Although, under the ruling in
Wallach v. Van Ryswick,
92 U. S. 207,
the defendant in a proceeding for confiscation under the
Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, c. 195, and Joint
Resolution No. 63, of the same date, 12 Stat. 627, had no power of
alienating the reversion of
Page 145 U. S. 547
remainder which was still in him after confiscation and sale,
still an alienation of it by him by a deed of warranty, accompanied
by a covenant of seisin on his part, estopped him and all persons
claiming under him from asserting title to the premises against the
grantee, his heirs and assigns, or from conveying it to any other
parties.
The general pardon and amnesty made by the public proclamation
of the President at the close of the war of the rebellion had the
force of public law.
The court stated the case as follows:
This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiffs to
recover of the defendant two lots of land in the City of
Cincinnati, Ohio, with the buildings thereon, known as "Nos. 50 and
52 West Pearl Street" in that city. The plaintiffs below, who are
also plaintiffs in error here, are the children and only heirs of
Thomas J. Jenkins, deceased. They are residents and citizens of
West Virginia. Two of them, Albert Gallatin Jenkins and George R.
Jenkins, are minors under the age of twenty-one years, and appear
by their mother and guardian. The defendant is a citizen of Ohio
and a resident of Cincinnati.
The petition, the designation given to the first pleading in the
case, alleges that prior to 1863, Thomas J. Jenkins was the owner
of the real estate mentioned, which is fully described, and that
while such owner, he joined the Rebel army, and such proceedings
were had in the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Ohio, in the year 1863, that the property was
confiscated, and the life estate of Jenkins was sold, and the
defendant William A. Collard, then or subsequently in the year
1865, and during the lifetime of Jenkins, became the owner of the
life estate; that Jenkins died on the 1st day of August, 1872, and
that thereupon the plaintiffs became seised of the legal estate in
the premises, and entitled to the possession thereof; but that the
defendant since that time has unlawfully kept them out of
possession. The petition also sets forth that the defendant has
been receiving the rents, issues, and profits of the premises from
the 1st day of August, 1872, up to the commencement of this action
without the consent of the plaintiffs, and has refused to account
for them; that their yearly value has been, on the average,
$1,800,
Page 145 U. S. 548
and that the plaintiffs have been deprived of all profit and
benefit from the premises since that time, to their damage of
$40,000. They therefore pray judgment for the possession of the
premises and for the damages alleged.
The defendant appeared to the action and set up nine defenses.
The first defense, which was substantially the general issue, was
subsequently withdrawn. To the several other defenses demurrers
were interposed, and all of them, except the one to the second
defense, were sustained, and no further proceeding respecting them
was taken. The second defense was as follows:
"For a second defense the defendant says that he denies that
such proceedings were had in the District Court of the United
States within and for the Southern District of Ohio in the year
1863, or at any other time, that the said property was confiscated,
but defendant avers that in a proceeding instituted in said court
in the year 1863 a decree was entered in the words and figures
following, to-wit:"
"
District court United States, Southern District of
Ohio"
"
The United States vs. Lots and Stores Nos. 50 and 52 Pearl
Street, Cincinnati"
"This cause came on for hearing at this term, upon the libel of
information filed herein, and upon the evidence in the case, and
the court find that, in pursuance of law, the Attorney of the
United States for the Southern District of Ohio did issue to the
marshal of said district his warrant in writing bearing date March
9, 1863, commanding him to seize, for the cause set forth in said
warrant, all the right, title, and interest of one Thomas J.
Jenkins, in and to the real estate described in said warrant, and
in said libel of information, and that in pursuance there of the
said marshal, on the 12th day of March, 1863, seized said real
estate, and notified the tenants thereof, and also W. A. Collard,
agent of said Jenkins, of such seizure by notice in writing. That
afterwards, on the 7th day of March, 1863, a writ of monition
issued out of this Court,
Page 145 U. S. 549
under the laws thereof, to said marshal, by virtue whereof the
usual notice prescribed by law and by the rules of this Court to
all persons interested in said real estate to appear in this Court
on the first Tuesday of April, 1863, to assert their claims, if any
they have, in said real estate, was given by said marshal, which
notice was duly published in the Cincinnati Daily Gazette, a
newspaper printed and of general circulation in said district, for
ten days from and after March 18, 1863, and all persons interested
having made default, and the default of all persons being duly
entered, and the court having heard the testimony of the witnesses
proving that said Thomas J. Jenkins, of the State of Virginia at
the date of said seizure, was the owner of said property, and that
ever since the 17th day of July, 1862, the said Thomas J. Jenkins
was, and now is, in the army service of the rebels in arms against
the United States, to-wit, in the State of Virginia, and the court
further find that the allegations in said libel are true in fact
and that the life estate of said Jenkins in said real estate is
justly and legally forfeited to the United States in pursuance of
law, for the causes set forth in said libel."
