Where a tax deed in Illinois is relied on as evidence of
paramount title, it is indispensable that it be supported by a
valid judgment for the taxes and a proper precept authorizing the
sale.
It is well settled in that state that a tax title is purely
technical, and depends upon a strict compliance with the statute,
and that the giving of the particular notice required by the
statute is an indispensable condition precedent to the right to
make a deed to the purchaser or his assignee.
The owner of land in Illinois sold for the nonpayment of taxes
or of special assessments is entitled to be informed in the
statutory notice whether the sale was for the nonpayment of a tax
or of such an assessment and a notice which informs him that the
sale was made "for taxes and special assessments, authorized by the
laws of the State of Illinois" is a defective notice.
The right of an occupant of land in Illinois sold for the
nonpayment of taxes or special assessments to personal notice of
the fact of sale before the time of redemption expires is expressly
given by the Constitution of Illinois, and is fundamental, and upon
a direct issue whether such notice was given, the owner testifying
that he did not receive notice, the evidence should be clear and
convincing that it was given as required by law before the tax
title can be held to be paramount.
The Court stated the case as follows:
The appellee, Bani, claiming to be the owner in fee and being in
the actual possession of lots 12 and 13 in block 2 of Lewis
Heintz's subdivision of 24 acres in the Town of Lake, Cook County,
Illinois, brought this suit December 6, 1883, for a decree setting
aside and declaring void three several tax deeds covering those
lots and which were held by the defendant, Asahel Gage.
It is alleged in the bill that the plaintiff derived title by
warranty deed from Peter Caldwell and wife, of date May 15, 1882,
the consideration being $3,000; that his purchase was without
notice of any adverse claim or title; that from the
Page 141 U. S. 345
27th day of April, 1868, until such purchase, Caldwell was the
owner in fee of the premises, with a complete title deducible of
record, and in actual and continued possession, under claim and
color of title, paying taxes thereon for a period of more than
seven years, and that prior to his purchase, to-wit, on the 27th of
March, 1880, the plaintiff took possession as Caldwell's tenant,
and in that capacity occupied the premises up to the date of the
deed to him, thereafter holding and occupying them as owner, under
claim and color of title, paying all taxes and assessments legally
made thereon.
The tax deeds held by Gage against which the bill was
particularly aimed were dated, respectively, July 3, 1880, June 30,
1880, and July 6, 1880. The one of July 3, 1880, was based upon a
judgment of the county court at its July term, 1877, for the amount
of the third installment of a special assessment, warrant 36,
assessed by authority of the Town of Lake, which, with interest and
costs, amounted to $6.98; the one of June 30, 1880, upon a judgment
for the fifth installment of South Park assessment for the year
1876, amounting, with interest and costs, to $3.38, and the one of
July 6, 1880, upon a judgment for state, county, and city taxes for
1876, amounting, with interest and costs, to $16.88.
The bill also alleges that the plaintiff, having learned for the
first time in March, 1883, of these tax deeds, immediately offered
to pay any sum reasonably necessary to cover all expenditures by
Gage for taxes, costs, and disbursements, together with interest
and penalties, if a quitclaim deed was made to him, and that Gage
refused such offer, pretending that the lots belonged to him.
The plaintiff, after setting out numerous grounds upon which he
assails the validity of these tax sales and deeds and renewing his
offer to reimburse the defendant for all sums paid on account of
taxes and assessments upon the property, with damages and
penalties, prayed that the tax deeds, which were fair upon their
face, be declared void and decreed to be surrendered for
cancellation.
The defendant pleaded in bar of the suit that on the 24th of
July, 1876, the County Clerk of Cook County, under the
provisions
Page 141 U. S. 346
of chapter 120 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, executed and
delivered a tax deed conveying to him, his heirs and assigns
forever the title to the lots in the bill mentioned, and that
afterwards, on the 3d day of August, 1876, that deed was filed for
record, and recorded in the proper office.
This plea was held to be insufficient, and the defendant, with
leave of the court, filed an answer, relying in support of his
claim to the lots on the tax deed of July 24, 1876, as well as
upon
"divers other good and sufficient tax deeds, all of which are
duly recorded in the recorder's office of Cook County aforesaid,
and are matters of public record, each of which is based upon a
valid judgment and precept."
