The statute of the South Carolina, passed March 2H, 1876, acts
of 1875-6, p. 198, is capable of being construed either, when taken
by itself, as conferring upon the Coosaw Mining Company the
exclusive right of
Page 144 U. S. 551
digging, mining and removing phosphate rocks for an unlimited
period, so long as it should comply with the terms of the statute,
or, when taken in connection with the Act of March 1, 1870, 14
Gen.Stats.So.Car. 381, as conferring such a right only for "the
full term of 21 years" named in the latter act, and as the
interpretation should be adopted which is most favorable to the
state, it is
held that such exclusive right expired on the
termination of the 21 years named in the act of 1870.
Only that which is granted in clear and explicit terms passes by
a legislative grant of property, franchises or privileges in which
the government or the public has an interest.
A court of equity has jurisdiction over a bill filed by a state
to prevent illegal interference with its control of the digging,
mining, and removing phosphate rock and phosphate deposits in the
bed of a navigable river within its territories.
The Court stated the case as follows:
This suit was brought by the appellees March 23, 1891, in one of
the courts of South Carolina, and subsequently, on the petition of
the appellant, the defendant below, was removed into the circuit
court of the United States. 45 F. 804. Its object was to obtain a
decree enjoining the Coosaw Mining Company, its servants, agents,
and employees, from claiming any right, title, interest, or grant
in or to the phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits in Coosaw River
in that state; from digging, mining, or removing such rock and
deposits in the bed of that river, and from obstructing, by suit or
otherwise, any agent or other person acting by authority of the
state board of phosphate commissioners from digging, mining, and
removing the same.
The appellant claimed in its answer to have a contract with the
state by which it acquired an exclusive right for an indefinite
period to occupy, dig, mine, and remove such rocks and deposits in
Coosaw River, and that in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, the obligation of its contract had been impaired by
a subsequent act of the legislature.
The decree below, rendered September 16, 1891 -- the Chief
Justice and Judge Simonton concurring -- proceeded upon the ground
that the appellant did have at one time, and for a limited period,
a contract with the state of the kind mentioned, but that such
period had expired before the institution
Page 144 U. S. 552
of this suit.
South Carolina v. Coosaw Mining Co., 47
F. 225. The relief asked was therefore granted.
The principal question to be considered depends upon certain
legislative enactments relating to phosphate rocks and phosphatic
deposits in the navigable waters of South Carolina. It is necessary
to ascertain the scope of those enactments.
By an act which took effect March 1, 1870, the state granted to
certain named persons and their associates the right, for the full
term of twenty-one years, to dig, mine, and remove phosphate rocks
and phosphatic deposits from the beds of the navigable streams and
waters within the jurisdiction of the State of South Carolina. This
grant was made upon the express condition that the grantees pay the
state one dollar per ton for every ton of phosphate rock and
phosphatic deposits so dug, mined, and removed, and five hundred
dollars as a license fee before commencing business under the
grant.
The act further provided that before commencing operations under
authority of the act, the grantees and their associates should file
or cause to be filed in the office of the state auditor a bond in
the sum of $50,000 conditioned that they would make true and
faithful returns to that officer annually on or before the first
day of October, and oftener if required, of the number of tons of
phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits dug, mined, and removed by
them, and punctually pay to the state treasurer annually, on the
first day of October, one dollar per ton for every ton of rocks and
deposits by them so dug, mined and removed during the year
preceding, such bond to be renewed annually and approved by the
Attorney General. 14 Gen.Stats.S.C. p. 381.
The Coosaw Mining Company, it is admitted, succeeded to all the
rights given by this act.
On March 28, 1876, another act was passed entitled
"An act to settle definitely the period at which returns shall
be made of phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits dug and mined in
the beds of the navigable streams and waters of the State of South
Carolina and the royalty shall be paid thereon, and also to fix the
terms on which this act may be accepted by the parties named
therein."
This act is the foundation of
Page 144 U. S. 553
the appellant's claim of an exclusive right, for an indefinite
period, to dig, mine, and remove phosphate rocks and phosphatic
deposits in that part of Coosaw River which it occupies. Its
provisions are therefore given in full as follows:
"Whereas differences have arisen between the Coosaw Mining
Company and the Comptroller General as to the times and manner in
which the said company shall make their returns of the number of
tons of phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits dug, mined, and
removed by them from the beds of the navigable streams and waters
of the state, and also as to the times when the royalty thereon
shall be paid therefore for remedy thereof."
"Section 1.