"It is further ordered, sentenced, and decreed that the life
estate of said Thomas J. Jenkins be, and the same is, hereby
condemned as enemies' property, and that the same be appraised,
advertised, and sold in the manner pointed out by the rules of this
court, and to that end the necessary process is ordered to be
issued to the marshal to make sale of said real estate in the
manner aforesaid, and that upon such sale he bring the proceeds
into this Court for distribution, and it is further ordered that
the rights of all loyal people to share in such distribution are
hereby reserved for further hearing."
"Defendant says that the above was the only decree touching said
property, except the decree of confirmation of the sale and
distribution of proceeds."
"Defendant says that thereafter such proceedings were had in
said cause that there was sold and conveyed by the marshal, in
accordance with said decree, the life estate of said Thomas J.
Jenkins to one Edward Bepler."
"Defendant says that by reason of the premises, all the
Page 145 U. S. 550
estate of said Jenkins in said property was not condemned and
sold, but that there remained in him the reversion or remainder in
fee of said property after said life estate sold to said Bepler.
Defendant further says that after the termination of the Civil War,
said Thomas J. Jenkins bargained and sold to the defendant, in
consideration of the sum of eighteen thousand dollars paid to said
Jenkins by defendant, all the interest and estate of said Jenkins
in said property, and did execute and deliver to the defendant, on
the 26th day of August, 1865, a deed in fee simple, with covenants
of general warranty, binding himself and his heirs, and Susan L.
Jenkins, wife of said Thomas J. Jenkins, did join in said deed, and
did release all her right and expectancy of dower in said
property."
"Defendant further says that on the 6th day of June, 1865, said
Edward Bepler did execute and deliver to the defendant a deed for
said life estate purchased by him at said sale. Defendant says that
by reason of the premises, he became the owner in fee simple of the
property, and entered into possession thereof, and so continued to
the present time."
To this defense the plaintiffs demurred, on the ground that it
constituted no defense, and was insufficient in law on its face,
and they claimed and asked the court to hold that by the decree set
up there was an adjudicated forfeiture and sale of the lots
described under the Confiscation Act of Congress of July 17, 1862,
and the joint resolution of even date therewith, and that there was
not left in Thomas J. Jenkins any interest which he could convey by
deed, but that all which could become the property of the United
States, and could be sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and
order of sale, was the life estate of Thomas J. Jenkins, and that a
decree condemning the fee could have no greater effect than to
subject the life estate to sale, and therefore the deed executed
and delivered by him on the 26th day of August, 1865, was a
nullity, and the plaintiffs inherited and were entitled to the
property as prayed for in their petition. But the court held that,
by reason of said decree, all the estate of Thomas J. Jenkins in
the property was not condemned and
Page 145 U. S. 551
sold, but only a technical life estate therein, and that there
remained in him the reversion or remainder in fee of the property
after the termination of the life estate sold to said Bepler, which
he could sell and convey by deed, and which he did sell and convey
by the deed of August 26, 1865, and that consequently the
plaintiffs had not inherited any interest in the property, and
overruled the demurrer, to which the plaintiffs excepted. The
plaintiffs then had leave to reply to the defense, and they replied
as follows:
"That by the proceedings in the District Court of the United
States for the Southern District of Ohio in the year 1863, all the
estate of Thomas J. Jenkins in the property was confiscated and
sold, and there did not remain in him the reversion or remainder in
fee after the sale to Bepler; that they admit the execution and
delivery of a deed to the defendant on the 26th day of August,
1865, by Thomas J. Jenkins at Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, but
deny that Jenkins had any interest in the property at that time
which he could convey, and aver that defendant took nothing by the
deed from him."