The answer makes no express reference to the deeds of July 3,
June 30, and July 6, 1880
The plaintiff having paid into court the sum of $150 for the
defendant on account of tax sales, costs, and disbursements, taxes,
and interest, it was adjudged that he was the owner in fee of the
lots in question, and that the tax sales and deeds under which the
defendant claimed title were void.
By the statutes of Illinois in force when the sales were made,
upon which the tax deeds in question were based (Rev.Stats. 1889,
title Revenue, pp. 1145, 1146), it was, among other things,
provided:
"SEC. 216. Hereafter no purchaser or assignee of such purchaser
of any land, town or city lot at any sale of lands or lots for
taxes or special assessments, due either to the state or any county
or incorporated town or city within the same, or at any sale for
taxes or levies otherwise, by the laws of this state, shall be
entitled to a deed for the lands of lots so purchased until the
following conditions have been complied with, to-wit, such
purchaser or assignee shall serve or cause to be served a written
or printed or partly written and partly printed notice of such
purchase on every person in actual possession or occupancy of such
land or lot, and also the person in whose name the same was taxed
or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry he or she can be
found in the county; also the owners of or parties interested in
said land or lot, if they can, upon diligent inquiry, be found in
the county, at least three months
Page 141 U. S. 347
before the expiration of the time of redemption on such sale; in
which notice he shall state when he purchased the land or lot, in
whose name taxed, the description of the land or lot he has
purchased, for what year taxed or specially assessed, and when the
time of redemption will expire. If no person is in actual
possession or occupancy of such land or lot, and the person in
whose name the same was taxed or specially assessed, upon diligent
inquiry, cannot be found in the county, then such person or his
assignee shall publish such notice in some newspaper printed in
such county, and, if no newspaper is printed in the county, then in
the nearest newspaper that is published in this state to the
county-seat of the county in which such land or lot is situated,
which notice shall be inserted three times, the first time not more
than five months, and the last time not less than three months,
before the time of redemption shall expire."
"SEC. 217. Every such purchaser or assignee, by himself or
agent, shall, before he shall be entitled to a deed, make an
affidavit of his having complied with the conditions of the
foregoing section, stating particularly the facts relied on as such
compliance, which affidavit shall be delivered to the person
authorized by law to execute such tax deed, and which shall by him
be filed with the officer having custody of the record of the lands
and lots sold for taxes and entries of redemption in the county
where such lands or lots shall lie, to be by such officer entered
upon the records of his office and carefully preserved among the
files of his office, and which record or affidavit shall be
prima facie evidence that such notice has been given. Any
person swearing falsely in such affidavit shall be deemed guilty of
perjury, and punished accordingly."
"SEC. 219. At any time after the expiration of two years from
date of sale of any real estate for taxes or special assessments,
if the same shall not have been redeemed, the county clerk, on
request, and on the production of the certificate of purchase, and
upon compliance with the three preceding sections, shall execute
and deliver to the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, a deed of
conveyance for the real estate described in such certificate. "
Page 141 U. S. 348
"SEC. 225. Unless the holder of the certificate for real estate
purchased at any tax sale under this act takes out the deed, as
entitled by law, and files the same for record within one year from
and after the time for redemption expires, the said certificate or
deed, and the sale on which it is based, shall, from and after the
expiration of such one year, be absolutely null. If the holder of
such certificate shall be prevented from obtaining such deed by
injunction or order of any court or by the refusal of the clerk to
execute the same, the time he is so prevented shall be excluded
from the computation of such time. Certificates of purchase and
deeds executed by the county clerk shall recite the qualifications
required in this section."
These regulations were established in obedience to the fifth
section of article 9 of the Constitution of Illinois of 1870,
providing:
"The right of redemption from all sales of real estate for the
nonpayment of taxes or special assessments of any character
whatever shall exist in favor of owners and persons interested in
such real estate for a period of not less than two years from such
sales thereof, and the General Assembly shall provide by law for
reasonable notice to be given to the owners and parties interested,
by publication or otherwise, of the fact of the sale of the
property for such taxes of assessments, and when the time of
redemption shall expire,
provided that occupants shall in
all cases be served with personal notice before the time of
redemption expires."
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is not necessary to consider whether the defendant's plea was
or was not sufficient, for the facts alleged in it, namely the
execution by the county clerk to Gage of the tax deed of July 24,
1876, and the recording of that deed, are restated and relied on in
the answer, and no objection was made in
Page 141 U. S. 349
the court below to the answer upon the ground that it set up the
same matter presented by the plea. Story, Eq.Pl. ยง 688.
