The grant of public land to the State of Iowa by the Act of May
15, 1856, 11 Stat. 9, c. 28, "in alternate sections to aid in the
construction of certain railroads in that state" was a grant
in
praesenti, which did not attach until the time of the filing
of the map of definite location; although the beneficiary company
(under the Iowa statute) may have surveyed and staked out upon the
ground a line for its road before the filing.
The plaintiff, claiming under the said grant to the Iowa,
brought an action against the defendant to recover a tract, a part
of the grant. The defendant claimed under a patent from the United
States subsequent to the filing of the map of definite location,
but issued on a preemption claim made prior thereto, and filed a
cross-bill for quieting his title.
Held that it was not
open to the plaintiff to contest the
bona fides of the
preemption settlement.
The Court stated the case as follows:
Page 143 U. S. 33
On May 15, 1856, Congress passed an act granting lands to the
State of Iowa to aid in the construction of certain railroads. 11
Stat. 9, c. 28. The grant was a grant
in praesenti, and of
alternate sections, with the familiar provision:
"But in case it shall appear that the United States have, when
the lines or routes of said roads are definitely fixed, sold any
sections, or any parts thereof, granted as aforesaid, or that the
right of preemption has attached to the same, then it shall be
lawful for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the governor of
said state, to select, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, from the lands of the United States nearest to the
tiers of sections above specified, so much land, in alternate
sections, or parts of sections, as shall be equal to such lands as
the United States have sold or otherwise appropriated, or to which
the rights of preemption have attached as aforesaid."
By an Act of the General Assembly of Iowa of date July 14, 1856,
the Dubuque and Pacific Railway Company was made one of the
beneficiaries of this grant. By section 6 it was provided:
"The lines and routes of the several roads above described shall
be definitely fixed and located on or before the first day of April
next after the passage of this act, and maps or plats showing such
lines or routes shall be filed in the office of the Governor of the
State of Iowa, and also in the office of the Secretary of the State
of Iowa. It shall be the duty of the governor, after affixing his
official signature, to file such map in the department having the
control of the public lands in Washington, such location to be
considered final only so far as to fix the limits and boundary in
which said lands may be selected."
The map of the definite location thus provided for was not
received by the officers of the state until after September 27,
1856, and was filed at the General Land Office in Washington on
October 13, 1856. Prior, however, to the 14th day of July and the
passage of the act making it the beneficiary of the congressional
grant, the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company had commenced the
survey of its line and had surveyed and staked out a line upon the
surface of the ground along the land in controversy, which, by such
survey, was within the limits of the grant. On the 19th of
Page 143 U. S. 34
July, 1856, Griffey entered upon this land, filed his
declaratory statement, and on the 5th of September located it with
a military bounty land-warrant, and received his certificate of
location.
Page 143 U. S. 38
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first and principal question is at what time the title of
the railroad company attached -- whether at the time the map of
definite location was filed in the General Land Office at
Washington or when, prior thereto, its line was surveyed and staked
out on the surface of the ground. While the question in this
precise form has never been before this Court, yet the question as
to the time at which the title attaches under grants similar to
this has been often presented, and the uniform ruling has been that
it attaches at the time of the filing of the map of definite
location.
Grinnell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.
S. 739;
Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.
S. 360,
106 U. S. 366;
Kansas Pacific Railway v. Dunmeyer, 113 U.
S. 629,
113 U. S. 634;
Waldan v. Knevals, 114 U. S. 373;
United States v. Missouri, Kansas &c. Railway,
141 U. S. 358,
141 U. S.
375.
In
Van Wyck v. Knevals, where the question arose
between Knevals, the grantee of the railroad company, and Van Wyck,
who had entered the lands at the local land office after the filing
of the map of definite location with the Land Department, but
before notice thereof had been received at such local land office,
this Court said:
"The route must be considered as 'definitely fixed' when it has
ceased to be the subject of change at the volition of the company.
Until the map is filed with the Secretary of the Interior, the
company is at
Page 143 U. S. 39
liberty to adopt such a route as it may deem best after an
examination of the ground has disclosed the feasibility and
advantages of different lines. But when a route is adopted by the
company, and a map designating it is filed with the Secretary of
the Interior and accepted by that officer, the route is
established; it is, in the language of the act, 'definitely fixed,'
and cannot be the subject of future change so as to affect the
grant except upon legislative consent."