Be it enacted, etc., that the said Coosaw
Mining Company, and all other companies and persons engaged in
digging, mining, and removing phosphate rocks and phosphatic
deposits from the bed of the navigable streams and waters of the
state shall be and they are hereby required, from and after the
passage of this act, to make to the Comptroller General true and
faithful returns of the number of tons of phosphate rocks and
phosphatic deposits they have so dug, mined, and removed, and
shipped, or otherwise sent to market at the end of every month, and
shall punctually pay to the state treasurer the royalty already
provided by law to be paid thereon at the end of every quarter or
three months, the first quarter to commence to run on the first day
of March in the present year."
"SEC. 2. That the said Coosaw Mining Company, and all other
companies and persons mentioned in the preceding section, shall,
within ten days from the passage of this act, enter into new bonds
in the penal sums and in the manner and form already provided by
law, but conforming in their conditions to the terms set forth in
the said preceding section, and also pay to the state treasurer the
royalty accrued up to the said first day of March of the present
year. And whereas it is desirable that the said Coosaw Mining
Company and all other companies and persons engaged in digging,
mining, and removing phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits as
aforesaid shall accept the terms of this act in order to make it
binding on
Page 144 U. S. 554
them respectively, and whereas the said Coosaw Mining Company
have already occupied so much of the Coosaw River as lies opposite
to and south of Chisolm's Island, whereon their works are located,
and to the marshes thereof, and have expended large sums of money
in establishing themselves thereon with sufficient mining plant for
mining and preparing for market the phosphate rocks and phosphatic
deposits of that part of the said Coosaw River; therefore, in
consideration thereof,"
"SEC. 3. That the said Coosaw Mining Company, on accepting the
terms of this act within ten days from the passage thereof, shall
thenceforth have the exclusive right to occupy and dig, mine, and
remove phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits from all that part of
the said Coosaw River above mentioned so long as, and no longer
than, they shall make true and faithful returns of the number of
tons thereof they shall so dig, mine, and remove, and ship or
otherwise send to market, and punctually pay the royalty thereon,
as provided in the first section of this act."
"SEC. 4. That all other companies and persons engaged in
digging, mining, and removing phosphate rocks and phosphatic
deposits as aforesaid under gift and grant of the State of South
Carolina, or by authority thereof, who shall accept the terms of
this act within ten days from the passage thereof, shall
thenceforth have the same exclusive right where they have
respectively occupied and established themselves for mining
purposes, and on the same limitations as are prescribed in the
preceding section of this act."
"SEC. 5. That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this
act be, and they are hereby, for the purpose of this act,
repealed."
Acts of South Carolina, 1875-1876, p. 198.
The appellant accepted the terms of that act, and thereby, it is
contended, acquired the exclusive right in question. The act which
is supposed to have impaired the obligation of its contract with
the state was that of December 23, 1890, creating a board of
phosphate commissioners consisting of the Governor, Attorney
General, Comptroller General, and two individual citizens, charged
with the exclusive control and protection
Page 144 U. S. 555
of the rights and interest of the state in the phosphate rocks
and phosphatic deposits in its navigable streams and marshes. The
latter act empowered the board -- if, upon full investigation and
examination, they deemed it advisable -- to require all persons or
corporations digging or mining phosphate rock or phosphatic
deposits in the navigable streams and marshes of the state to pay a
royalty not to exceed two dollars per ton for all or any phosphate
rock so dug or mined, six months' notice being given before raising
the royalty above one dollar.
It also authorized and directed the board, after the first day
of March, 1891, "to take possession and control of the Coosaw River
phosphate territory heretofore occupied by the Coosaw Mining
Company," and to issue licenses to mine and remove therefrom
phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits, in like manner as was then
provided by law for the other navigable streams and waters of the
state, each ton of phosphate rock or phosphatic deposits, the
product of such mining operations, to be deemed the property of the
state until the said parties paid thereon a royalty, to be fixed by
the board at not exceeding two dollars per ton on each ton of
phosphate rock or phosphatic deposits dug, mined, and removed, and
six months notice to be given before raising the royalty above one
dollar.
It was further provided that if any person interfered with,
obstructed, molested, or attempted to interfere with, obstruct, or
molest the board or anyone by them authorized or licensed in the
peaceable possession and occupation for mining purposes of any of
the marshes and navigable streams and waters of the state, it was
authorized, in the name and on behalf of the State of South
Carolina,
"to take such measures or proceedings as they may be advised are
proper to enjoin and terminate any such molestation, interference,
or obstruction, and place the state, through its agents, the said
board of phosphate commissioners, or anyone under them authorized,
in absolute and practicable possession and occupation of the
same."