In respect to that tax deed, it appears that the sale upon which
it was based was made August 29, 1873. Did Gage serve or cause to
be served upon Caldwell notice of that sale, as required by the
statute? The notice presented to the county clerk at the time of
the application for a deed, and which Gage claimed was served
August 14, 1874, upon Caldwell personally, was as follows:
"To whom it may concern: This is to notify you that on the 29th
day of August, 1873, Henry H. Gage purchased, and afterwards
assigned the certificate of purchase to the undersigned at a sale
of lots and lands for taxes and special assessments authorized by
the laws of the State of Illinois, the following described real
estate, taxed in the name of Peter Caldwell, to-wit [here follows a
description of various lots, including those here in dispute] --
said taxes and special assessments were levied for the year 1872 --
and that the time of redemption thereof from said sale will expire
on the 29th day of August, 1875. ASAHEL GAGE."
It is plain upon the face of the statute that a purchaser at a
sale for taxes or special assessment is not entitled to a deed
until the conditions prescribed by section 216 are met, one of
those conditions being that the notice required to be served by the
purchaser or his assignee on every person in actual possession or
occupancy of the land or lot sold, and upon the person in whose
name the same was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent
inquiry he can be found in the county,
"shall state when he purchased the land or lot, in whose name
taxed, the description of the land or lot he has purchased, for
what year taxed or specially assessed, and when the time of
redemption will expire."
The notice that Gage claimed was served on Caldwell is radically
defective in that it did not show whether the sale was for taxes or
special assessments. It stated that the sale of 1873 was "for taxes
and special assessments." This precise question has been determined
by the Supreme Court of Illinois. In
Gage v. Waterman, 121
Ill. 115, 118, the court said:
"It might be of consequence to the land owner to know whether
his property was sold for a tax
Page 141 U. S. 350
or special assessment. This notice did not afford that
information."
In
Stillwell v. Brammell, 124 Ill. 338, 345, the notice
was of a "sale of lands, town and city lots, made pursuant to law,
. . . for the delinquent taxes and special assessments levied for
the year 1880." The court held this notice to be materially
defective, saying:
"There is a difference between a tax and a special assessment.
The notice above quoted fails to inform the land owner whether his
property was sold for a tax or a special assessment. It was
therefore defective under the ruling made in
Gage v.
Waterman, 121 Ill. 115. The title to be made under a tax deed
is one
stricti juris."
So, in
Gage v . Davis, 129 Ill. 236, 239, where one of
the questions was as to the validity of a notice given by the
assignee of a purchaser
"at a sale of lots and lands for taxes and special assessments,
authorized by the laws of the State of Illinois, . . . said taxes
and assessments were levied for the year 1872,"
etc., the court said:
"The notice above quoted fails to state whether the lots were
taxed or specially assessed. It does not inform the owner whether
his lots were sold for a tax or special assessment. It merely tells
him that his lots were sold at a general sale of lots and lands for
taxes and special assessments levied for the year 1872. The words,
'said taxes and special assessments were levied for the year 1872'
refer back to and define the sale at which the lots in question
were sold, but such words cannot be construed to mean that the lots
were sold on September 13, 1872, for both taxes and special
assessments."
This view is not at all affected by section 224 of the above
statute, declaring that deeds executed by the county clerk shall be
prima facie evidence in all controversies and suits in
relation to the right of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, of
the following facts: that the real estate conveyed was subject to
taxation at the time it was assessed, and had been listed and
assessed at the time and in the manner required by law; that the
taxes or special assessments were not paid before the sale; that
the estate conveyed had not been redeemed at the date of the deed,
was advertised for sale in the manner and
Page 141 U. S. 351
for the length of time required, and sold for taxes or special
assessments, as stated in the deed; that the grantee was the
purchaser or assignee of the purchaser, and that the sale was
conducted in the manner required by law. It has been uniformly
held, notwithstanding this section, that where a tax deed is relied
on as evidence of paramount title, it is indispensable that it be
supported by a valid judgment for the taxes and a proper precept
authorizing the sale.
Holbrook v. Dickinson, 46 Ill. 285;
Gage v. Lightburn, 93 Ill. 248, 252;
Pardridge v.