To which reply the defendant demurred, and after hearing the
case, the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Ohio at October term, 1888, held that only the
technical life estate of Thomas J. Jenkins was confiscated by the
said decree, and that there was left in him the reversion or
remainder, which he sold and conveyed to the defendant by the deed
of August 26, 1865, and that consequently the plaintiffs had no
interest in the property, and sustained the demurrer, to which
ruling the plaintiffs excepted. And the plaintiffs not desiring to
plead further, the court gave judgment for the defendant for the
reasons stated in overruling the demurrer.
To review that judgment the case is brought to this Court on
writ of error.
Page 145 U. S. 552
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The important questions presented in this case relate to the
nature and duration of the estate condemned and sold by the decree
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio in the proceedings taken for the confiscation of the property
of Thomas J. Jenkins, under the Act of Congress of July 17, 1862,
12 Stat. 589, and to the power of disposition possessed by him over
the naked fee or property in reversion, after the termination of
the confiscated estate. The questions must find their solution in
the interpretation given to the provisions of that act and to the
terms of the decree. The act is entitled "An act to suppress
insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and
confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes."
In one of the earlier cases in this Court under this act, it was
earnestly contended that the act was not passed in the exercise of
the war powers of the government, but in the execution of the
municipal power of the the government to legislate for the
punishment of offenses against the United States. Such was the
contention in
Miller v. United
States, 11 Wall. 268,
78 U. S. 308,
78 U. S. 369. The
Court, however, was of opinion that only the first four sections,
which were aimed at individual offenders, were open to that
objection, and admitted that they were passed in the exercise of
the sovereign, and not the belligerent, rights of the government,
but held that in the fifth and following sections another purpose
was avowed -- not that of punishing treason and rebellion, as
described in the title, but the other purpose there described --
that of seizing and confiscating the property of rebels. The
language of the fifth section is that
"to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it
shall be the duty of the President of the United States to cause
the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits,
and effects of the persons hereinafter named in this section, and
to apply and use the same, and the proceeds thereof, for the
support of the Army of the United States."
And the Court, stating that the avowed purpose of the act was
not to reach any criminal
Page 145 U. S. 553
personally, but to insure the speedy termination of the
Rebellion, which the court had recognized as a civil war, held that
this purpose was such as Congress in the situation of the country
might constitutionally entertain, and that the provisions made to
carry it out -- namely, confiscation, were legitimate unless
applies to others than enemies. The act therefore, in execution of
this purpose, provided for judicial proceedings
in rem,
for the condemnation and sale of the property mentioned, after its
seizure, to be brought in any district or territorial court of the
United States, which should conform as nearly as possible to
proceedings in admiralty and revenue cases, and it declared that if
the property should be found to have belonged to a person engaged
in rebellion, or who had given aid or comfort thereto, the same
should be condemned as enemies' property, and become the property
of the United States, and might be disposed of as the court should
decree, and the proceeds thereof paid into the Treasury of the
United States for the purposes stated. After the act embodying this
and other provisions had passed both houses of Congress and been
presented to President Lincoln for approval, it was ascertained
that he was of opinion that in some of its features it was
unconstitutional, and that he intended to veto it. His objections
were that in several of its clauses, the provision of the
Constitution concerning forfeitures not extending beyond the life
of the offender was disregarded. Article III, Section 3. To meet
this objection, which had been communicated to members of the House
of Representatives, where the bill originated, a joint resolution,
explanatory, as it was termed, of the act, but which might more
properly be designated amendatory of the act and restrictive of its
operation, was passed by the House and sent to the Senate. That
body, being informed of the objections of the President, concurred
in the joint resolution. It was then sent to the President, and was
received by him before the expiration of the ten days allowed him
for the consideration of the original bill. He returned the bill
and resolution together to the house where they originated with a
message, in which he stated that, considering the act and the
resolution explanatory of the act as being substantially one, he
approved and signed both. 12 Stat. 589 and 627.
Page 145 U. S. 554
The joint resolution declares that the section of the act shall
be so construed as not to apply to any act or acts done prior to
its passage,
"nor shall any punishment or proceedings under said act be so
construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the
offender beyond his natural life."
