
into general use is evidence of its utility, it is not conclusive
even of that, much less of its patentable novelty."
In the present case, it appears that it was not until a short
time before 1870 that furniture springs began to be commonly made
of steel wire. It was not until 1868, when the general introduction
of Bessemer steel and open hearth steel afforded a cheap substitute
for iron, that the use of steel became general in the art in
question. It was then natural that there should be introduced into
that art methods of treatment which were well known as applied in
allied arts. The method of the patent, already in use, thus
occurred to Cary, but he was appropriating a method which was
common property. When steel was adopted for the first time in any
art, it was natural that existing methods of treating it should be
applied to its new use in the given art. The case is merely one of
a double use. Nor is it of force that experts expressed surprise
that the process in question was applicable to furniture
springs.
Cary was not the first to discover the process described in his
specification for the restoration of steel. He claims only the
process, and the use made of the article after it is subjected to
the process does not affect the nature of the process itself. As a
process, there is nothing new in the subject matter of the claim.
The claim does not cover an improvement in furniture springs or
other coiled springs, as a new article of manufacture, and the
"coiled springs," to which, by the claim, the method of tempering
is to be applied, include all such springs, irrespective of the use
to which they are to be applied. The method or process claimed is
substantially the old method of restoring mechanically strained
steel.
The present case is covered by cases of
Vinton v.
Hamilton, 104 U. S. 485;
Stow v. Chicago, 110 U. S. 547;
Locomotive Truck Case, 110 U. S. 490;
Blake v. San Francisco, 113 U. S. 679;
Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U. S. 1;
Miller v. Foree, 116 U. S. 22;
Dreyfus v. Searle, 124 U. S. 60;
Brown v.
Page 147 U. S. 637
District of Columbia, 130 U. S. 87;
Aron v. Manhattan Railway, 132 U. S.
84;
Watson v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis &c.
Railway, 132 U. S. 161;
Marchand v. Emken, 132 U. S. 195;
Royer v. Roth, 132 U. S. 201;
Hill v. Wooster, 132 U. S. 693,
132 U. S. 701;
Burt v. Evory, 133 U. S. 349;
Howe Machine Co. v. National Needle Co., 134 U.
S. 388;
Florsheim v. Schilling, 137 U. S.
64;
Consolidated Roller Mill Co. v. Walker,
138 U. S. 124;
Ansonia Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U. S.
11;
Ryan v. Hard, 149
U. S. 241. The principle deducible from those cases is
that it is not a patentable invention to apply old and well known
devices and processes to new uses in other and analogous arts. The
decision in
Ansonia Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., supra,
is very pertinent. In the opinion in that case, the cases were
reviewed which established (1) that the application of an old
process or machine to a similar or analogous subject, with no
change in the manner of application, and no result substantially
distinct in its nature, will not sustain a patent, even if the new
form of result had not before been contemplated, and (2) that, on
the other hand, if an old device or process be put to a new use
which is not analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of the
old process to the new use is of such a character as to require the
exercise of the inventive faculty to produce it, such new use will
not be denied the merit of patentability.
In the case of
Cary v. Wolff, 24 F. 139, Judge Wheeler
remarked that the discovery of Cary was that the application of
heat would restore the lost strength and elasticity of the wire
consequent on the displacement of its particles; that the
application of heat for that purpose was not known until it was
applied to that kind of springs in their peculiarly weakened state;
that the discovery was of a new application of an old process,
which produced a new and highly useful result; that wire bells for
clocks were made to have sonorous properties by the same process in
kind, but for a different purpose and with a different result; that
what seemed to be the nearest to it was the method of shaping and
spacing the coils of hair balance springs for marine clocks by
coiling the wire into a mold of the required shape, called a
"snail,"
Page 147 U. S. 638
and subjecting it to heat while there in place to make it retain
its shape, but there was no displacement of the particles of which
the wire was composed by distortion, and the process was not a
restoration of any lost quality, but a mere shaping of the wire
into the article desired; that the discovery of that effect of
restoration by Cary's mode was new; that experts called by the
defendants admitted that they had not believed the result would be
produced until they saw the process tried in connection with that
litigation, and that such production of a new and useful result,
although by a new application of an old process, was patentable,
citing
Crane v. Price, 1 Webster's Pat.Cas. 393;
Smith
v. Goodyear Co., 93 U. S. 486, and
Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580.
In the present case, in the opinion of Judge Acheson granting
the preliminary injunction, 24 F. 141, the court cited and followed
the decision of Judge Wheeler.
In the opinion of Judge Nixon in
Cary v. Domestic Spring Bed
Co., 27 F. 299, he stated that. in ordering the preliminary
injunction, he had followed the decision of Judge Wheeler, and that
is shown also by his opinion granting such injunction. 27 F.
299.
In the opinion of Judge Acheson in the present case on final
hearing, 31 F. 344, concurred in by Judge McKennan, 31 F. 347, it
is stated that the process of the patent is based on the fact that
the evils resulting from the distortion of hard-drawn steel wire,
in the ordinary operation of coiling it into springs for furniture,
can be removed by a single application of heat, as set forth in the
specification, so as to result in a greatly improved spring; that
furniture springs so treated came into immediate and very general
use on their introduction into the market, largely superseding
springs not subjected to that treatment, and that experts and
others practically familiar with the treatment and behavior of
steel were greatly surprised at the result effected by the patented
process, it being contrary to all their previous conception and
experience. The opinion then cites and quotes from the opinion of
Judge Wheeler, and states that the latter opinion held that the
Cary process was new and patentable, although previously, in
the
Page 147 U. S. 639
manufacture of wire bells for clocks, heat had been applied to
them for the purpose of giving them the desired sound and tone, and
hair balance springs for marine clocks were subjected to heat while
coiled in grooves of a metallic plate for the purpose of
permanently setting the coils in proper relation to each other. The
opinion of Judge Acheson further said that after giving to the
subject matter an independent investigation, the court saw no
reason to doubt the correctness of Judge Wheeler's conclusions, and
added:
"The purpose, object, and result of the application of heat in
the practice of the Cary invention are so entirely different from
those aimed at and attained by the application of heat in the
manufacture of wire clock bells, hair balance springs for marine
clocks, and the other shown instances of its prior use that we do
not hesitate to adopt the conclusion of Judge Wheeler upon this
branch of the case."
But we are of opinion that the same principle set forth in the
patent was developed in the manufacture of the wire bells for
clocks and of the hair balance springs, that there was no
patentable invention in applying that principle to the springs
mentioned in the specification, and that the case is merely one of
a double use.
It results that the decree of the circuit court must be
Reversed, and the case be remanded to that court with a
direction to dismiss the bill with costs.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not sit in this case or take any part in
its decision.