Village of Hyde Park, 131 Ill. 537, 541. So it must appear
that the purchaser at the tax sale or his assignee made the
affidavit required by section 217 as to the service of notice of
the tax sale.
Smith v. Hutchinson, 108 Ill. 662, 667;
Gage v. Caraher, 125 Ill. 447, 454. And when the notice is
produced, the question is necessarily open as to whether it was
such as section 216 prescribed before the purchaser is entitled to
a deed from the county clerk. The settled doctrine of the Supreme
Court of Illinois is that a tax title is purely technical, and
depends upon a strict compliance with the statute.
Altes v.
Hinkler, 36 Ill. 265, 267;
Marsh v. Chesnut, 14 Ill.
223;
Charles v. Waugh, 35 Ill. 315, 323;
Wisner v.
Chamberlin, 117 Ill. 568, 580;
Chappell v. Spire, 106
Ill. 472, 475;
Stillwell v. Brammell, 124 Ill. 338, 345.
It is as firmly settled that the giving of the particular notice
required is an indispensable condition precedent to the right to
make a deed to the purchaser or assignee.
Gage v. Bailey,
100 Ill. 530, 536;
Gage v. Schmidt, 104 Ill. 106, 109;
Gage v. Hervey, 111 Ill. 305, 308;
Gage v. Mayer,
117 Ill. 632, 636.
As the notice of the sale of 1873 was not in conformity with the
statute, Gage was not entitled to the deed of July 24, 1876, and it
is void.
The first of the deeds held by Gage which is referred to in the
bill is that of July 3, 1880. One of the contentions of the
plaintiff is that even if there was a valid judgment and precept
for the sale, that deed was issued without authority of law. The
county clerk issued it upon the showing made by the following
papers: 1. A notice of the tax sale, dated Chicago, April
Page 141 U. S. 352
21, 22, and 23, 1879, given by Asahel Gage, addressed
"To the owners or parties interested in the following described
lands and lots, and to the persons in whose names they were taxed
or specially assessed, and to whom it may concern,"
and published in the Chicago Daily Evening Journal on those
days. That document gave notice of the purchase by Asahel Gage of
the lots here in dispute on the 8th day of August, 1877 at a sale
"for taxes and special assessments authorized by and levied or
assessed in compliance with the laws of the State of Illinois,"
and
"taxed or specially assessed for the year 1874 for the third
installment of special assessment number 36 of the Town of Lake,
and the time of redemption of said land or lots from said sale will
expire on the 8th day of August, 1879."
The fact of the publication of that notice is supported by the
affidavit of the publisher of the paper referred to. 2. An
affidavit of the agent and attorney of the purchaser in which,
after setting out the above notice and its publication in the
newspaper, he states that
"Asahel Gage served or caused to be served written or printed or
partly written and partly printed notices of purchase at said tax
sale, as in other affidavits, hereto attached, more fully set
forth, on every person in actual possession or occupancy of such
land or lots, and also the person in whose name the same were taxed
or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry they could be found
in said county, and a reasonable notice was given to the owners or
parties interested in said land or lots at least three months
before the expiration of the time of redemption on such sale, and
that said notices stated when he purchased the land or lots, in
whose names taxed, the description of the land or lots he has
purchased, for what year taxed or specially assessed, and when the
time of redemption will expire. And this affiant says that he has
compared the affidavits hereto attached
with the original
memoranda of service of the respective parties making the same, and
that the same are correct according to the original memoranda of
service as aforesaid."
