Mandamus will not lie to compel a railroad corporation to build
a station at a particular place unless there is a specific duty,
imposed by statute, to do so, and clear proof of a breach of that
duty.
A petition for a mandamus to compel a railroad corporation to
perform a definite duty to the public which it has distinctly
manifested an intention not to perform is rightly presented in the
name of the state at the relation of its prosecuting attorney, and
without previous demand.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, whose charter authorized
it to locate, construct and maintain a continuous railroad from
Lake Superior to Puget Sound "by the most eligible route, as shall
be determined by said company," within limits broadly described,
and directed that its
Page 142 U. S. 493
road should
"be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike manner, with
all the necessary draws, culverts, bridges, viaducts, crossings,
turnouts, stations and watering places, and all other
appurtenances,"
constructed its railroad through the County of Yakima, and
stopped its trains for a while at Yakima City, then the county seat
and the principal town in the county; but, on completing its road
four miles further to North Yakima, a town which it had laid out on
its own land, established a freight and passenger station there and
ceased to stop its trains at Yakima City. Thereupon a writ of
mandamus was applied for to compel it to build and maintain a
station at Yakima City and to stop its trains there. Afterwards,
and before the hearing, Yakima City rapidly dwindled, and most of
its inhabitants removed to North Yakima, which became the principal
town in the county and was made by the legislature the county seat;
there were other stations which furnished sufficient facilities for
the country south of North Yakima; the earnings of this division of
the road were insufficient to pay its running expenses, and the
passenger and freight traffic of the people living in the
surrounding country, considering them as a community, would be
better accommodated at North Yakima than at Yakima City.
Held that a writ of mandamus should not issue.
A petition in the name of the Territory of Washington at the
relation of the prosecuting attorney for the County of Yakima and
four other counties in the territory, was filed in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the territory on February
20, 1885, for a mandamus to compel the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company to erect and maintain a station at Yakima City, on the
Cascade branch of its railroad, extending from Pasco Junction on
the Columbia River up the valley of the Yakima River and through
the County of Yakima, toward Puget Sound, and to stop its trains
there to receive and deliver freight, and to receive and let off
passengers.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated by Act of
Congress of July 2, 1864, c. 217, and was thereby
"authorized and empowered to lay out, locate, construct,
furnish, maintain, and enjoy a continuous railroad and telegraph
line, with the appurtenances, namely, beginning at a point on Lake
Superior, in the State of Minnesota or Wisconsin, thence westerly,
by the most eligible rail road route, as shall be determined by
said company, within the territory of the United States, on a line
north of the forty-fifth degree of latitude, to some point on
Puget's Sound, with a branch, via the valley of
Page 142 U. S. 494
the Columbia River, to a point at or near Portland, in the State
of Oregon, leaving the main trunk line at the most suitable place
not more than three hundred miles from its western terminus, and is
hereby vested with all the powers, privileges, and immunities
necessary to carry into effect the purposes of this act as herein
set forth."
By § 5 of its charter, it was enacted
"that said Northern Pacific Railroad shall be constructed in a
substantial and workmanlike manner, with all the necessary draws,
culverts, bridges, viaducts, crossings, turnouts, stations, and
watering places, and all other appurtenances, including furniture
and rolling stock, equal in all respects to railroads of the first
class when prepared for business, with rails of the best quality,
manufactured from American iron, and a uniform gauge shall be
established throughout the entire length of the road."
And by § 20 it was enacted
"that the better to accomplish the object of this act, namely,
to promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of
said railroad and telegraph line, and keeping the same in working
order, and to secure to the government at all times (but
particularly in time of war) the use and benefits of the same for
postal, military, and other purposes, Congress may at any time,
having due regard for the rights of said Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act."
