for a review of the matter. Additional testimony was taken, as
authorized by the statute, and on hearing that court reversed the
decision of the board of general appraisers and sustained the
ruling of the collector. 46 F. 510. From this decision appellants
appealed to this Court. Paragraphs 396 and 392 are as follows:
"396. On clothing, ready made, and articles of wearing apparel
of every description, made up or manufactured, wholly or in part,
not specially provided for in this act, felts not woven, and not
specially provided for in this act, and plushes and other pile
fabrics, all the foregoing, composed wholly or in part of wool,
worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals, the
duty per pound shall be four and one-half times the duty imposed by
this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first class, and in
addition thereto sixty percentum
ad valorem."
"392. On woolen or worsted cloths, shawls, knit fabrics, and all
fabrics made on knitting machines or frames, and all manufactures
of every description made wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the
hair of the camel, goat, alpaca, or other animals not specially
provided for in this act, valued at not more than thirty cents per
pound, the duty per pound shall be three times the duty imposed by
this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first class, and in
addition thereto forty percentum
ad valorem; valued at
more than thirty and not more than forty cents per pound, the duty
per pound shall be three and one-half times the duty imposed by
this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the first class, and in
addition thereto forty percentum
ad valorem; valued at
above forty cents per pound, the duty per pound shall be four times
the duty imposed by this act on a pound of unwashed wool of the
first class, and in addition thereto fifty percentum
ad
valorem. "
Page 147 U.S. 496
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether knit woolen shirts,
drawers, and hosiery come within the enumeration of "clothing,
ready made, and articles of wearing apparel of every description,
made up or manufactured wholly or in part . . . of wool," as
provided in paragraph 396, or of "knit fabrics, and all fabrics
made on knitting machines or frames, and all manufactures of every
description, made wholly or in part of wool," as found in paragraph
392. In the original brief filed by counsel for appellants, it is
conceded that either enumeration, in the absence of the other,
might cover these goods, though in the reply brief it is contended
that in no proper sense of the term are the appellants'
importations wearing apparel, and in support thereof definitions
are quoted from several dictionaries in which the word "apparel" is
defined as "external clothing," "external habiliments or array,"
and "a person's outer clothing." As against this, counsel for the
government also refers us to dictionaries in which the term
"wearing apparel" is defined as "garments worn or made for wearing;
dress in general," and the noun "wearing" as "that which one wears;
clothes; garments." But it is unnecessary to search or compare the
dictionaries. The term "wearing apparel" is not an uncommon one in
statutes, and is used in an inclusive sense, as embracing all
articles which are ordinarily worn -- dress in general. Indeed this
very statute, paragraph 752, in respect to articles exempt from
duty, names "wearing apparel and other personal effects (not
merchandise) of persons arriving in the United States." Obviously
the term is here used as covering all articles of dress, while
"personal effects" refer to other matters of personal baggage not
used as clothing. And it cannot be believed that a person coming
into the United States is permitted to bring in his outer clothing
free from duty while his underclothing is subject to duty and
seizure for the nonpayment thereof. So in exemption statutes is
frequently found the term "wearing apparel." Thus, for
Page 147 U.S. 497
instance, in the General Statutes of Kansas, page 474, c. 38,
sec. 4, is this description of exempt property: "First, the wearing
apparel of the debtor." And in the late Bankruptcy Act, "the
wearing apparel of the bankrupt" is excepted from the operation of
the assignment. Rev.Stat. sec. 5045. No one would suppose that
under such statutes, a man's pantaloons and shoes were exempt,
while his drawers and socks were not. Not only is that the general
sense in which the term is used in statutes, but also the very form
of the language here used indicates an intent to compass within the
enumeration every article which is ordinarily worn or recognized as
an article of dress. The language is "clothing, ready made, and
articles of wearing apparel of every description." The words
"clothing, ready made," would include coats, pants, vests, and
overcoats at least, and the sweeping term added thereafter,
"articles of wearing apparel of every description," was obviously
meant to reach out and include everything that one wears. We think
that the concession made by appellants' counsel in their principal
brief is beyond question.
Each paragraph, as will be noticed, contains the words "not
specially provided for in this act," and the contention of
appellants is that the enumeration in paragraph 392 is more
specific, and that therefore it should control, referring in this
connection to
Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U.