This affidavit states generally that Asahel Gage caused a
reasonable notice to be given to the owners or parties interested,
by publication or otherwise, of the fact of the sale of the
property described in the notice
Page 141 U. S. 353
attached for the taxes or assessments therein described, and
when the time of redemption would expire, and complied with all the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State of Illinois to
entitle him to a deed or deeds of conveyance. 3. Affidavit of
Charles P. Westerfield, made July 15, 1879, in which he describes
himself as agent of Asahel Gage and states that on the 5th day of
December, 1878, he served upon Peter Caldwell and Ann Caldwell, his
wife, by "handing the same to and leaving the same
with the
said Ann Caldwell personally," a copy of the notice annexed to
his affidavit; that
"the persons so served were the only persons in actual
possession or occupancy of said land or lots [the premises in
dispute] at least three months before the expiration of the time of
redemption;"
and that said lands or lots were taxed or specially assessed in
the names of "P. Caldwell and Peter Caldwell." 4. Affidavit of one
Bunker, made July 15, 1879, describing himself and stating that he,
as agent of Gage,
"on the dates mentioned in the foregoing affidavit, accompanied,
was present with, and witnessed, Charles P. Westerfield, on the
dates and at the several places as mentioned in the foregoing
affidavit, serve the notices above mentioned on the persons
mentioned in the above affidavit,"
and that "a copy of the annexed notice was served upon the said
persons at the times, places, and in the manner and form as stated
above." 5. Affidavit of Charles P. Westerfield, made July 15, 1879,
describing himself as agent of Asahel Gage, and stating that as
such agent he served, April 4, 1879, upon Peter Caldwell,
personally, a copy of the notice which was annexed. 6. Affidavit of
U. George Taylor, in the precise words of Bunker's affidavit,
except that Taylor states the service which he, as agent of Gage,
witnessed, occurred on the 4th of April, 1879. 7. One of the
notices annexed to the above affidavits was addressed, "To whom it
may concern," stated the purchase by Gage, on the 8th day of
August, 1877, "at a sale of lots and lands for taxes
and
special assessments authorized by the laws of the State of
Illinois, taxed in the name of P. Caldwell," of the lots in
controversy,
"taxed
or specially assessed for the year 1874 for the
third installment of special assessment number 36
Page 141 U. S. 354
of the Town of Lake, and that the time of redemption thereof
from said sale will expire on the 8th day of August, 1879."
The other notice differed from the first one only in stating
that the lots and lands sold were taxed in the names of P. Caldwell
and Peter Caldwell. 8. Certificates of sale of the two lots in
dispute to Asahel Gage.
In considering whether the purchaser was entitled, upon the
showing made by him, to the deed of July 3, 1880, we give no weight
to the notice published in the newspaper. The right of the
purchaser or his assignee to give notice in that mode of the tax
sale existed only when no person was in actual possession or
occupancy of the property sold, and the person in whose name it was
taxed or specially assessed could not, upon diligent inquiry, be
found in the county -- a condition of things which is not pretended
to have existed after 1868 up to the execution of the deeds in
question. Nor do we attach any value to the affidavit of
Westerfield, made July 15, 1879, as to the service on the 5th of
December, 1878, because that service was upon Peter Caldwell, by
handing the notice to his wife, and that is not stated to have been
done in the presence of the husband. The statute provides for
service upon every person in actual possession or occupancy of the
land, and also upon the persons in whose name it is taxed. If it be
proper or necessary under any circumstances to serve notice of the
sale upon the wife where the husband owns and occupies the land and
it is taxed in his name, no such circumstances are disclosed in the
present case.
As to the notice which Westerfield claimed to have served on
Caldwell April 4, 1879, it is doubtful under the decisions above
cited whether the obscurity arising from the words in each notice,
"taxes
and special assessments" and "taxed
or
specially assessed," is removed by the use of the words "for the
third installment of special assessment number 36 of the Town of
Lake." But, waiving that question, we are not prepared to hold that
the decree is erroneous so far as it sustains the plaintiff's
contention that there was in fact no service on Caldwell of notice
of the tax sale and of Gage's purchase. Caldwell testifies that he
was not at any time, to his knowledge,
Page 141 U. S. 355
served with notice of the tax sales of these particular lots.
The witness relied on to prove the contrary is Westerfield. He
states in his deposition, taken November 29, 1884, but not in the
presence of the plaintiff or of his attorney, and, so far as the
record shows, without notice to either, that on the 4th day of
April, 1879 -- more than five years before he gave the deposition
-- he served a notice of the tax sale of this property personally
on Peter Caldwell and wife. It is difficult to believe that he
could have remembered at the time he testified, in November, 1884,
the particular day in the spring of 1879 when he served such a
notice unless his memory was refreshed by some memorandum made at
the time by him or in his presence; but he does not state that he
made, or that he ever saw, any such memorandum. The deposition of
Caldwell was given before that of Westerfield, and it behooved the
defendant to show, if he could do so, that when Westerfield gave
the 4th of April, 1879, as the date of the service of the notice on
Caldwell, he was not guessing or giving merely his impressions. But
Westerfield was not asked whether he ever made or saw any
memorandum of the date of service, nor did he state how he was
able, apparently without hesitation or doubt, to fix the exact day
of such service, nearly six years before giving his deposition. It
may be that Westerfield based his statement upon the affidavit made
by him on the 15th day of July, 1879, but that affidavit was not
made contemporaneously with the alleged service, and is one showing
service only on Peter Caldwell, whereas in his deposition, he
testified that the service on the 4th of April, 1879, was on both
Caldwell and wife.
