In fixing the classification of goods for the payment of duties,
the name or designation of the goods is to be understood in its
known commercial sense, and their designation in the market will
control their classification without regard to their scientific
designation, the material of which they may be made or the use to
which they may be applied.
Gilling twine, when imported as gilling for the manufacture of
gill nets, is liable only to the duty of 25 percent under the Act
of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488.
Statements made in Congress by the promoters of a customs act
are inadmissible as bearing upon its construction, but the
proceedings therein may be referred to to inform the court of the
reasons for fixing upon a specific rate of duty.
Where a customs act imposes a duty upon an article by a specific
name, general terms in the act, though sufficiently broad to cover
it, are not applicable to it.
In cases of doubt in the construction of a customs act, the
courts resolve the doubt in favor of the importer.
Page 141 U. S. 469
This was an action against the collector of the port of Boston
to recover back certain duties upon gilling twine, paid under
protest. By written stipulation of the parties, the case was heard
by the court without a jury, and the following facts were
found:
"The plaintiff corporation, whose business is the manufacture of
fishing nets and seines, in the months of February, March, April,
and May, 1885, made seven different importations of gilling into
the port of Boston from Liverpool -- in all, forty-five cases. The
merchandise was invoiced and entered at the custom house as gilling
twine. Upon the appraisement by the custom house officials here,
the merchandise was classified as 'linen thread,' and the collector
assessed upon it a duty of forty percent
ad valorem. The
plaintiff in each instance paid the assessed duty under protest,
claiming that the article was dutiable at twenty-five percent
ad valorem as gilling twine. Upon appeals to the Secretary
of Treasury, the decisions of the collector were affirmed, and the
plaintiff then brought this suit to recover back the alleged
excess, which amounted on all the importations to $1,685.85. All
the proceedings in respect to the plaintiff's protests and appeals
were regular, and taken in due season, and this suit was commenced
within the time limited by law for bringing such suits. The
merchandise, after its importation, was used by the plaintiff in
the manufacture of gill nets, and was imported expressly for that
purpose."
"The article in question is No. 35 three-cord, unbleached linen
thread of superior quality, put up in half-pound balis, and was
manufactured by the Scotch firm of W. & J. Knox at their works
in Kilbirnie, Scotland. For more than twenty years, thread of this
description has been used by the plaintiff and other netmakers in
this country for the manufacture of gill nets, principally for the
fisheries on the great western lakes, the numbers of the thread
used for this purpose ranging from 10 to 60. For many years before
the Tariff Act of 1883, this kind of thread, of the manufacture of
W. & J. Knox and other foreign makers, was imported under the
name of 'gilling twine,' to be used in making gill nets, and was
invoiced and entered at the custom house under that name, and was
so designated
Page 141 U. S. 470
on price lists and trade circulars of the foreign makers. For
many years before the act, no other imported article was known by
the special name of 'gilling twine.' One of the custom house
officers testified that he never heard or knew of any other
imported article that was called 'gilling twine.'"
"On the other hand, the article is clearly not twine. It is not
suitable for the uses which twine is commonly put to. It is made of
flax from which the gum has been removed by boiling. It is
flexible, without the stiffness of twine, highly finished, capable
of being used for sewing, and is largely used for machine sewing in
many trades. It is not claimed by the plaintiff in this suit that
in a general sense it is anything else than linen thread, or that
it differs in material or quality or mode of manufacture from other
similar threads. For many years, linen thread of the same kind and
quality has been both imported from abroad and made here in large
quantities for many other purposes than for gilling. It is used by
boot and shoe makers, upholsterers, book-binders, saddlers, and in
many other trades as sewing thread. When imported for this purpose,
it is invoiced and entered as linen thread, and is so known in
commerce and designated on price lists and trade circulars. That
which is made here for these uses is known only as 'linen thread.'