13 Stat. 366, 368, 372.
The petition set forth at length the size and importance of
Yakima City and its need or railroad accommodations; alleged that
it was the county seat of Yakima County, a county having more than
4,000 inhabitants, and had a courthouse where courts of the United
States and of the territory were held, and a United States land
office; that the defendant had refused to establish a freight and
passenger station or to stop its trains at Yakima City, but was
building a freight and passenger station and stopping its trains at
the rival Town of North Yakima, four miles further north, which it
had laid out on its own unimproved land, and was ruining Yakima
City for the purpose of enhancing the value of its own town
site.
The answer, filed June, 1, 1885, said nothing as to the
courthouse; admitted that at the time of filing the petition
there
Page 142 U. S. 495
was a United States land office at Yakima City, but alleged that
it had since been removed by order of the President of the United
States to North Yakima; admitted that Yakima City heretofore had
500 inhabitants, but alleged that since the construction of the
defendant's railroad, two-thirds of them had removed with their
houses and other buildings to North Yakima, and others were
continually abandoning it, and no buildings or business were
replacing those taken away; denied that it had laid out the Town of
North Yakima for the purpose of enhancing the value of its own
property, or for the purpose of injuring the property of any other
person, town, or city, and alleged that there was not business
enough to warrant more than one station on this part of its road,
and that North Yakima was a much larger and more prosperous town
that Yakima City ever was, and was a more convenient point for the
people of the neighboring valleys, who were more than fifteen times
as many, and had more than fifteen times as much taxable property,
as the people living in Yakima City and its immediate vicinity.
The parties also made allegations and denials and, after the
filing of a replication not copied in the record, introduced
evidence at the trial by a jury as to the matters afterwards stated
in the special verdict, which was returned October 17, 1885, in
answer to forty-six questions submitted by the court, and was in
substance as follows:
In January, 1885, the defendant carried freight and passengers
for hire on its railroad to and from Yakima City, and kept an agent
there who attended to the freight and sold tickets to passengers;
but before February 20, 1885, having completed its road to North
Yakima, it ceased to stop its trains at Yakima City and established
a freight and passenger station at North Yakima, and, pursuant to §
4 of its charter, tendered its road to the United States as fully
completed and equipped from Pasco Junction to or beyond Yakima
City, and caused to be appointed by the President of the United
States commissioners to examine and report on the condition of the
road. On March 16, 1885, that part of its road from Pasco Junction
by Yakima City to North Yakima had not been
Page 142 U. S. 496
turned over to the operating department of the company, but the
freight and passenger trains were not run as subordinate to the
construction of the road.
In January, 1885, Yakima City was the oldest and largest town,
and the most important business center, on the Cascade branch of
the defendant's railroad between the Columbia River and Puget
Sound. On February 20, 1885, and when the defendant built and
operated its road to Yakima City, the amount of business done at
Yakima City annually was $250,000, its population was 500, and
there was no other town or business center of any importance in
Yakima County.
On October 17, 1885, Yakima City was the largest town and the
most important business center in the county except the Town of
North Yakima; the population of Yakima City was 150; there were
seventy children attending school there, and it had two hotels, a
flour mill, thirteen stores and places of business, twenty-seven
dwelling houses, and but a limited amount of industries requiring
railroad facilities. The amount of business furnished by Yakima
City to the defendant over that portion of its road between Pasco
Junction and North Yakima in the summer of 1885 was in June 16,000
pounds, in July 4,000 pounds, in August none, in September 2,400
pounds, in October none, and during that period no product of
Yakima City or the country adjoining was furnished by anyone to be
carried over the defendant's road.
There is a safe and suitable place for a freight and passenger
station in Yakima City on the line of the defendant's road, and the
defendant has the ability to construct and maintain such a station
there, with freight and passenger facilities. If the defendant had
done so, Yakima City would have retained its former size and
importance. No demand was ever made upon the defendant for the
establishment of a freight and passenger station there. The expense
of construction and fitting for practical use a station and
warehouse at Yakima City would be about $8,000, and of keeping the
requisite agents there $150 a month. The wear and tear and cost of
stopping a train at a station is $1.