No decree condemning real property of persons seized under the
act could therefore extend the forfeiture adjudged beyond the life
of the offending owner. During his life only could the control,
possession, and enjoyment of the real property seized and condemned
be appropriated. To that extent, the property vested in the United
States upon its condemnation and passed to the purchaser, to whom
the government might afterwards sell it.
What, then, was the situation of the remainder of the estate of
the offending party after the condemnation and sale? The
proceedings did not purport to touch any interest in the property
or control of it beyond his life. When that ceased, his heirs took
the property from him. They could not take anything from the
government, for it had nothing; the interest it acquired by the
condemnation passed by the sale to the purchaser. The reversionary
interest or remainder of the estate must have rested somewhere. It
could not have been floating in space without relationship to
anyone. The logical conclusion would seem to be that it continued
in the offending owner. This, we think, follows not only from the
language of the act, but from decisions of this Court construing
its provisions, though some of the latter contain declarations that
its possession is unaccompanied with any power of disposition over
the future estate during his life.
In
Bigelow v.
Forrest, 9 Wall. 339, which came before this Court
at December term, 1869, it was held that the Act of July 17, 1862,
and the explanatory resolution of the same date were to be
construed together, and that, thus construed, all that could be
sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and order of sale under
the act was a right to the property seized terminating with the
life of the offending person, and that the fact that he owned the
estate in fee simple, that the libel was against all his right,
title, interest, and estate, and
Page 145 U. S. 555
that the sale and marshal's deed professed to convey as much,
did not change the result. The district court, said this Court,
under the act of Congress had no power to order a sale which would
confer upon the purchaser rights outlasting the life of the party,
and had it done so it would have transcended its jurisdiction. This
was the unanimous decision of the court.
In
Day v. Micou,
18 Wall. 156, before this Court at October term, 1873, it was held
also by the Court unanimously that under the Confiscation Act and
joint resolution explanatory of it, only the life estate of the
person for whose offense the land had been seized was subject to
condemnation and sale, and that the fact that the decree may have
condemned the fee did not alter the case.
In
Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.
S. 207, which was before this Court at October term,
1875, it was held that after an adjudicated forfeiture and sale of
an enemy's land under the Confiscation Act, and the joint
resolution accompanying it, there was not left in him any interest
which he could convey by deed. This ruling was not made upon any
express provision of the statute. There is no personal disability
imposed by its provisions upon the offending party beyond the
forfeiture of his estate during his life. It was made by the Court
apparently upon what it considered the policy of the Confiscation
Act. The purpose of the act, it said, and its justification, was to
strengthen the government and to enfeeble the public enemy by
taking from his adherents the power to use their property in aid of
the hostile cause. "With such a purpose," it added,
"it is incredible that Congress, while providing for
confiscation of enemy's land, intended to leave in that enemy a
vested interest therein, which he might sell and with the proceeds
of which he might aid in carrying on the war against the
government."
In this ruling the Court, in addition to the statutory effect of
the decree as a conveyance to the United States of the title to the
land for the life of the offending party, made the decree impose
upon him a disability or disqualification to hold or transfer an
estate which the United States did not acquire or condemn.
Though the ruling in
Wallach v. Van Riswick was
followed
Page 145 U. S. 556
in several cases -- in
Pike v. Wassell, in 1876,
94 U. S. 712,
and in
French v. Wade, in 1880,
102 U.
S. 132 -- this Court subsequently held, in 1885, in
Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 U. S. 293,
that the heirs at law of a person whose life interest in real
estate was confiscated under the confiscation Act of July 17, 1862,
took at his death by descent from him, and not from the United
States under the act, and in 1887, in
Shields v. Schiff,
124 U. S. 355,
that the confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, construed in connection
with the joint resolution of the same date, made no disposition of
the confiscated property after the death of the owner, but left it
to devolve upon his heirs, and not by donation from the
government.
It is not to be overlooked that previous to the decision of the
case of
Wallach v. Van Riswick, a general amnesty and
pardon had been proclaimed by the President throughout the land to
all who had participated in the Rebellion, thus relieving them from
the disabilities arising from such participation. Estates and
interests in land, present and future, which had not for such
participation been previously condemned and sold to others fell at
once under the control and disposition of the original owners, as
though the offenses alleged against them had never been committed.
