The writ of error in this case is dismissed because it does not
appear that the jurisdictional amount is involved.
This was a proceeding by the United States to compel the
defendant to abate a wire fence, by which he was alleged to have
enclosed a large tract of public lands belonging to the United
States, and subject to entry as agricultural lands, in violation of
the Act of February 25, 1885, 23 Stat. 321, c. 149, to prevent the
unlawful occupancy of public lands. The first section of the act
reads as follows:
"All enclosures of any public lands in any state or territory of
the United States heretofore or to be hereafter made, erected, or
constructed by any person, . . . to any of which land included
within the enclosure the person . . . making or controlling the
enclosure had no claim or color of title made or acquired in good
faith, or an asserted right thereto by or under claim made in good
faith, with a view to entry thereof at the proper land office under
the general land laws of the United States at the time any such
enclosure was or shall be made, are hereby declared to be unlawful,
and the maintenance, erection, construction, or control of any such
enclosure is hereby forbidden and prohibited, and the assertion of
a right to the exclusive use or occupancy of any part of the public
lands of the United
Page 146 U. S. 534
States in any state or any of the territories of the United
States, without claim, color of title, or asserted right, as above
specified, as to enclosure, is likewise declared unlawful, and
hereby prohibited."
The answer denied in general terms that the defendant had
enclosed any of the public lands without any title or claim or
color of title acquired in good faith thereto or without having
made application to acquire the title thereto, etc. The answer was
subsequently amended by setting up a Mexican grant of the lands in
question, and an application then pending before Congress for the
confirmation of such grant. Upon the trial, the court found the
issue in favor of the United States, and decreed that the enclosure
was of public land, and was therefore unlawful, and rendered a
special judgment, in the terms of the act, that the fence be
removed by the defendant within five days from date, and, if
defendant fail to remove said fence, that the same be destroyed by
the United States marshal, etc.
Defendant thereupon appealed to the supreme court of the
territory, by which the judgment was affirmed. Defendant was then
allowed an appeal to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 443, c. 355,
"No appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any
judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity . . . in the
supreme court of any of the territories of the United States unless
the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of
five thousand dollars."
The proceeding in this case was a special one to compel the
abatement and destruction of a wire fence
Page 146 U. S. 535
enclose 800 acres of the public lands of the United States
without title or claim or color of title thereto acquired in good
faith. Defendant's answer was a general denial of the fact, and in
an amended answer he set forth the title claimed by him. The
question at issue between the parties, then, was whether the
defendant had color of title to the lands in question, acquired in
good faith. Defendant justified under a Mexican grant of
"
cuatro sitios de tierra para cria de ganado mayor"
(literally, four places or parcels of land for the raising of
larger cattle), and the case turned largely upon the question
whether, under the laws, usages, and customs of the country and the
local construction given to these words, a grant of four square
leagues or four leagues square was intended. The court found for
the United States, and held that the defendant had no colorable
title to the four leagues square which he had fenced.
We are of the opinion that this case must be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction by this Court. The only evidence that it involves
the requisite jurisdictional amount consists of three affidavits of
persons who swear they are acquainted with the property in dispute
and that the value of said property is more than $5,000, and the
finding of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in his allowance of an appeal, that
the property in controversy in this action exceeds in value this
sum. This evidently refers to the value of the land enclosed by the
fence in question. It is not, however, the value of the property in
dispute in this case which is involved, but the value of the color
of title to this property, which is hardly capable of pecuniary
estimation; and if it were, there is no evidence of such value in
this case. Had the defendant succeeded in the action, he would not
have established a title to the property, but a color of title to
it, and the adjudication would have been of no value to him except
so far as to permit the fence to stand. He could not have made it
the basis of an action of ejectment or other proceeding to test his
actual title to the premises in question. If the proceeding be
considered as one involving the value of the fence only, it is also
sufficient to say there is no evidence of such value.
Page 146 U. S. 536
Nor can our jurisdiction be sustained under the second section
of the Act of March 3, 1885, providing that the limit of $5,000
shall not apply to any case "in which is drawn in question the
validity of a . . . statute of or an authority exercised under the
United States," since this refers to an authority exercised or
claimed in favor of one of the parties to the cause, the validity
of which was put in issue on the trial of the case, and not to the
validity of an authority exercised by the United States in removing
the fence pursuant to the judgment of the court. If the latter were
the true construction, then every case in which the court issued an
injunction or an execution might be said to involve the validity of
a statute or an authority exercised under the United States, since
it is by virtue of such authority that the marshal executes the
writ. No question is raised here as to the validity of a statute,
but merely as to the application of the statute to this case.
The appeal is therefore
Dismissed.