The passenger and freight traffic of the people living in
the
Page 142 U. S. 497
valleys of the streams entering the Yakima River at and near
Yakima City and North Yakima, considering them as a community,
would be better accommodated at North Yakima than at Yakima City.
There are other stations for receiving freight and passengers on
that part of the defendant's railroad extending from Pasco Junction
to North Yakima, called "Yakima Division," furnishing sufficient
facilities for all the country below North Yakima, and the earnings
of that division are not sufficient to pay its running
expenses.
On the verdict of the jury and the admissions in the pleadings,
each party moved for judgment, and on April 23, 1886, the district
court ordered a peremptory mandamus to issue, in accordance with
the prayer of the petition. The record showed that the district
court during the previous proceedings in the case was held at
Yakima City, but at the time of rendering judgment, was held at
North Yakima, to which to county-seat and the courthouse had been
removed pursuant to the statute of the territory of January 9,
1886. Laws of Washington Territory 1885-86, pp. 57, 457. On appeal
to the supreme court of the territory, the judgment of the district
court was affirmed. 3 Wash.Terr. 303. The defendant thereupon sued
out this writ of error, and assigned the following errors:
"First. That the proceedings were not commenced by the proper
relator, or in the name or on behalf of the real party in
interest."
"Second. That Yakima City is the real party in interest."
"Third. The application and petition do not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action."
"Fourth. The findings of the jury are not sufficient to sustain,
and are inconsistent with, the judgment rendered thereon by the
court."
"Fifth. The jury found that existing depot and stations between
North Yakima and Pasco furnished sufficient railroad station
facilities."
"Sixth. The jury found affirmatively that the railroad, at the
time of the application and the return thereto, was in the hands of
the railroad contractors and construction department. "
Page 142 U. S. 498
"Seventh. That the business furnished said railroad company by
said Yakima City and its people, and transacted at said Yakima City
by said railroad, was not sufficient to pay the running expenses of
a station at said place."
"Eighth. The jury found that no demand whatever was ever made
upon the Northern Pacific Railroad Company for the said station or
other depot facilities mentioned in the said application and the
judgment of said court."
"Ninth. No facts are found showing any necessity for other or
additional stations and facilities than those already
furnished."
"Tenth. The charter of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company
vests in said company a discretionary power in reference to
locating and constructing and maintaining its stations."
"Eleventh. That the matters set forth in the application and
findings by the jury are not matters which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station."
"Twelfth. That the judgment affirming the judgment of the
district court rendered on the findings of the jury, and the writ
thereon, are vague, uncertain, and insufficient in not directing
and defining what said Northern Pacific Railroad Company was to do
under said judgment and writ, especially as to the character, kind,
and class of station and facilities to be furnished, and requires
an impossibility in this, to-wit, that said station be constructed
immediately."
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
A writ of mandamus to compel a railroad corporation to do a
particular act in constructing its road or buildings, or in running
its trains, can be issued only when there is a specific legal duty
on its part to do that act, and clear proof of a breach of that
duty.
Page 142 U. S. 499
If, as in
Union Pacific Railroad v. Hall, 91 U. S.
343, the charter of a railroad corporation expressly
requires it to maintain its railroad as a continuous line, it may
be compelled to do so by mandamus. So if the charter requires the
corporation to construct its road and to run its cars to a certain
point on tidewater, as was held to be the case in
State v.
Hartford & New Haven Railroad, 29 Conn. 538, and it has so
constructed its road and used it for years, it may be compelled to
continue to do so. And mandamus will lie to compel a corporation to
build a bridge in accordance with an express requirement of
statute.
New Orleans &c.Railway v. Mississippi,
112 U. S. 12;
People v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 70 N.Y. 569.
But if the charter of a railroad corporation simply authorizes
the corporation, without requiring it, to construct and maintain a
railroad to a certain point, it has been held that it cannot be
compelled by mandamus to complete or to maintain its road to that
point when it would not be remunerative.
