Page 146 U. S. 107
The bill further showed that on December 31, 1838 at a regular
meeting of the board of directors of the company, an ordinance was
passed by it requiring its agent, as soon as a charter could be
procured, to open a book for the registration and transfer of stock
and to give due notice of such opening, and conferring the right on
stockholders, after such notice, to file and register the
certificates issued to them by the said trustees, and receive in
lieu thereof certificates under the seal of the company, stating
the number of shares to which the party was entitled, which last
certificate should not be transferred, except on the regular books
of transfer of the company, and should be necessary in every case
to entitle the shareholder to receive the dividends due him; that
another ordinance was passed requiring the trustees to convey said
league and labor to the five persons who were then the directors of
the company, and their successors in office; that on April 12,
1839, the said trustees, by deed duly executed and recorded,
conveyed the said league and labor in fee to the said directors, by
virtue whereof the latter became seised and possessed of it in
trust for the stockholders of the company; that afterwards the said
Galveston City Company was incorporated under the same name by an
act of the Congress of the Republic of Texas, approved February 5,
1841, and that said David White was one of the original corporators
thereof.
Page 146 U. S. 108
The bill further showed that the directors of the company laid
off the said land into blocks and lots and offered the same for
sale, and from time to time made sales and conveyances of numerous
parcels of it to different persons, receiving in part consideration
therefor $1,000,000 and upwards; that there remains a large portion
yet unsold, of the value of $500,000 and upwards; that the company
adopted the policy of accepting from its stockholders shares of
stock in exchange for its lands, and the directors, in a large
majority of the sales of lots by them, accepted and received from
the purchasers in payment therefor, instead of a money
consideration, a surrender of shares in the capital stock of said
company, owned by said purchasers, in all such instances cancelling
upon the books of the company the shares thus surrendered; that
very many shares had been in that manner retired, until now, there
were not more than 50 shares outstanding; that no dividend of the
cash proceeds arising from sales of land had been declared among
the stockholders, although the same had always greatly exceeded the
expenses of the company, but the profits had been permitted to
accumulate, and that the market value of a share in the capital
stock of the company far exceeded now the face value of such share,
to-wit, $10,000 and upwards.
The bill further showed that on April 8, 1839, by an instrument
in writing, White appointed one Abner S. Lipscomb his attorney in
fact for him, among other things, to transfer any or all of his
Galveston stock, of any interest he might have in the City of
Galveston; that White thereupon delivered to Lipscomb, for that
purpose, the said 67 certificates of stock; that on December 3,
1841, Lipscomb surrendered to the company 3 of the certificates
issued to White, namely, certificates numbered 33, 36, and 39, out
of Book C, and with the consent of the company, and by an entry on
its books, but without authority, and in fraud of the rights of
White, transferred the 3 shares of stock represented by the 3
certificates into his own name, receiving from the company, in lieu
thereof, a certificate of ownership of said 3 shares, issued under
its seal in his name; that White died on December 10, 1841, leaving
Mary S. White, his wife, the plaintiff Asenath A. Ware, his
daughter,
Page 146 U. S. 109
and the five plaintiffs who are his grandchildren, his only
heirs at law; that he was entitled at the time of his death to a
considerable personal estate, and possessed of 24 shares in the
stock of the Galveston City Company, including the 3 shares so
alleged to have been fraudulently transferred by Lipscomb into his
own name; that 21 of said shares were at the time of said White's
death, standing in his name on the books of the company, and the
certificates of ownership thereof so issued to him, to-wit, those
numbered 108, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, and 124, out of Book A,
and those numbered 10, 12, 27, 28, 34, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
and 49, out of Book C, were at that time in the possession or power
of said Lipscomb; that the personal estate of which White died
possessed was more than sufficient, exclusive of the 24 shares of
stock, to pay his debts, and they had long since been paid, and
that there was no administration of his estate in Texas, nor any
necessity therefor.