Other sections of the act made it an offense punishable by fine
or imprisonment, or both at the discretion of the court,
Page 144 U. S. 556
for any person or persons to willfully interfere with, molest,
or obstruct, or attempt to interfere with, molest, or obstruct, the
state or the board of phosphate commissioners, or anyone by them
authorized or licensed, in the peaceable possession and occupation
of any of the said marshes and navigable streams and waters of the
state, "including the said Coosaw-River phosphate territory," or
who shall dig or mine, or attempt to dig or mine, any of the
phosphate rock or phosphatic deposits of this state without a
license so to do by the board. The board were authorized and
empowered to inquire into and protect the interests of the state in
and to any phosphate deposits or mines, whether in the navigable
waters of the state or in land, marshes, or other territory owned
or claimed by other parties, and in the proceeds of any such mines,
and to take such action for or in behalf of the state in regard
thereto as they might find necessary or deem proper. All acts or
parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of the act of 1890
were repealed. Acts of South Carolina, 1890, p. 691.
Page 144 U. S. 560
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Coosaw Mining Company undoubtedly acquired by the act of
1870, and upon the conditions therein prescribed, the right, for
the full term of twenty-one years, to dig, mine, and remove
phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits in the navigable waters of
South Carolina. But the right thus acquired was not made an
exclusive one. The state was at liberty, so far as that act was
concerned, to grant similar rights to other associations,
corporations, or persons. This is not disputed.
Did the appellant, by its acceptance of the act of 1876,
acquire
Page 144 U. S. 561
an exclusive right with respect to that part of Coosaw River
then occupied for the purposes of its business? If this question be
answered in the affirmative -- as, in view of the express language
of the act, it must be -- the state is nevertheless entitled to a
decree upon the issue as to the impairment of the obligation of the
alleged contract unless it be held that that act gave an exclusive
right to the Coosaw Mining Company
in perpetuity,
conditioned only upon its meeting the terms prescribed by the third
section -- namely that it would make true and faithful returns of
the number of tons of phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits dug,
mined, removed, shipped, or otherwise sent to market, and pay the
royalty as provided for in the first section of that act. It cannot
be denied that the third section, if it be construed literally and
without reference to other sections or to the act of 1870, will
bear this interpretation. But the act of 1876, if interpreted as it
ought to be in connection with that of 1870, will, to say the
least, bear equally another construction -- namely that the right
granted by the original act for the term of twenty-one years was
made, by the act of 1876, exclusive
only during the remainder
of that term as to the part of Coosaw River occupied by the
appellant's works, "so long as and no longer than" it made the
returns and paid the royalty prescribed by the latter act. Under
the latter construction, the right of the appellant, by the acts of
1870 and 1876, to dig, mine, and remove phosphate rocks and
phosphatic deposits in the navigable waters of the state ceased
altogether after the expiration of twenty-one years from March 1,
1870. If the act of 1876 materially altered that of 1870 in respect
to the times and manner of making returns or the royalty to be
paid, the Coosaw Mining Company received in consideration therefor
what it did not previously have -- that is, an exclusive right for
a limited period in the particular part of Coosaw River which it
occupied when the act of 1876 was passed.
If the act of 1876 is fairly susceptible of either of the
constructions we have indicated, as we think it is, the
interpretation must be adopted which is most favorable to the
state.
Page 144 U. S. 562
The doctrine is firmly established that only that which is
granted in clear and explicit terms passes by a grant of property,
franchises, or privileges in which the government or the public has
an interest.
Rice v. Railroad
Co., 1 Black 358,
66 U. S. 380;
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.
S. 666;
Hannibal &c. Railroad v. Missouri River
Packet Co., 125 U. S. 271;
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co.,
139 U. S. 24,
139 U. S. 49;
Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 141 U. S.
67,
141 U. S. 80;
State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 83, 86. Statutory
grants of that character are to be construed strictly in favor of
the public, and whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld.
Nothing passes by mere implication.
Holyoke Co. v.
Lyman, 15 Wall. 512;
The
Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51,
70 U. S. 75. This
principle, it has been said,
"is a wise one, as it serves to defeat any purpose concealed by
the skillful use of terms to accomplish something not apparent on
the face of the act, and thus sanctions only open dealing with
legislative bodies."
Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S. 412,
111 U. S.
438.