York & North
Midland Railway v. The Queen, 1 El. & Bl. 874;
Commonwealth v. Fitchburg Railroad, 12 Gray 180;
State
v. Southern Minnesota Railroad, 18 Minn. 40.
The difficulties in the way of issuing a mandamus to compel the
maintenance of a railroad and the running of trains to a terminus
fixed by the charter itself are much increased when it is sought to
compel the corporation to establish or to maintain a station and to
stop its trains at a particular place on the line of its road. The
location of stations and warehouses for receiving and delivering
passengers and freight involves a comprehensive view of the
interests of the public as well as of the corporation and its
stockholders, and a consideration of many circumstances concerning
the amount of population and business at or near or within
convenient access to one point or another, which are more
appropriate to be determined by the directors, or, in case of abuse
of their discretion, by the legislature or by administrative boards
entrusted by the legislature with that duty than by the ordinary
judicial tribunals.
Page 142 U. S. 500
The defendant's charter, after authorizing and empowering it to
locate, construct, and maintain a continuous railroad "by the most
eligible route, as shall be determined by said company" within
limits described in the broadest way, both as to the terminal
points and as to the course and direction of the road, and vesting
it with "all the powers, privileges, and immunities necessary to
carry into effect the purposes of this act as herein set forth,"
enacts that the road
"shall be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike manner,
with all the necessary draws, culverts, bridges, viaducts,
crossings, turnouts, stations, and watering places, and all other
appurtenances."
The words last quoted are but a general expression of what would
be otherwise implied by law, and cover all structures of every kind
needed for the completion and maintenance of the railroad. They
cannot be construed as imposing any specific duty or as controlling
the discretion in these respects of a corporation entrusted with
such large discretionary powers upon the more important questions
of the course and the termini of its road. The contrast between
these general words and the specific requirements, which follow in
the same section, that the rails shall be manufactured from
American iron and that "a uniform gauge shall be established
throughout the entire length of the road" is significant.
To hold that the directors of this corporation, in determining
the number, place, and size of its stations and other structures,
having regard to the public convenience as well as to its own
pecuniary interest, can be controlled by the courts by writ of
mandamus would be inconsistent with many decisions of high
authority in analogous cases.
The Constitution of Colorado of 1876, art. 15, sec. 4, provided
that "all railroads shall be public highways, and all railroad
companies shall be common carriers," and that "every railroad
company shall have the right with its road to intersect, connect
with, or cross any other railroad." Section 6 of the same article
was as follows:
"All individuals, associations, and corporations shall have
equal rights to have persons and property transported over any
railroad in this state, and no undue or unreasonable discrimination
shall be made in charges or
Page 142 U. S. 501
facilities for transportation of freight or passengers within
the state, and no railroad company, nor any lessee, manager, or
employee thereof, shall give any preference to individuals,
associations, or corporations in furnishing car or motive
power."
The General Laws of Colorado of 1877, c.19, § 111, authorized
every railroad company "to cross, intersect, or connect its
railways with any other railway," "to receive and convey persons
and property on its railway," and
"to erect and maintain all necessary and convenient buildings
and stations, fixtures and machinery, for the convenience,
accommodation, and use of passengers, freights, and business
interests, or which may be necessary for the construction or
operation of said railway."
This Court held that section 6 of article 15 of the Constitution
of Colorado was only declaratory of the common law; that the right
secured by section 4 to connect railroads was confined to their
connection as physical structures, and did not imply a connection
of business with business, and that neither the common law nor the
Constitution and statutes of Colorado compelled one railroad
corporation to establish a station or to stop its cars at its
junction with the railroad of another corporation, although it had
established a union station with the connecting railroad of a third
corporation and had made provisions for the transaction there of a
joint business with that corporation. Chief Justice Waite, in
delivering the opinion, said:
"No statute requires that connected roads shall adopt joint
stations, or that one railroad company shall stop at or make use of
the station of another. Each company in the state has the legal
right to locate its own stations, and, so far as statutory
regulations are concerned, is not required to use any other. A
railroad company is prohibited both by the common law and by the
Constitution of Colorado from discriminating unreasonably in favor
of or against another company seeking to do business on its road,
but that does not necessarily imply that it must stop at the
junction of one and interchange business there because it has
established joint depot accommodations and provided facilities for
doing a connecting business with another company at another place.