The bill further showed that Mary S. White died in 1853, without
having disposed of the right or interest she was entitled to as the
widow of David White in the said 24 shares of stock, leaving her
daughter, the said Asenath, and her said five grandchildren, her
only heirs at law her surviving, and that they, as such, and as the
only heirs at law of David White, thereupon became entitled to said
shares of stock.
The bill further showed that Lipscomb, after the death of said
White, and with the connivance of the company, and by an entry on
its books, but without authority, and in fraud of the rights of the
plaintiffs, transferred the said 24 shares of stock to some persons
unknown; the company at the time taking up and cancelling the said
certificates of ownership thereof, and delivering to the
transferees new certificates under its seal in their names,
representing the shares to be $1,000 each. That the company
subsequently procured the said 24 shares, and the certificates
corresponding thereto, to be surrendered to it by those to whom
Lipscomb had so transferred them, or by their assigns at the same
time cancelling said shares upon its books, thus retiring them, and
was now claiming the benefit thereof. That the transfer of said
shares
Page 146 U. S. 110
by Lipscomb, after the death of White, was without warrant and
void, and the company, in contemplation of law, was a party to his
said illegal acts, and liable to the plaintiffs for all the
consequences thereof, and that the company held the stock in trust
for the plaintiffs.
The bill further charged that the truth of the said matters
would appear by the books, certificates, writings, papers, and
memoranda relating to said shares of stock, in the possession or
power of the company, if it would discover and produce the same,
which it refused to do, though frequently applied to for that
purpose.
The bill further charged that the company and its agents and
servants had always studiously concealed from the plaintiffs the
said matters relating to the stock of the said White, and
particularly the said illegal acts of Lipscomb, and the company's
participation therein, by withholding from the plaintiffs all
information in reference to said stock, and refusing them access to
its books and papers; that the plaintiffs were in total ignorance
of said illegal acts of Lipscomb, and their rights in the premises,
until about 12 or 14 months next before the filing of the bill;
that the plaintiffs, except the said Asenath, were at the time of
the death of said White, minors of tender age, and resided in
Alabama and Florida at a distance of 800 miles and upwards from
Galveston, where Lipscomb resided, and where the said illegal acts
were committed; that the plaintiffs were not apprised even of the
fact that said White had owned shares in the capital stock of the
company until some years after his death; that after they were so
apprised, to-wit, in 1869, and again on March 19, 1879 at
Galveston, by one Thomas J. Molton, their agent in that behalf, and
at divers other times and by other persons, they made application
to the company, its agents and servants, for information as to what
disposition, if any, had been made of the shares owned by said
White, and also for permission to examine its books and papers, to
ascertain their rights, but the company, on every such application,
declined to disclose to the plaintiffs any facts relating to said
stock, and refused them access to its books and papers.
Page 146 U. S. 111
The bill further showed that Lipscomb died in December, 1856,
notoriously insolvent, and without having accounted to the
plaintiffs, or any of them, for the 24 shares of stock, or any
interest therein; that the plaintiffs had applied to the company to
cancel the alleged transfers of said 24 shares, and the entries of
such transfers in its books, and to revive said shares in the names
of the plaintiffs as the heirs at law of said White and his widow,
and to enter the names of the plaintiffs in its books as the owners
of said stock, and to issue and deliver to them certificates
therefor, in the proper form, but that it refused to comply with
such requests.
The bill called for an answer, but not upon oath, the benefit
whereof was expressly waived. It prayed that the alleged transfer
of the 3 shares of stock by Lipscomb into his own name from that of
White, and the entry thereof in the books of the company, and the
delivery by it to Lipscomb of a certificate of ownership of the 3
shares, might be declared to be a fraud upon White; that it might
be declared that the alleged transfers by Lipscomb of the 24
shares, after the death of White, and the subsequent retirement or
cancellation of said shares by the company, were without lawful
warrant, and void; that the said 24 shares might be declared to be
the property of the estate of White, and the plaintiffs might be
declared entitled to have the same to their own use, and to share
ratably with the other stockholders of the company in all
accumulations of property by the company since the date of said
illegal transfers; that the company might be decreed to cancel said
transfers and the entries thereof in its books, and to revive the
said 24 shares, to enter the names of the plaintiffs in its books
as the owners of the stock, and to issue and deliver to the
plaintiffs a certificate of ownership for each of said 24 shares at
the face value of $1,000 each; that if the revival of said stock
and the transfer thereof on the books of the company into the names
of the plaintiffs were impracticable, then the company might be
decreed to pay to the plaintiffs the market value thereof, and for
general relief.