The wisdom of the rule adverted to is well illustrated by the
present case. Neither the title nor the preamble of the act of 1876
suggests the purpose on the part of the Coosaw Mining Company, or
of any other association or corporation, to obtain, or the
intention of the legislature to grant, a new right to dig, mine,
and remove phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits, much less a
grant of such a right in perpetuity. The title discloses only a
purpose to settle definitely the time for making returns of rocks
and deposits so dug, mined, and removed, to establish the royalty
to be paid, and to fix the terms on which the act might be accepted
by the parties named in it. If the parties so named had in mind to
acquire a grant for an indefinite period, their purpose was
concealed under the general words in the title, "and also to fix
the terms on which this act may be accepted by the parties named
therein." Turning to the preamble, which has been said to be a key
to open the understanding of a statute, we find that the occasion
of the passage of the act of 1876 was a dispute between the Coosaw
Mining Company and the Comptroller General of the
Page 144 U. S. 563
state not as to the right of that company to dig, mine, and
remove phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits, but only as to the
times and manner in which it should make its returns and pay the
prescribed royalty, and that "for remedy thereof" the act was
passed. Neither the title nor the preamble indicates a purpose to
enlarge the right given by the act of 1870 for twenty-one years to
one for an indefinite period. While express provisions in the body
of an act cannot be controlled or restrained by the title or
preamble, the latter may be referred to when ascertaining the
meaning of a statute which is susceptible of different
constructions. In
United States v.
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358,
6 U. S. 386,
Chief Justice Marshall said:
"Neither party contends that the title of an act can control
plain words in the body of the statute, and neither denies that,
taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities.
Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where
the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it
seizes everything from which aid can be derived, and in such case
the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of
consideration."
United States v.
Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610,
16 U. S. 631.
This rule is especially applicable in states whose constitutions,
like that of South Carolina, provide that "every act or resolution
having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that
shall be expressed in the title."
Meyer v. Car Co.,
102 U. S. 1,
102 U. S. 11-12.
So, in
Beard v.
Rowan, 9 Pet. 301,
34 U. S. 317:
"The preamble in the act may be resorted to to aid in the
construction of the enacting clause when any ambiguity exists." The
ambiguity here referred to is not simply that arising from the
meaning of particular words, but such as may arise, in respect to
the general scope and meaning of a statute, when all of its
provisions are examined. Interpreting the act of 1876 with such aid
as may be properly derived from its title and preamble, we are of
opinion that the legislature did not intend to grant the appellant
an exclusive right for an indefinite period, but only an exclusive
right during the balance of the term of twenty-one years fixed by
the act of 1870, and not even an exclusive right for that period
except upon the performance of the conditions set
Page 144 U. S. 564
forth in the act of 1876 as to making returns and paying the
prescribed royalty.
It results that the contention of the state must be sustained
whether we apply the rule requiring public grants to be favorably
construed for the government or whether, independently of that
rule, we give effect to the intention of the legislature as
disclosed by the words of the statute.
It is contended by the appellant that this case is not one of
which a court of the United States, sitting in equity, could take
cognizance. In meeting this question, the counsel for the state
have placed some reliance upon the provisions in the act of 1890
authorizing the board of phosphate commissioners, in the name and
on behalf of the state, "to take such measures or proceedings as
they may be advised are proper to enjoin and terminate" any
molestation, interference, or obstruction of the peaceable
possession and occupation for mining purposes of the navigable
streams of the state, either by the board or by anyone licensed or
authorized by it, and to take such action for and in behalf of the
state as they deem proper for the protection of its interests. This
statute is not important here except as showing the authority of
that board to bring suits in the name of or for the state to
protect its interests. The suit may have been cognizable in the
state court, sitting in equity. But if it was not one of which the
circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, could
properly take cognizance,
Payne v. Hook,
7 Wall. 425,
74 U. S. 430;
Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86,
129 U. S. 98,
the pleadings, upon removal of the case from the state court,
should have been reformed so as to make it a case to be tried at
law. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire whether, according to
the principles of equity as recognized in the courts of the United
States, the state can obtain relief by a suit in equity.
The grounds of equity jurisdiction in such cases as the one
before us are substantially those upon which courts of equity
interfere in cases of waste, public nuisance, and purpresture.
The case of
United States v.
Gear, 3 How. 120,
44 U. S. 121,
44 U. S. 133, bears
upon this question. The United States, claiming to be the owner of
certain lands upon which there was a lead mine,
Page 144 U. S. 565
brought an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit
against the party in possession. They also brought a suit in equity
for an injunction to stay waste. This Court held in the equity case
that digging ore from lead mines upon the public lands was such
waste as entitled the United States to a writ of injunction to
restrain it.
In
City of Georgetown v.
Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91,
37 U. S. 98, it
was said to be
"now settled that a court of equity may take jurisdiction in
cases of public nuisance by an information filed by the Attorney
General, . . . upon the principle that equity can give more
adequate and complete relief than can be obtained at law."
