Under the provisions of the Act of July 4, 1884, 23 Stat. 73, c.
179, the United States Circuit and District Courts for the Northern
District of Texas, the Western District of Arkansas, and the
District of Kansas have concurrent jurisdiction, without reference
to the amount in controversy and without distinction as to
citizenship of the parties, over all controversies arising between
the Southern Kansas Railway Company and the inhabitants of the
Indian nations and tribes through whose territory that railway is
constructed.
This was a motion
"to dismiss the writ of error herein, because the court has no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the same or to affirm the
judgment, it being manifest that even if the court has
jurisdiction, the question on which the jurisdiction depends is so
frivolous as not to need further argument."
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Briscoe brought suit, as an inhabitant of the Chickasaw Nation,
Indian Territory, in the District Court of the United States for
the Western District of Arkansas, against the Southern Kansas
Railway Company to recover damages for the wrongful killing of
certain livestock by one of the defendant's trains, which was tried
in the circuit court for that district after the passage of the Act
of February 6, 1889, 25
Page 144 U. S. 134
Stat. 655, c. 113, and judgment rendered for $896.75. The case
was brought to this Court under the Act of February 25, 1889, 25
Stat. 693, c. 236, on the question of the jurisdiction of the court
below.
By the Act of July 4, 1884, 23 Stat. 73, c. 179, Congress
granted the right of way through the Indian Territory to the
Southern Kansas Railway Company. The act defined the route and the
extent of the right of way; provided for compensation for property
taken or damage done by reason of the construction of the road; for
regulating the rates for freight, passenger, and mail service; for
the filing of maps showing the routes of the located lines through
the territory, in the office of the Secretary of the Interior, and
also in the office of the principal chief of the nations or tribes
through which the lines might run; for the construction of
prescribed mileage within three years; for the recording of all
mortgages executed by the company in the Department of the
Interior, and that the right of way should be accepted upon the
express condition that the company would neither aid, advise, nor
assist in any effort looking to wards the changing or extinguishing
the tenure of the Indians in their lands, and not attempt to secure
from the Indian nation any further grant of land or occupancy than
as provided, under penalty of forfeiture of all the rights and
privileges of the company under the act.
The eighth section reads as follows:
"That the United States circuit and district courts for the
Northern District of Texas, the Western District of Arkansas, and
the district of Kansas, and such other courts as may be authorized
by Congress, shall have, without reference to the amount in
controversy, concurrent jurisdiction over all controversies arising
between said Southern Kansas Railway Company and the nations and
tribes through whose territory said railway shall be constructed.
Said courts shall have like jurisdiction, without reference to the
amount in controversy, over all controversies arising between the
inhabitants of said nations or tribes and said railway company, and
the civil jurisdiction of said courts is hereby extended within the
limits
Page 144 U. S. 135
of said Indian Territory, without distinction as to citizenship
of the parties, so far as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this act."
It was contended on behalf of defendant, before Judge Parker,
holding the circuit court, that the last clause of this section,
to-wit, "so far as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this act," operated to limit the jurisdiction conferred to such
controversies as might arise between the nations or inhabitants and
the company, in respect of the construction of the railroad, as
pertaining to the right of way, damages for land improvements or
occupancy rights thereby injured or disturbed, etc.
The circuit court held otherwise, and that the courts named in
the section were properly given jurisdiction over the suit because,
as there was no remedy for a tort such as that in question at the
place where the same was committed, there was no remedy anywhere,
until given by the law under consideration, and that this
constituted a right or privilege thereunder, and upon the further
ground that, as the act conferred upon the corporation the right to
build and run its road through the Indian country, and to exercise
the ordinary powers incident thereto, this rendered the suit one
arising under the laws of the United States. 40 F. 273.
That Briscoe was at the time mentioned an inhabitant of the
Chickasaw Nation, where the property destroyed was, must be
assumed. The answer did not specifically put this fact in issue,
but denied any liability generally, and defendant requested the
court to instruct the jury that Briscoe was not an inhabitant,
which the court refused to do, as there was evidence tending to
show that he was. This left the question as one of fact to the
jury, and it was determined, in effect, in Briscoe's favor by their
verdict.
As the defendant acquired all its rights in the matter of the
construction and operation of its road within the Indian Territory
under and by virtue of a law of the United States, enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its power over the territories,
controversies arising by reason of the exercise of its powers
therein were necessarily controversies arising under
Page 144 U. S. 136
the laws of the United States, and, this being so, it was
competent for Congress to give the enumerated courts jurisdiction
over not only controversies immediately relating to or growing out
of the construction of the road, but over all controversies between
the nations, and tribes or the inhabitants thereof, through whose
territory the railroad might be constructed, and the company.
And as the civil jurisdiction of these courts was extended
within the limits of the territory, without distinction as to the
citizenship of the parties, "so far as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this act," and that might embrace all
controversies arising between the inhabitants or the nations and
tribes and the railway company, we do not regard the addition of
these words as intended to operate as a limitation of the
controversies to those growing out of the construction of the road
merely, since the section in terms applies to "all
controversies."
It is true that, apart from jurisdiction over the subject
matter, a citizen of a territory cannot sue a citizen of a state in
the courts of the United States, nor an Indian tribe or nation sue
a state or its citizens, but the judicial power extends to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under the laws of the United
States, and this case falls within that category, and therefore the
jurisdiction in question could be conferred, as we hold that it
was.
The decision of the circuit court was right, and its judgment
is
Affirmed.