The answer of the defendant sets forth, by way of demurrer for
want of equity, that the cause of action of the plaintiffs
Page 146 U. S. 112
and of those under whom they claim accrued more than 35 years
before the filing of the bill; that no reasonable or sufficient
cause or excuse is alleged why the suit was not earlier brought, or
why all the facts therein pretended to be known were not earlier
discovered; that it was not shown in the bill when or how any
discovery of facts alleged not to have been before known, or to
have been concealed, was made by the plaintiffs, nor any diligence
to ascertain the same, nor any excuse for the want of such
diligence, nor any statement as to the course of proceedings, nor
any facts connected with the administration of the estates of David
White or his widow in Alabama, or as to the knowledge or acts of
the legal representatives thereof in regard to the alleged rights
and claims which are the subject of this suit, nor to remove the
presumptions that all matters relating to the said stock, and on
which the rights thereto were dependent, were fully known to said
representatives; that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by
the law of limitations of Texas, and the lapse of more than 35
years since the same accrued before this suit was brought; that the
suit had been delayed such great lapse of time, and parties holding
the certificates of stock alleged to have been issued in renewal of
those which belonged to White had many years ago obtained full
value therefor in the property of the company, and the rights of
third and innocent parties, as the only holders of the present
alleged stock in the company, had intervened, and been permitted to
grow up and become of great value, and that therefore the
plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by such lapse of time and
laches, was stale and inequitable, and ought not to be heard in a
court of equity.
The answer sets forth various denials of material allegations in
the bill, and various alleged defenses thereto. It further sets
forth that no person survives who was connected with the business
or administration of the company, or who had any connection with
the stock, or could be reasonably presumed to have any knowledge
respecting the same.
The answer further says that the defendant pleads that suit on
the matters alleged in the bill had been forborne until all persons
connected with the transactions to which it related,
Page 146 U. S. 113
knowing particular facts and details in regard to said stock,
and the receipt and appropriation of proceeds therefor, were dead,
and it pleads the laches, neglect, and delay of the plaintiffs in
bar of the suit, and alleges that the same is stale and
inequitable, and ought not to be further heard or considered.
The answer further sets forth that by the statute of limitation
of suits in Texas, passed in 1841, and ever since in force, all
actions for personal property must be commenced and sued within two
years after the cause of action accrued, all actions of debt
grounded upon any contract in writing must be commenced and sued
within four years next after the cause of such action or suit, and
longest period of limitation for suits or actions of any kind was
ten years; that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any they ever
had, accrued more than ten years and more than thirty-five years
before the filing of the bill; that said statute had not failed to
be operative against the plaintiffs on account of any exception
therefrom, contained therein, within the principles of equity and
good conscience restraining the same. It denies all concealment,
fraud, or wrong charged in the bill on the part of the defendant,
to prevent the running of said statute, and denies that any
diligence had been shown or existed on the part of the plaintiffs,
or any excuse for the lack thereof, to prevent the running of said
statute, and it pleads the same as a bar to the plaintiffs' suit.
It further answers that the great lapse of time, rendering
impossible correct knowledge of facts at the present day, resulting
from the death of all parties to the transactions, the laches of
the plaintiffs, and the
bona fide accrual of the large and
valuable rights of the other stockholders in the company, render
the bill a stale, inequitable, and unconscientious demand, which
ought not to be heard in a court of equity, and the defendant
pleads the same in bar and estoppel.