A station may be established for the special
Page 142 U. S. 502
accommodation of a particular customer, but we have never heard
it claimed that every other customer could, by a suit in equity, in
the absence of a statutory or contract right, compel the company to
establish a like station for his special accommodation at some
other place. Such matters are, and always have been, proper
subjects for legislative consideration unless prevented by some
charter contract; but, as a general rule, remedies for injustice of
that kind can only be obtained from the legislature. A court of
chancery is not, any more than is a court of law, clothed with
legislative power."
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad v. Denver & New
Orleans Railroad, 110 U. S. 667,
110 U. S.
681-682.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in a very recent case, refused
to grant a mandamus to compel a railroad corporation to construct
and maintain a station and warehouse of sufficient capacity to
accommodate passengers and freight at a village containing 1,200
inhabitants, and furnishing to the defendant at its station therein
a large freight and passenger business, although it was admitted
that its present building at that place was entirely inadequate,
that the absence of a suitable one was a matter of serious damage
to large numbers of persons doing business at that station, that
the railroad commissioners of the state, after notice to the
defendant, had adjudged and recommended that it should construct a
suitable building there within a certain time, and that the
defendant had failed to take any steps in that direction not for
want of means or ability, but because its directors had decided
that its interests required it to postpone doing so. The court,
speaking by Judge Danforth, while recognizing that "a plainer case
could hardly be presented of a deliberate and intentional disregard
of the public interest and the accommodation of the public," yet
held that it was powerless to interpose because the defendant, as a
carrier, was under no obligation at common law to provide
warehouses for freight offered, or stationhouses for passengers
waiting transportation, and no such duty was imposed by the
statutes authorizing companies to construct and maintain railroads
"for public use in the conveyance of persons and property," and to
erect and maintain all necessary
Page 142 U. S. 503
and convenient buildings and stations "for the accommodation and
use of their passengers, freight, and business," and because, under
the statutes of New York, the proceedings and determinations of the
railroad commissioners amounted to nothing more than an inquest for
information, and had no effect beyond advice to the railroad
company and suggestion to the legislature, and could not be
judicially enforced. The court said:
"As the duty sought to be imposed upon the defendant is not a
specific duty prescribed by statute either in terms or by
reasonable construction, the court cannot, no matter how apparent
the necessity, enforce its performance by mandamus. It cannot
compel the erection of a stationhouse, nor the enlargement of one.
. . . As to that, the statute imports an authority only, not a
command, to be availed of at the option of the company in the
discretion of its directors, who are empowered by statute to manage
'its affairs,' among which must be classed the expenditure of money
for station buildings or other structures for the promotion of the
convenience of the public, having regard also to its own interest.
With the exercise of that discretion the legislature only can
interfere. No doubt, as the respondent urges, the court may by
mandamus also act in certain cases affecting corporate matters, but
only where the duty concerned is specific and plainly imposed upon
the corporation. . . . Such is not the case before us. The
grievance complained of is an obvious one, but the burden of
removing it can be imposed upon the defendant only by legislation.
The legislature created the corporation upon the theory that its
functions should be exercised for the public benefit. It may add
other regulations to those now binding it, but the court can
interfere only to enforce a duty declared by law. The one presented
in this case is not of that character, nor can it by any fair or
reasonable construction be implied."