S. 208, and
Hartranft v. Meyer, 135 U.
S. 237. But we think that the reverse is true, and that
the description in 396 is more of a special enumeration than that
in 392. Clothing and articles of wearing apparel are more specific
than cloths and knit fabrics. Out of cloths and knit fabrics
clothing and wearing apparel are made. The latter are included
within the former, while the former are not included within the
latter. So if the decisive matter was the more special enumeration,
we think 396 would be preferred, and in this connection may be
noticed the relative rate of duty, which is higher for the articles
in 396 than for those in 392. The idea which runs through this
statute is well known to be that of protection to our manufactures.
As the duty prescribed by 396 exceeds that prescribed by 392, it
suggests that the articles named in
Page 147 U.S. 498
396 have been subjected to an additional process, which is to be
protected by an increase of duty, and so it is that paragraph 392
is apparently intended to provide the duty for what may be
considered "piece goods," manufactured material, while that part of
paragraph 396 which we have been considering, and which stands, as
it were, correlated to paragraph 392, does not refer to
manufactured material, but that material carried by an additional
process of manufacturing into the condition of manufactured
articles. It is true that we find shawls named with cloths and
fabrics in paragraph 392, and they are manufactured articles, yet
they closely resemble manufactured material, and are little more
than piece goods cut into sizes suitable for use. It is also true
that paragraph 396 names felts, plushes, etc., in addition to
clothing and wearing apparel, and they are manufactured material,
rather than manufactured articles. But the articles embraced within
the terms "clothing" and "wearing apparel" are put in a class by
themselves, and separated from the other articles named in the
paragraph by the expression "not specially provided for in this
act," and it may well be that Congress thought that the manufacture
of felts, plushes, etc., required so much more labor than that of
cloth and knit fabrics as to justify subjecting them to the higher
duty of manufactured articles, like clothing and wearing
apparel.
But more significant is the change made in the provisions of the
tariff of 1890 from those in that of March 3, 1883. A paragraph of
that tariff act, 22 Stat. 509, is as follows:
"Clothing, ready made, and wearing apparel of every description,
not specifically enumerated or provided for in this act, and
balmoral skirts, and skirting, and goods of similar description, or
used for like purposes, composed wholly or in part of wool,
worsted, the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other animals, made up or
manufactured wholly or in part by the tailor, seamstress, or
manufacturer, except knit goods, forty cents per pound, and in
addition thereto thirty-five percentum
ad valorem."
Knit goods, it will be perceived, are excepted from the
Page 147 U.S. 499
description of "clothing, ready made, and wearing apparel of
every description." In
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,
25 U. S. 438,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized as
"a rule of interpretation to which all assent that the exception
of a particular thing from general words proves that, in the
opinion of the lawgiver, the thing excepted would be within the
general clause had the exception not been made."
Applying that rule, it follows that but for the exception, the
general description of "clothing, ready made, and wearing apparel"
would include knit goods, and when, by the legislation of 1890,
this exception was stricken out, it is very persuasive that
Congress understood and intended that no articles of wearing
apparel should be excepted from the enumeration of paragraph 396,
because they were knit goods or fabrics.
And again, there is some significance in the substitution of the
term "knit fabrics" in the act of 1890 for "knit goods" in that of
1883, for while they are frequently interchangeable, it would seem
as though "knit goods" more appropriately described manufactured
articles, while "knit fabrics" referred more especially to
manufactured material -- piece goods. Thus, in the subsequent
description in paragraph 396 are these words, "plushes and other
pile fabrics." Obviously they refer to manufactured material,
rather than manufactured articles. And in this connection it is
well to notice that, according to the testimony, there are goods
known to the trade which are piece goods, and which are fabrics
made on knitting machines or frames. One witness, John D. Ashwell,
manager of the Norfolk & New Brunswick Hosiery Company, a company
dealing in undershirts, drawers, and hosiery, and who had been
connected with that company for eighteen years, testified that he
had never heard such articles called "knit fabrics," saying:
"I never had a man ask me for knit fabrics in our line of
business, that I know of. Had he written to me for knit fabrics, I
should have told him that we did not have them, that we did not
sell them, and sent him to parties who did make them."
The change of the term therefore strengthens the conclusion
deduced from other considerations.
Our conclusion therefore is that there was no error in the
decision of the circuit court, and it is
Affirmed.