In
Attorney General v. Richards, 2 Anstr. 603, an
information in equity in the name of the attorney general to
restrain the erection of wharves and docks in a certain harbor and
to abate those erected was sustained, the court observing that
"where the King claims and proves a right to the soil, where a
purpresture and nuisance have been committed, he may have a decree
to abate it." In
Attorney General v. Forbes, 2 My. &
Cr. 123, 133, it was said by the Lord Chancellor that
"in informations and proceedings for the purpose of preventing
public nuisances, the ordinary course is for the attorney general
to take it on himself to sue as representing the public."
In reply to the suggestion that an application to the High Court
of Chancery to prevent a nuisance to a public road was never heard
of before, he said:
"Many cases might have been produced in which the court has
interfered to prevent nuisances to public rivers and to public
harbors, and the Court of Exchequer, as well as this court, acting
as a court of equity, has a well established jurisdiction, upon a
proceeding by way of information, to prevent nuisances to public
harbors and public roads, and in short, generally to prevent public
nuisances."
So, in
Gibson v. Smith, 2 Atk. 182, in which an
injunction was sought to restrain a defendant from opening mines
upon an estate held by him under a deed containing reservations
against waste and the opening of mines, and in which it was
objected that the matter was not for the determination of a court
of equity, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
Page 144 U. S. 566
said:
"The plaintiff may certainly come into this court to restrain
the defendant from opening the mines, etc., even if he has only
threatened to do it; nor is it necessary the plaintiff should have
waited till the waste is actually committed, where the intention
appears, and the defendant, even by his answer, insists on his
right to do so."
An instructive case upon this subject is
Attorney General v.
Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 361, 363-364. That was an
information in equity, in the name of the attorney general, to
restrain a corporation from doing certain illegal acts the
necessary effects of which would be not only to impair the rights
of the public in the use of one of the great ponds of Massachusetts
for purposes of fishing and boating, but to create a nuisance by
lowering the pond and exposing upon its shores slime, mud, and
offensive vegetation detrimental to the public health. It was held,
upon the authority of numerous cases, American and English, that
where the nuisance is a public one, an information by the attorney
general was the appropriate remedy. After observing that the
preventive force of a decree in equity restraining the illegal acts
before any mischief was done would give a more efficacious and
complete remedy than an indictment or proceedings under a statute
for the abatement of the nuisance, the court said:
"There is another ground upon which in our opinion this
information can be maintained, though perhaps it belongs to the
same general head of equity jurisdiction of restraining and
preventing nuisances. The great ponds of the commonwealth belong to
the public, and like the tidewaters of navigable streams, are under
the control and care of the commonwealth. The rights of fishing,
boating, bathing, and other like rights which pertain to the public
are regarded as valuable rights, entitled to the protection of the
government. . . . If a corporation or an individual is found to be
doing acts without right the necessary effect of which is to
destroy those rights and privileges, it furnishes a proper case for
an information by the attorney general to restrain and prevent the
mischief."
So, in Eden on Injunctions:
"The usual, and perhaps the more correct, mode of proceeding
in
Page 144 U. S. 567
equity in cases of public nuisance, is by information at the
suit of the attorney general."
Page 267. Mr. Justice Story said that an information in equity
at the suit of the attorney general would lie in cases of
purpresture and public nuisance, the jurisdiction of courts of
equity being sustained because of
"their ability to give a more complete and perfect remedy than
is attainable at law in order to prevent irreparable mischief and
also to suppress oppressive and vexatious litigations."
Eq.Jur. ยงยง 922-924;
People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287,
293;
District Attorney v. Lynne & Boston Railroad Co.,
16 Gray 242, 245; Kerr on Injunctions 262, 263; 1 Joyce on
Injunctions 120.
These principles are applicable to the present case. The remedy
at law for the protection of the state in respect to the phosphate
rocks and phosphatic deposits in the beds of its navigable waters
is not so efficacious or complete as a perpetual injunction against
interference with its rights by digging, mining, and removing such
rocks and deposits without its consent. The Coosaw Mining Company,
unless restrained, will not only appropriate to its use property
held in trust for the public, but will prevent the proper
administration of that trust for an indefinite period by
obstructing others, acting under lawful authority, from enjoying
rights in respect to that property derived from the state. These
conflicting claims cannot be so effectively or conclusively settled
by proceedings at law as by a comprehensive decree covering all the
matters in controversy. Proceedings at law or by indictment can
only reach past or present wrongs done by the appellant, and will
not adequately protect the public interests in the future. What the
public are entitled to have is security for all time against
illegal interference with the control by the state of the digging,
mining, and removing of phosphatic rock and phosphatic deposits in
the bed of Coosaw River. Such security was properly given by the
decree below.
Decree affirmed.