The pardon and amnesty did not and could not change the actual fact
of previous disloyalty, if it existed, but, as said in
Carlisle v. United
States, 16 Wall. 151, "they forever closed the eyes
of the court to the perception of that fact as an element in its
judgment, no rights of third parties having intervened." As
repeatedly affirmed by this Court, pardon and amnesty in legal
contemplation not merely release offenders from the punishment
prescribed for their offenses, but obliterate the offenses
themselves.
In
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Bosworth,
133 U. S. 92, which
was here at October term, 1889, we have the latest expression of
this Court upon the subject we have been considering, and also on
the effect of pardon and amnesty upon the disabilities imposed upon
parties whose life estates had been confiscated under the Act of
July 17, 1862, and the accompanying joint resolution. That was an
action brought by the surviving children of A. W. Bosworth,
deceased, to recover possession
Page 145 U. S. 557
of one undivided sixth part of a tract of land in New Orleans,
which formerly belonged to their father. The petition stated that
the latter, having taken part in the war of the Rebellion and done
acts which made him liable to the penalties of the Confiscation
Act, the said one-sixth part of the land was seized, condemned, and
sold under the act, and purchased by one Burbank, in May, 1865;
that A. W. Bosworth died in October, 1885, and that the plaintiffs,
upon his death, became the owners in fee simple of the said
one-sixth part of the property of which the defendant, the Illinois
Central Railroad Company, was in possession. The company filed an
answer setting up various defenses, among others, tracing title to
themselves from Bosworth by virtue of an act of sale executed by
him and wife in September, 1871, disposing of all their interest in
the premises with full covenants of warranty. They also alleged
that Bosworth had, before the act of sale, not only been included
in the general amnesty proclamation of the President, issued on the
25th of December, 1868, but had received from him a special pardon
on the second of October, 1865, and had taken the oath of
allegiance, and complied with the terms and conditions necessary to
be restored to and reinvested with the rights, franchises, and
privileges of citizenship.
The principal question involved in the case was whether, by the
effect of the pardon and amnesty granted to A. W. Bosworth, he was
restored to the control and power of disposition over the fee
simple or naked property in reversion, expectant upon the
determination of the confiscated estate in the property in dispute.
"The question of the effect of pardon and amnesty," said the
Court,
"on the destination of the remaining estate of the offender
still outstanding after a confiscation of the property during his
natural life has never been settled by the Court."
In
Wallach v. Van Riswick, the Court said it
"was not called upon to determine where the fee dwells during
the continuance of the interest of a purchaser at a confiscation
sale, whether in the United States or in the purchaser subject to
be defeated by the death of the offender."
It had been also suggested that the fee remained in the person
whose estate was confiscated, but without any power in him to
dispose
Page 145 U. S. 558
of or control it. "Perhaps," said Mr. Justice Bradley, in
speaking for the Court and referring to those different
suggestions,
"it is not of much consequence which of these theories, if
either of them, is the true one, the important point being that the
remnant of the estate, whatever its nature and wherever it went,
was never beneficially disposed of, but remained, so to speak, in a
state of suspended animation."
And again he said:
"It is not necessary to be over-curious about the intermediate
state in which the disembodied shade of naked ownership may have
wandered during the period of its ambiguous existence. It is enough
to know that it was neither annihilated nor confiscated nor
appropriated to any third party. The owner, as a punishment for his
offenses, was disabled from exercising any acts of ownership over
it, and no power to exercise such acts was given to any other
person. At his death, if not before, the period of suspension comes
to an end, and the estate revives and devolves to his heirs at law.
. . . It would seem to follow,"
added the learned Justice,
"as a logical consequence from the decisions in
Avegno v.
Schmidt and
Shields v. Schiff that after the
confiscation of the property, the naked fee (or the naked
ownership, as denominated in the civil law), subject, for the
lifetime of the offender, to the interest or usufruct of the
purchaser at the confiscation sale, remained in the offender
himself; otherwise how could his heirs take it from him by
inheritance? But, by reason of his disability to dispose of or
touch it or affect it in any manner whatsoever, it remained, as
before stated, a mere dead estate, or in a condition of suspended
animation. We think that this is, on the whole, the most reasonable
view. There is no corruption of blood; the offender can transmit by
descent; his heirs take from him by descent; why, then, is it not
most rational to conclude that the dormant and suspended fee has
continued in him?"