It is also made here for gilling purposes, and in such cases is
invariably called 'gilling thread' -- never 'gilling twine.' Of all
that is made here or imported at least nine-tenths, and probably
nineteen-twentieths, is used for other purposes than as gilling. It
also appears that there is a large, coarse twine made of hemp,
which is imported under the name of 'salmon twine,' and is made
into nets for gilling salmon. This article seems never to have
acquired the name of 'gilling twine' in the trade. There is also a
cotton gilling twine which is made in this country, but never
imported."
Upon the foregoing facts, the court decided that the plaintiff
could not maintain the action, and ordered judgment for the
defendant, with costs.
The plaintiff thereupon sued out a writ of error from this
Court. The opinion of the court below is reported in 33 F. 826.
Page 141 U. S. 471
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The decision of this case depends upon the construction of the
Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488, c. 121. Schedule J of
this act, page 507, provides for a duty of 40 percent
ad
valorem upon
"flax or linen thread, twine, and pack thread, and all
manufactures of flax, or of which flax shall be the component
material of chief value, not specially enumerated or provided for
in this act,"
while a subsequent paragraph of the same schedule imposes a duty
of 25 percent
ad valorem upon "seines and seine and
gilling twine." The question is to which category, under the
finding of facts, these goods are to be assigned. We think the
following extract from the finding is decisive in favor of the
position taken by the plaintiff in error:
"For many years before the Tariff Act of 1883, this kind of
thread, of the manufacture of W. & J. Knox, and other foreign
makers, was imported under the name of 'gilling twine,' to be used
in making gill nets, and was invoiced and entered at the custom
house under that name, and was so designated on price lists and
trade circulars of the foreign makers. For many years before the
act, no other imported article was known by the special name of
'gilling twine.'"
It is a cardinal rule of this Court that, in fixing the
classification of goods for the payment of duties, the name or
designation of the goods is to be understood in its known
commercial sense, and that their denomination in the market when
the law was passed will control their classification without regard
to their scientific designation, the material of which they may be
made, or the use to which they may be applied.
Two
Hundred Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 430,
22 U. S. 438;
United States v. Casks of
Sugar, 8 Pet. 277;
Page 141 U. S. 472
Elliott v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137;
Curtis v.
Martin, 3 How. 106;
Arthur v. Morrison,
96 U. S. 108;
Swan v. Arthur, 103 U. S. 597;
Schmieder v. Barney, 113 U. S. 645;
Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U. S. 70;
Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U. S. 412.
It must be assumed that Congress, in imposing a duty upon
"gilling twine"
eo nomine, intended that some article used
for the purpose of manufacturing gill nets should pay duty as such,
and as the article in question is and was for many years before the
act was passed imported, invoiced, and entered at the custom house
under that name, and was so designated in price lists and trade
circulars, and was actually intended for use in the manufacture of
gill nets, and no other article was imported under that name, it
follows that it should be classified as such, notwithstanding it is
in fact linen thread, and, when intended for sewing purposes, is
invoiced and entered as linen thread.
The argument for the higher duty is based upon the finding that
the article is not twine, is not suitable for the purposes to which
twine is commonly put, because made of flax from which the gum has
been removed by boiling, and is flexible, without the stiffness of
twine, highly finished, capable of being used for sewing, and
largely used for machine sewing in many trades. It would seem to
follow from this that, in the opinion of the court below, twine
must be stiff, and contain a certain quantity of gum, as the most
ordinary form of twine for wrapping parcels undoubtedly does. But
these qualities are not essential to twine, which is defined by
Webster as
"a strong thread, composed of two or three smaller threads or
strands twisted together, and used for various purposes, as for
binding small parcels, making nets, and the like; a small cord or
string."
If in fact twine were necessarily stiff, and contained an
infusion of gum, there could be no such thing as "gilling twine,"
since, for the purpose of gill nets, linen thread must combine the
utmost possible flexibility of movement with lightness of texture,
strength, and invisibility. It is stated in the opinion of the
general appraisers at New York of December 4, 1980, referred to in
the brief of counsel, that
"the action of
Page 141 U. S. 473
the water would kink the hard twisted thread, and dissolve the
gum or sizing, thus rendering the nets made therefrom comparatively
worthless."