In this connection, there are some circumstances that are not
without interest. Taylor made an affidavit in support of Gage's
application for the deed, stating that he also was an agent of
Gage, was present "on the date and at the place as mentioned" in
Westerfield's affidavit, and witnessed the service of the notice
upon Caldwell "in the manner and form" as stated by Westerfield. A
witness so clear in his recollection, being one of the numerous
agents whom Gage seemed to have had in this business, ought to have
been required to give
Page 141 U. S. 356
his deposition, or some reason should have been given why he was
not produced as a witness. Of course, the defendant knew that
ex parte affidavits, filed to procure a deed, would not be
conclusive evidence in a suit between the owner of the land and the
holder of the tax title in respect to the notice of the tax
sale.
There is another circumstance not without weight. The agent and
attorney of Gage, in his affidavit in support of the application
for a deed, stated that there were then in existence "the original
memoranda of service of the respective parties making the same,"
and that the affidavits of Westerfield, Bunker, and Taylor were
correct according to such memoranda. He based that statement upon a
comparison by himself of the affidavits with the memoranda. But he
does not testify in the case as a witness, although he knew that
Caldwell, under oath, had denied service of notice as to the sale
of the particular lots here in dispute, and no such original
memoranda appear upon the notice returned. If such memoranda were
made by Westerfield, or in his presence, contemporaneously with the
service of the notice, and the court was informed by the record
that the statements in his deposition were made after his
recollection had been refreshed by examining them, there would be
ground to contend that Caldwell's statement was incorrect.
There is still another difficulty in the way of the defendant.
Caldwell having testified that he did not receive any notice of the
tax sale, and Westerfield being afterwards called as a witness to
show notice, there was no distinct reference by the latter to the
notice filed by Gage with the county clerk. Being asked whether "in
the spring, on or about the 4th of April, 1879," he "served a
notice of the tax sales of this property upon Peter Caldwell," he
replied: "On the 4th day of April, I served a notice personally on
Peter Caldwell and wife." Now what notice was this? The statute
required that the notice shall state certain facts, and that the
affidavit should state "particularly the facts relied on" as
showing compliance with the statute. Did the notice to which
Westerfield refers in his deposition meet these requirements?
He
Page 141 U. S. 357
does not so state. Was that notice the same as the one referred
to in his affidavit of July 15, 1879? We cannot tell from the
record. In determining the weight to be given to Westerfield's
deposition upon the issue as to whether notice was in fact given to
Caldwell, that deposition is not to be supplemented by his
ex
parte affidavit used in supporting Gage's application for a
deed, and to which in his deposition he makes no reference
whatever; so that upon the issue as to notice of the tax sale,
there is no proof whatever in this case in conflict with the
statement of Caldwell except the
prima facie evidence
furnished by the
ex parte affidavit of Westerfield made
July 15, 1879.
Under all the circumstances disclosed by the record, we are not
prepared to say that the court below erred if it proceeded upon the
ground -- as it may well have done -- that the proof failed to show
satisfactorily or with sufficient certainty such notice by the
purchaser or his assignee as the statute required before he could
receive a deed. The right of an occupant of land sold for the
nonpayment of taxes or special assessments to personal notice of
the fact of sale before the time of redemption expires is expressly
given by the Constitution of Illinois, and is fundamental, and upon
a direct issue as to whether such notice was given -- the owner
testifying that he did not receive notice -- the evidence should be
clear and convincing that it was given, as required by law, before
the tax title is held to be paramount.
The case as to the deeds of June 30, 1880, and July 6, 1880, is
substantially the same as that made in relation to the deed of July
3, 1880. What has been said in reference to the last-named deed
applies to the other two.
Other questions involving the validity of the tax title have
been discussed in the briefs or counsel, but, in view of the
conclusions reached upon other questions, they deed not be
examined.
Decree affirmed.