And the Court held, after full consideration, that the
disabilities which prevented the offending party -- Bosworth --
from exercising power over the suspended fee, or naked property,
was removed by the pardon and amnesty, and that he was restored to
all his rights, privileges, and immunities as if he had never
offended, except as to
Page 145 U. S. 559
those things which had become vested in other persons, and that,
among other things,
"he was restored to the control of so much of his property and
estate as had not become vested either in the government or in any
other person; especially that part or quality of his estate which
had never been forfeited, namely, the naked residuary ownership of
the property, subject to the usufruct of the purchaser under the
confiscation proceedings."
In the confiscation proceedings, under which the property in
controversy was condemned and sold, the decree of the United States
district court adjudged, from the proof presented, that Thomas J.
Jenkins, the party whose property was proceeded against, was at the
date of its seizure, the owner of the property, which consisted of
certain real estate described, and had been since July 17, 1862,
and was in the service of the rebels in arms against the United
States, and
that his life estate in the said real estate
was justly and legally forfeited, and it ordered
that such life
estate be condemned and sold, and that the necessary process
be issued to the marshal to make such sale and bring the proceeds
into court. Upon this decree, a sale and conveyance were made by
the marshal
of the life estate of said Jenkins to one
Edward Bepler. The only sale and conveyance executed under the
decree, as thus seen, were of the life estate of Thomas J. Jenkins
in the real property in controversy. No condemnation was had or
sale made of any other estate in the premises.
In some of the cases, as, for instance,
Bigelow v.
Forrest, 9 Wall. 339, a condemnation and sale had
been made of the property in fee, and it was held to be valid as a
condemnation and sale of the life estate of the offending owner;
but the reverse is not true. When the lesser estate -- the life
estate -- is sold, the sale cannot be held to pass the larger
estate -- the fee.
Of the reversion or remainder of the estate of the offending
party no disposition was ever made by the government. It must
therefore be construed to have remained in him, but, under the
ruling in
Wallach v. Van Riswick, without any power in him
to alienate it during his life. That disability
Page 145 U. S. 560
was in force when be executed, with his wife, the deed of the
premises, August 26, 1865. The proclamation of pardon and amnesty
was not made by the President until December 25, 1868. This deed,
however, was accompanied with a covenant of seisin on his part, and
that he would warrant and defend the title against the lawful
claims of all persons whomsoever. Admitting that he had no present
estate in the premises and none in expectancy, he was at liberty to
add to his deed the ordinary covenants of seisin and warranty, and
the same legal operation upon future acquired interests must be
given to them as when accompanying conveyances of parties whose
property has never been subject to confiscation proceedings. That
warranty estopped him and all persons claiming under him from
asserting title to the premises against the grantee and his heirs
and assigns, or conveying it to any other parties. When
subsequently the general amnesty and pardon proclamation was
issued, the disability, if any, that had previously rested upon him
against disposing of the remaining estate, which had not been
confiscated, was removed, and he stood with reference to that
estate precisely as though no confiscation proceedings had ever
been had. The amnesty and pardon, in removing the disability, if
any, resting upon him respecting that estate, enlarged his estate,
the benefit of which inured equally to his grantee. The removal of
his disabilities did not affect the purchaser's right under the
decree of confiscation. The latter remained in the full enjoyment
of the property during the life of the offending party, but he had
no claim upon the future estate, nor did the heirs of the offending
party have any such claim upon it as to preclude the operation of
any previous warranties by him respecting it.
Van
Renesselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297;
Irvine v.
Irvine, 9 Wall. 617. As the general pardon and
amnesty to all persons implicated in the Rebellion are not pleaded
by the defendant, to relieve the offending party, whose life estate
in the premises in controversy was confiscated, from his
disabilities respecting the reversionary interest, or naked fee in
the premises, it is claimed that no benefit can be derived from
them. But this result does not follow from the omission in
pleading, for the pardon and amnesty were
Page 145 U. S. 561
made by a public proclamation of the President, which has the
force of public law, and of which all courts and officers must take
notice, whether especially called to their attention or not.
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202,
137 U. S. 212,
137 U. S.
215.
Judgment affirmed.