A replication was filed to the answer, proofs were taken, and
the cause was heard. The circuit court, in November, 1886,
dismissed the bill, with costs, and allowed an appeal to this Court
by the plaintiffs. No written opinion was delivered, but it is
stated in the brief of the appellants that the circuit court held
that the claim could not be prosecuted, by reason
Page 146 U. S. 114
of the laches of the plaintiffs. We think there was good cause
on that ground for the dismissal of the bill, and the decree of the
circuit court must be affirmed.
David White died in December, 1841. Whatever cause of action, if
any, the plaintiffs had, arose either then or in March, 1842, when
Lipscomb assigned to one James Love shares of the stock. It is
contended for the plaintiffs that the discovery on which their suit
was based was made only a short time before 1881; but an agent was
sent to Texas in 1843, expressly to obtain information. He saw
Lipscomb, and obtained from the office of the Galveston City
Company, in June, 1843, a full report as to the persons who
surrendered the original certificates and got renewals. The report
showed that the three certificates embraced in this suit, numbered
33, 36, and 39, were renewed to Lipscomb. It showed the fact of the
renewal of 16 shares to Love. There was information enough to make
it the duty of the agent to make further inquiry. In July, 1844,
Robert J. Ware, executor of David White, visited Texas for the
purpose of seeing Lipscomb, but did not meet him. Then ensued the
period from 1844 to 1854, when no diligence was shown by the
representative of White's estate. In July, 1844, administration on
the estate of White was opened in Texas by W. B. Lipscomb, the son
of A. S. Lipscomb. He brought a suit against Menard, claiming that
the latter owed White's estate over $14,000 and interest, and that
the claim was a lien on all the property of the Galveston City
Company. Jones, the trustee, was made a party to the suit, and an
injunction was prayed against all the operations of the company.
This suit was brought with the knowledge and privity of Ware, the
executor; but the administration in Texas did not assert any rights
against the company, such as are asserted in the present suit. Ware
visited Texas again, and saw Lipscomb, prior to 1854, and had an
opportunity to make inquiries of the company.
In 1854, one A. F. James, as agent of David White's estate, made
inquiry at the office of the company as to the rights and interest
which White had in the company at the time of his death. The books,
records, and papers were all opened to his inspection, and the
agent of the company made out for him an
Page 146 U. S. 115
historical record of White's stock. At that time, no suspicion
existed of a claim against the company in the matter, and it was
supposed that the search was made as the foundation of a liability
on the part of Lipscomb. Therefore there could have been no purpose
on the part of the company of any concealment. The information
contained in the report of the company's agent was sufficient to
put James upon inquiry.
Ware went to Texas again in 1858, when James, as his agent, made
a further examination. This was after A. S. Lipscomb had died. It
appears that then, in 1858, the question arose between Ware and
James as to the liability of the company to account to the heirs of
White for the stock which, it was alleged, was transferred by
Lipscomb after the death of White. Thus, in 1858, twenty-three
years before this suit was brought, the attention of Ware was
directed to the point of the liability of the company for any
transfers of White's stock made by Lipscomb after White's death.
Then the whole matter appears to have been dropped for eleven
years, until 1869. At that time Ware had died, and his executor,
with Mr. Molton, went to Galveston in the interest of Ware's estate
and of his widow, and the question arose as to a claim for the
stock against the company.
On June 17, 1873, the firm of Ballinger, Jack & Mott, of
Galveston, lawyers at that time employed by the company, wrote to
Molton that very careful and thorough examination had satisfied
them without doubt that the heirs of David White could not recover
against the company for stock improperly transferred to others in
the company's books. The matter was then dropped until 1881, when a
bargain was made with a land agent of Galveston to employ counsel
and bring a suit, for a contingent interest of one-half.
On all these facts, the defense of laches is sustained on the
principles established by this Court in the cases of
Stearns v.