People v. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad,
104 N.Y. 58, 66-67.
In
Commonwealth v. Eastern Railroad, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in holding that a railroad
corporation, whose charter was subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal at the pleasure of the legislature, might be required by
Page 142 U. S. 504
a subsequent statute to construct a station and stop its trains
at a particular place on its road, said:
"If the directors of a railroad were to find it for the interest
of the stockholders to refuse to carry any freight or passengers
except such as they might take at one end of the road and carry
entirely through to the other end, and were to refuse to establish
any way stations, or do any way business for that reason, though
the road passed for a long distance through a populous part of the
state, this would be a case manifestly requiring and authorizing
legislative interference under the clause in question, and on the
same ground, if they refuse to provide reasonable accommodation for
the people of any smaller locality, the legislature may reasonably
alter and modify the discretionary power which the charter confers
upon the directors, so as to make the duty to provide the
accommodation absolute. Whether a reasonable ground for
interference is presented in any particular case is for the
legislature to determine, and their determination on this point
must be conclusive."
103 Mass. 254, 258.
Upon the same principle, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
compelled a railroad corporation to build a station at a specified
place on its road in accordance with an order of railroad
commissioners, expressly empowered by the statutes of the state to
make such an order, and to apply to the court to enforce it. Maine
Stat. 1871, c. 204;
Railroad Commissioners v. Portland &
Oxford Railroad, 63 Me. 270.
In
Southeastern Railway v. Railway Commissioners, a
railway company was held by Lord Chancellor Selborne, Lord Chief
Justice Coleridge, and Lord Justice Brett, in the English Court of
Appeal, to be under no obligation to establish stations at any
particular place or places unless it thought fit to do so, and was
held bound to afford improved facilities for receiving, forwarding,
and delivering passengers and goods at a station once established
and used for the purpose of traffic only so far as it had been
ordered to afford them by the railway commissioners, within powers
expressly conferred by act of Parliament. 6 Q.B. Div. 586, 592.
The decision in
State v. Republican Valley Railroad,
17
Page 142 U. S. 505
Neb. 647, cited in the opinion below, proceeded upon the theory
(inconsistent with the judgments of this Court in
Atchison
&c. Railroad v. Denver & New Orleans Railroad, and of
the Court of Appeals of New York in
People v. New York &c.
Railroad, above stated) that, independently of any statute
requirements, a railroad corporation might be compelled to
establish a station and to stop its trains at any point on the line
of its road at which the court thought it reasonable that it
should.
The opinions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, though going
further than those of most other courts in favor of issuing writs
of mandamus to railroad corporations, afford no countenance for
granting the writ in the case at bar. In
People v. Louisiana
& Nashville Railroad, 120 Ill. 48, a mandamus was issued
to compel the company to run all its passenger trains to a station
which it had once located and used in a town made a terminal point
by the charter, and which was a county seat, because the
corporation had no legal power to change its location, and was
required by statute to stop all trains at a county seat. In
People v. Chicago & Alton Railroad, 130 Ill. 175, in
which a mandamus was granted to compel a railroad company to
establish and maintain a station in a certain town, the petition
for the writ alleged specific facts making out a clear and strong
case of public necessity, and also alleged that the accommodation
of the public living in or near the town required, and long had
required, the establishment of a station on the line of the road
within the town, and the decision was that a demurrer to the
petition admitted both the specific and the general allegations,
and must therefore be overruled. The court, at pages 182-183 of
that case and again in
Mobile & Ohio Railroad v.
People, 132 Ill. 559, 571, said:
"It is undoubtedly the rule that railway companies, in the
absence of statutory provisions limiting and restricting their
powers, are vested with a very broad discretion in the matter of
locating, constructing, and operating their railways, and of
locating and maintaining their freight and passenger stations. This
discretion, however, is not absolute, but is subject to the
condition that it must be exercised
Page 142 U. S. 506
in good faith, and with a due regard to the necessities and
convenience of the public."
But in the latter case, the court also said:
"The company cannot be compelled, on the one hand, to locate
stations at points where the cost of maintaining them will exceed
the profits resulting therefrom to the company, nor allowed, on the
other hand, to locate them so far apart as to practically deny to
communities on the line of the road reasonable access to its use.