And in
Pacific Railway Company v. Dunmeyer it is also
said:
"We are of opinion that under this grant, as under many other
grants containing the same words or words to the same purport, the
act which fixes the time of definite location is the act of filing
the map or plat of this line in the office of the commissioner of
the General Land Office. The necessity of having certainty in the
act fixing this time is obvious. Up to that time, the right of the
company to no definite section or part of section is fixed. Until
then, many rights to the land along which the road finally runs may
attach, which will be paramount to that of the company building the
road. After this, no such rights can attach, because the right of
the company becomes by that act vested. It is important, therefore,
that this act fixing these rights shall be one which is open to
inspection. At the same time, it is an act to be done by the
company. The company makes its own preliminary and final surveys by
its own officers. It selects for itself the precise line on which
the road is to be built, and it is by law bound to report its
action by filing its map with the commissioner, or rather in his
office. The line is then fixed. The company cannot alter it so as
to affect the rights of any other party."
The reasoning of these opinions is applicable here. The fact
that the company has surveyed and staked a line upon the ground
does not conclude it. It may survey and stake many, and finally
determine the line upon which it will build by a comparison of the
cost and advantages of each, and only when, by filing its map, it
has communicated to the government knowledge of its selected line
is it concluded by its action. Then, so far as the purposes of the
land grant are concerned, is its line definitely fixed, and it
cannot thereafter,
Page 143 U. S. 40
without the consent of the government, change that line so as to
affect titles accruing thereunder. In accordance with these
decisions, it must therefore be held that the line was not
definitely fixed until the 13th of October, 1856.
Inasmuch as Griffey's preemption right had attached to this land
prior to such time, it did not pass to the railroad company under
the grant, and it was a matter of no moment to the company what
thereafter became of the title. This is settled by the case of
Pacific Railway Company v. Dunmeyer, in which it was
said:
"It is not conceivable that Congress intended to place these
parties as contestants for the land, with the right in each to
require proof from the other of complete performance of its
obligation. Least of all is it to be supposed that it was intended
to raise up, in antagonism to all the actual settlers on the soil,
whom it had invited to its occupation, this great corporation, with
an interest to defeat their claims, and to come between them and
the government as to the performance of their obligations."
And, again:
"Of all the words in the English language, this word 'attached'
was probably the best that could have been used. It did not mean
mere settlement, residence, or cultivation of the land, but it
meant a proceeding in the proper land office, by which the inchoate
right to the land was initiated. It meant that by such a
proceeding, a right of homestead had fastened to that land which
could ripen into a perfect title by future residence and
cultivation. With the performance of these conditions the company
had nothing to do. The right of the homestead having attached to
the land, it was excepted out of the grant as much as if in a deed
it had been excluded from the conveyance by metes and bounds."
See also Hastings & Dakota Railroad v. Whitney,
132 U. S. 357, in
which was a similar ruling.
The only other question we deem important is this: on July 5,
1871, the State of Iowa issued a patent, under which plaintiff in
error claims, and on June 30, 1882, the United States issued a
patent to Griffey, which is the basis of defendants' title. The
defendants filed, as was authorized under the Iowa statute, a
cross-petition, praying to quiet their title,
Page 143 U. S. 41
and the decree entered was one dismissing the plaintiff's bill
and quieting defendants' title.
Now it is claimed that Griffey never complied with the
preemption laws; that he never made a
bona fide
settlement; that he secured his preemption rights by false
representations and a pretended settlement; that he does not come
into a court of equity with clean hands, and is entitled to no
relief, and that therefore there was error in entering a decree in
favor of the defendants upon the cross-petition. But as we have
seen, Griffey did make a settlement, file his declaratory
statement, and thus initiate a preemption right. By these means,
such preemption right had, in the language of the statute,
attached. The land therefore did not pass under the railroad grant.
It was no matter of interest to the company what became of the
title. The government -- the owner of the land -- was satisfied
with what Griffey had done, took from him its land warrant as
payment, and patented the land. Into the
bona fides of
this transaction no one but the government can inquire. As the
title was beyond challenge on the part of the railroad company, it
had no right to cast a cloud thereupon, and, having done so by
accepting a patent from the State of Iowa, under the pretense that
the land was a part of the grant made to that state, and having
affirmed the validity of the title conveyed by such patent, it does
not lie in its mouth, or with those claiming under it, to now
object to a decree removing all cloud cast by such patent.
We see no error in the rulings of the Supreme Court of Iowa, and
its judgment is
Affirmed.