Page, 7 How. 819,
48 U. S. 829;
Moore v.
Greene, 19 How. 69,
60
U. S. 72;
Beaubien v.
Beaubien, 23 How. 190;
Badger v.
Badger, 2 Wall. 87,
69 U. S. 94;
New Albany v.
Burke, 11 Wall. 96,
78 U. S. 107;
Broderick's
Will, 21 Wall. 503,
88 U. S. 519;
Upton v.
Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45;
Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 94 U. S.
806,
94 U. S.
811-812;
Godden
Page 146 U. S. 116
v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201;
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135;
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613;
Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391;
Philippi v. Philippi, 115 U. S. 151,
115 U. S. 157;
Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377,
120 U. S.
386-387;
Richards v. Mackall, 124 U.
S. 183,
124 U. S.
187-188;
Hanner v. Moulton, 138 U.
S. 486,
138 U. S. 495;
Underwood v. Dugan, 139 U. S. 380,
139 U. S. 383;
Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224,
143 U. S.
274.
Within the rules laid down in the cases above cited, there are
not in the bill sufficiently distinct averments as to the time when
the alleged fraud was discovered and what the discovery was, nor
does the bill or the proof show that the delay was consistent with
the requisite diligence. On the evidence in the record, the case
stood in March, 1881, when the bill was filed, on no different
ground from that on which it stood in 1858, or that on which it
stood from 1843, or in fact from the date of White's death. Molton
married a daughter of the plaintiff Asenath A. Ware, and
granddaughter of David White. He testified that in the spring of
1869, he went to Texas as agent of the heirs of David White,
especially to examine carefully into the facts of the transfers of
the shares of stock which had belonged to White.
Nor is there anything which takes any of the plaintiffs out of
the operation of the statutes of limitations of Texas so as to
affect the question of laches. David White's widow was a
feme
sole from 1841 to 1853. The plaintiff Lumpkin became of age in
1843, the plaintiff Daniel O. White in 1847, the plaintiff Clement
B. White in 1850, the plaintiff Cowles in 1852, and the plaintiff
Mary A. Holtzclaw in 1854. Robert J. Ware died in 1867, and his
widow, since that time, has been a
feme sole. The longest
period of limitation for any cause of action in Texas is ten
years.
Decree affirmed.
*
"
City of Galveston in one thousand shares"
"The proprietors, M. B. Menard, Robert Triplett, Sterling
Neblett, and Wm. Fairfax Gray conveyed to the undersigned, as
trustees, by their deed of the 15th of June, 1837, a league and
labor of land, containing 4,605 acres, on the east end of Galveston
island, to be sold as joint stock in 1,000 shares."
"By the terms of said deed, certificates of shares, when issued,
are to be assigned by endorsement under hand and seal, in the
presence of two witnesses, before any justice of the peace or
notary public."
"The trustees, any two of whom may act, are to call a meeting of
the shareholders when deemed advisable."
"In the proceedings of the stockholders in general meeting, each
share to be entitled to one vote, and to be represented in person
or by proxy, and a majority in interest to determine all questions
which may arise. The company may prescribe such rules and
regulations for its government and management, and give such orders
and directions to the trustees for the sale of lots or any other
purpose, as it may think promotive of the general interest."
"
Certificate of Stock. Book No. ___."
"This is to certify that we, Levi Jones, William R. Johnson, and
Thomas Green, trustees of the City of Galveston, in consideration
of _____, do grant, bargain, and sell to David White, his heirs and
assigns, forever, one share, No. ___, in the City of Galveston, to
be holden and enjoyed by him and his assigns upon the terms
prescribed in the deed bearing date the 15th of June, 1837, of M.
B. Menard, Robert Triplett, Sterling Neblett, and William Fairfax
Gray constituting us the trustees, and in the agreement entered
into between us and the stockholders in said city, as set forth in
the proposal for subscription."
"Witness our hands this 7th day of November, 1838."
"LEVI JONES"
"THOMAS GREEN"
"
Trustees"