The duty to maintain or continue stations must manifestly rest upon
the same principle, and a company cannot therefore be compelled to
maintain or continue a station at a point when the welfare of the
company and the community in general requires that it should be
changed to some other point."
Page 570.
"The rule has been so often announced by this court that it is
unnecessary to cite the cases, that a mandamus will never be
awarded unless the right to have the thing done which is sought is
clearly established."
Page 572. And upon these reasons, the writ was refused.
Section 691 of the Code of Washington Territory of 1881,
following the common law, defines the cases in which a writ of
mandamus may issue as
"to any inferior court, corporation, board, officer, or person
to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station."
By the same code, in mandamus as in civil actions, issues of
fact may be tried by a jury; the verdict may be either general or
special, and if special, may be in answer to questions submitted by
the court, and material allegations of the plaintiff not denied by
the answer, as well as material allegations of new matter in the
answer not denied in the replication are deemed admitted, but a
qualified admission cannot be availed of by the other party except
as qualified. Sections 103, 240, 242, 694, 696;
Breemer v.
Burgess, 2 Wash.Terr. 290, 296;
Gildersleeve v.
Landon, 73 N.Y. 609. The replication filed in this case, not
being copied in the record sent up, may be assumed, as most
favorable to the defendant in error, to have denied all allegations
of now matter in the answer.
The leading facts of this case, then, as appearing by the
Page 142 U. S. 507
special verdict, taken in connection with the admissions,
express or implied, in the answer, are as follows: the defendant at
one time stopped its trains at Yakima City, but never built a
station there, and after completing its road four miles further to
North Yakima, established a freight and passenger station at North
Yakima, which was a town laid out by the defendant on its own
unimproved land, and thereupon ceased to stop its trains at Yakima
City. In consequence, apparently, of this, Yakima City, which at
the time of filing the petition for mandamus was the most important
town, in population and business, in the county, rapidly dwindled,
and most of its inhabitants removed to North Yakima, which at the
time of the verdict had become the largest and most important town
in the county. No other specific facts as to North Yakima are
admitted by the parties or found by the jury. The defendant could
build a station at Yakima City, but the cost of building one would
be $8,000, and the expense of maintaining it $150 a month, and the
earnings of the whole of this division of the defendant's road are
insufficient to pay its running expenses. The special verdict
includes an express finding (which appears to us to be of pure
matter of fact, inferred from various circumstances, some of which
are evidently not specifically found, and to be in no sense, as
assumed by the court below, a conclusion of law) that there are
other stations for receiving freight and passengers between North
Yakima and Pasco Junction, which furnish sufficient facilities for
the country south of North Yakima, which must include Yakima City,
as well as an equally explicit finding (which appears to have been
wholly disregarded by the court below) that the passenger and
freight traffic of the people living in the surrounding country,
considering them as a community, would be better accommodated by a
station at North Yakima than by one at Yakima City. It also appears
of record that after the verdict and before the district court
awarded the writ of mandamus, the county seat was removed pursuant
to an act of the territorial legislature from Yakima City to North
Yakima.
The mandamus prayed for being founded on a suggestion that the
defendant had distinctly manifested an intention not
Page 142 U. S. 508
to perform a definite duty to the public, required of it by law,
the petition was rightly presented in the name of the territory at
the relation of its prosecuting attorney,
Attorney General v.
Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 479; Code of Wash.Territory § 2171, and
no demand upon the defendant was necessary before applying for the
writ.
Commonwealth v. Allegheny Commissioners, 37
Penn.Stat. 237;
State v. Board of Finance, 38 N.J.Law 259;
Mottu v. Primrose, 23 Md. 482;
Attorney General v.
Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 477.