It should be so light as to float in the current, so fine and so
near the color of the water as to be invisible, and so strong that
when the fish are caught by the gills they are held by the tenacity
of the thread. It is undoubtedly thread, and the finding is that
home-made linen thread used for gilling purposes is invariably (and
more properly) called "gilling thread," never "gilling twine." We
are bound, however, to give some effect to the words "gilling
twine," and, if there be no other imported article of that name, it
follows conclusively that this must have been the article intended.
Nor is this inference greatly weakened by the fact that the article
is nothing less than linen thread, differing not in material,
quality, or mode of manufacture from other similar thread, that
nine-tenths of the thread so imported is used for other purposes
than gilling, and that when so imported, it is invoiced and entered
as linen thread, and is so known in commerce, and designated on
price lists and trade circulars.
It would appear from the Treasury reports and circulars to admit
of some doubt whether there is an absolute identity between the
thread used for gilling and that used for sewing, but it is not
necessary for us to determine whether the same duty should be
imposed, if the same article be imported for different purposes. Of
course this would follow only in case the two articles were
absolutely identical, and if, as found by the board of general
appraisers of New York, to which reference has already been made,
the difference between the two is so marked as to render them
easily separable, the question of identity would not arise. It was
found by them that the machine thread is a harder twist, and
contains more sizing, than the gilling, and that the former could
not be satisfactorily used for the manufacture of gill nets.
It is sufficient for the purposes of this case to hold that when
imported as gilling for the manufacture of gill nets, it is liable
only to the duty of 25 percent
While the statements made and the opinions advanced by the
promoters of the act in the legislative body are inadmissible
Page 141 U. S. 474
as bearing upon its construction, yet reference to the
proceedings of such body may properly be made to inform the court
of the exigencies of the fishing interests and the reasons for
fixing the duty at this amount.
Jennison v. Kirk,
98 U. S. 453,
98 U. S. 459;
Blake v. Bank,
23 Wall. 307,
90 U. S. 317;
Collector v.
Richards, 23 Wall. 246,
90 U. S. 258;
Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586,
120 U. S. 590;
United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, 91 U. S.
72,
91 U. S. 79. It
seems that the duty upon seines was originally fixed at six and
one-half cents per pound; when, upon representations of the
fishermen upon the lakes, who use seines and gill nets which are
only made of Scotch and Irish flax, and always from imported twine,
that they were suffering from the competition of Canadian
fishermen, who imported their twine free of duty, and found a ready
sale for their fish in American ports, also free of duty, an effort
was made to put seines and seine gilling twine on the free list,
but the matter was finally compromised by fixing the duty at 25
percent
ad valorem. Unless this be held to include the
thread of which these gill nets are actually made, the intention of
Congress will evidently be defeated.
While in the absence of a more specific designation this article
might properly be classed as "linen thread," it is a familiar rule
in revenue cases that where Congress has designated an article by a
specific name and imposed a duty upon it, general terms in the same
act, though sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are not
applicable to it -- in other words, the article will be classified
by its specific designation, rather than under a general
description.
Homer v.
Collector, 1 Wall. 486;
Arthur v. Lahey,
96 U. S. 112;
Arthur v. Stephani, 96 U. S. 125;
Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S. 144.
We think the intention of Congress that these goods should be
classified as "gilling twine" is plain, but were the question one
of doubt, we should still feel obliged to resolve that doubt in
favor of the importer, since the intention of Congress to impose a
higher duty should be expressed in clear and unambiguous language.
United States v.
Isham, 17 Wall. 496;
Hartranft v.
Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609;
Gurr v. Scudds, 11 Exch. 190.
Page 141 U. S. 475
The judgment of the court below will therefore be
Reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in
conformity with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY and MR. JUSTICE GRAY were not present at the
argument, and took no part in the decision of this case.