But upon the facts found and admitted, no sufficient case is
made for a writ of mandamus, even if the court could under any
circumstances issue such a writ for the purpose set forth in the
petition. The fraudulent and wrongful intent charged against the
defendant in the petition is denied in the answer, and is not found
by the jury. The fact that the Town of North Yakima was laid out by
the defendant on its own lands cannot impair the right of the
inhabitants of that town, whenever they settled there, or of the
people of the surrounding country, to reasonable access to the
railroad. No ground is shown for requiring the defendant to
maintain stations both at Yakima City and at North Yakima; there
are other stations furnishing sufficient facilities for the whole
country from North Yakima southward to Pasco Junction; the earnings
of the division of the defendant's road between those points are
insufficient to pay its running expenses, and to order the station
to be removed from North Yakima to Yakima City would inconvenience
a much larger part of the public than it would benefit, even at the
time of the return of the verdict; and, before judgment in the
district court, the legislature, recognizing that the public
interest required it, made North Yakima the county seat. The
question whether a mandamus should issue to protect the interest of
the public does not depend upon a state of facts existing when the
petition was filed if that state of facts has cased to exist when
the final judgment is rendered. In this regard, as observed by Lord
Chief Justice Jervis in
Great Western Railway v. The
Queen, already cited, "there is a very great difference
between an indictment for not fulfilling a public duty, and a
mandamus commanding the
Page 142 U. S. 509
party liable to fulfill it." 1 El. & Bl. 878. The court will
never order a railroad station to be built or maintained contrary
to the public interest.
Texas & Pacific Railway v.
Marshall, 136 U. S. 393.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the supreme court
of the territory must be reversed, and the case remanded with
directions to enter judgment for the defendant dismissing the
petition, and, Washington having been admitted into the union as a
state by act of Congress passed while this writ of error was
pending in this Court, the mandate will be directed, as the nature
of the case requires, to the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington. Act Feb. 22, 1889, c. 180, §§ 22, 23, 25 Stat. 682,
683.
Judgment reversed and mandate accordingly.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE FIELD and
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case.
The question is not whether a railroad company can be compelled
to build a depot and stop its trains at any place where are
gathered two or three homes and families, nor whether courts can
determine at what locality in a city or town the depot shall be
placed, nor even whether, when there are two villages contiguous,
the courts may determine at which of the two the company shall make
its stopping place, or compel depots at both. But the case here
presented is this: a railroad company builds its road into a
county, finds the county seat already established and inhabited,
the largest and most prosperous town in the county, and along the
line of its road for many miles. It builds its road to and through
that county seat. There is no reason of a public nature why that
should not be made a stopping place. For some reason undisclosed --
perhaps because that county seat will not pay to the managers a
bonus, or because they seek a real estate speculation in
establishing a new town -- it locates its depot on the site of a
"paper" town, the title to which it holds, contiguous to this
established county seat, stops only at the one, and refuses to stop
at the
Page 142 U. S. 510
other, and thus, for private interests, builds up a new place at
the expense of the old, and for this subservience of its public
duty to its private interests we are told that there is in the
courts no redress, and this because Congress, in chartering this
Northern Pacific road, did not name Yakima City as a stopping
place, and has not in terms delegated to the courts the power to
interfere in the matter.
A railroad corporation has a public duty to perform as well as a
private interest to subserve, and I never before believed that the
courts would permit it to abandon the one to promote the other.
Nowhere in its charter is in terms expressed the duty of carrying
passengers and freight. Are the courts impotent to compel the
performance of this duty? Is the duty of carrying passengers and
freight any more of a public duty than that of placing its depots
and stopping its trains at those places which will best accommodate
the public? If the State of Indiana incorporates a railroad to
build a road from New Albany through Indianapolis to South Bend,
and that road is built, can it be that the courts may compel the
road to receive passengers and transport freight, but, in the
absence of a specific direction from the legislature, are powerless
to compel the road to stop its trains and build a depot at
Indianapolis? I do not so belittle the power or duty of the
courts.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concur with me in this
dissent.
